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This study examines the market for British military expertise in the commercial 
security sector.  It focuses predominantly on people who have served in the armed 
forces, or worked closely with them in private security.  It is argued that the UK 
private military security sector forms a coherent social ‘field’ based around the 
commodification of military forms of capital through which the emotional reward 
of military style work can be re-experienced in civilian life. Using in-depth 
interviews, the study analyses the experiences of practitioners working across the 
field and explores the implications that this has for our understanding of the 
private security phenomenon. 
The study demonstrates how the private military security sector commoditises 
the emotionally reliable capacity to exercise coercive force inherent to the military 
habitus.  Thorough the exchange of this ‘military capital’, private military security 
replicates the more ‘offensive’ practices of state militaries.  These practices often 
sit in tension with the commercial imperative of the sector.  The experience of 
military service and transition into private security work is examined highlighting 
how the combat-oriented culture of elite military sub-units dominates the 
commercial security sphere, particularly in those ‘fringe areas’ of the field where 
transparency is limited and ethical boundaries ambiguous. The replication of 
these state-like practices in the civilian marketplace highlights paradoxes 
inherent to these forms of ‘security’.  This provides an opportunity for researchers 
to better understand our social construction of ‘security’ in its state and private 
forms.  The study explores how the ‘symbolic capital’ of state exceptionalism, 
possessed by veterans of ‘high policing’ Special Forces units, has been central to 
the evolution of the field, and provides indicative evidence of the opportunity this 
affords state and private elites to extend their capacity to exercise autonomy and 
control in a manner that creates new, ‘hybrid’ forms of sovereignty.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Overview 
Introduction and Research Aims 
Writing before the invasion of Iraq, Singer in his book Corporate Warriors (2003) 
observed that an undeniable change was taking place in the outsourcing of 
military activity to private companies.  He described the actions and influence of 
the Virginia based military consultancy MPRI on the outcome of the Bosnia conflict 
during the late 1990s, and the subsequent widespread engagement of outsourced 
military logistical functions during the Kosovo campaign of 1999.  While Singer 
began his investigation focusing on the outsourcing of functions previously the 
preserve of state military forces, his enquiries led him to conclude that ‘Private 
companies are now responsible for the provision of security in society on a scale 
not seen since the formation of state militaries in the eighteenth century’ (Singer, 
2003). 
This study seeks to develop the literature of private security by focussing on the 
market for British military expertise in the commercial provision of security.  It is 
concerned predominantly with people who have served in the armed forces, or 
those from other backgrounds who have worked closely with them, in private 
security.  Britain has been at the heart of the global private security phenomenon, 
and former British military personnel at the heart of these businesses (Singer, 
2003:12; Kinsey, 2006).  The British security industry has a number of 
characteristics that make it worthy of discrete study.  Britain has cultural 
traditions and norms relating to the use of coercive force in society that are 
distinct from those of the United States and other European countries.  The British 
armed forces were the first modern professional military to be formed in Europe 
and, although a state organisation, had its roots in the commercial imperatives of 
early modern colonialism; the British Navy emerging from a tradition of ‘for profit’ 
privateering in the mid-1600s to the 1800s; and the Army tracing its history, at 
least in part, to the commercial charters granted to the colonial trading companies 
(Kinsey, 2006:35-40).  Prior to the First World War, the main function of the 
British military had been the policing and security of Britain’s colonies. This 
tradition of policing did not emerge from the ‘Peelian’ mould of the domestic 
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British constabulary, but instead from the legacy of colonial mercantile 
adventures and, in particular, that of the British East India Company and its 
successor the ‘Raj’ administration (Phillips, 2016).  Thus, the institutional memory 
of organised violence in the pursuit of commercial interests could be seen to reside 
within the British military in juxtaposition with the more ‘statist’ tradition of 
Cromwell’s new model army (Chandler, 2003).  These traditions have sustained 
against the backdrop of post-war de-colonialisation (Harvey, 2005:55-56) and 
make the British tradition distinct from that of the United States, the other major 
player in the emergent private military security sector.   
Public attitudes in Britain towards the commodification of force, particularly 
where this is regarded to be reminiscent of the colonial past, heavily influence 
perceptions and attitudes towards private military security.  Indeed, the British 
transition to neoliberalism differs markedly (in process if not effect) from that of 
the United States and other nations (Harvey, 2005:55).  The British public have 
remained more sceptical than their US counterparts over the privatisation of key 
areas of state provision (Harvey, 2005:61).  The extent to which these societal 
attitudes influence actors in the private security field is key to understanding the 
nature of this fundamental change to our social landscape. 
It was the explosion of military style private security activity that accompanied 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003 that brought the private military security 
phenomenon fully to the attention of the public in Britain and America.  In this 
conflict there appeared something new and different about the extent to which 
civilian contractors were engaged in ‘security’ activity that was indistinguishable 
from the role that the public had previously understood to be the business of the 
military and police.  The scale and visibility of private security activity in Iraq 
inevitably became a focus of media attention.  Public disquiet grew, as evidence 
emerged that commercial organisations with the capability to wield lethal force 
were playing a major part in the project to stabilise Iraq following the downfall of 
Saddam Hussein.  This disquiet was not only the result of news articles that 
illustrated a range of dangerous and illegal behaviour being carried out by private 
security employees (Daily Mail, 2009; Der Spiegal, 2009), it spoke also to the sense 
that a longstanding societal norm was being breached; that private companies, 
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aligned to the maximisation of profit rather than patriotic duty, were taking over 
functions that even the most trenchant libertarian would, a decade earlier, have 
regarded as the sole preserve of the state.  This sense of dissonance was 
heightened further when, under the administration of George W. Bush, the same 
companies active in Iraq were commissioned to provide security on US soil in the 
wake of the devastating Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans (Scahill, 2005).  
Although Iraq may have been the ‘tipping point’ that brought the private security 
phenomenon to public consciousness, the transformation of the state’s 
relationship with those who were charged to provide ‘security’ in society had been 
happening in less spectacular ways for a number of years.   
The neoliberal reform agenda that took hold in both the UK and US during the 
1980s had, for some time prior to the Iraq war, been engaged in recalibrating the 
relationship between the citizen and the state.  The dogma of the market’s 
superior ability to distribute scarce recourses efficiently had been established as 
a central political narrative in response to the economic crises of the 1970s and 
ideological polarisation of the Cold War.  State-centred economic models came 
under ideological attack and state-interventionism in markets became associated 
with economic inefficiency.  With the ideology of market superiority established, 
the ‘old liberal’ ideas of the ‘laissez faire’ economy, where the state’s primary 
responsibility was to remove itself from untoward intervention in the private 
commercial sphere, was superseded by a new conception of the role of the state.  
Known as ‘neoliberalism’, this held that the state’s central function should be the 
active promotion and creation of markets, particularly in formerly state-
controlled areas of economic life (Harvey, 2005).   
The end of the twentieth century saw the creation of widespread programmes of 
privatisation.  While initially these programmes focused on the sale of state-
owned industries, very quickly neoliberal principles were being extended into a 
wide range of state-run services: transport, healthcare, housing, policing, criminal 
justice and the military all became the focus of initiatives to improve their 
efficiency through marketisation.  In so doing, this newly experienced 
commodification wrought profound change in a range of social activity 
inextricably tied to the manner in which the state exercised its governing function.  
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In turn, the state responded through the generation of new ways of governing the 
results of which were often surprising and paradoxical.  Scholars of 
‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 1979) observed that the ‘retreat’ of the state did not 
result in a weakening of ‘state-like’ influences in the lives of ordinary citizens.  
Instead, the functions of the state became dispersed and devolved throughout 
society, exercised by a host of ‘civil society’ organisations, including commercial 
companies, who found themselves with a newly adopted responsibility for 
controlling and influencing the behaviour of individuals (Rose, 1999; Rose and 
Miller, 2008; 2010). 
If the nature of government has become more complex in the neoliberal era, so has 
the nature of security.  Security has been a defining responsibility of nation states 
since their conception.  The act of providing security rests on the legitimate ability 
to use coercive force, a function over which, in the Weberian tradition, the state 
maintains a monopoly.  Foucault has argued this symbolic monopoly is so 
complete that attitudes to the modern state differ little from the deference paid to 
the Kings and Emperors of pre-modernity (Foucault, 1978:88–9).  Yet, as Adam 
White (2011:89) highlights in his examination of the political economy of private 
security, no state (or sovereign) has ever exercised ‘a perfect Weberian-style 
monopoly over the provision of security’.  Contemporary scholars of 
governmentality demonstrate that the political construction of hegemonic 
sovereignty afforded to the modern state is largely fictive; that the exercise of 
power has always been the result of a network of arbitration between a complex 
array of competing needs, advocated by social assemblages both public and 
private (Rose and Miller, 2010:274; Mann, 1988; Poggi, 1978; and Foucault 1980).  
Thus, the exercise of ‘rule’ has only ever been an attempt to guide, channel and 
direct an unwieldy collection of fractious interests towards a conclusion politically 
constructed as representing the ‘common good’.  The ambiguity of ‘governance’ is 
mirrored in the study of security in its various forms.  Singer argues that the 
modern state’s monopoly of both domestic and international force has been an 
‘historical anomaly’ (Singer, 2003:39) having only occurred over the last 200 
years, and that, even during this latter period, this proposed ‘hegemony’ is less 
clear cut than many of the political and social narratives of modernity would have 
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us believe.  He goes on to propose that there should be no expectation that ‘in the 
future’ organised violence would be restricted to the public realm. 
Since the end of the Second World War changes to the nature of state governance 
have been both mirrored and exacerbated by changes in the nature of conflict.  In 
her book New and Old Wars Mary Kaldor (2012) addressed the way in which a 
confluence of factors has served to alter the nature and behaviour of participants 
to contemporary violent struggles.  Globalisation and ethnic conflicts have blurred 
the distinction between the legitimate actions of nation states and those of private 
organisations including criminal groups.  In responding to this, the distinction 
between state policing and military activity has become indistinct and conflated.  
Kaldor proposes that these changes are simultaneously radical and regressive, 
avant-guard and antiquated.  In this she encapsulates the inherent tension in 
interpreting the growth of the private military security industry.  The 
anthropologist Joshua Woods concurs that the roots of the contemporary private 
security phenomenon can be seen in cultural models of non-state violence that 
have endured since the Middle Ages (Woods, 2010).  Thus, the question of the ‘real 
nature’ of modern private security is key to our understanding of the true nature 
of both contemporary conflict and neoliberal power.  In different interpretations 
what is happening in private security can be seen as both a substantive societal 
progression towards an inevitable ‘free market’ logic (Avant, 2005; Brooks, 
2000b, Stanger, 2009), or a social realisation of the true nature of sovereign 
power; evidence of the frailty of the Weberian myth of state hegemony and a 
return to pre-modern social behaviour.  This ambiguity between competing 
constructions of progress and regression make the definition of contemporary 
private security both problematic and imperative.   
The breadth and extent of the private security phenomenon has been rehearsed 
in a number of academic texts and industry surveys1.  While establishing the true 
 
1  Jones and Newburn (1995) described the extent of the privatisation of security in Britain in the 
1990s.  Brodeur (2010:255-283) analysed the available sources of data on private security, and the 
scale of the industry in European countries (including data provided by Morré (2004), Van Steden and 
Hubert (2005), Van Steden and Sarre (2007) and De Waard (1999)). Brodeur’s work includes statistics 
for the United Kingdom (2010:269) as well as international statistics. He identifies that, as of 2006, in 
Canada, South Africa and the United States private security employees considerably outnumbered the 
figure of public police, while in EU countries the growth rate of private sector security employees 
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scope of the industry remains problematic (Brodeur, 2010:258), it is clear that the 
number of commercial private security and military employees now eclipses that 
of state police and security employees in many developed nations.  Beyond the 
economic impact of the growth of private security, the phenomenon has 
profoundly changed the way that society views the commercial use of militarised 
techniques and practices by private sector actors.  This social change is most 
evident in the manner in which private security is now portrayed in popular 
culture.  Prior to the Iraq war of 2003 public perceptions of the private security 
employee were dominated by constructions of low skilled ‘watchmen’, unethical 
‘gangsters’ or nihilistic ‘hired guns’ (Livingstone and Hart, 2003).  Military activity 
by private participants was usually viewed through the prism of the Cold War era 
mercenaries presented in popular fiction and film such as the ‘Dogs of War’ (Irvin, 
1980) and ‘The Wild Geese’ (McLaglen, 1978).  However, since the Iraq War 
private military companies have become a staple of the entertainment industry - 
this includes a growing literature of private military memoirs (Shepherd, 2008; 
Fainaru 2008; Geraghty, 2007) journalistic accounts (Pelton, 2006), film (Loach, 
2011) and video games (Call of Duty, 2014; Blackwater, 2011).  While the cultural 
stereotype of the poorly paid ‘mall cop’ persists, the competent and often sinister 
figure of the private military contractor, once only an invention of dystopian 
science fiction writers, now populates a wide range of media space. 
While media representations of the private security actor are worthy of study in 
their own right, they are indicative of the breadth of social change that has been 
wrought in relation to privatised security and military activity.  Accepting parallels 
with public policing, the nature of these new forms of private security must, ‘be as 
much a matter of symbolism as of substance’ (Reiner, 2008:314).  Thus, media 
representations give us a key indicator of the extent to which the scope and 
 
outstripped that of public Police in all jurisdictions.  In the Small Arms’ Survey of 2011, Nikolas 
Florquin (2011) estimated that the private security industry employs between 19.5 and 25.5 million 
employees globally (ibid:101) and utilises1.7-3.7 million firearms (ibid:116). The CoESS (Confederation 
of European Security Services) 2011 report demonstrated growth in the numbers of private security 
employees in almost all European jurisdictions between 2008 and 2011 (CoESS, 2008; 2011) and 
assessed that by 2013 the United Kingdom hosted 2500 security companies employing 364,586 
employees.  The Sector had annual revenues of €3,970 million, with one security officer to 170 
inhabitants by comparison to 1 State Police Officer to 382 inhabitants (CoESS, 2013; 2015:24). This 
figure does not include in-house services or those working internationally in areas of the private 
security field where UK security qualifications may not be required. 
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breadth of ‘that which is socially conceivable’ in the private security realm has 
been extended.  This extension has created new opportunities for those working 
in the private military security sector.  Indeed, the identification and development 
of new areas where military capacities can be commoditised remains a constant 
focus for those involved in the ‘business’ of private military security.  Thus, while 
it cannot be maintained that the attitudes and actions of the private security 
practitioner (or ‘contractor’, or ‘business-person’ or ‘entrepreneur’ etc.) are the 
unique determinant of the industry’s evolution and development, they are central, 
and of critical importance.  The role that these private purveyors of force play in 
the creation of these new ‘opportunities’, and in the extension of their ‘field’ 
(Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977) of activity, is the subject of this study.  
The expansion of private forms of policing and military activity has only recently 
become the subject of a unified field of scholarship (Abrahamsen and Leander, 
2016:4-6) with researchers adopting different positions as to the nature and effect 
of this emergent industry.  For some it represents an existential threat to our 
democracy (Silverstein, 1997), for others a humanitarian opportunity (Brooks, 
2000b) and, for the majority, a complex and unrestrained experiment the eventual 
outcome of which is highly contingent (Petersohn, 2015) and clouded with 
uncertainty (Avant, 2005; Abrahamson and Williams, 2011). Despite this 
uncertainty, there is a consensus reflected in the literature that private sector 
military and security activity is ‘here to stay’ (Krahmann, 2010a:11; Singer, 
2003:230; Kinsey 2006:151, Chesterman and Lehnardt. 2007:forward).  Yet, the 
industry itself stubbornly defies classification (Kinsey 2006:9; Carmola, 2010; 
Berndtsson, 2012); its fluid structure and ever evolving service offerings respond 
to a host of factors: economic, political, jurisdictional, regulatory and market 
related (Avant, 2005).  While a number of taxonomies of the sector have been 
attempted many of these reflect understandings more closely linked to 
epistemological concerns than to the lived experience of this emergent 
phenomenon. 
Thus, the question remains what is the nature of these new forms of private 
security? Are the changes that we have witnessed indicative of a regressive trend 
towards the instability and inequity of the pre-modern mercantile violence 
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(Cerny, 1998); or does the growth of privatised forms of security represent a 
welcome, liberal pluralisation of the control of coercive force that, if sufficiently 
‘anchored’ (Loader 1997a, b, c; Loader and Walker 2007), will assist in 
distributing security more effectively in society?  Sitting at the heart of this 
question is the identity of the private security actor themselves.  How do they 
make the choices they make in the course of their work?  How do they interpret 
the legitimacy (or otherwise) of their actions and profession?  Do they see 
themselves as soldiers, as police officers, as business people, or as something that 
pre-dates and/or transcends these modern constructions of role and identity?  Do 
private security actors consider their work a practical extension of the Liberal 
state (Krahmann, 2010a), or are they purist market actors (Avant, 2005)? Are they 
criminals operating with a cloak of legitimacy (Rothe and Ross, 2010), or humanist 
saviours of a dysfunctional global order (Brooks, 2000a)?  Does private security 
challenge the power of the state (Silverstein, 1997), reinforce it, or change it to a 
new normative condition the impact of which is yet to be fully realised?  What can 
we learn about the industry and its development by focusing on private security 
actors? 
In this thesis I sought initially to provide an insight into these questions through 
the examination of a group of people involved in work for private companies 
engaged in the type of activity that had become the focus of public attention; 
security work in hostile environments.  I identified the existence of a ‘field’ of 
private military security which coalesced around the possession of certain types 
of skills and competences, predominantly acquired in military service, and which 
afforded those active in the field a sense of community and shared endeavour.  As 
the research progressed, the centrality of military service to participation and 
conduct within the field became clear, as did evidence that the activity of those 
working in the field extended across wide portfolio of security related services.  
These practices were enacted both internationally and domestically, and included 
activity where the potential for physical violence varied considerably, but where 
the enactment of alternative forms of control and coercion could have a significant 
social impact nonetheless (see Chapter 8 on covert surveillance).  The result is a 
portrait of a community of practice, predominantly, but not exclusively 
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constituted of British military veterans, whose business has become the sale of 
forms of military expertise in the private security market.  My thesis explores how 
this community is constituted, the range and nature of activity its members 
undertake, and how members of this community make the defining decisions 
between behaviours and actions they deem acceptable, and those which fall 
beyond the norms of accepted practice in the field.  Through this it has been 
possible to theorise this area of private military security provision, and to examine 
the implications that this may have on our understanding of security in its 
commercial, state and ‘hybrid’ dimensions. 
Research Questions 
In pursuit of the broader questions outlined above, my empirical work focussed on 
the micro level and, initially, asked the following questions:  
• How did the interviewees socially construct the area of private security 
activity in which they were engaged? How did they interpret the role and 
constitution of this private security activity within the broader 
society/societies? 
• How did interviewees construct the lived experience of their work in 
private security? What factors influenced this construction? 
• How did the interviewees construct social boundaries between normative 
and transgressive behaviour in their working environment.  What factors 
influenced these constructions of transgression and normativity? 
As the centrality of military identity to the ‘field’ of private military security activity 
emerged, so the following research questions were incorporated: 
• How did interviewees construct the experience of transition between their 
former state/military work and their work in the private security? 
• How did interviewees socially construct their experience of state/military 
service? Who did they perceive themselves to have been, how did they 
perceive the organisations in which they served, which of these factors 
were key to their transition to, and practice in private security? 
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Through these questions I aimed to gain an understanding of who participated in 
military private security, how they participated, why they participated, and to 
develop theory that could provide an indicative insight into broader questions 
relating to the impact of private security on society.   
Private Security Studies: Posing Questions About Private Force in Society 
The growth of private forms of security in the post-Cold War era has given rise to 
a growing societal, and academic, focus on this emergent industry.  In recent years 
this has coalesced into a combined field of scholarship known as private security 
studies (PSS).  Private security studies began to emerge in the 1990’s, and 
developed during the first decade of the new millennium (Van Meegdenburg, 
2015; Abrahamsen and Leander, 2016:4-6).  This field represents the convergence 
of a number social science epistemologies, many of which already had a cross-
disciplinary character.  Criminologists examine policing in its public and private 
forms; International Relations scholars and conflict researchers, the global impact 
of new forms of private military and constabulary activity.  Legal scholars and 
political scientists focus on governance and control over the use-of-force by 
private companies.  Sociologists explore the impact of privatisation on military 
organisation and ethics, and scholars of gender and race examine the manner in 
which the commodification of coercive force may reinforce, or exacerbate, societal 
inequalities.   
Until their convergence in the field of private security studies, epistemologies 
dealing with policing and the military had remained somewhat separate in 
character.  This was a legacy of the Westphalian system of nation states, and the 
rise of national citizenries in the 19th Century (Singer, 2003).  Together these 
factors had created the modern ‘Weberian’ status-quo that, throughout the 19th 
and 20th Centuries, saw nation states draw an increasingly clear distinction 
between the ‘constabulary’ nature of coercive force exercised on domestic 
citizens, and the ‘military’ nature of force used on the state’s external enemies.  
This bifurcated the academic disciplines that addressed the use of coercive force 
by states in the domestic (policing) and international (military) spheres.  Despite 
some early attempts (Mannheim, 1941), criminology struggled to conceptualise 
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state military conduct in international conflict as falling within a realm where it 
could be analysed through a criminological lens. Crime, it appeared, pre-supposed 
functioning societal norms against which transgression could be measured; 
circumstances that the condition of ‘war’ negated (Jamieson, 1998).  In the early 
years of the new millennium the coherence of this ‘modernist’ consensus began to 
break down, with the visible emergence (or resurgence) of forms of hybrid 
state/non-state violence particularly in the Balkans (Haagen and Greer, 2002).  
This has led to calls for war itself to be addressed by criminologists in a similar 
manner to corporate and state crimes (Ruggiero, 2009).  Thus, as scholars across 
a number of disciplines have turned their gaze to the transformation of states and 
conflicts, the theoretical praxis of private security studies has begun to emerge. 
In more recent years, with the acceleration of interconnected networks of global 
communication and commerce, security has become increasingly de-coupled from 
the traditional constraints of modern nationhood (Cowan, 2014:10).  As the ‘oil-
shocks of the 1970s’ accelerated the push for an expansion of the extractive 
industries into areas of political instability (Abrahamsen and Leander 2016:2), 
neoliberal financial reforms and the end of Cold War caused the restructure and 
depletion of traditional state provision in all its forms.  Simultaneously military 
technological advancement accelerated as state funding of standing armies 
reduced (Krahmann, 2010a).  Through these transitions the stage was set for 
private security and military activity to (re)emerge into the public realm.  With 
this has come concerns that a traditional social order that held private actors as 
peripheral or subordinate to state authorities in matters of security was being 
overturned (Livingstone and Hart, 2003, Jones and Newburn, 1998).  In turn, this 
engendered a divergence between the way in which private security actors, many 
of whom are former employees of state military, policing and security agencies, 
saw themselves, and the way in which they were portrayed in public discourse 
and media.  (Kruck and Spenser, 2013).  This tension exists at a number of levels, 
political, legal, practical and theoretical, and forms the territory of many 
contemporary debates on private security. 
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Private Security and Ethics 
Many of the tensions engendered by the (re)emergence of private force in society 
are ethical in nature.  In the literature, there are three broad positions (Alexandra, 
Baker and Caparini 2008:1-2).  On one end of the spectrum are those who consider 
that the private provision of forms of security previously considered the sole 
responsibility of the state, does not itself generate an insurmountable ethical 
conflict.  This literature sees the ethical challenges of private security as ‘merely 
apparent’ (ibid:1), that the fictive nature of the state’s monopoly over the use-of 
force in society meant that, substantively, it mattered little whether coercion was 
enacted by the state, or on its behalf by private actors (Frost, 2006:43-55).  A 
middle ground of ethical opinion sees the conflict between the public and private 
as real, but potentially resolvable as social attitudes towards security change.  
Finally, there are those who consider the conflict to be enduring; that tight 
regulation of the private use-of-force, with the restriction, or even prohibition of 
many types of private security and military activity, is the only sustainable 
outcome to the challenge that the industry poses to the coherence of national 
sovereign integrity.  At their heart these ethical positions rest on the extent to 
which observers see the state as uniquely virtuous, and the act of challenging or 
restructuring the state’s perceived monopoly over the legitimate use of force as 
innovative or transgressive.   
Critical scholars have erred towards a position that sees private military security 
as inherently un-ethical, operating within a ‘terrain of unaccountability’ (Rothe 
and Ross, 2010) that makes the industry uniquely susceptible to transgressive and 
harmful practice (Loader and Walker, 2007; Rothe, 2006; Rothe and Mullins, 
2011; Leander, 2010) and that renders it fundamentally illegitimate in its conduct 
(Hall and Bierstecker, 2002).  At the other end of the spectrum functionalist 
scholars hold that private military security provides practical answers to the 
moral problems created by the complexities of international politics (Shearer, 
1998; Brooks and Chorev, 2008:116-130).  Increasingly, the literature of private 
security ethics appears to be moving towards a synthesis; Baker and Pattison 
(2012) make a ‘principled case’ for the use of private military companies in 
humanitarian crises and Carmola proposes that private military security has 
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adopted ‘frontier ethics with a cosmopolitan goal’ (2010:133-154) with the 
implication that ostensibly un-ethical means may achieve ethical aims.  McFate 
(2016a:65) analyses state and private security actions through an increasingly 
symmetric ethical paradigm, proposing that in Iraq both state and private armed 
groups have demonstrated a similar capacity for wrongdoing and excessive force.  
Brauer (2008) focuses on function, arguing that ‘at issue is not how a force is 
organised (public or private), but how organized the force is’.  This thesis takes 
these concepts forward by directly exploring how military identities, created in 
the service of the state, manifest in the commercial market for force and what this 
tells us about both state and privatised forms of coercive violence and control. 
This landscape of contested definitions, tension between public perceptions and 
industry self-image, and fault-lines in perceived ethics and legitimacy, serves to 
illustrate that private security is a field of both contestation and arbitration.  While 
functionalist theories of private security emphasise the importance of state 
executives as the ‘principal’ actors determining the sector’s development 
(Cockayne, 2007), in this thesis I propose that industry practitioners are not 
passive participants in this process. There is mounting evidence that practitioners 
shape the way in which the sector, and the security challenges with which it is 
engaged, are perceived and understood (Leander 2005; Berndtsson, 2012; 
Joachim and Schneiker, 2012b).  Leander talks of the ‘epistemic’ power of the 
private security actor to define the nature of, and solution to, security problems 
(Leander, 2005:805).  Both Cutler (2010) and Krahmann (2012) have observed 
the effect that practitioners’ subjective understandings of their work and identity 
has on the projection of legitimacy surrounding their actions.  Cutler’s work in 
particular shows the extent to which the narratives of private security ‘experts’ 
act to legitimise private forms of governance.  As such, the manner in which 
security practitioners understand the world of their work (Franke and von 
Boemcken, 2011), the modes of discourse they use (Berndtsson, 2012; Higate, 
2012a; Joachim and Schneiker, 2012a) and the ‘social construction’ of their role 
(Krahmann, 2012:347) influence the trajectory and evolution of the sector. 
Practitioners’ understanding of their work was not created solely by their 
experience in private security.  As the centrality of military experience emerged in 
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the narratives of my interviewees, so the literature of civil military relations (and 
military sociology in particular) became foundational to my understanding of the 
effect that military identity had on the practices of private security.  Similarly, as 
evidence emerged that military private security companies were involved in 
activities that closely resembled domestic policing, so the literature of policing and 
private policing became seminal.  It is to these that I now turn before recapping 
current theories in private security studies. 
Military Culture: Within or Beyond Society? 
This research substantively links the practice, structure and evolution of private 
military security with the identity of the soldier, created in the service of the state 
and brought forward into the realm of commercial security.  Here the literature of 
civil military relations provides a starting point for examining and understanding 
the people and organisations charged with the application of military force.  
Caforio (2003) notes that this tradition has its roots in the philosophical and 
historical works that informed the modern understanding of the nature of the 
military in society – Tocqueville (1990a and b), Liebknecht (1907), Vagts (1959) 
and Jaurês (1916) - and has spawned two areas of intellectual endeavour: conflict 
and security studies (e.g. Allison, 1971, Betts, 1977, 1999 in Caforio 2003) and 
military sociology.  The latter examines control over the use-of-force in society by 
military organisations, and provides a foundational paradigm for interpreting the 
identity of the soldier, and the extent to which their violence is integrated with 
referent social values.  This, in turn, determines the manner in which privatisation 
affects the ‘integration of violence’ with referent social values in the private realm 
(Avant 2005:43). 
Sociologists have long been concerned with the relationship between society and 
those using force as part of society’s ordering process.  The sociology of the 
military emerged as a by-product of the attempt, initially by American scholars, to 
improve military effectiveness and define the role of the military in a changing 
post-war society (Caforio, 2003:65).  This body of work has become known as the 
‘functionalist paradigm’ (Ouellet, 2005:8) or the ‘American School’ (Caforio, 
2003:15) of military sociology.  These core works date back to the 1950s and 
1960s and were produced by sociologists working within military and 
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government organisations, such as the US Rand Corporation (Janowitz, 1960, 
1971, 1975; Huntingdon, 1957; Finer, 1962; Stouffer, 1949).  The focus of this 
early research was the relationship between the state and its military, and 
reflected the concerns of an establishment struggling with the transition from the 
citizen armies of the Second World War to the post-war model of the smaller 
professional military.  Within this school, an understanding of the military ‘self’ 
had been explored through two dominant paradigms: The first, focussing on the 
conceptualisation of the role and identity of (initially) officers within the armed 
forces based upon their exposure to different operational practices; the second 
addressing the nature of the military institution itself and, by extension, the effect 
of military service on individual and collective identity. 
Huntingdon in his work ‘the Soldier and the State’ (1957) was the first modern 
scholar to define the military officer corps as a ‘profession’2.  He proposed that 
military officers represented a separate societal ‘caste’ responsible for the 
commission of specific acts that fell outside the societal norm; the ‘direction, 
operation and control of an organisation whose primary function is the 
application of violence’ (Caforio, 2003:16).  This professional class was defined by 
its overarching purpose (the effective destruction of the enemies of the state) and 
was possessed of a collective identity, a ‘warrior culture’, deliberately distinct 
from civilian cultural values (Huntingdon, 1957; 1963).  This view came to define 
one side of sociological debate on the nature of the military.  The political theorist 
Finer (1962) was later to develop and refine Huntingdon’s argument.  He 
emphasised both the ‘separateness’ of the military and the necessity that it be fully 
controlled by civilian authorities, lest it become a danger to the state that it 
purported to protect.  Thus, Finer argued, an effective military was one that, while 
separate from the society it protected, was politically subordinate to civilian 
control. 
Maurice Janowitz, a sociologist with a grounding in both American pragmatism 
(Dewey, 1909) and in the Chicago School of sociological research, demurred from 
 
2 Huntingdon argues that the activity of state military officers should be considered a ‘profession’ due 
to the characteristics of ‘expertise, responsibility and corporateness’ (summarized in Caforio, 
1998a:15) that distinguish this area of military activity from the purely ‘occupational’. 
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Huntingdon’s liberal view.  He argued that the efficacy of the military was a 
function of the extent to which its values were representative of the values of civil 
society.  This view was grounded in a republican political ideology, but rejected 
the grand institutional approach proposed by Huntingdon (Janowitz, 1960).  
Through his understanding of Mead’s (1934) symbolic interactionism, Janowitz 
recognised the reflexive manner in which social systems developed and affected 
one another.  He proposed that an effective military was one that was socially 
aligned to its parent society’s expectations regarding the legitimate use-of-force.  
Through his analysis of a large group of elite military officers3, Janowitz proposed 
a convergence between the civil and military spheres.  He considered that 
demographic changes in military recruitment increased the extent to which the 
military reflected civil society.  This dynamic, coupled with the increasingly 
technological nature of warfare, led to a ‘managerialism’ that, by the 1980s was 
showing signs of having civilianised the military establishment.   
Janowitz’s conception of the military, and the military person, was defined by his 
recognition of the changing nature of the military role after the Second World War 
and the challenge that this posed to traditional military values and identity.  In The 
Professional Soldier (1960) he identified the increasingly ‘constabulary’ nature of 
military operations and proposed that the growing engagement of the military in 
non war-fighting activity necessitated a departure from traditional military 
values4 (activity he defined in his work as Operations Other Than War, or OOTW).  
Caforio describes this transition as a form of ‘professional identity crisis’ (Caforio, 
2003) for the military, noting the low regard in which the American military held 
constabulary activity.  Importantly, Janowitz made the distinction between 
military personnel who retained traditional military values, based on the historic 
‘warrior’ identity, and those for whom accommodating the ‘constabulary concept’ 
created a new type of professional identity better oriented to the complex 
 
3 Janowitz surveyed 760 United States military generals and admirals and 576 military officers from 
the Pentagon destined for senior positions in military decision-making.  Additionally, he conducted 
interviews over one hundred high-level officers. 
4  Caforio summarises the character of the new ‘constabulary force’ described by Janowitz as one in 
which a the military was maintained in circumstances of continual preparedness to act, as opposed to 
continual engagement in action, and where the organisation was oriented to the use of minimum 
force to achieve the aims of international relations, rather than the destruction of the enemies of the 
state to achieve a ‘victorious’ outcome (Caforio, 2003:67) 
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challenges of peacekeeping and increasingly convergent with the values of the 
parent society5 
Typology: Warrior and Peacekeeper 
 
(Reproduced from Caforio 2003:75) 
The concept of the civilianisation of the United States military was taken forward 
by Charles Moskos, a professor of sociology at Northwestern University, a former 
combat engineer and a consummate US military ‘insider’6.  Moskos explored the 
extent to which the adoption of civilian practices in the US military had led to a 
convergence with civilian values.  Through an examination of a range of factors 
including free market recruitment and the modification of military practice to 
ensure the retention of labour, Moskos developed the civilian ‘occupation’ and 
military ‘institution’ paradigm for understanding the unique character of military 
service.  He proposed that the post-war military establishment was adopting a 
more ‘occupational’ character.  In his examination of the ‘postmodern military’ 
Moskos (2000:21) highlighted an increased reliance on civilian contractors as 
contributing to this trend.  However, more recently scholars of strategic studies 
have argued that advances in military technology and the decline of the mass 
military conscription of the modern era (Krahmann 2010a:9) have not 
unambiguously resulted in a ‘civilianisation’ of the military ethic.  Instead the 
 
5 Larson (1974:57) juxtaposes Huntingdon and Janowitz’s approach stating ‘Huntingdon Proposed 
apolitically neutral profession, isolated from society and concerned with the efficient achievement of 
victory without regard to non-military considerations.  Janowitz proposed a politically sensitive 
profession integrated with the society and concerned with the measured use of force to achieve 
viable international relations.’ 
6 Moskos was responsible for the development of the ‘don’t ask don’t tell’ policy in relation to 
homosexuality in the US military implemented by the Clinton administration in 1993. 
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‘professionalisation’ of military service has reinforced its cultural ‘otherness’.  At 
the same time the privatisation of functions previously carried out by the military 
has served to ‘militarise’ civil society with little corresponding ‘civilianisation’ of 
the military (Cohen, 1985; 2010).   
Typology: Institutional and Occupational 
 
(Reproduced from Moskos, 1986:78) 
The British Context 
The British military has experienced a similar challenge to traditional notions of 
military identity as that of their US counterparts.  The Cold War saw a decline in 
the commitment of the British Army to active war-fighting operations.  The uneasy 
standoff between the Warsaw Pact and NATO meant that, while war-fighting 
capability was maintained through exercises and training, it was rarely put into 
practice.  The geopolitical constraints of the Cold War saw the military’s active 
operational role re-orient towards peacekeeping, counter-insurgency and 
counter-terrorist operations (especially in Northern Ireland).  By the 1980s this 
trend was sufficiently embedded to require incorporation into formal military 
doctrine.  This was achieved through the conceptualisation of Military Operations 
Other than War (MOOTW) that encompassed, peacekeeping, military aid to civil 
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powers (MACP) and peace support operations (PSO).  These new types of 
operations were formally incorporated into British military practice in the ‘Dobbie 
Doctrine’ in 1994 (Dobbie, 1994)7.  This institutional re-orientation was indicative 
of the fact that, while there were clearly differences in the experience and culture 
of military organisations, the United Kingdom faced a similar process of transition 
to that witnessed by Janowitz in the United States. 
As the Cold War ended and the British Armed forces emerged into the era of the 
‘peace dividend’, conventional war looked to be a declining military priority.  
However, with the re-emergence of geopolitical instability in the post-Cold War 
era, ‘constabulary’ missions assumed a new importance for the military.  The 
armed forces increasingly found themselves responsible for the governance of 
post-conflict environments in successive eras of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and 
‘regime change’.  Thus a range of low-intensity military action, incorporating the 
mission types identified by Dobbie, and including a wide range of operations short 
of full scale conventional war-fighting, were encompassed under the umbrella of 
‘Stability and Support Operations’. The conduct of this type of operation has 
become central to the development of private military security. 
The tension between traditional ‘warrior’ cultures and the contemporary trend 
towards more complex constabulary operations has been reflected in scholarship 
(Reed and Segal, 2000).  In their study of European Armies, Caforio and Nuciari 
(1994) look beyond traditional warrior and peacekeeper identities to propose the 
existence of third category; that of the ‘flexible officer’. This new identity describes 
a military professional who displays elements of both the warrior and 
peacekeeper orientations.  Simultaneously this literature provides us with 
evidence that repositories of ‘warrior’ culture continue to exist within the broader 
military organisation, particularly within elite, combat oriented sub-units 
(Thomas and Rosenzveig, 1982; Thornborrow and Brown, 2009).  This work 
demonstrates the manner in which an army’s operational orientation is 
reproduced in the subjective construction of the professional self among its 
members.  Thus, the tension at the heart of ethical concerns over the potential for 
 
7 Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dobbie was an Intelligence Corps and Special Forces officer who served 
as a staff officer with the Inspectorate General of Doctrine and Training. 
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disproportionate and counterproductive applications of force in private military 
security could be seen to exist also within the state organisations from which the 
private sector recruits.  
The Changing Nature of Conflict 
As the nature of the military organisation has been the subject of scholarship, so 
the nature of conflict itself has been the focus of much academic research, 
particularly in the field of international relations and conflict studies.  Mary Kaldor 
(2012) illustrates what she considers to be a paradigm shift in the way conflict has 
been enacted in society throughout the post Cold War era.  Echoing Von Clausewitz 
(1908), Kaldor demonstrates that war is an activity situated in the social sphere, 
and that the modern understanding of warfare is a social construction that has its 
roots in the establishment of the nation-state.  Within this context, as political 
distinctions were drawn between the civil and the military, the domestic and the 
international, the private and the public, a new societal consensus was reached on 
the ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ exercise of violence in society.  In so doing the 
social construction of legitimate external conflict, that which we now know as 
‘war’, was constituted.  Concurrently, notions of the legitimate management of 
internal conflict within the polity of the nation-state led to the formation of the 
first modern police forces.  Thus, both internally and externally, a social 
construction of legitimate and illegitimate violence was created with the symbolic 
sovereignty of the state at its heart, and the state’s monopoly over the exercise of 
legitimate violence its defining and pervasive incantation. 
The power of the modernist construction of legitimate violence is undeniable.  The 
modern era has seen nation states able to legitimise types of industrialised 
violence unthinkable in previous eras (Arendt, 1966; Rothe and Mullins, 2011; 
Tilly, 1985).  Despite this, Kaldor argues, a new type of conflict has emerged that 
differs in nature from the conflicts of the modern industrial era.  She articulates 
the notion of ‘new wars’ observing that these conflicts occur in situations where 
state revenues decline, usually as a result of the decline of the national economy 
under the pressures of globalisation; that this decline is accompanied by the 
spread of criminality, corruption and inefficiency. In turn, this incentivises the 
privatisation of violence in response to organised criminality, and sees the 
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emergence of paramilitary structures that challenge and diminish the legitimacy 
of the state.  Under these circumstances traditional distinctions between ‘external 
barbarity’ and ‘domestic civility’; between the combatant as a legitimate bearer of 
arms and the non-combatant; between the soldier, the police and the criminal, all 
begin to break down.  Kaldor’s hypothesis is that, while the barbarity of war 
between states may have become a thing of the past, in its place ‘a new type of 
organised violence that is more pervasive and long-lasting, but also perhaps less 
extreme’ (Kaldor, 2012:6) has emerged.  Wulf (2008) highlights the central ethical 
question that the involvement of private security companies in these conflicts 
presents; what is the effect of private force on conflict itself?  Do private forces, 
through the pursuit of economic incentives, risks-aversion or indiscipline have the 
potential to prolong or exacerbate conflict where their state counterparts would 
not? 
Kaldor has her critics who suggest that there are no fundamental characteristics 
in the ‘new wars’ that differ from those in evidence in historical conflicts (Kalyvas, 
2001 and Smith, 2003).  Despite this, there remains a considerable scholarly 
consensus that the nature of conflict has changed in fundamental ways since the 
end of the Cold War (see also Van Creveld, 1991; Held 1995 and Grey, 1997).  The 
blurring of the delineation between war and crime is reflected in a convergence of 
the previously distinct literatures of criminology, international relations and 
conflict studies (Loader and Percy, 2012 and Walklate and McGary, 2015).  
Additionally, a new literature that deals with the increasing militarisation of 
policing is indicative of the ‘hybridisation’ of conflict discussed by Kaldor.  This 
literature encompasses the increasing use of soldiers as police officers in military 
‘stability support’ operations and counter-insurgencies abroad (Campbell and 
Campbell, 2010).  In the United States in particular, the increasing ‘militarisation’ 
of domestic policing has become a focus of scholastic attention (Kraska and 
Kappeler, 1997; Kraska, 2001, McCulloch, 2004, Beede, 2008).  These studies 
provide us with an insight into the powerful impact that the social construction of 
‘military elitism’ can have on the culture of civil policing organisations (Campbell 
and Campbell, 2010).   
Thus, the genesis of the complex operations that have so challenged the traditional 
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‘warrior’ identity of the soldier, resides in the response to new forms of conflict 
that have emerged since the end of the Second World War.  These changes can be 
seen, at least in part, as a result of the same forces that have created the private 
security phenomenon.  As the changing nature of global governance has altered 
the nature of conflict, so changes in the nature of conflict can be seen to affect the 
nature of governance.  As Rose observes, ‘Warfare, that is to say, requires and 
inspires the invention of new practices of government’ (Rose and Miller, 
2010:276).  These forms of conflict confound the traditional public/private divide; 
blur the distinction between the domestic and the international, and between the 
military and the constabulary.  It is to the latter (policing studies) to which I now 
turn. 
Policing and Private Policing 
Research into privatised forms of policing began in the early 1980’s (Shearing and 
Stenning, 1981; 1983; 1987a; 1987b) and has, like civil military relations, been 
centrally concerned with the relationship between the emergent private 
practitioners of policing and the state (Shearing, 1992; Johnson, 1992). While the 
private origins of public policing are increasingly recognised (Kempa, 2017), the 
convergence between forms of public and private constabulary activity is, 
increasingly a focus of study (Reiner, 2010). Initially scholars saw private security 
as a ‘junior partner’ to state policing (Jones and Newburn 1995; 1998). However, 
by the early 2000s evidence was emerging that privatised policing was creating 
forms of non-state government in both the public and private realms (Bayley and 
Shearing, 2001, Shearing, 2006:11).  Scholars began to question the centrality of 
the state to the provision of security in society in the wake of neoliberal reforms.  
This gave rise to theories of ‘nodal governance’ (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; 
Shearing and Wood, 2003; Wood and Shearing, 2007) that cast private security as 
one of many actors, public and private, who often cooperated on a equal footing to 
provide the security of public or private spaces.  This attempt to challenge the 
perceived monopoly of the state in the creation of security (White, 2011:91) was 
not universally accepted.  Loader and Walker (2006; 2007) proposed that ‘the 
symbolism and cultural power’ of the state ensured that its influence on domestic 
security remained pivotal, even where the state took a less direct role in its 
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provision (Loader, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c).  This ‘anchored plural’ approach 
proposed that deeply embedded cultural norms ensured that the same symbolism 
that reinforced high levels of legitimacy among public police forces actually had a 
negative impact on the perceived legitimacy of private security providers; the 
logic of the market being seen as incompatible with deeply embedded cultural 
concepts of legitimacy that underpinned popular attachment to public policing.  
The normative legitimacy of the state (Loader and Walker, 2006), and its relation 
to the practices of state policing, is relevant to our understanding of private 
security.  In particular, examination of the relative legitimacy associated with 
different forms of state policing provides an insight into the implications of their 
commoditisation.  Brodeur (1983; 2005:227; 2010) casts light upon the difference 
between the practices of ‘high and low’ policing and their respective relationships 
with the public and the state. He characterises ‘low policing’ as the overt policing 
carried out by uniformed officers and criminal detectives oriented towards the 
protection of the public.  In contrast, he draws from accounts of the covert activity 
of the continental police magistrates in revolutionary France, demonstrating that 
‘high policing’ is possessed of both a different character and different aims: 
‘As part of the criminal justice system, low Police share its aim of protecting 
society.  In contrast, the protection of the political regime is the raison d'être 
of high policing.  This basic aim is sometimes expressed as the protection of 
the state or the protection of national security.  However, the clause 
“protection of the political regime” is more comprehensive, as it also covers 
so-called “failed states,” where high policing is devoted to perpetuating the 
imposed distribution of power, often at the expense of society’ (Brodeur, 
2005:226) 
Brodeur (2005:809; 2010:226) proposed that modern ‘high policing’ was carried 
out by a mixture of policing and intelligence agencies; that it was characterised by 
the use of technique that involved secrecy and deceit, that it often operated extra-
legally and blurred the ‘separation of powers’ that underwrites the modern 
democratic ideal.  He posits that, in its contemporary form, high policing can be 
regarded as a form of private security for the state (2010:227) with high policing 
agencies acting to privilege the protection of the state as a ‘victim’ over that of the 
other victims in society, be they institutions or individuals.  Brodeur proposed this 
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as a form of ‘self-privatisation’ of the state, by the state.  This can be seen to have 
both driven the privatisation of state military and security functions, and to have 
been reinforced by the autonomy from democratic accountability that 
privatisation has provided. 
Scholars of conflict and private security studies have evidenced the ways in which 
‘high policing’ functions have become the preserve of both police and military 
organisations (Kaldor, 2012 and Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011).  In Britain 
military involvement in law enforcement became commonplace throughout the 
period of ‘the troubles’ in Northern Ireland (Urban, 1992; Punch, 2012).  This 
commitment involved military activity that replicated the ‘high’ and ‘low’ policing 
distinction described by Brodeur.  The British Army retained its own identification 
in slang for military units that became engaged in covert action as part of the ‘high 
policing’ function of the state; making a distinction between the ‘green army’, 
those who operated in uniform and whose actions were subject to only such 
secrecy as was afforded to conventional military operations, and the ‘non-green 
army’; the collection of Special Forces and special intelligence units who worked 
covertly (i.e. not wearing uniform, hence the ‘non-green’ denomination) and 
whose actions were subject to much greater levels of secrecy.  It was these units 
that enacted the ‘exceptional’ actions of the British State such as the alleged ‘shoot 
to kill’ policy in Northern Ireland during the 1980s (Punch, 2012; Urban, 1992; 
Holroyed and Burbridge 1989) and the covert coordination of ‘pseudo-gangs’ of 
paramilitaries throughout the conflict (Kaldor, 2018:81).  Thus, taking Brodeur’s 
‘high policing’ impunity from legal norms as a starting point, our understanding of 
the differential status of the units involved in this type of action can be expanded 
through the work of Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben.  Schmitt created (1922), 
and Agamben developed (2005), the concept of the ‘state of exception’; the 
condition sought by many sovereign states, particularly when proposing 
circumstances of emergency or existential threat: that of legal exemption to the 
law (in essence, the removal of sovereign power from legal accountability).  Thus 
the ‘high policing’ or Special Forces practitioner, when operating on behalf of the 
state had legal recourse to the secret practice of extra-legal technique, and as such, 
has increasingly become the direct executor of sovereign exceptionalism.   
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Despite evidence of the moral ambiguity often surrounding the conduct of states, 
state-centric frames of analysis have remained prevalent even where scholars 
have grappled with evidence of the diffuse nature of state control (Loader, 1997b).  
Echoing Bauman (2000), in her work on the liquidity of modern forms of state and 
private security, Zedner lamented a lack of a coherent ethical vision in private 
security by contrast to a public police that, she believed, displayed a strong sense 
of ‘integrity’ and ‘public duty’.  Simultaneously Zedner comments that the ‘security 
product on sale by the private sector is quite other than that offered by the state’ 
(Zedner, 2006:269).  Through this Zedner highlights the complexities that the 
different aims and outcomes of public and private policing produce, and the 
manner in which these map on to security definitions and security identities.  
Indeed, while academics have gone some way to explore the nature and character 
of state policing (Foster, 2003; 2008), the lived experience of private security staff 
in the domestic field remains relatively underexplored.  The small number of 
studies that directly examine the experiences and perception of actors in this 
sector (Jones and Newburn, 1998; Wakefield, 2003; 2008; Hobbs, 1988; 2005) 
have not provided evidence that the relationship with the state, or comparisons 
with state police, are particularly relevant to their day-to-day conduct.  Indeed, 
Mopasa and Stenning (2001) have highlighted that the relative paucity of 
‘symbolic power’ (Bourdieu, 1991) possessed by private security actors meant 
that they had to develop very different approaches to achieving public compliance 
to those of their state counterparts. 
More recently scholars of private policing have begun to draw increasingly 
nuanced distinctions between forms of security that have sovereignty as their 
foundation and those that cannot rely on this underpinning.  Based on Shearing 
and Bailey’s (2001) proposition that public police and private sector actors 
display different ‘mentalities’ in the conduct of their roles, Crawford (2014) 
observes that local and plural forms of private ordering have always ‘played a vital 
role in constituting security’, and that developing global and transnational threats 
render forms of security based on national sovereignty ineffective.  In this context 
he argues that public and private partnerships between state and commercial 
organisations have become not just practical, but essential.  However, Crawford 
30 
 
observes a growing bifurcation in security practice between public policing and 
private security.  Here the ‘normative moral logic’ and ‘symbolic and visible 
sovereign authority’ of public policing is contrasted with the more ‘instrumental 
logic’ of private security; the punitive, punishment-oriented proclivity of the state 
sitting in stark contrast to the more ‘proactive/preventative’ and ‘problem solving’ 
orientation of private practitioners (Crawford, 2017).  While Crawford recognises 
the inequities that private security can produce (Crawford, 2014:4), he draws a 
clear distinction between the nature of ‘security’ as it is created through sovereign 
practices and those that rely of other forms of legitimacy.  Gill (2015) notes the 
tension this can create between state and private actors, with senior police officers 
often conflicted as to whether to cooperate or compete with private security 
companies operating in their areas.  Thus, while critical scholarship orients 
around the idea that security without the assumed moral legitimacy of affiliation 
to the state is ethically deficient, a developing functionalist approach presents this 
absence of moral certitude as appropriate to the creation of a different kind of 
security, more local, instrumental and less essentialist in its logic. 
Taxonomies of Private Security 
As the field of private security studies has coalesced, so a number of theoretical 
positions have emerged to explain the nature and causes of the contemporary 
private security phenomenon (Avant, 2005:30–38; Binder, 2007; Rosen, 2008; 
Singer, 2003; Deitelhoff, 2010; Krahmann, 2010a; Petersohn, 2010, 2011a).  The 
first of these relates to taxonomies, as the academic literature has grappled with 
the challenge of coherently articulating the nature and boundaries of an industry 
that has evolved at such a pace as to make classification difficult.  Singer (2003) 
initially saw the sector as one in which practitioners were defined by their 
involvement in either ‘front-line’ or support activities.  Chesterman and Lehnardt 
(2007) similarly proposed potential engagement in the use of lethal force as a 
paradigm through which the structure of the sector and its participants could be 
understood, and added a geographical dimension; whether the service was 
enacted inside our outside the home-state jurisdiction.  Kinsey (2006) saw the 
nature of the private security company’s clients as key to the sector’s construction, 
differentiating between companies that catered to state or commercial clients.  
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Bearpark and Schulz (2007) proposed that the sector should be understood 
through its involvement in five functional areas of activity, traditional security, 
post conflict reconstruction, state building, humanitarian disaster relief and 
development; while Hakala (2010) developed a separate typology for the security 
industry based on a ‘family tree’ of security services that includes a list of discrete 
operational categories such as ‘security consultancy’, ‘private investigation’ 
‘crowd management’ and ‘guarding’.  He includes ‘private military services’ as a 
separate operational branch.  However, as I will demonstrate, in both theory and 
practice the ‘branches’ of Hakala’s tree are somewhat more intertwined than the 
typology of his thesis might imply. 
More recently, scholarship has begun to focus on the character and practice 
inherent to different ‘disciplines’ of private security (see O’Reilly, 2010; Cusumano 
and Kinsey, 2016 on consultancy and diplomatic security).  Perhaps most notably 
Berndtsson (2012) has endeavoured to view the sector through the prism of the 
expertise that companies construct and present as the competences (or ‘capital’) 
they propose to trade.  Through this it is possible to interpret the extent to which 
forms of experience shape the structure of the sector; a dynamic recognised by 
Abrahamson and Williams (2011) and Williams (2016) in their proposal that 
security constitutes itself through ‘assemblages’ of actors whose expertise allows 
security challenges to be addressed irrespective of restrictive traditional 
boundaries.  This changing and self-constituting conception of the sector marries 
structure and competence in a manner that is more satisfactory than other more 
traditional typologies, and aligns with the ‘protean’ moniker afforded the sector 
by Carmola (2010). 
One persistent definitional dispute relates to the categorisation of private military 
security practitioners as ‘mercenaries’ (Brewis and Godfrey, 2018).  This 
addresses a number of ethical concerns including: the alignment of coercive force 
with the motivation of financial profit (Steinhoff, 2008), changes to the 
relationship between the civil polity and the state military (Wolfendale, 2008), 
and potential changes to the nature and ethics of conflict and military organisation 
(Runzo, 2008; Kasher, 2008). Perhaps most pronounced is the concern that, 
without the political control imposed over state military forces, ‘mercenary’ 
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organisations may be used to enact political change (Musah and Fayemi, 2000; 
Musah, 2002; Francis, 1999).  This perceived lack of control is seen, perhaps 
paradoxically, to result in both a propensity for un-restrained aggression and a 
‘lack of fighting spirit’ (Von Clausewitz, 1908).  Indeed Machiavelli notes the 
inclination displayed by 16th Century Condottieri for fighting ‘sham’ or ‘bloodless’ 
battles when pitted against other mercenary companies; an interesting if 
antiquated example of the fact that the profit motive often sits uneasily with the 
destructive essentialism of state conflict (Machiavelli cited in Carmola, 2010:14).   
Despite adoption by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UN, 2011), 
the use of the term mercenary to categorise private military security companies 
has been problematised by functionalist scholars (Cleaver, 2000; Baker, 2008) and 
is a label from which practitioners have sought to distance themselves (Gómez Del 
Prado, 2011:40), often against fierce opposition (see for example the dispute 
between Brooks and Fainaru in Carmola, 2010:13).  The development of military 
companies with a recognisable corporate structure has, in the view of Percy 
(2007), served to narrow the scope of private military activity that carries with it 
the pejorative moniker of ‘mercenary’ without necessarily constraining the 
damaging consequences of their conduct.  The construction of ‘mercenary’ activity 
remains a fault-line between ethical perceptions of legitimate and illegitimate 
commercial military activity, and has been the overwhelming focus of 
transnational policy makers in particular (UN, 1990).   
Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) have problematised the policy (and scholarly) 
focus on the visible military manifestations of private military force in conflict 
environments. Drawing together an analysis of private security that encompasses 
both its specialised militarised form and what they call the ‘commercial, non-
military dimension’ (ibid:23), they argue that a narrow view of private security 
through analysis of the more militarised examples, leads to an understanding of 
the sector as operating predominantly without legitimate authority and beyond 
state control (what they call the ‘Mercenary Misconception’ ibid:23).  Instead they 
draw attention to the symbiotic relationship between the new private security and 
the structures of states and international organisations.  They argue that the 
phenomenon of private security must be viewed more broadly, situating debate in 
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the milieu of ‘transformations of global governance’ rather than the important, but 
narrower concerns of control and legitimacy. 
Several different taxonomies have been developed to sculpt these arguments into 
a common framework, and better structure our understanding of the private 
security field (Carmola, 2010:18).  Of these Kruck’s is the least unwieldy (Kruck, 
2014)8.  He identifies three dominant theoretical paradigms that have emerged in 
Private Security Studies.  These align broadly with what Carmola sees as the 
‘origin’ stories of the private military security industry, and each provides a frame 
of analysis through which the identity of the contemporary private security 
practitioner can be viewed, and the nature of the industry interpreted. 
Functionalist Theory 
Kruck (2014:115) describes functionalism as stemming from the development of 
a form of private ‘problem-driven privatisation’.  This has emerged as state actors 
have sought to find economically effective means to competently deliver military 
and security capability where state capacity has been reduced through budgetary 
restrictions.  This theory first assumes the perceived superior ‘cost-efficiency’ of 
the private provider and secondly its greater efficacy by comparisons to the state 
functions it replaces (Kruck, 2014:115; Petersohn, 2010).  To whit, that 
technological advances, the increasing complexity of modern hybrid warfare, and 
the transition from ‘old’ to ‘new wars’, has meant that traditional state military 
organisations compare unfavourably to private providers of force when it comes 
to their flexibility and deployability (Shearer, 1998).  For example, the relative 
geographical autonomy of private security allows foreign-policy makers to 
influence regions beyond the practical reach of state forces (Lehnardt, 2007). 
Functionalism produces two versions of the private security actor, the first casts 
the practitioner in a relatively passive role, responding to geopolitical 
circumstance and the strategies of state bureaucrats. This emphasises ‘pull’ 
factors that have served to draw a generation of demobilized service people into 
private military security work as states, anticipating an end to the ‘hyper-
militarization’ of the Cold War downsized their armed forces (Lock, 1998 in 
 
8 Albeit a framework that Kruck seeks to challenge. 
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Carmola, 2010:42). However, while states reduced their capacity for overseas 
military engagement non-state bodies began to adopt responsibility for 
operations to implement security sector reform in territories emerging from Cold 
War conflict or isolation (Kinsey, 2006:51 and Carmola 2010).  In identifying the 
push for states to find more flexible and effective responses to changing forms of 
conflict, the foundation of much functionalist theory is the idea that there has been 
a fundamental change to the nature of conflict during the closing years of the 20th 
Century.  In turn this has produced a strain of ethical functionalism that laments 
the failure of ‘western’9 nations to engage effectively with the private providers of 
force in circumstances where such engagement could ameliorate humanitarian 
crisis (Brooks and Chorev, 2008:116-130; Avant, 2005:61).  This strain of 
functionalism casts the private practitioner in the more active, albeit highly 
contested, ‘true professional’ or ‘ethical hero warrior’ role (Joachim and 
Schneiker, 2012a); as rational actors redressing the inefficiencies of an 
increasingly dysfunctional global order through market mechanisms. 
Ideational Theory 
Ideational theory (Kruck, 2014: 118) links the development of privatised military 
and security activity to the evolution of market based, neoliberal ideology.  
Through this prism, private security has developed in a space where the orthodox 
logic of the state monopoly over security is challenged by a market-led, pluralistic 
approach (Carmola, 2010:50; Singer, 2003, Avant, 2005 and Stanger, 2009).  Like 
functionalists, proponents of this theory propose the superiority of market forces 
over state provision, but unlike functionalism sees this belief as ideologically, 
rather than empirically created.  Ideational theory sees private security 
practitioners as actively engaged in the national and transnational proliferation of 
neoliberal economic and governance practices (Cutler, 2010; Krahmann, 2010a 
and 2010b; Petersohn, 2010; 2011a; 2015; Walker and Whyte, 2005).  Baum and 
McGahan (2009) interpret this ideological alignment with neoliberalism as an 
almost ‘conditioned’ response to increases in privatisation, while others 
 
9 Van Meegdenburg (2015:322) problematizes the uncritical use of the category ‘western’ in private 
security literature.  I use the term throughout this thesis chiefly due to its ubiquity in practitioner 
discourse, while recognising its use is contested. 
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(Fredland, 2004; Berndtsson, 2012) interpret these beliefs as nested in a more 
fundamental ideological commitment to the efficiency of market mechanisms. 
Ideational theories emphasise the active nature of the private security 
practitioner as an advocate of neoliberal ideology.  In their work on Darfur 
Leander and van Munster (2007) observed how private security actors 
simultaneously depoliticised and instrumentalised security discourses to bolster 
the legitimacy of market-based solutions, demonstrating their importance as 
incubators of neoliberal governmentality (Rose and Miller 2010:272 on Foucault 
1979), both germinating and cultivating, ‘state-like’ thinking among private 
companies, NGOs and transnational organisations.  This trend can be seen to have 
influenced the culture and practice of these organisations, and altered their 
traditional relationship with the state and other groups in society.  Critics of 
ideational theory argue that ideational factors alone cannot explain the differing 
character of private security in countries with a similar ideological foundation 
(Cusumano and Kinsey, 2015:593).  Nonetheless, even these critics accept that 
neoliberal privatisation has challenged state hierarchies and redistributed power 
and resources among actors within the executive branch, with one effect of this 
having been to allow military aspects of foreign policy to be conducted 
independently of state military structures (Cusumano and Kinsey, 2015:595).  
Political Instrumentalist 
Political instrumentalist theory (Kruck, 2014: 116), described by Carmola as the 
‘nasty’ private security origin story (Carmola, 2010:48), encompasses many of the 
more critical strains of private security studies (Leander, 2016).  This approach 
views the emergence of private security as the result of public officials’ desire to 
obviate political accountability rather than to increase efficiency per-se 
(Chesterman and Lehnardt, 2007; Avant and Sigelman, 2010), creating greater 
freedom for governments to operate without scrutiny or legislative oversight 
(Cockayne, 2007; de Nevers, 2016:173, O’Reilly, 2010).  In so doing these officials 
willfully alter the traditional relationships between constituent elements of the 
state’s apparatus and the processes that generate policy (Avant 2005:59-60).  A 
significant concern of political instrumentalist theory has been the effect that the 
creation of private markets-for-force has had on the conduct of foreign policy 
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(Avant, 2005:68; de Nevers, 2016).  Research in this area has focused on the role 
of private security companies in security sector reform (SSR) in post-conflict 
environments (McFate, 2016b; Kinsey, 2005; 2006: 122-127 and Avant and de 
Nevers, 2011) and the manner in which the ‘hollowing out’ of the state ultimately 
inhibits its ability to enact its own foreign policy, by surrendering many of its 
policy decisions to private actors (Avant, 2005;176).   
In some cases the use of private security entities to achieve foreign policy 
objectives has resulted in considerable backlash (see Singer, 2003:115 on the 
‘Sandline Affaire’ of 1997) and, as such, political instrumentalist concerns have 
underpinned a strong vein of critical scholarship.  This scholarship tends to view 
the private security actor as unthinking or unprincipled, and focuses on the extent 
to which the privatisation of military and security activity challenges or 
reproduces social hierarchies.  Here questions of the relationships and ‘revolving 
doors’ between military, intelligence organisations, civil society groups and 
private military security companies have become the focus (Leander, 2016b:89; 
Cowan, 2014; Joachim and Schneiker, 2012b).  Cowan emphasizes the extent to 
which military disciplines now form the core management practice of 
international logistics.  This perpetuates a global ‘logic of conflict’ by situating 
international logistics within a ‘trajectory of struggle’ which has ‘entwined’ 
military and civilian business practice (Cowan, 2014:5-6).  Critical literature has 
demonstrated the relative impunity afforded to private military security 
companies by existing regimes of self-regulation; Leander’s examination of ‘Codes 
of Conduct’ (2012) and ‘Whitelisting’ (2016a) both show the extent to which these 
informal systems simultaneously produce ‘both regulation and militarization’ 
(Leander, 2016b:91).  Thus, in critical literature the morally disengaged 
practitioner is seen to willfully suborn civil and legal safeguards, and harm the 
civilian ecosystems with which they interact. 
Although much critical scholarship continues to explore the extent to which 
private military security alters or reinforces the power of states, increasingly it 
looks beyond public/private paradigm to examine the extent to which the 
commodification of security effects categories of hierarchy such as race and 
gender (Schulz and Yeung, 2005; 2008; Via, 2010; Joachim and Schneiker, 2012a; 
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Higate, 2012b, 2012c; 2012d; 2012e: Eichler, 2015; 2016; 2017; Stachowitsch, 
2013; 2015a; 2015b; Chisholm and Stachowitsch, 2016; 2018; Chisholm, 2008; 
2014a; 2014b; Bulmer and Eichler, 2017; Chisholm and Eichler, 2018;). Like 
others, this literature can be seen to have its origins in study of state actors, 
particularly the impact of military masculinities on state peacekeeping operations.  
Here scholars have observed how the traditional masculinity of military culture 
has had to adapt to the new humanitarian missions that the military were 
undertaking (Enloe, 1993; Whitworth, 2003; Tickner 2001, Duncanson, 2009; 
Duncanson and Woodward, 2016). Together this has produced a substantial 
literature on military and security identities, which I explore, and develop, 
throughout this thesis. 
A Note on Bourdieu 
In this thesis I have made considerable use of the work of the French sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu. The work of this thesis has, by necessity, been based 
predominantly on interviews rather than ethnographic observation and has 
focussed on a social constructionist analysis of these recalled accounts.  Despite 
these methodological differences, the vocabulary of Bourdieusian theory has 
provided a framework through which it has been possible to theorise a 
‘practitioners’ eye view’ of private military security, the topology of the field, and 
the boundaries of behaviour that have determined its logic and practice over time.  
In this I make no claim to advance Bourdieusian theory, but aim only to 
supplement the work of scholars such as Abrahamson and Williams (2011), 
Diphorn and Grassiani (2016), Bowden (2019), Cooper at al. (2017) and White 
(2018) who have begun to apply Bourdieu’s theories to security and military 
transition. 
Thesis Structure  
Having discussed the literature that underpins my research (Chapter 1), I continue 
by outlining the methodology used to conduct the study (Chapter 2).  Chapter 3 
provides an overview of the contemporary UK military private security sector 
through the eyes of actors within the sector.  I describe its history and activities: 
its inception in the close networks of ex-Special Forces veterans of the Cold War 
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era, and its evolution into the ‘corporate’ structures of the Global War on Terror.  
Here also I introduce the cohering logic of the ‘field’ and establish the centrality of 
certain forms of military experience to its constitution.  Chapter 4 examines the 
foundations of military identity, created in state service and taken through into 
the private security field, with particular reference to the culture and identity of 
‘high policing’ or non-green army units.  Chapter 5 explores the experience of 
transition between military service and the private security sector, proposing a 
number of different trajectories and experiences that accompany the move from 
state service to the commercial realm.  Chapters 6 to 8 examine the experience of 
my interviewees in different areas of private military security, starting with the 
‘mainstream’ market of armed protective security in the Middle East and the 
growth of the maritime security field.  I then examine two areas of the private 
military security field identified by my interviewees as being the ‘frontiers’, or 
‘fringes’ of the sector; the areas where norms and practices were most emergent 
or ambiguous.  The first of these is the sphere of international commercial 
offensive military operations and training (Chapter 7) and the second the world 
of covert surveillance, enacted (predominantly) in the more advanced centers of 
global capitalism (Chapter 8).  I draw together the key findings in Chapter 9, 
proposing how the experiences of my interviewees can further our understanding 
of both private and state forms of violence and control, and the implications this 
has for our more fundamental understanding of the nature of security and 




Chapter 2 Methodology 
The research discussed in this thesis grew out of my own experiences working in 
private military security during the late 1990s and early 2000s, a period when the 
industry saw considerable change and expansion.  Like many of my interviewees 
I began my working life by joining the British Army, specifically the infantry, and 
had been selected for officer training and commissioned at the Royal Military 
Academy Sandhurst.  In this role I was part of the ‘green army’10, engaged in the 
provision of a recognised type of organized violence on behalf of the state.  As the 
Cold War ended I, like many colleagues, became involved in the conflicts that 
resulted from this geopolitical upheaval.  This new complexity in international 
relations provided opportunities for me and I spent the latter part of my career 
involved in military human intelligence.  The diverse nature of this unconventional 
military role exposed me to the habitus of covert military operations and brought 
me into contact with a range of military, police, security and civilian actors; 
relationships that subsequently provided the foundation for my own transition 
into private security.  
In the late 1990s I left the regular11 British Army and began working for a number 
of private security and Non Governmental Organisations involved in the provision 
of military and security services.  My work included a wide range of activity, from 
de-mining and explosive ordinance disposal, to business intelligence, 
investigations, close protection, training and security consultancy; as well as the 
management of the ‘business’ of security, the day-to day routine of winning 
contracts and managing organisations.  Much of this work took place overseas, but 
a notable amount was in the United Kingdom.  
By 2003 I was working in a senior regional executive position in a joint UK/US 
owned multinational private security firm.  Over the next 4 years I had a 
grandstand seat on the company’s decisions on its growth and development in the 
 
10 The ‘green army’ is military slang for conventional military forces, as opposed to Special Forces or 
special intelligence.  
11 Regular denotes ‘full time’ service in the military rather than ‘reserve’ or ‘territorial’ service both of 
which are ‘part time’. 
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wake of the declaration of the ‘Global War on Terror’ and the invasion of Iraq.  
During this period the political possibilities and commercial opportunities 
available to the private military security industry changed profoundly (See 
Chapter 3).  It was misgivings about the nature and extent of those changes that 
led me to return to the United Kingdom and seek work in the relatively benign 
environment of higher education.  
In 2007 I took a management position as the Head of Security at the London School 
of Economics.  In accepting this job I moved, for the first time in my working life 
into an institution and environment where the majority of my colleagues were 
‘civilians’; people with no experience in the conduct of military, security, 
intelligence or policing activity on behalf of the state.  This transition was 
profound, and gave me the opportunity to review and re-appraise my previous 
career.  In 2011 I completed an MSc in Criminology and embarked upon a PhD and, 
in so doing, have been able to remove myself in a small way from the 
overwhelmingly ‘practical’ concerns of operational security risk management.  
Through my engagement with academia in this new setting, I became interested 
in how, and why the private security sector had developed in the way in which it 
had, and the social implications that arose from it.  I was also concerned that 
although nothing that I had done while working in private security had, at the time, 
felt deliberately dangerous or unethical, the industry of which I had been part (and 
the people working in it) had the capacity to be just that.  As such, I had seen and 
thought of myself in a manner that was different from the way that others may 
have seen me (and the way in which I now see myself).  This dissonance was 
exemplified by Rose and Miller’s statement, that contemporary ‘governmentality’ 
is defined by relationships between individual subjectivities: 
‘Not who they are, but who they thought they were, what they wanted to 
be, the languages and norms according to which they judged themselves 
and were judged by others, the actions they took upon themselves and that 
others might take, in the light of those understandings’ (Rose and Miller, 
2008:7) 
Thus, understanding how people in private security saw themselves, why they 
saw themselves in this way, and the implications of this sense-of-self, became my 
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focus of interest.  The aim of my research became to understand who participated 
in private military security, why they participated in the sector, how they 
experienced and constructed their work and the social implications which arose 
from this.  In this chapter I describe how I addressed these aims and the design 
and methodology of my study.  I outline my participant sample; discuss my 
collection and analysis of data, theoretical ideas, and other methodological issues 
including ethics, reflexivity and the challenges of insider status that shaped my 
research.  
Adopting a Qualitative Methodology  
Any research aim is contingent upon the nature of the research methods used 
(Longhoffer et. al., 2012).  An initial challenge in researching private security is 
that many important decisions and discourses occur under circumstances that are 
difficult to observe and record.  For example, decisions on the use-of-force often 
occurred in spatially isolated circumstances (in a building or vehicle) in 
environments that could be socially disordered and dangerous (Avant, 2005).  The 
forums in which decisions relating to the business of security are taken, for 
example marketing meetings, proposal presentations and consultancy meetings, 
are often equally inaccessible to researchers since they are subject to considerable 
confidentiality.  These constraints, and the complex and developing nature of the 
private security industry results in few accessible records of decision making, 
certainly by comparison with those sometimes available to policing scholars.  
Given the context above, it was clear that I could not achieve my research aims 
through an assessment of ‘objective’ factors (i.e., legal frameworks, regulatory 
standards, governance models) alone.  I needed to understand the internal 
dialogue that formed the narrative of my interviewees’ decision-making.  If, in 
accordance with Janowitz (1960), Shearer (1998) and Avant (2005) I was to judge 
the social impact of the emerging model of privatised security through the 
congruence or divergence of its values with that of its referent civil society(s), I 
had to understand the values of the individual actors involved (Becker, 1963).  
This focus on the individual participants’ perception of their circumstances, work 
and experience led naturally to an ontological position that recognised social 
realities as subjectively created - a social constructivist approach best articulated 
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by Charmaz’s (2000:521) proposal that: ‘people create and maintain meaningful 
worlds through dialectical process of conferring meaning on their realities and 
acting within them’. 
As I was concerned with establishing the nature of an emergent phenomenon, the 
shape and form of which was created by the participants themselves through 
‘discourse, account or repertoire – which represents a culturally available way of 
packaging experience’ (Kitzinger, 2004:128 cited in Silverman, 2011:212) 
qualitative methods were most apposite (Creswell, 1998:17).  I wanted to provide 
an intimate understanding of an aspect of private security through an analysis of 
how those working in the sector socially constructed the experience of their work.  
These ‘social constructions’ could not be arrived at through the examination of 
numerical data (Bryman, 2008), nor would they be volunteered by participants in 
a form that was complete and ready for analysis.  They had to be reached through 
an interpretation of the narratives provided by participants (Williams, 2002) that 
took into account the context of the experiences they described (Holstein and 
Gurbrium, 2004).  
My methodological choices were also influenced by a number of practical 
considerations.  My thesis needed to be completed part-time alongside full-time 
employment.  The ethnographic approach used by Amanda Chisholm (2008) who 
conducted her research in Afghanistan observing and interviewing private 
military contractors was not open to me.  The extended fieldwork involved in this 
type of study (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995) could not be reconciled with my 
employment.  Beyond this, the issue of access to the operations of a private 
security company would have presented an ethical and methodological challenge, 
if indeed it had been possible at all.  Furthermore, a classic ethnography would 
have restricted my subject group to a single environment and category of 
operation.  I was also conscious that the military and security operational 
environment encouraged the suppression of specific emotions, and may not have 
been conducive to the kind of introspective narratives I was trying to elicit.  




Participant Sample  
As the study progressed it became clear that my interviewees saw themselves as 
participating in a ‘field’ of activity that I have identified as ‘private military 
security’.  This was a social and vocational space, which they shared with other 
actors on the basis of their common experience (see chapters 3 and 6).  As I 
explored this field, I sought participants who were representative of the ‘mix’ of 
actors involved in private military security across different positions and in 
different areas of practice.  This proved challenging not least as a result of the 
general paucity of reliable data on the size and constitution of the UK-centric, 
transnational commercial security sector I was exploring.  Although my insider 
status provided me with some insight into the breadth of the industry, it did not 
provide immediate access to every necessary sphere of activity.  I had, for instance, 
never worked in the field of maritime security and had no immediate contacts in 
this industry area.  My most immediately accessible group of potential 
participants worked in security consultancy.  However, the nature of consultancy, 
an activity generally conducted by more experienced industry practitioners, and 
acting in many respects as a ‘gateway’ to other more discreet areas of industry 
activity, meant that through ‘snowballing’ and referrals it was possible to access 
participants involved in a wide range of practice.  
The study involved 37 face-to-face interviews with 30 participants conducted 
between February 2013 and December 2016.  A full list of interviewees, their 
background and employment history is at Appendix A.  26 participants were 
former members of military organisations (predominantly the British Army).  Two 
of these had only Territorial Army experience.  One participant had experience in 
the military of a commonwealth country.  Four interviewees came from 
exclusively non-military backgrounds (civilian, police or intelligence services). Of 
those participants with a military background 8 had served as senior non-
commissioned officers (NCOs) in the regular Army 22nd Special Air Service 
Regiment and 7 in other Special Forces or military special intelligence units.  As 
the study developed, a mixture of military experience was sought to ensure that 
interviewees were not drawn from a single operational or regimental culture.  
Three participants had experience in the police, two in the United Kingdom and 
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one in a former Commonwealth country; of these one also had experience in a 
military Special Forces unit.  Two interviewees had worked for UK 
security/intelligence services, and another for a Commonwealth equivalent 
service.  With the exception of one interviewee, all had experience working as 
contractors or executives in United Kingdom and multinational private military 
security companies from the 1980s to the present day.  As the study progressed, 
and I began to develop theoretical concepts on the basis of my data analysis, one 
interview was conducted with a man who had worked in a recruitment firm 
engaged in the selection of former military personnel for industries including the 
private military security industry. 
All but one of the interviewees were men.  Interviewees said that there were very 
few women active in the industry and Kate (my single woman interviewee) was 
the only one working in the international field12.  I was made aware of one other 
woman, a former army Intelligence Corps soldier, active in covert surveillance in 
the UK but was unable to secure an interview.  Most interviewees were aged 
between 40 and 64, with a smaller number in their 30s (n=3).  While this was 
broadly reflective of an industry that formed a second career for most, it may 
represent a skew towards more experienced participants.  This was a function of 
the research aims (i.e. to seek interviewees with a range of experience in different 
sectors) and the nature of my field access (i.e. initially through peers of similar age 
or older). 
All but one of the interviewees, including the single female interviewee, were 
white.  The majority self-identified as British with the remainder holding South 
African or Commonwealth citizenship.  The single BAME interviewee identified as 
Fijian.  The involvement of former Gurkha personnel in the field of military private 
security has been explored in detail (Chisholm, 2014a; 2014b; Chisholm and 
Stachowitsch, 2016).  However, I was unable to access any Gurkha participants.  
This may be because many Gurkhas discharged before 1997 were not given UK 
residency status and therefore lived abroad.  Additionally my interviewees 
described Gurkhas active in military private security as ‘a very closed community’ 
 




(Gary) and as ‘Having a bit of their own thing going on’ (Andrew), indicating some 
distance between ex-Gurkhas and other participants in the sector.  While this 
dynamic aligns with Chisholm’s observation that Gurkhas were a ‘silenced’ 
community (2014b) within private security, this also means that my account 
cannot reflect their experiences directly.  As a consequence issues of race and 
intersectionality may be less developed than in other studies designed specifically 
to address these themes (Chisholm, 2014a; 2014b; 2016; Chisholm and 
Stachowitsch, 2018).  This is, in no way intended to diminish their importance. 
Access  
Access to private security industry actors reflected many of the same problems as 
that of access to law enforcement organisations (Noaks and Wincup, 2004), 
especially those involving practitioners drawn from elite specialist units where 
secrecy was an important constituent of professional culture (see Chapters 7 and 
8).  Further, in addressing experiences and decisions relating to the use-of-force I 
needed to access participants who were active, or had recently been active in 
armed security in high-threat environments.  Gallaher (2012:59) in her work on 
paramilitaries in Northern Ireland noted the difficulty of gaining access to armed 
groups particularly where they might be perceived as socially unpopular or 
suspect.  My previous career meant I had access to private security practitioners 
involved in a range of industry activity and from a variety of backgrounds.  At the 
outset, I did not have to negotiate the suspicion of my potential interviewees (Tota, 
2004), neither did I have to effect a change to my own behavior in order to enter 
and assimilate with the group I was studying (Wolf, 1991) or deliberately deceive 
my participant group to gain access (Calvey, 2000; Holdaway, 1982; Chambliss, 
1975).  
My initial interviewees were selected on the basis of both their accessibility and 
experience and then I used snowball sampling; requesting, or being offered, 
introductions to potential interviewees by existing participants (Marshall and 
Rossman, 2006; Bryman 2008).  This approach became more important as the 
study progressed, particularly in accessing people with specific experience or 
characteristics.  Snowballing was not successful in all cases.  For example, I was 
introduced to two interviewees who chose not to take part in the study.  One 
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provided no explanation; the other said that the sensitivity of the topic was such 
that he would not cooperate with the research, as he did not know me personally.  
In addition to snowballing I used the referral function of the website ‘LinkedIn’ to 
contact potential participants whom I did not know personally but was aware had 
specific experience.  Where the potential interviewee understood that I had 
identified them through ‘insider’ knowledge I received positive responses, 
although in all cases the participants checked my bona fides before agreeing to be 
interviewed.  This was indicative of the inherent caution exercised by industry 
actors in disclosing details of the work they conduct and highlights both the 
ethically ambiguous nature of the industry and the habitus of secrecy that defines 
it.  
Most interviews were conducted in London (n=28) and a small number in 
Hereford (n=7) and the Midlands (n=2).  The London interviews were all 
conducted at the London School of Economics and Political Science while those 
outside London were conducted in private residences (n=5) or other locations 
(n=4) according to interviewee preference.  
Data Collection  
From semi-structured to open-ended interviews  
A constructivist approach is ‘concerned with the manner in which interview 
participants ‘create meaning’ (Silverman, 2013:182).  As such, any interviewing 
strategy needed to enable the elicitation and capture of the participants’ 
interpretation of their lived experience.  Noaks and Wincup identify semi- 
structured interviews as those that involve ‘some probing’, ‘rapport with the 
interviewee’ and an ‘understanding of the aims of the project’ (Noaks and Wincup, 
2004:80 cited in Silverman, 2011).  My interviews were intended to elicit 
participants’ narrative explanations of their social world (Miller and Glassner, 
2004) and to encourage them to discuss their experiences.  Interviews lasted 
between 1 and 5 hours and took the form of ‘career histories’.   
All interviews began with an open question inviting participants to describe their 
professional and personal experience in their own words without prompting by 
me (Bryman, 2008).  The completion of this initial part of the interview varied 
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from 21 minutes to over 2 hours.  Thereafter, I would follow up with a series of 
open questions that sought to draw out more information from the participant 
about certain aspects of their experience.  I gave my interviewees freedom to 
answer in their own words and structure their own accounts.  I also afforded 
considerable freedom to introduce topics or information that they considered 
relevant.  These measures ensured, where possible, the narrative data collected 
reflected the participants’ own constructed social world; conveyed through a logic 
determined by them and not me (May, 2001).  
The majority of interview questions I had developed were covered with all 
interviewees.  However, the subject areas I addressed with participants were 
more uniform at the beginning of the study and became more divergent as the 
study progressed.  The practice of theoretical sampling (Charmaz and Bryant, 
2011), the selection of interviewees whose experience was relevant to the theory 
emerging from the analysis of my data, required that I explore different topics and 
areas of activity with different participants as the study developed.  Appendix B 
contains examples of the subject areas covered with interviewees and the 
question guides used at different stages.  Some interviews transcended the bounds 
of the ‘semi-structured’ format and became more ‘open ended’ (Noaks and Wincup 
2004).  This created a more abductive discourse (Rapley 2001); the interview 
becoming a forum in which knowledge was co-constituted between participant 
and researcher.  The resulting narratives are reflective of a ‘deep mutual 
understanding’ (Rapley 2001) that provided the greatest insight possible into the 
way that my interviewees saw their world, but that also gave rise to 
methodological challenges relating to reflexivity, insider status, trust and bias. 
Recording of Data  
The majority of interviews were audio recorded.  However, 9 interviewees 
declined recording because of concerns about confidentiality and their 
employment status.  These participants agreed that written notes be taken during 
the interview.  One of these interviewees agreed to allow me to audio record a 
second interview having refused during the first.  I also conducted three focus 
groups as part of my process of triangulation.  These were recorded in hand 
written notes.  All audio recordings were transcribed, either personally or through 
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a commercial transcription service with which I had a confidentiality agreement.  
Where interview data was particularly sensitive I carried out the transcription 
myself.  
Data Limitations  
All research has limitations, and there are some limitations to the data I have 
collected.  The study deals with predominantly retrospective accounts.  These are 
subject to the memory of the participants, who at times were recalling events up 
to 40 years in the past.  While memory is both selective and deteriorates over time 
(Sudman and Bradburn, 1973), these considerations are perhaps less pertinent in 
my type of research as my focus was less on the ‘facts’ of an action or incident than 
on the manner in which an experience was reconstructed and given meaning by 
the interviewee.  All of the interviewees remained active in the private security 
sector, or had only recently ceased to be active in the sector and it was their 
memory of events, the chain of their interactions (Collins, 2004) that defined the 
actions they would take, or had recently taken.  The focus of this research was not 
to achieve a factual understanding of what had happened to the participants 40 
years ago, but instead to understand how they interpreted these experiences and 
how this interpretation affected their own practice and that of the industry in 
which they worked. 
The ‘rationalisation’ of motivations (Viterna, 2006) was also a factor.  This was 
something of a ‘double edged’ phenomenon.  While rationalisation could cloud the 
determination of the actual cause or intention behind an action, the process of 
rationalisation provided rich interpretive territory for understanding the 
boundaries of normativity and transgression interviewees constructed.  In some 
cases my ‘insider’ status served to minimise the potential for rationalisation as the 
circumstances and context of some events were known to me.  This benefit was 
counterbalanced by the danger that, through shared experience, I and the 
interviewee may have mutually assumed the rationale behind certain 
circumstances, and inadequately tested and explored this for the benefit of the 
reader (Daly, 1992).  
Where interviews were not recorded the accuracy of data may be somewhat 
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diminished.  I sought to be as accurate as I could in note taking, and that the exact 
phrases and words of the participant were recorded.  Any mistakes are entirely 
my own.  
Analysis and the Generation of Theory  
I adopted a grounded theory (Glazer and Strauss, 1967) approach to the analysis 
of my research data for a number of reasons.  My research aims went beyond the 
simple exploration and description of phenomenon.  I was familiar with the, then, 
small body of existing literature relating to the micro-sociology of the private 
security industry, of which the most developed strand focused heavily on 
analysing contractor experiences through the paradigm of gender and masculinity 
(see Chapter 1:36-37).  I was also familiar with the relatively limited research into 
the experiences of employees in the domestic security sector (Chapter 1:29).  I was 
conscious that these studies had, in the main, been explanatory and many had a 
specific theoretical focus (i.e. gender and masculinity).   
Within military sociology the work of Ouellet (2005) and Woodward and Jenkins 
(2011) had shown that factors such as spatiality, shared endeavour and proximity 
to events of historical significance were important in defining the lived experience 
of military service people.  Indeed, Paul Higate, whose research was firmly 
situated in the field of gender studies, found that other factors, such as national 
and professional identity were important in determining the private military 
security contractor’s construction of self (Higate, 2012a).  It was necessary, 
therefore, to be able to derive from my data an emergent theoretical approach 
based on the concepts and categories I was observing (Strauss and Corbin, 1990), 
but unconnected, at least at the outset, with any pre-existing theory or typology.  
In this way I could aim to develop the existing paradigms used to understand and 
define the private security field being studied.  Grounded theory provided this 
deliberate theoretical ‘épocheè’ (Field and Morse, 1985). 
Triangulation  
The extended contact I had with some research participants, together with my 
former experience within both the military and private security sectors provided 
an additional dimension to this study.  Bryman’s proposition that ‘extended 
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involvement in the social life of those he or she studies’ (Bryman 2008:201) was a 
feature of my interaction with some interviewees, as was extended immersion 
within the community being researched (Noaks and Wincup, 2004).  
Retrospectively, and pre-dating the study, my immersion in both the military and 
private security fields had been significant.  Furthermore, my current 
employment, involving the management and provision of security, meant that I 
had remained professionally associated with the private security industry and this 
assisted in the triangulation of data.  On many occasions I already knew the nature 
and extent of an interviewee’s involvement in the incidents they described, and 
their opinion, or ‘construction’, of that experience.  My ethnographic observations 
provided a useful supplementary means to triangulate interview data.  Thus my 
study has some of the benefits of the mixed methodology approach to 
triangulation advocated by Fielding (2010).  
Documentary data analysis also offered opportunities for triangulation.  A 
considerable volume of documentation was used in the generation of this study 
including reports by governments and transnational organisations, mass media 
reports, company brochures and websites, Curriculum Vitae and military and 
private security biographies.  These documents have been used to verify ‘facts’ 
(e.g., to check, where possible that a company was conducting the type of service 
that a participant described being involved with), but were also subject to a similar 
‘grounded’ analysis as that of interview transcriptions.  Documents, and memoirs 
were viewed as a subjective construction of lived experience (Atkinson and Coffey 
2004; Prior, 2003) and therefore requiring of a similarly robust process of analysis 
as that of interview data.  Even ‘official’ documents, those originated by 
government organisations or private companies, had to be considered to reflect a 
subjective representation of their own subject matter (May, 2001), the hierarchies 
they described and the controls that they proposed an ‘aspiration’ rather than a 
neutral ‘reality’.  Further, the intended audience of any document had to be 
carefully considered when analysing its conceptual content; the narrative of a 
private security memoir differing considerably from the ‘reality’ presented in 




As I came towards the end of data collection with different groups of interviewees 
I conducted focus groups, the aim of which was to triangulate data and test my 
preliminary findings.  One focus group had two participants and the other two 4 
participants respectively.  All participants had been interviewed individually prior 
to the focus group.  The focus groups addressed particular themes and topics 
emerging from my data analysis. The focus groups also allowed me to observe the 
extent to which participant narratives altered when they were in a group (Bryman, 
2008, Noaks and Wincup, 2004) or accompanied by another participant.  The 
focus groups proved particularly useful for establishing consensus around broad 
interpretive themes about which interviewees were uncertain or circumspect 
during individual interview.  For example, interviewees were more confident 
assessing the size and constitution of the military private security field when they 
could test their assumptions with peers. 
Coding  
Conscious of the ‘fairy tale’ denigration of a grounded theory in which Wacquant 
questioned the extent to which a robust process of grounded analysis was really 
conducted by scholars claiming to apply the methodology (Wacquant, 
2002:1481), I applied a deliberate structure to the generation of theory from data 
throughout the study.  This took the following form: on completion of my 
interviews transcriptions were created, this text was then subject to open (Glazer 
and Strauss, 1967; 1968) or initial (Charmaz, 2008; 2009) coding.  This involved 
the selection of a passage of text and the attribution of codes on a line-by-line 
basis.  This was carried out by reading the text while listening to the audio 
recording of the interview.  This process identified conceptual components 
present in the text and the audio data13.  Through constant comparison these 
initial conceptual components were then grouped into broader categories - 
unifying concepts or ‘axial codes’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).  Informed by theory, 
 
13 Rapley (2001) highlights the importance of detailed transcription in establishing accurately the 
meaning of participant narratives.  I used the practice of reviewing text and audio record together to 




these axial codes were themselves constantly compared.  Memos were kept on the 
theoretical concepts that emerged from this comparison (the selective coding 
process described by Glaser and Strauss).  As these theoretical concepts 
developed, they were recorded and given (provisional) placement within the 
structure of the study’s substantive chapters.  Thus, I aimed to synergize the 
development of theoretical concepts through memos, with the narrative plan for 
the thesis.  As theoretical categories emerged, these were fed back into both the 
selection of potential interview participants and interview questions.  The 
integration and refinement of theory emerged in the format of the draft chapters 
of the thesis.  Finally, these theoretical proposals, refined and tested through 
theoretical sampling and triangulation focus groups, were represented in the 
substantive chapters of the thesis and its conclusion.  
Presentation of Data  
As this study relates to the experience of real people, I was keen to retain a sense 
of proximity between the reader and the participants portrayed in the study.  It 
was only in this manner that the context of the interviewees’ understanding of 
their work could be properly understood.  As such, I have not chosen to adopt a 
matrix or graphical representation of my coding and analysis.  While theoretical 
categories I describe in the substantive chapters have been derived from the 
grounded analysis of data, I have opted to retain a narrative format in the text that 
allows the reader to best hear the ‘voice’ of the interviewee.  Quotes have been 
selected that best represent the categories of meaning and theory derived from 
the data.  The quotes included in the text are not presented verbatim but have been 
subject to minor amendments to ensure understanding by the reader. For 
example, affectations of speech such as, ‘like’, ‘you know’ and ‘basically’ have often 
been removed, and irregularities of grammar or sentence construction, common 
in the spoken register have sometimes been amended.  Without these 
amendments, both meaning and ‘voice’ may have been lost and the reading 
experience impaired.  I have remained in each case, faithful to the language, 
context and meaning of the participants’ statements as I understood them.  I have 
aimed throughout to provide an account and analysis of my interviewees’ social 
construction of private security that is both authentic and accessible.   
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Reflexivity and Insider Status  
This study generated several methodological issues worthy of note particularly in 
relation to my own position.  Beyond the simple mechanics of gaining access, 
interviewees were prepared to speak to me because they identified that, in sharing 
a common background I could be trusted to provide a more authentic (or perhaps, 
in their view, less critical) account than a researcher with different experience.  
This has allowed me to speak with a number of people who would have refused 
engagement with a researcher without this background.  The confidence 
engendered by my ‘insider’ status enabled participants to discuss very sensitive 
issues, the trust implicit in this discourse helping to ensure the authenticity of the 
participants’ narratives. 
Despite this, my own position helped and hindered the research agenda.  My 
‘insider’ status, while providing me with significant existing knowledge of the field 
of study, access to participants and narratives not open to other researchers, and 
affording me a greater sensitivity to their nuanced responses (Padgett, 2008 and 
Kacen and Chaitin, 2006), also risked compromising the integrity of the data I 
collected through inner circle assumptions (Daly, 1992), projection biases (Drake, 
2010) or a simple desire not to challenge interview participants by taking them 
into areas that might have been less comfortable for them, but nonetheless 
necessary to meeting the research aims.  Constant reflexive self-examination was 
therefore at the heart of this study.  
Yet, it was inevitable that, in conducting this research I affected and influenced my 
interviewees just as they influenced and affected me. One participant exemplified 
a sentiment expressed by a number of interviewees when he said, ‘it’s interesting 
to take a break and think about why you do what you do. It gives you a different 
perspective.  You start to think about what the aim really is’ (James).  In turn, my 
own view of the military and private security has changed through contact with 
my interviewees and reading and thinking about the literature and scholarship 
that underpinned this study.  As Berger (2015) observed, knowledge production 
cannot exist independently of the researcher producing it.  The findings of this 
thesis are therefore derived from a co-constitution of knowledge between the 
research participants and me; an approach that replicates the ‘abductive’ analysis 
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of data described by Jo Reichertz (2007).  However, adopting this approach meant 
that recognising and managing my own subjective dispositions and biases was 
critical if I was to ensure the reliability of my data (Kirk and Miller, 1986). 
Trust and Bias  
The recognition of bias associated with shared experience was a significant 
dynamic in this study.  This became the subject of constant review with my 
supervisor and other research colleagues.  In these conversations I would discuss 
my attitudes and feelings about the private security sector, and review the extent 
to which these attitudes aligned or diverged from those of my academic 
colleagues.  Through this discourse I was able to explore, and reflect upon, the way 
in which people without military or private security experience constructed their 
understanding of these fields of social activity, and to try to challenge my inner 
circle assumptions.  This process was aided by my grounded theory methodology.  
The analysis of narratives through social theory provided me with an increasingly 
divergent understanding of the logic and motives that underpinned my 
interviewees’ construction of their experience.  Through this I confronted the 
central challenge of the researcher using ‘insider’ access: that of distancing oneself 
from the ‘doxa’ (Bourdieu, 1977:165-7; 2000) of the researcher’s former field to 
ensure the rigor of research, while at the same time not losing the contextual 
understanding of the participants’ logic, and maintaining a communicative 
register that encouraged the exploration of ‘back region’ narratives (Goffman, 
1959:93).  In short, there was a necessity to remain steeped in the logic that 
underpins practice in the field, while at the same time distancing oneself from that 
same logic.  
Accepting the dissonance of these two positions, and embracing the simultaneous 
‘insider/outsider’ status of the researcher described by Lofland (1971), the 
reflexive quality of the research became an important measure of its rigour 
(Gemignani, 2011; Pillow, 2003).  Maintaining this dissonant insider/outsider 
position left me with feelings of discomfort and guilt, that through my actions I 
was ‘betraying’ the research participants whom I interviewed.  This feeling was 
not dissimilar to the emotion described by Stein (1964) in his study of working-
class miners.  My understanding of the trust placed in me by the interviewees and 
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their expectation that my background made me a sympathetic audience I knew to 
be at odds with the critical manner in which their narratives would be interpreted 
when exposed to social theory and an academic audience.  While this discomfort 
existed I was reasonably confident that my analysis acknowledged the ‘doxic’, 
unspoken logic of the military, or private military security fields.  At times this felt 
uncomfortably like deception, my own interaction with interviewees tailored to 
ensure that the most negative elements in the study could be explored without 
engendering a response that might curb access; a position not dissimilar (although 
perhaps less extreme) than that experienced by Leon Festinger in his 
ethnographic exploration of apocalyptic cults (Festinger et al., 1956) and 
reminiscent of Klatch’s discomfort in her discourse with ‘pro-life’ activists (Klatch, 
1988)14.  
Elite Status and ‘Dirty Work’  
Of the 30 participants interviewed, almost all self-identified as being, or having 
been a member of an elite group.  These constructions of elitism were most often 
the result of affiliation with military units that had a particularly stringent physical 
selection (n=18), practiced ‘high policing’ or ‘non-green army’ (see Chapter 1) 
roles (n=15), or who held special status as a result of their military rank15 and/or 
professional position (n=5).  Additionally, three interviewees were part of the 
‘business elites’ identified by Atkinson, Roberts and Savage (2012:2); a ‘fusion’ of 
business owners, ‘high level managers’ and ‘top level professionals’ in major 
businesses and corporations.  Given these elite statuses I experienced similar 
methodological challenges to that of other ‘elites research’ (Aguiar and Schneider, 
2012), but also, as a former officer, had to manage the perception of my own ‘elite’ 
status in the eyes of some of my interviewees. 
 
14 Leon Festinger and his group had to maintain the outward appearance of adherence to an 
apocalyptic cult while conducting their ethnography When Prophecy Fails.  Klatch describes her 
experiences of conducting ethnography among members of a ‘pro-life’ group.  She explains the 
dissonance that she experienced when research participants assumed that she held views 
sympathetic to those of the group that she was studying.   
15 Characterised in this study as holding the commissioned officer ranks traditionally associated with 




As well as being members of elite groups, participants were also members of 
groups that were subject to a ‘dirty work’ construction (Hughes, 1958, Ashforth 
and Kreiner, 1999), particularly in relation to the potential use of coercive force 
as an element of their role, both in their former military professions and within 
private military security 16 .  Members of occupations subject to a ‘dirty work’ 
stigma often have to conduct social relations with people, inside and outside their 
occupation, who do not share their values and beliefs.  In so doing they employ 
what Goffman described as ‘front’ and ‘back region’ narratives (Goffman, 
1959:93).  ‘Front region’ narratives are those used when the audience is not 
intimate and their response to the exposure of the ‘dirty worker’s’ professional 
reality may engender moral opprobrium or disapproval.  ‘Back region’ narratives 
are those engaged in with trusted colleagues or intimate friends and family.  These 
narratives are expressed in circumstances free from the potential moral challenge 
to the workers’ identity of a disapproving audience (Dick, 2005)17.  As such, they 
are a more ‘authentic’ and reliable expression of the individual’s lived experience. 
In my research, I intended my ‘insider’ status to be used to elicit ‘back’ as well as 
‘front’ region narratives.  The division between ‘front’ and ‘back’ region narratives 
in the interviews was often very clear.  In some cases the ritual of the interview 
initially meant participants adopted a ‘front region’ narrative even when they 
were well known to me.  In other cases, interviewees, although only recently 
introduced to me, moved quite quickly into both subject matters and modes of 
discourse identifiably more ‘back region’.  At times participants gave verbal cues 
that they were moving into ‘back region’ discourse through the use of vernacular 
language or profanity.  In other cases, ‘back region’ narratives were addressed 
outside the environment of the formal interview.  This was particularly the case 
where I spent an extended amount of time with an interviewee before or after the 
interview had been concluded.  Observations from these informal conversations 
were recorded in writing when I had the opportunity.  
 
16 See Higate et al. (2019) on the ’spoiled identity’ of military reservists. 
17 Dick (2005:1374) illustrated the use of ‘front’ region narratives when interviewed about their use of 
coercive force. She saw this as a means by which the interviewees managed ‘power relation’ of the 
interview by minimizing the potential for moral opprobrium.   
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On occasion a participant’s view of my status became a factor too.  One 
interviewee, a former junior non-commissioned officer who had been talking 
quite freely, on finding out that I had served as a commissioned officer, altered his 
register and addressed me as ‘sir’ for the remainder of the interview, our relative 
status in our former profession re-asserting itself in a way that prevented me from 
retaining the rapport we had gained.  The way constructions of rank/status 
affected participants’ narratives, and the manner in which my former status could 
affect the way in which I viewed participant narratives, became an important 
element of my reflexive self-examination.  This highlighted that ‘insider status’ 
was more complex than the binary insider/outsider paradigm suggests.  While 
holding the broad status of an insider, my specific experience and background 
dictated the extent to which I was ‘more or less’ an insider.  In this case the ex-
junior non-commissioned officer, his perception of my ‘officer’ status established 
my ‘otherness’; the interviewee’s change of register indicating that there was a 
realm of constructed experience that they were not prepared to share with a 
former officer.    
Analysis of the narratives provided in the interview showed how the interviewee 
altered his presentation of decisions surrounding the use-of-force,  the ‘dirty 
work’ circumspection of moral judgment reasserting itself and causing him to 
present his decisions as being clearer and less ambiguous after he had identified 
my ‘officer’ status.  As well as a changing both the register and content of our 
discourse, this represented a change to the nature of ‘consent’ implicit to the 
interview.    
Research Ethics and Consent  
The LSE Research Ethics Committee reviewed the research discussed in this 
thesis.  All participants to the study were provided with a study sheet including a 
short explanation of the nature of the study and signed an ‘informed consent’ form 
(see Appendix C).  This form made undertakings as to the security and 
management of the data that I would obtain in interview.  It also provided an 
undertaking to participant anonymity and, where possible, the anonymity of 
organisations and individuals referred to in interview.  This approach was 
intended to protect interviewees and allow the research participants to talk as 
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freely as possible about negative as well as positive experiences.  I also agreed to 
contact participants prior to publication of any sensitive or prejudicial 
information relating to them.    
Within the interviews, the establishment of the boundaries of consent was a 
constant reflexive dynamic.  Indeed, the nature of the information communicated 
in the interview was characterised by interplay between three competing 
constructions of consent.  The first was the extent to which interviewees were 
prepared to volunteer narrative data, answer questions, provide opinions or, even, 
consider the subject matter that I wanted to pursue.  The second construction of 
consent was formed by the ‘rules’ of consent included in the study sheet and 
consent form, albeit understood differently by interviewer and interviewee.  The 
third construction of consent was based on my own experience as interviews 
progressed; a subjective interpretation of the subject matter that I ‘should’ be able 
to discuss with the interviewees.  In practice this meant that consent was multi-
faceted and consistently negotiated throughout the different stages of the 
interview.  This interplay was often subtle and not always explicit, but resulted in 
an accommodation as to what could, or should be discussed in interview that 
differed in almost every case.  For this reason, no matter how carefully proscribed 
the study sheet, consent was not uniform or static, it was the subject of constant 
re-interpretation throughout the period of contact between the researcher and 
participant. 
During the study I spent many hours with some participants outside the 
environment of interview.  Some I met socially fairly frequently, others I spent 
considerable time with before and after interviews had been conducted.  On these 
occasions my study, and private security in general, was a constant source of 
conversation.  Frequently participants offered interpretations, opinions and 
examples that were clearly communicated as a result of their relevance to the 
study.  The direct quotations that I use in the thesis are all taken from the 
interviews in which the boundaries of consent were more or less clear.  Data 
provided to me outside the context of interview I have incorporated into field 
notes, and included where relevant in my analysis, but I have not included this 
data as reported speech or attributed material to an individual participant.  Two 
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participants whose interviews included particularly sensitive data provided me 
with feedback via e-mail on the material I wanted to include in the thesis.  Their 
wishes in relation to this have been honored in the text. 
In this study I have aimed to provide an authentic account of how those working 
in the field of private military security see and experience their work.  Further, 
through analysis of these accounts I develop a theoretical position that explains 
why work in this field is experienced in the way it is.  In so doing I hope this 
research improves the understanding of private military security and its 
relationship with civil society.  During this study I have asked my interviewees to 
engage in discourse that involved greater reflection and, at times, more intimacy 
than most conversations between peers in my erstwhile professions usually 




Chapter 3: Industry Development, Structure and Governance  
Industry Structure Overview  
What is the United Kingdom private military security industry?  How is it defined 
and who defines it?  How is it different from other areas of private security 
provision?  Which services, practices and activities fall within its scope, and how 
are these areas of practice understood, constituted and expressed by industry 
practitioners?  In this Chapter I describe the ‘scope’ of UK private military security.  
In so doing I focus on two important phases of industry development identified by 
my interviewees.  The first is ‘the Circuit’, a term used to describe the private 
security industry between the 1960s and 1990s 18 .  The second phase, the 
‘corporate security’ era, extends from the 1990s through to the current day.  In 
this section I discuss the expansion of private security services following the 
Global War on Terror, and the maritime security boom of the early 2000s.   
This Chapter draws from the experiences of a number of participants who were 
involved, and in some cases influenced the development of the UK private military 
security industry:  Craig, an ex-Special Forces, freelance security consultant was 
involved in the security ‘Circuit’ of the 1980s and corporate security in the 1990s 
and 2000s; Roger, a former military officer, was responsible for managing a 
number of major United Kingdom firms throughout the days of  ‘the Circuit’ and 
into the corporate era.  Mike, an accountant, and civilian, occupied senior 
executive positions in private military security companies and brought a 
businessman’s perspective to the emerging industry; and Lawrence, another 
former military officer was a corporate executive in a maritime security business. 
My participants provided a description of the breadth and extent of the ‘field’ of 
private security within which they were active.  To reinforce these narrative 
explanations, I have sought to provide a visual representation to the reader that 
reflects how my participants saw their field of work.  This approximate topology 
was drawn from two of the focus groups I conducted towards the end of the study.  
Here, participants were provided with a single piece of paper with a timeline on 
 
18 Bob Shepherd uses the same term in his memoir ‘the Circuit’ (Shepherd, 2008).  Shepherd’s ‘Circuit’ 
extends well into the post War on Terror era demonstrating that the term is still in common use.    
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the x-axis corresponding to the duration that they considered the private military 
field in its current form had been active.  The y-axis was split between domestic 
and international work and further divided into an approximate assessment of the 
number of people actively engaged in the field.  The task was intended to 
collaboratively develop a visual representation of the private military security 
field and its development.  Groups were asked to record significant points that 
explained the changes represented in their diagram.  The results are reproduced 
below: 
Participant Constructions of Military Private Security Field Topology 
 
 
 Focus Group 2     Focus Group 3 
This visual representation was not based on hard data, and was the subject of 
some uncertainty and debate between interviewees.  No directly comparable data 
exists that would indicate the number of people involved in the UK centric, 
transnational provision of private security and military services represented in 
this chart.  However, the trends illustrated are broadly consistent with figures that 
indicate a considerable rise in spending on private military security by the UK 
Government in the period between 2003 and 2008 (Freedom of Information Act, 
2012) and globally between 2003 and 2012 (War on Want, 2016:4).  They also 
broadly correspond with White’s (2017) analysis of the employment trajectories 
of ‘private military veterans’. Perhaps more importantly for the purposes of this 
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study it provides an insight into the way in which participants understood and 
constructed the scope and extent of the industry, and the nature of the ‘field’ in 
which they worked.  This ‘field’ was perceived to encompass predominantly 
former British military service people (overwhelming men) who engaged in the 
operational provision of security internationally and domestically.  It did not 
encompass third country nationals with whom interviewees may have worked 
while overseas, but did include former British Army Gurkhas.  As such, there were 
both a gendered and racialised aspects to the construction of field.  Accepting 
these limitations, the chart provides a visual key to some of the major dynamics 
discussed in this chapter. 
The Circuit 
Craig was in his 60s, heavy set and athletic in build, his one visible concession to 
age being the reading spectacles he used to examine text.  Before making the 
transition to private security Craig served in the British Army as a Non-
Commissioned Officer in the 22nd SAS Regiment.  He was a veteran of the 
Regiment’s secret involvement in the conflict in Oman during the 1970s.  Leaving 
the military in the early 1990s he began working in private security.  Craig’s 
experience in this sector extended across a range of activity both domestic and 
international; he routinely undertook four security jobs a year throughout his 
career, often working for different private security companies doing security 
training, ‘operational work’ (usually close protection, or ‘body guarding’) and 
consultancy (often involving security assessments and contract management). 
Early in our conversation Craig described himself ‘a veteran of the Circuit’, a term 
he used to define the early years of the development of the modern private 
military security industry in the United Kingdom and, more than this, the informal 
network of (predominantly) former UK Special Forces personnel who transitioned 
into private security work on completion of their military service.   The 
construction of ‘the Circuit’ to which Craig referred was more than just a temporal 
‘phase’ in the industry’s development, or simply a group of professional contacts; 
it described a series of practices, behaviours and values that characterised this 
form of elite private security.  For Craig, his involvement in ‘the Circuit’ defined his 
professional identity.  He described himself as ‘a product’ of the Circuit; a security 
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operator with a specific brand of knowledge and expertise; part of a generation of 
actors with a ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1990) of security practice that has been 
foundational in the development of the United Kingdom private military security 
industry. 
At the time of Craig’s transition from the military, private security was a relatively 
obscure field of practice that attracted little public attention.  As a contemporary 
of Craig observed: 
‘The private security industry in 1989 was really a very unknown industry.  
I guess what you would have is normal manned-guarding and static-
guarding work, and then a lot of the close protection was an overspill for 
people that live in London, experienced doormen, the big gorilla, or ‘men in 
black’ type image.   There was a more specialist side of the private security 
industry which was really born in the late 70s and early 80s.  Predominantly 
that was controlled by Control Risks Group, DSL/ArmorGroup and 
companies like Saladin, doing big training jobs or consultancy.  Most with a 
memorandum of understanding with the FCO19.’ (Ryan) 
Even at this early stage within the industry there was a division between two 
separate ‘fields’ of practice.  A less specialist ‘civilian’ sector of security, tied to 
traditional manned guarding and incorporating nightclub and venue doormen 
who may have transitioned into the ‘body guarding’ of celebrity and show 
business clients in a domestic (i.e. London) environment; and a more specialist 
sector oriented to overseas contracting and predominantly employing former 
military personnel.  This social construction underpins the concept of ‘the Circuit’, 
which was clearly linked to the latter type of security practice. 
Craig traced the history of ‘the Circuit’ to the actions of David Stirling, the former 
founder of the SAS Regiment during the 1960s:  
‘It all stems from Stirling, David Stirling.  In the sixties he set up Watchguard 
International.  They did one or two jobs in East Africa20 and maybe in the 
Middle East and it wasn’t very big or very well-known and it would be 
literally down to less than twenty people involved at that.’  
 
19 Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
20 See also Musah and Fayemi (2000) on Watchguard’s activities in Zambia between 1967 and 1969.  
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Craig suggested that the security company Watchguard originated from Stirling’s 
involvement in the Mau-Mau insurgency of 1950s.  The company’s work continued 
beyond Africa with discreet operations in Yemen, ostensibly sanctioned by the 
British government, providing military services to counter the presence of 
Nasser’s Egyptian forces in the country during the civil war of 195921.  However, 
Watchguard’s activity considerably expanded following the kidnap of the Saudi 
Arabian Minister of Petroleum Ahmed Zaki Yamani (and other OPEC oil ministers) 
by ‘Carlos the Jackal’ at a summit in Vienna in 1975: 
‘The thing that kicked it all off then was when Yamani was taken by Carlos 
in seventy-five.  He was the Chief Negotiator for OPEC.  Now, this is hearsay, 
the Saudi’s paid massive [to secure Yamani’s release] fortunately, for 
whatever reason they negotiated a settlement.  Carlos disappeared, Yamani 
was released, but Carlos seemingly told Yamani that next time he wouldn’t 
be so lucky.  So when the Saudis paid Yamani to carry on doing this work 
on their behalf, he said “okay but I want a proper bodyguard team not those 
people who ran away”22.  A bloke called Jim Johnson who was, I think ex 
SIS23, he had been in the SOE24 during the war, David Walker, he was an 
EOD 25  Engineer, been an Oxford graduate; he had been a Troop and 
Squadron Commander in G Squadron26 , He was just about leaving [the 
military] and the three of them, Jim Johnson, with his connections to the 
City and the intelligence services, David Walker, with his recent 
connections to R Squadron, he was OC27  R Squadron28  at the time, and 
Brigadier Wingate Gray, who was an old Colonel of the Regiment29, those 
three then put KMS together, Keenie Meenie Services.’ (Craig) 
In the foundation of KMS Craig described the establishment of a security 
‘assemblage’ (Abrahamson and Williams, 2011) based around a small network of 
people connected by their service in, or affiliation with, the SAS Regiment.  This 
 
21 See also Kinsey (2006:44-46) on Sterling’s involvement in Yemen and the formation of Watchguard.   
22 Yamani’s Saudi bodyguards allegedly fled the scene when the group led by Carlos the Jackal 
attacked the summit. 
23 SIS, The Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) 
24 SOE, the Special Operations Executive, a clandestine organisation founded by Winston Churchill to 
wage unconventional warfare against the Germans during the Second World War, a forerunner of the 
SAS. 
25 EOD, Explosive Ordinance Demolition (bomb disposal). 
26 G Squadron is one of the four operational, or ‘Sabre’ Squadrons of the SAS.  A Squadron consists of 
approximately 65 SAS soldiers broken down into 4 Troops. 
27 OC, Officer Commanding. 
28 R Squadron was a Territorial Army Squadron of the SAS comprising former regular soldiers and 
providing a reserve to the regular army SAS for casualty replacement in the event of war. 
29 The 22nd SAS Regiment 
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core group, possessing high social capital, and the specific symbolic capital of elite 
military service, had connections to a number of correspondingly elite 
organisations within the world of business and government intelligence.  These 
connections made it possible to commodify the counter-terrorism skills that they 
had acquired during their military service.  Craig describes how the first ‘job’ 
carried out by KMS was ‘putting together a bodyguard team for Yamani’.  KMS’s 
business developed from here and ultimately resulted in a project that came to be 
called ‘The Goat Farm’, the establishment of the Sultan’s Special Force in Oman; in 
Craig’s words, the creation of a Special Forces regiment of the Oman army ‘raised, 
trained, paid, all the logistics provided, procurement, everything done from the 
commercial company in London; A brilliant operation’.   
KMS’s focus was not restricted to international work.  ‘They also had another 
organisation running on the side called Saladin.   Saladin did everything in the UK’ 
(Craig).  Another interviewee (Gary) described having carried out surveillance 
tasks in London for Saladin including the observation and infiltration of 
environmental protest groups.  Thus, even at this formative stage in the 
development of the private military security industry, individuals would 
frequently transition between security work in the international and domestic 
spheres. 
KMS’s development was not unique.  During the same period other former 
members of UK Special Forces were developing commercial opportunities for the 
sale of security services:  
‘At about the same time that KMS was getting set up there was another 
small group set themselves up as Control Risk.  That was in the mid-
seventies and people like Arish Turle, another Squadron Commander, and 
a very, very innovative and bright guy, and Simon Adams-Dale, and they 
had a connection with the insurance company Hiscox’ (Craig).   
Through their connection with the City of London insurance industry, Control 
Risks began providing kidnap and ransom consultancy to a raft of companies and 
individuals responding to growing public consciousness of terrorist hijacks and 
hostage taking.  The establishment of Control Risks was quickly followed by that 
of DSL, Defence Systems Limited, another London based security company formed 
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by former SAS Officers Alistair Morrison and Richard Bethel.  Craig describes 
KMS/Saladin, Control Risks and DSL as ‘the three big players all the way through 
the eighties’.  In Craig’s words the work of these companies, ‘ticked along with jobs 
in Sri Lanka, body guarding the Sultan of Brunei, the Maktoums 30 , all the big 
players, Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador to the US’.  This situation prevailed 
until the advent of large-scale oil industry engagement in Algeria in the early 
1990s.   
Thus, from the 1960s to the 1990s ‘the Circuit’ provided an opportunity for a small 
group of, mainly, former-UK Special Forces soldiers to commoditise the skills 
acquired in the elite military establishment within a market where supply and 
demand remained fairly stable.  Craig described an industry where, for certain 
types of work, such as complex physical security and asset protection tasks in 
hostile environments, all the major industry companies would be accessing a pool 
of seven to ten former-military contractors sufficiently experienced and trusted to 
undertake this work.  The requirement to have already established oneself as a 
‘credible operator’ within military Special Forces (or associated units) acted as an 
informal control over access to this labour market. This, coupled with the ‘social 
capital’ of network access to potential clients, meant that those former SAS 
soldiers at the heart of ‘the Circuit’ experienced very little uncertainty in their 
ability to continue routinely accessing discreet and well paid employment.  The 
alignment between the elite former soldiers and international political elites 
(particularly in the Middle East and Africa), as well as business elites still 
benefitting from residual post-colonial advantage (again, particularly in African 
markets), coupled with the privileged patronage (or benign acquiescence) of the 
British intelligence and foreign policy establishment, underpinned this small but 
stable market for military security knowledge and services.   
In Craig’s view, the first real change to this status quo took place in the 1990s.   The 
Algerian Civil War (beginning in 1991) saw the targeting of western oil workers 
by the GIA 31  and other Islamist groups opposed to the secular Algerian 
 
30 Ruling family of the United Arab Emirates. 
31 Groupe Islamique Armé 
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Government.  Craig described how, during this war, over a period of 20 months, 
violence cost the lives of 117 expatriate workers (Thornbury, 2011).  The 
acceleration of violence in Algeria created an increase in demand for commercially 
available military security expertise.  For the first time the ‘big three’ companies 
were unable to meet the demands of the international oil corporations through 
the small pool of predominantly former-SAS circuit ‘insiders’.  Another challenge 
for British security companies was that Algeria was a former French colony and, 
while many former SAS soldiers spoke Arabic as a legacy of operations during the 
1970s in Oman, very few spoke French.  It was natural therefore that companies 
began to recruit French speaking ex-foreign legionnaires who themselves became 
incorporated into ‘the Circuit’s’ inner circle.  With the expansion of business in 
Algeria a small number of new companies entered the market and began to 
compete with the ‘big three’32.  However, the impact of this remained limited.  The 
incorporation of former Foreign Legion French speakers providing less a 
‘democratisation’ of the labour force than another esoteric pool of regional ‘Africa 
specialists’ the recruitment of whom was, if anything, more arcane than that their 
British Special Forces counterparts33.   
Craig considered that, even during its period of greatest activity, ‘the Circuit’ 
remained a relatively ‘exclusive club’ involving only ‘a few hundred’ active 
members.  These were characterised by their ‘credible military background’ and 
experience of working independently in areas of conflict.  Further, the structure of 
the companies operating during the ‘Circuit’ era replicated the class based rank 
structure of the British military.  Business owners, the first modern generation of 
military security entrepreneurs, were of the officer class, often former Squadron 
or Troop Commanders in the SAS.  The work of security consultancy, or 
operational service provision, carried out in large part by former Non-
Commissioned Officers of the same organisation.  These former NCOs would 
 
32 This included the companies Stirling (another firm associated with David Stirling, founder of the 
SAS) and Generik. 
33 One interviewee described the difficulty of conducting pre-employment due diligence on members 
of the French Foreign Legion ‘The only way you can be really sure they have done what they say they 
have done is if you have a contact in the central Legion personnel office in Castlenaudary.  The Legion 




transition between a number of companies conducting a variety of tasks, the 
military capital of their Special Forces experience and the social capital of network 
access to the ‘officer cast’ of business entrepreneur (and the elite clients with 
whom they had contact), guaranteeing a stable post military second career. 
Craig considered the ‘heyday’ of “the Circuit” to have been the Algerian war of the 
1990s.  For him this provided both interesting work and lucrative remuneration 
as demand for his services increased.  However, the increasing demand for 
security services by major corporations engaged in the early stages of neoliberal 
globalisation also heralded the ‘swan song’ of ‘the Circuit’ as a restricted, discreet 
and privileged market in which unofficial social control maintained a certain 
standard of operations (and operator):   
‘Well in Algeria when these hundred expats were killed the daily rate went 
up very nicely, levelled off again and then after the Twin Towers, I mean 
for nine months my feet didn’t touch the ground.  I was visa’d up to work 
in Pakistan. In fact I was working in Pakistan when it happened.  So I mean 
Algeria was a good impulse - I am looking at it purely from an ex two-two34 
guy’s point of view - Algeria was manageable in that the market had got too 
big, but big enough for us to be able to cope with it.  After nine eleven, and 
especially when they decided to go into Iraq, the Circuit as it was, couldn’t 
handle it; they didn’t have the men.  So basically they started watering 
down the product.  If I’m the product of the Circuit, Iraq watered it down.’ 
(Craig) 
Craig’s depiction of ‘the Circuit’ demonstrates all the characteristics of a 
Bourdieusian ‘field’ (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Bourdieu 1988; 1996a; 1996b; 
1999; 2005; Bourdieu et al., 1990a and 1990b), it had a spatial locus and members 
met, worked and communicated with each other.  But it was also sphere of activity 
defined by a series of ‘norms of practice’, behaviours that constituted the ‘habitus’ 
of the field’s participants, mostly derived from former military experience.  Within 
the field different forms of capital interacted.  The military, symbolic and social 
capital (Bourdieu 1986:241-258) that Craig derived from his service in an elite 
military unit allowed him to ‘move’ successfully within the field.  In so doing he 
associated with groups of military entrepreneurs, often former-Special Forces 
 
34 Ex two-two, an ex-member of the 22nd SAS Regiment. 
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officers, themselves possessed of social capital that provided access to elite clients, 
and economic capital sufficient to allow them to create and run the businesses that 
employed Craig for much of his career.   However, the exchange and interrelation 
of capital were not static.  Globalisation and neoliberal economics (Harvey 2005; 
Rose and Miller, 2010) altered the opportunities for financial capital and with it 
the ‘field’ of military private security changed, as in Craig’s view, did the practices 
and behaviours of actors within the sector. 
The development of the private security industry can be seen to be the result of a 
raft of socio-economic changes that have not been restricted to the United 
Kingdom (Weiss 2007).  Musah and Fayemi (2000) observe how, in Africa, these 
changes have created new opportunities for the commoditisation of military 
activity in ways that have both paralleled and converged with the UK private 
military security industry.  As Kinsey (2006:58) highlights, the growth of the 
United Kingdom private security industry cannot be viewed in isolation from its 
international counterparts.  Pete, whose story I examine in detail in Chapter 7, 
observed that ‘the South Africans had their own Circuit’.  Thus, the conception of 
‘the Circuit’, and private military activity generally as ‘fields’ allows us to see how 
these ‘communities of practice’ can exist with their own discreet behaviours and 
logic, while at the same time interacting to influence and change the nature and 
development of other fields with their own distinct national focus.   
The Development of Corporate Military Security 
Roger’s office was modern, functional and understated – and located 
ostentatiously close to Britain’s locus of state power; minutes walk from Whitehall 
and nestled in the expensive housing of the ‘business end’ of Belgravia.  Roger was 
a former British Army officer.  Following a short period of service in a Cavalry 
Regiment, he left the military to work in the insurance industry in London.  After 
another relatively short, although not unsuccessful period in insurance, he 
returned to the military field when he applied for a role as a contract officer with 
the Army of Oman in the 1970s.  During this time Roger spent 6 years training and 
re-integrating demobilised rebels into the Sultan of Oman’s armed forces.  During 
the 1980s he took up a position with one of the ‘big three’ British security 
companies in Africa.  Here he trained militias in Mozambique in military and 
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security techniques to enable them to protect ‘critical national infrastructure’.  
Roger described this as a ‘joint state/private initiative’ that paved the way to 
Mozambique’s successful application to join the Commonwealth in 1995.  His 
career involved a number of transitions between the private military security 
sector and state organisations; he worked for the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office as an observer during the Bosnia conflict.  Following this, 
he moved into a series of senior management positions in a number of UK based 
private military security companies.  At the time of interview Roger was 
responsible for the corporate governance of one of the UK’s largest private 
security companies.  In this capacity found himself at the heart of operational and 
ethical decision-making in the industry as it has transitioned from ‘the Circuit’, to 
its contemporary ‘corporate’ form. 
Roger saw the current condition of the UK private security industry as being 
intrinsically tied to the growth of what he describes as ‘stability support’ 
operations.  These operations were the result of foreign policy interventions, 
predominantly conducted by the United States and United Kingdom (but also 
undertaken by transnational organisations such as the United Nations) that have 
aimed to influence the emergence of political and sovereign power in the post-
Cold War era.  Kinsey (2006:59) has characterised this period as one in which the 
British government sought to maintain its global position as a ‘major player’ 
internationally, protecting its commercial rights and interests, but increasingly 
affected by the constraints of international law, changes to the nature of mass 
media coverage and considerations of ethics and human rights among a domestic 
audience.  Critically, this was also a period that saw considerable constraints 
placed on state sector military spending, particularly the retention of standing 
armies of directly employed military service people (Krahmann, 2010a).  The 
phenomenon of private sector involvement in ‘stability support’ was also, in part 
the result of a political reluctance in most ‘western’ nations to see the commitment 
of national military forces to foreign policy interventions that could not be clearly 
identified as a national necessity, particularly where this may have involved the 
military sustaining casualties.  The post Cold War expectation of a ‘peace dividend’ 
and the still fresh legacy of failed military intervention by the US in South East 
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Asia, created a period between 1989 and 2001 of considerable ‘casualty aversion’ 
within western political culture (See Kull and Destler, 1999 and Von Bredow, 1994 
in Caforio: 2003:178).  It was within this changing political, ethical and 
commercial environment that the United Kingdom private security industry 
involvement in ‘stability support’ evolved. 
Roger described this development through a history of broadening interaction 
with an increasingly diverse range of civil society groups and actors.  Initially this 
interaction was brought about through the physical proximity of private security 
staff and civil society groups in regions where ‘stability support’ operations were 
being conducted: ‘Liaison with Human Rights Watch etcetera really began because 
we were sharing the same operating space’.  This in turn gave rise to the 
development of ‘personal relations’ between people working in private security 
and those engaged in humanitarian and human rights based work.  In Roger’s 
words:  ‘It [communication] comes about because somebody knows somebody; 
somebody in Human Rights Watch comes to know or meet somebody in [a private 
security company]’.  Roger described how, with this interaction, came the 
realisation that despite their different ‘methodologies and cultures’, the interests 
of the private security industry and civil society groups were ‘not so far apart’ and 
that the ‘end desire of both parties is exactly the same’.   
Roger gave the example of the Congo during the 1990s where international 
organisations and charities were concerned that private security companies were 
employing child labour and carrying weapons to intimidate a population.  He 
described how members of his company were able to clarify that, in this case, they 
were doing neither of these things, but that the work they were conducting 
supported the necessary aim of achieving economic stability in the country.  
Through this discourse a convergence of purpose was achieved, both sides 
recognising that they were working towards similar goals.  This led to further 
discussions where certain members of the private security community came to be 
seen as ‘legitimate interlocutors’, explaining the work of the industry to a growing 
range of groups in civil society (including academia).   
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‘At that time one of the Directors of [private security company] was of the 
same nationality as Singer35, and they started talking, and that bridge then 
developed.  People wanted to understand us and, because of a culture of 
positive engagement we were prepared to speak.  We believed that we 
knew our subject matter sufficiently, and were sufficiently moderate to 
mean that we could speak with credibility for the industry.’  (Roger) 
Thus, in Roger’s view, the more established firms in the United Kingdom market 
began to extend their interaction beyond the exclusive field of ‘the Circuit’ and in 
so doing started to actively shape societal perception of private military security: 
‘By 1998 my company had a culture change that was really a change of 
management.  There was a recognition that we could no longer keep the 
door closed to Amnesty international and others who were watching the 
industry, but we had to engage.  We entered into a period of positive 
engagement; if you, Amnesty, have a concern, real or perceived, come and 
talk about it.  We may not agree but we will both go away better informed 
from the process.  So a number of us began to engage with these groups 
who had concerns about us.  This provided some self-education to us, like 
looking in a mirror.  We had to see how others saw us not just how we saw 
ourselves.  Given what was going on in the rest of the world and the rise of 
Executive Outcome and Sandline36, we recognised that civil society had an 
inevitable and justifiable interest in men with guns and what they got up 
to.  It was not enough to be seen to be ‘something or other’ by other people; 
we had to define what we were and therefore work within certain bounds.  
Not just what we thought was best, but what could be written and defined 
as adequate, and when we made decisions ensure these were sustainable 
decisions that we could then justify.’ (Roger) 
In Roger’s description, the process of widening interaction with civil society 
groups had the effect of forcing elements of the industry to work to define their 
own culture, creating norms and values through the formation of administrative 
structures that, hitherto, had been informal where they had existed at all. 
This initiative, predominantly undertaken by the larger and more established 
companies, changed the manner in which these firms were managed.  Their 
internal decision-making architecture began to reflect the ‘new reality’.  Roger 
 
35 Peter Singer is an American political scientist. 
36  Companies created in the 1990s and notable for their preparedness to engage in offensive 
operations, see Singer (2003:115) 
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described the emergence of formal structures of governance within security 
companies: 
‘You have to start talking about decisions and record what you conclude; 
board minutes had to reflect an approach to this.  Thereafter, where you 
had more complicated matters it became necessary to consider an ethics 
committee to debate and research the issues that you might face.  Whether 
this is the activities of right wing groups in Latin America, and whether we 
might be a party to that or not, inadvertently.  Whether it was - should we 
engage in a contract in Burma to protect a pipeline when we consider that 
the pipeline might be constructed by forced labour?  If we were asked to 
export water cannon to Zimbabwe, did we consider that these would solely 
be used to supress democratic protest?  We had to start considering the 
issues in the business that we were offered, and to record that, so that when 
challenged, we could justify why we might have made a decision, even the 
wrong decision.  But we couldn’t be faulted for not having made any 
decision.’ (Roger) 
Roger described a period during which a vanguard of mature and established 
actors began the process of creating standards of corporate governance in an 
industry in which these standards had been largely absent.  In his view this 
development led to a division between ‘those firms up for this cultural branding 
and those who were not, those who were purely economically driven’, a 
polarisation that was exacerbated by the very rapid growth and restructure of the 
industry that occurred in the wake of the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Despite this, 
the discourse with civil society described by Roger led to the development of a 
broader structure of governance across the industry.   
In 2004 the United Kingdom Government released a Green Paper on regulation of 
the private security industry (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2002)37.  The 
release of this paper prompted the more established private security companies 
in the United Kingdom to participate in a meeting of The Royal United Services 
Institute (RUSI) at Oxford University in October 2004.  During this meeting a 
number of firms, including Erinys, AKE, Aegis and Control Risks shared a stage 
 
37 Kinsey (2006:89) proposed the publication of this Green Paper as the point at which the United 
Kingdom government accepted that private military companies were sufficiently embedded into the 
system of international security to mean that their activity, while in need of regulation, should be 
accepted as legitimate. 
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and, in Roger’s words: ‘all said the same thing; we need to work together to 
present a common front with a common code of practice’.  Even Tim Spicer, a 
central figure in the activity of both Sandline International and Executive 
Outcomes, was reported to have said ‘We reject the idea of offensive action, the 
previous model doesn’t work, the industry cannot offer an offensive capability’.  In 
so doing, he identified one of the most significant and contested boundaries of 
behaviour in private military security: that between offensive and defensive (or 
protective) security operations, a boundary that I explore in greater depth in 
subsequent chapters.  
This meeting, and the common position reached by participating security 
companies, gave rise to the formation of the British Association of Private Security 
Companies (the BAPSC), a membership organisation founded by Andy Bearpark, 
a former British government civil servant and Director of Operations and 
Infrastructure for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq (European 
Parliament, 2014).  The creation of this association aimed to provide a ‘platform’ 
for private security companies from which they could interact collectively with the 
United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).  In Roger’s view the 
creation of the BAPSC in 2005 was, at least in part, a consequence of the desire of 
the FCO to ‘legitimise’ its already considerable contact with (and in some cases 
reliance upon) the private security industry.   
The FCO’s desire to adequately structure relations with the private security sector 
became increasingly acute in the wake of the killing of 17 unarmed civilians in 
Nisour Square, Baghdad, by members of the American private security company, 
Blackwater, working on contract to the US Department of State in 2007 
(Krahmann, 2017).  In Roger’s interpretation, the mutual realisation across 
government and the industry of the potential impact of this type of ‘lapse’, led to 
further discussions being convened in 2008 sponsored by the Swiss Government.  
Representatives from the private security industry, civil society groups and 
government officials from the 17 ratifying states, formed a committee that 
oversaw the creation of The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal 
Obligations and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military 
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and Security Companies during Armed Conflict of 17 September 2008 (ICRC and 
FDFA, 2009).  
The Montreux document, a non-binding and non-legal text, articulated a common 
view of norms and standards in relation to the employment of private military 
security companies by nation states based on voluntary principles of security and 
human rights.  On conclusion, members of the Montreux Committee presented the 
document to the Swiss government.  In Roger’s words ‘we were describing 
ourselves, our own position’ and asking the Swiss Government to support the 
participants of Montreux in the creation of an industry in the image they had 
defined.  In 2009, with the support of the Swiss Government the principles 
articulated in the Montreux Document were used to underpin the development of 
the International Code of Conduct (ICoC) (ICoCA, 2009) for private military 
security companies.  The ICoC was agreed and concluded in 2010.  Following this, 
participants of Montreux requested that the Swiss Government support them in 
the creation of an international governance mechanism for private military and 
security activity.  In 2012 a formal standard, against which the compliance of 
providers of private military and security services with the ICoC was launched.  
These standards, known as ANSI/ASIS PSC.1-2012, for ground based security and 
ANSI/ASIS PSC.4-2013 for maritime security, were subject to external validation 
by third party auditors38 and were incorporated into the ISO standard 18788.39 .  
The implication of this standard for certified companies was, in Roger’s words, 
that: 
‘Everybody from Managing Director to uniformed guard has been looked 
at and their comprehension of human rights and standards of training have 
been reviewed.  All that work leads up to an industry that recognises and 
trains for the recognition of human rights as integral to its operation.  So 
the understanding of higher order considerations is presented as a 
fundamental principle of operations.’ (Roger) 
 
 
38 Such as Intertek Moody. 
39 By 2014 the first UK companies were receiving their certification to the PSC1 standard.  Despite this 
the compliance of even major companies to the standard was inconsistent.  By 2016 Control Risks 
Group, one of the most dominant companies in the market and a direct participant of the Montreux 
talks and the ICoC exercise had, according to one interviewee, only received certification for their 
Iraq operating company despite, according to their literature, having offices in 36 countries globally. 
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Iraq and The Global War on Terror 
The narratives of Roger and Craig illustrate the transformation of the UK private 
military security industry from the discreet, and often secretive work of ‘the 
Circuit’ to a structure incorporating greater integration with ‘norms of business’.  
Roger considers these to have been ‘fully embraced by the most progressive 
elements of the industry by 2005’.  However, the proposed trajectory of the United 
Kingdom private military security industry towards the norm of self-governed 
ethical stability has not been smooth.  The inception of the Global War on Terror 
in the wake of the attack on the United States on September 11th 2001, and the 
subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003, had a profound effect on the industry’s 
evolution.  While, in Roger’s view, the industry’s expansion had led to a 
strengthening of the governance structure of the field, Craig observed how 
standards of service provision had changed:  
‘This is the history of it.  So in 1999 that is how small it [The United 
Kingdom private military security industry] was; and then they flew those 
two planes into the Twin Towers.  To be mercenary about it, it created a lot 
of work.  But because of this they started watering down the product, if I 
am the product, they started watering it down by having one of our blokes40 
with a team of guys with less experience.  Some blokes working in Iraq and 
Afghan now, they are just ex- doormen.  You know a big strong lad goes 
from being a bouncer basically and they give him a sub-machine gun and 
let him loose on the streets.’ (Craig) 
This pluralisation of military (and non-military) experience caused by the number 
of new entrants to the field, and the demand for their labour, fundamentally 
affected the implicit guarantees of conduct and behaviour that participants felt 
had underpinned the professional ethos of ‘the Circuit’.  This challenged the 
perceived boundaries of the field.  
Mike’s background was not military.  He was an accountant and had acted as the 
Finance Director and Chief Financial Officer of a number of multinational 
companies.  He had begun his career in the oil industry, working for one of the 
largest global providers of oilfield services.  Through this he became familiar 
enough with the field of private security to take a position within one of the more 
 
40 A former member of the SAS. 
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established UK companies as Financial Director and subsequently CEO (a position 
he was appointed to a short time after the invasion of Iraq).  As CEO, Mike dealt 
directly with both commercial and operational elements of security provision.  He 
observed how the Global War on Terror changed the structure of the private 
military security marketplace. 
‘2001 changed the industry.  On the back of the military going into 
Afghanistan and subsequently into Iraq, and then the significant support 
function needed on the back of the Iraq War created a new industry.  So 
there is a whole heap of companies that have been born of Iraq.  There are 
some great examples of two-bit organisations turning over 100k 
beforehand, and then all of a sudden they are turning over 20 million.  
Erinys was one, Johnny Garrat’s company.  Blue Hackle another one.  Aegis 
got a 40 million a year contract when they hadn’t in fact turned over a 
penny previously.  The problem with that – with the businesses that were 
born of Iraq is that people were falling over themselves just to get workers 
– because they had to have ‘boots on the ground’. And therefore it took a 
reasonable amount of time and a number of pretty terrible incidents for the 
policies and the processes and the checks and balances to actually catch up 
with the number of people on the ground.’  (Mike) 
The expansion of activity in Iraq changed the ‘field’ of private security in respect 
of the external groups and actors with whom the industry had contact.  While 
Roger provided evidence of the development of field-to-field contact with civil 
society groups in a manner that has reinforced structures of governance in the 
sector, Mike illustrated how the expansion of Iraq negatively impacted on industry 
actors’ behaviour.  He said that there was a commonly held belief that a number 
of the major UK companies had engaged in corruption to obtain contracts 41 .  
Beyond the suspicion of corruption in Iraq, the opportunities presented by the 
conflict encouraged the development of some less salubrious field-to-field 
relations in the domestic sphere.  Mike gave the example of one of the smaller 
British security companies established at the start of the Iraq conflict: 
‘I happened to be at a function 6 months ago where the owner of this 
company was telling a bunch of entrepreneurs how he got into the game.  
 
41 A number of participants alleged that one British company had obtained a contract for the 
coordination of all private security movement in Iraq with a value of some 40 million dollars per 
annum by bribing a US official.   
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He was working for [a large US based security company].  [They] sent him 
out there [Iraq].  He saw what was going on and said to [the company] “we 
have to set up an Office”.  [The US company] decided it wasn’t for them; 
they were risk averse.  So he and his mate set up the business.  They went 
around all the usual sources of funding but couldn’t get the money.  So he 
went to an illegal moneylender in Glasgow and borrowed 250K in cash, in 
a holdall, handed over at a roadside layby.  He goes off and he buys some 
armoured vehicles off Saloon Cars in Northern Ireland that had been 
surveillance cars during the troubles.  Spray painted them as taxis and then 
ran around Baghdad just as a taxi.  Got everyone in the car to wear weapons 
and tactical kit.  Six months later he paid back the 250K plus interest of 
20% in cash. […] Anyway – you roll it on, that was 2004 – 2011 they sold 
that business for 60 million dollars.  60 million! They sold it to a private 
equity business in the States.’ (Mike) 
Thus the ‘frontier’ nature of business in Iraq (both operationally and 
commercially) can be seen to have created incentives for transgression that were 
enacted both internationally and domestically. 
Mike viewed the private military industry through the prism of business, for him 
the defining character of the companies operating in Iraq following the invasion 
was that they were ‘immature’ in a commercial sense.  The Iraq phenomenon 
encouraged this juvenility, as many providers were ‘opportunistic’, not looking at 
the sustainability and longevity of the business they were creating, but instead 
interested in ‘making hay while the sun shined’.  Mike, like Roger, felt that it was 
the larger and more established companies, focused on the development of their 
businesses beyond the ‘Iraq bubble’ that led the evolution of the industry to a more 
mature model.  Like Roger, he considered that the development of effective 
standards of corporate governance was key to this process: 
‘The quality and the rigour of those processes will be a function of the 
maturity and the size of the business.  If you look at Erinys at one point they 
had a contract to provide 17,000 Iraqis to protect a pipeline.   You think 
what the hell did you do?  They basically stood them out every 20 yards.  
How do you run a payroll process for 17 thousand people?  How do you get 
quality service in there?  How do you get accountability?  Bloody difficult.  
But did they have any reservation about taking the contract?  No, they 
didn’t.  They just said “yes we can” because it was about taking a big chunky 
contract.  Another company got the command and control contract; they 
coordinated all movements for all security companies.  What screening did 
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they have in terms of process to actually deploy and manage that contract?  
They didn’t have any reference points, they didn’t have anything.  A lot of 
these companies used these big chunk contracts that they never would 
have got outside Iraq as a way to get in to the type of things that they 
shouldn’t have been doing in the first place.’ (Mike) 
Mike highlighted one of the major problems in analysing the private security 
industry; that the nature of security work can be sufficiently diverse as to make 
the categorisation, and therefore regulation of the industry difficult (Kinsey, 
2006:9; Carmola, 2010:9-39).  This complexity was compounded by the practice 
of security companies undertaking work well beyond their core competence in 
order to establish commercial relations that might lead to more conventional 
security contracts.  The history of private security in Iraq was replete with 
examples of security companies whose activity began with the commission of ‘soft 
services’ (accommodation, transport, logistics, postal delivery etc.) that in another 
environment would have been the preserve of established specialist providers42.  
In so doing the private security industry exponentially increased its field-to-field 
relations with a range of industry actors with whom they had previously had little 
contact.  Within a short time, ‘security’ had become the business of corporate 
managers responsible for health and safety, human resources, legal-compliance, 
operations, logistics and even administration, in addition to the burgeoning 
number of Chief Security Officers, Heads of Security and security advisors 
employed by the corporate sector. 
Despite these changes, the Iraq boom was not to last.  Allan, a former-commando 
described how the employment of nationals from third countries limited the 
opportunities available for former British service personnel: 
‘First people would employ ex-British Army Ghurkhas, who were cheaper 
than UK squaddies43.  Then the same people were providing ex-Indian Army 
Ghurkhas, who were cheaper than the British Army ones.  Before you knew 
it companies were recruiting guys from Chile and Columbia, anyone who 
could carry a gun.’ 
 
42 One participant described working for a company specializing in de-mining operations that 
diversified into the procurement of luxury goods, agricultural equipment and livestock as well as the 
provision of administrative support for visa and university applications. 
43 Squaddies is a colloquial term for British soldiers. 
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Terry, a former Paratrooper, confirmed this: ‘Yes a lot of people are getting out, 
some people in Baghdad have been there a long time, but they are getting less and 
less money really, considering the job they are being asked to do’.  However, 
emphasising the constantly evolving nature of the private security industry he 
observed: ‘I always advise people to stay in [a security position] as long as they can, 
because with security as you see one door closing another country opens up’.   
Post Iraq and the Maritime Boom 
For many the opportunity that ‘opened up’ after Iraq was the growth in the 
security of international shipping following a rise in instances of piracy off the 
coast of Somalia in 2008-2009.  Lawrence, a former officer in the British Army 
Airborne Brigade, worked for a company formed to deal with this threat: 
‘The business really sprang up, as so many did, 4-5 years ago specifically to 
deal with the heightened threat of piracy.  Predominantly Somalian based 
piracy in what is now known as ‘the High Risk Area’.  Well over 200 
companies are still actively involved in providing physical security against 
that particular threat.  On a day-to-day basis that is placing armed guard 
teams on vessels as they move around the Indian Ocean and areas outside 
it.  Physical security sits at the heart of it, but there is a lot of risk 
assessment, risk advice and training that goes with that.   
In very practical terms the teams will board a vessel, normally outside the 
High Risk Area, they will spend some time working with the captain and 
the crew making adjustments to the physical security and the procedures 
on board that vessel so that when it enters the High Risk Area the ship’s 
captain is comfortable that what we [the security team] will do will not 
affect the overall management of the vessel; that he will still be in charge, 
but that we have given a significant amount of comfort to him and his crew 
as to how we would deal with an incident.  That could involve the hardening 
of various parts of the vessel, ensuring that the ‘citadel’44, the safe haven, is 
fully accessible and putting the crew go through some training. 
Increasingly our clients are looking for a broader risk management 
capability.  So the security of moving crews around the world, for instance 
when the crew fly into a country to join a vessel; how they get to the port, 
where they stay, how are they tracked, are they situationally aware of the 
environment they are in, do they need additional close protection to move 
 
44 The ‘citadel’ is an armored and secure area of a ship to which the ship’s crew will retreat if the ship 
is boarded.  . 
81 
 
into that high risk area (as is very common currently for transits between 
Cairo and Suez)?  So the risk umbrella we cover is not just from point-to-
point on a ship’s transit, but the security of crew from the point they leave 
the head office.  Part of that also includes the provision of timely and active 
intelligence to enhance that service.  Sometimes clients only take the 
intelligence bit even without the physical security.  There are also a 
network of ancillary services that we cooperate with, medical service 
providers, evacuation transport providers etc.’ (Lawrence) 
Unlike the growth of land based security in Iraq and Afghanistan, the new 
practitioners of commercial maritime security entered into an established market 
place (that of maritime sea transport) that already had a considerable 
infrastructure of objective control in place.  Risk management and corporate 
governance within the shipping industry were well-established, due in part to the 
experience that existed in the maritime industries of implementing the rules and 
norms of conduct on the high seas, as well as managing compliance across multiple 
national jurisdictions where ships docked and in whose waters they sailed. 
Lawrence described compliance with these objective standards of control as one 
of the most important elements of the provision of services to the maritime 
industry, key to both the development of new business and the maintenance of 
existing client relationships.  This range of objective control began with the type 
of compliance familiar to all businesses: ‘good practice, financial good practice, 
environmental good practice standards.  ISO 9001 45 , 14001 46  etcetera’ and 
extended to ‘flag state compliance’- the process of ensuring that the status of 
individuals on board a vessel met the requirements of maritime law and those of 
the national jurisdictions in which security personnel found themselves 
operating: 
‘As part of that service, often not seen by the client, is all the legal flag state 
compliance that we have to adhere to, to deliver a credible service not just 
the route of a vessel from port to port, but the flag state of that vessel, what 
does that mean in terms of security? What [does a jurisdiction] allow and 
what do they not allow?  The fact that that vessel may be owned by one 
party chartered by another party and then sub-managed by a third party, 
so you have got multiple stakeholders involved in that business.  
 
45 International Standards Organisation quality management standards. 
46 International Standards Organisation environmental management standards. 
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Understanding all of those dynamics is key.’ (Lawrence) 
Maritime security teams were routinely armed with military specification 
weapons (usually rifles, carbines and pistols).  Lawrence described how the most 
important systems of objective control in a maritime environment related to the 
use and potential use of firearms: 
‘The ones that are more critical for the provision of services to our clients 
naturally come about from the fact that our business was predicated on 
some use or potential use of weapons.   As soon as that is mentioned that 
throws everybody, Her Majesty’s Government and everybody, into a flat 
spin 47 .  So the procurement of those weapons, the disposal of those 
weapons, the training of people on those weapons, the compatibility of 
ammunition, the servicing of those weapons and the movement of those 
weapons is all incredibly strictly controlled.  At any stage the internal 
auditors, and indeed clients, do come in and go through these procedures.  
It is a key aspect of what they are looking at; how we control all elements 
of the use of weapons.  The second part is the personnel: who is it that 
might have to pull the trigger on that weapon?  Or who is it that makes a 
decision about a security situation regardless or not of whether a weapon 
was involved? (Lawrence) 
Lawrence said that these standards were the subject of audit by a number of 
external bodies. In the case of his own company, a chief auditing function was 
carried out by the Lloyds Register (the LRQA), a quality assurance organisation 
associated with the Lloyds of London, the chief global provider of maritime 
insurance.  However, he also highlighted that the company’s clients would 
routinely audit the governance of staff selection and the management of weapons 
(often multiple times in any calendar month).  Further, he considered that 
adherence to effective standards of objective control was reinforced by 
membership of certain industry associations; although he admitted that the role 
of voluntary industry associations in good governance was at best symbolic: 
‘Associations like SCEG 48  and SAMI 49  is less about their formal 
 
47 ‘A flat spin’ is a phrase used to describe panic or anxiety. 
48 SCEG is the Security in Complex Environments Group, a special interest group of the Aerospace 
Defence Security and Space Group.  SCEG was formed in 2011 to ‘define, develop and facilitate 
robust, internationally recognised professional standards for the UK private security sector operating 
abroad’ (SCEG 2011). 
49 SAMI, The Security Association for the Maritime Industry. 
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accreditation.  It’s about how clients perceive these groups, and if you are 
a member of this body, there is a perception that you are a credible 
organisation.  We would slightly argue that there are some companies who 
are members of these organisations that don’t have those same standards. 
But a lot of clients, and their insurers, will look at them’ (Lawrence) 
Lawrence considered that the insurance industry has been a ‘key driver’ in the 
development of modern private security (Carmola, 2010:68-77) albeit he 
considered the influence of insurers to have been more direct and encompassing 
in the maritime security sector than in other industry areas.  He attributed this to 
the existing framework of insurance surrounding international maritime freight 
transport: 
‘There are different elements to the insurance, there is the insuring of the 
hull, insuring of the cargo, insurance of the crew, so there are multiple 
different insurance interests for these vessels that move around the world.  
And given some of those well-known piracy incidents in 2008-2009 the P&I 
clubs50 and the insurers were a major driver.  [They determined] whether 
those shipping companies could move those cargoes from A-B.  But also 
they decided who would be perceived as credible providers of security 
services that might reduce the insurance risk and therefore the clients’ 
insurance premiums.’ (Lawrence) 
While the development of maritime security within an environment of more 
mature governance can be seen to effect the levels of objective control present in 
the sector, overall the constitution of the private maritime security company was 
remarkably similar to that of its land based counterpart.  At the time of interview 
Lawrence’s company employed 37 full-time corporate staff who worked within 
the 5 divisions of the company: operations, intelligence, commercial, 
administration and IT.  He described some recent changes to the employee 
constitution of the company, with a limited move towards the employment of staff 
with a background in commercial shipping rather than the military.  However, he 
insisted: 
‘The frontline security staff are former military personnel, predominantly 
Royal Marines or Special Forces or, to some extent, other parts of the 
 
50 P&I Clubs are mutual associations that provide protection and indemnity insurance to very serious 




British military or former NATO troops who’ve got the right experience.  
[All frontline staff] also have to have various seaman’s qualifications and 
have to have first aid qualifications.  So at the sharp end that decision, that 
ultimate decision, on how a security incident is dealt with, and how force is 
used, is taken by those people who have got that very strong proven 
military background.  The guidance, logistics support that might come from 
head office is predominantly ex-military, but now peppered with people 
who have other operational and logistics background and experience’. 
(Lawrence) 
Significantly, despite operating in a more developed compliance environment, the 
maritime security industry has faced the same cycle of opportunity as that 
experienced by ground based security companies in Iraq.  Lawrence described 
how the ‘demographic’ of maritime security contractors had begun to change: 
‘Initially the market place was predominantly driven by British Royal 
Marines, and to a lesser extent US naval personnel providing armed 
security on-board vessels.  That demographic has changed significantly 
with Greek teams, East Europeans, Philippinos, Sri Lankans, Indians etc.  
And there are some security companies that provide just the former type, 
and some that provide just the latter type, and there are some that provide 
a variety of teams.’  (Lawrence) 
He observed that, with the perceived threat of piracy diminishing in some waters 
clients were less and less keen to pay the costs of armed physical security.  This 
had led to pressure on the remuneration of maritime security contractors many of 
whom were leaving the industry, either to more lucrative contracts in other areas 
of private security or departing altogether.  These pressures had led to a 
consolidation of the market, with smaller maritime security companies unable to 
sustain the cost of the infrastructure required to operate effectively and larger 
companies seeing a reduction of profitability. 
As the employee constitution of private maritime security companies showed 
some evidence of transition so did the client base.  Initially the industry catered 
predominantly to the major shipping fleets:  
‘The big players the Kuhn and Nagel, Maersk, Cosco, Hapag-Lloyd the CMAs 
the MSCs.  These were fleets that would have high value cargo that was at 




This traditional client base had expanded with some evidence of a convergence 
with land based security companies in the provision of services to Oil and Gas 
majors and seismic exploration companies operating in hazardous areas.  
Maritime private security had also found a role in the protection of cruise liners 
and leisure fleets owned by large corporate bodies such as Disney and P&O.  
However, perhaps most significant was the increase of work associated with the 
protection of super-yachts owned by very ‘high net worth’ individuals and major 
corporations. 
Lawrence’s company was already diversifying away from reliance on maritime 
security contracts alone.  In his words:  
‘We have gone from being totally focused on the maritime security sector 
to [being] a broader risk management business.  In the last 6-12 months 
we’ve made some really positive steps as a company to develop that 
broader footprint in terms of our client base and expand the service 
offering because it’s very, very clear that a private maritime security 
company that just stays doing what it is doing has got a certain life 
expectancy and certainly a diminishing financial return51  
You will find that with terrorism and cyber security threats increasing and 
pressures on HM52 Government, the potential input of companies like ours 
into capacity building projects acting in support of HMG53 is certainly an 
area of opportunity. Developing the capability of the Tanzanian navy or the 
Libyan coastguard, those are the sorts of projects that, whilst not new, 
British forces, particularly Special Forces have been at it for a while, will be 
an increasing focus on the private sector to take the lead on.  It’s a young 
industry; it’s having to mature and grow very quickly and I’m sure it will 
look like something different in a few years.’ (Lawrence) 
Thus, the future, in both Lawrence and Roger’s view was in increasing integration 
 
51 In December 2015 a roundtable of international shipping associations and the oil companies’ 
international marine forum reduced the size of the High Risk Area to reflect improvements in 
maritime security in areas of the Indian Ocean (Maritime Security Review, 2015).  By April 2016 SAMI 
had gone into administration, having seen a halving of its membership numbers from a peak of 180 
during the height of maritime industry concern over Somali Piracy (Maritime Security Review, 2016). 
52 HM, Her Majesty’s 
53 HMG, Her Majesty’s Government. 
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and hybridisation of private security with state sponsored security sector reform, 
post-conflict capacity building and stability support operations, an aspiration that 
is increasingly being recognised in contemporary defence strategy (see 
Ares&Athena, 2017). 
Toward Defining the Private Military Security Field 
Craig’s account of the ‘the Circuit’ provided a picture of a private security industry, 
initially operating with very limited numbers of active participants.  Supply and 
demand within this market remained sufficiently stable to provide Craig 
employment for over 20 years.  Access to this labour market was tightly controlled 
by the secrecy of the sector, restricted networks of potential clients and informal 
social control that limited employment to people with a specific professional 
background and disposition.  Class divides, evident in the structure of ‘the Circuit’ 
have endured into the modern corporate security era.  Former officers were 
disproportionately represented in commercial and entrepreneurial activity and 
more likely to be directly employed corporate representatives.  By contrast, 
former soldiers and Non-Commissioned Officers predominated in the ‘delivery’ of 
operational security.  They were more likely to conduct their work as contractors, 
to be employed through agencies or as freelance operators and to be remunerated 
on a ‘piece-work’ basis (Weisse, 2007).  This insight provided an indication of the 
relative position of actors within the field in relation to their access to different 
forms of capital; former officers, with greater access to financial capital and 
greater social capital (but often possessed of less operational military 
experience54) brokering commercial relationships that commoditise the greater 
operational expertise, or military ‘capital’, of the soldiery.   
The constitution of work in the sector was ‘nodal’ (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; 
Shearing and Wood, 2003; Wood and Shearing, 2007), groups of individuals and 
organisations collecting together to resolve a specific security challenge or group 
of challenges.  However, the constitution of the private military security sector 
during the era of ‘the Circuit’ ensured a tight, if unofficial, anchoring to the values 
 
54 Officers serve limited terms in UK Special Forces usually lasting three to four years. 
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and interests of the United Kingdom state; ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ with the FCO 
clearly implying a form of legitimacy to participants and to their actions.  However, 
as the work of the sector became visible to a wider audience in civil society, this 
assumed legitimacy came under scrutiny and challenge.  
The development of governance (Krahmann, 2003) across the private military 
security field was presented as the result of the (ostensibly misplaced) concerns 
of civil society organisations over the sector’s potential to create and foster abuses 
of human rights.  As such, international human rights law (Sossai, 2016:239 and 
Katz and Maffai, 2016:228-237) was seen to have underpinned both civil society 
scrutiny of the sector and the development of the Montreux based standards of 
voluntary, or self-regulation (Braithwaite, 2000).  This resulted in changes to 
client purchasing decisions that spurred changes to industry practice.  Thus, the 
‘behaviour modification’ function of governance (Hood et al. 2001 in Hutter, 
2006:3) was most influenced by changes to procurement practices (Krahmann, 
2016:249) that reflected the ‘pluralized’ ‘multi-stakeholder’ governance 
initiatives with which the industry engaged (Avant and Westerwinter, 2016:124 
and De-Winter Schmitt, 2016).  In the maritime sector, insurance was seen to have 
been central to the development of the industry and to have formed the 
framework through which its governance had developed (Ericson, 2003)55.  More 
traditional transgovernmental (Keohane and Nye, 1974) governance initiatives, 
such as the United Nations Article 47 and the ban on mercenary activity (Percy, 
2016:222), were entirely absent from narratives describing the evolution of the 
sector.  This was perhaps reflective of the failure of the UN to secure international 
support for its prohibitive stance on private military activity (De-Winter Schmitt, 
2016:258), although the mercenary ‘norm’ (Percy, 2007b) did still influence 
constructions of acceptable and unacceptable conduct in the field (See Chapters 6 
and 7).  Thus, the emergence of the sector from ‘the Circuit’ into the corporate era 
was characterised by engagement with multi-stakeholder governance initiatives 
involving civil society organisations and industry practitioners, and driven by the 
norms and requirements of international human rights law and transnational 
 
55 Increasing stringency in procurement resulted in the more developed contracting and employment 




insurance and reinsurance.  
In Roger’s description of the development of private security industry governance 
we can see the interplay of objective and subjective factors that gave rise to the 
‘structure’ of the private military security field.  Throughout this, industry actors 
have been central to the creation of ‘norms’ of behaviour within the sector through 
their participation in the establishment of systems of governance.  Indeed the 
decision to engage in the creation of regulatory standards for the sector can be 
seen to have stemmed as much from the pressures of winning new business (and 
defending existing business) in the face of increasing bad publicity and societal 
scepticism, as from a subjective commitment to the values of civil society.  In so 
doing former military actors were central to the creation of a ‘field’ of activity that 
perpetuated, through legitimation and cultural reproduction, the activity of 
former military actors; and was therefore, arguably, more ‘doxic’ (Bourdieu, 
2000a) than transformative.  
The participants’ narratives of the private security sector incorporated both 
personal and contextual elements in explaining the evolution of the sector.   
Bourdieu described this as ‘ontological complicity’ (Bourdieu, 1990), 
interdependency between the subjective and objective, the habitus of the 
individual and the logic of their ‘field’, in the creation of a social reality.  Indeed 
this concept sits at the heart of Bourdieu’s theory of practice (Grenfell, 2012:44).  
From these narratives it is clear that the culture of private security described by 
the participants was not wholly a collective construction, or a ‘shared consensus’ 
in the tradition of Levi Strauss (Grenfell, 2012:45); neither was it purely a function 
of existing social infrastructure (how could it be in such an emergent industry).  
The cultures described by all participants were dynamic, changing to meet the 
needs of existing social systems with which they come into contact, in turn 
affecting and changing these social systems.  This interplay, best conceived of as a 
Bourdieusian ‘field’, was congruent with Carmola’s description of private security 
a ‘protean’ (Carmola 2010:12;38-39) and Abrahamson and Williams (2011) 
proposal that contemporary private security was constituted through the creation 
of transnational security ‘assemblages’, which themselves represented self-
constituting social fields. 
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Accepting the applicability of field theory to analysis of the private military 
security we gain an insight into the structure and relationship between the fields 
that Roger, Craig, Mike and Lawrence described.  In keeping with Bourdieu’s 
concept we can see the overall field of United Kingdom private military security 
broke down into a series of sub-fields defined by the ‘type’ or ‘distinction’ 
(Bourdieu, 1984) of security being conducted (protective security, maritime 
security, security consultancy, close protection, surveillance etc.) as well as the 
geographical area in which the security was enacted (i.e. ground based security in 
Iraq, or surveillance in the United Kingdom).  All participants were active in 
multiple sub-fields each of which conformed, more or less, to the logic of practice 
in the broader field of private military security.  However, each also had its own 
specific networks, relations, rules, norms and behaviours.  A matrix of the sub-
fields that my interviewees participated in is included at appendix D.   
Analysis of this matrix provides a number of insights.  Former Officers were 
disproportionately involved in the commercial aspects of security work 56  and 
more likely to be involved in commerce at a corporate level57.  Although most 
participants emphasised the ‘international’ nature of their work, there was a 
strong correlation between the work carried out in an international environment 
and that conducted in the United Kingdom.  Prior experience, and certain types of 
state service were key to determining access to sub-fields of security both 
domestically and internationally. Actors with UK policing background for instance 
were more likely to orient their private security activity to the domestic market, 
while military actors tended towards international work.  Former members of 
Special Forces units were involved in the greatest number of sub-fields within the 
industry58.  Participants involved with other specialist ‘non green’ (See Chapter 4) 
units, were the next most broadly active59, with former members of conventional 
 
56 All former Officers interviewed in the study were involved in commercial aspects of the security 
business.  By contrast, only eight out of 21 former NCOs conducted commercial work. 
57 Five of the six participants involved with commerce at a corporate level in larger more established 
firms were former Officers only one was a former NCO. 
58 Former Special Forces personnel were involved in a modal average of 12 fields and a mean average 
of 8.6 fields. 
59 Former-military interviewees who had not served in Special forces, but had experience in special 
intelligence, police specialist units and state intelligence/security agencies (i.e. non Special Forces 
organisations involved in the state’s exceptional practices) were involved in a modal average of 6 
fields and a mean of 7.1 fields. 
90 
 
military units the most restricted in their sub-field participation60.  While these 
trends were based on a sample size too small to draw any statistical inference 
from, they aligned with the qualitative description of the field provided by 
participants (see Chapters 6-8). 
Since the era of ‘the Circuit’, the private military security sector had experienced 
a very considerable expansion of its field-to-field relations with other societal 
groups.  Security in general, and military style armed security in particular, had 
become the concern of a more plural range of actors than at any time since the 
colonial era (Singer, 2003:35).  The retention of private companies who could 
exercise potentially lethal force on behalf of non-state interests was a significant 
challenge to traditional societal norms, and as field theory demonstrates, this 
interaction will have changed not just the nature of private security, but also the 
nature of the commercial fields with which it interacted.  The implications of this 
are explored in greater detail in Chapter 8 where I examine the relations of 
security practitioners with the elite corporations and high net worth individuals 
who, as new actors in ‘the ‘field of power’ are replacing and integrating with the 
traditional ‘state nobilities’ of the modern era (Bourdieu, 1996b).  Despite these 
changes, we see an industry that retains almost symbiotic relations with the state 
and, in particular the state’s organs of security and intelligence.  Here we see the 
potential that the growth of private military security has to alter the relationship 
between the private providers of coercive force and the state itself; themes I 
explore in greater depth in subsequent chapters.  
That the military private security field had evolved over time was indisputable.  
‘The Circuit’ era was one characterised by subjective control over values and 
behaviour within the sector.  The pre and post-Iraq expansion of the industry 
created the requirement for more transparent structures of governance to be 
established leading in turn to changes in the nature of the field.  The post-Iraq 
boom in maritime security saw the sector diversify into a field of activity that was 
already subject to a very developed structure of objective control necessitated by 
 
60 Interviewees with only conventional ‘green army’ experience and no service in Special Forces, 
Special Intelligence, police special units or intelligence and security services participated in a modal 
average of 4 fields and a mean of 4.8 fields. 
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the very specific environmental conditions of work at sea.  But once again we have 
seen the sector move beyond the bounds of the limited provision of physical 
security to shipping and towards more ‘holistic’ and wide ranging ‘risk 
management’ activity; the commercial imperative, if nothing else, guaranteeing 
the continued search for new markets in which the skills of former military actors 
could be commoditised. 
Within this exposition of field we can see a number of dynamics emerging.  The 
first is the transitional nature of military security markets.  Both ground based 
security in Iraq and Afghanistan, and global maritime security has seen a 
transition from the intensive employment of military personnel from Britain and 
other ‘western’ nations, to the employment of nationals with experience in, 
ostensibly, less developed national militaries as a result of market pressures.  This 
highlights the changing relationship of different forms of capital within any 
emerging field of private security.  This dynamic will be further explored in 
subsequent chapters as I analyse the forms of capital that former military actors 
bring to the field, and the relative relations of capital in the sale and provision of 
military style security. 
While this Chapter focuses on the constitution of the fields in which private 
security actors operate and the objective measures of control present in those 
fields (rules, procedures, standards, certifications and codes of conduct), it is clear 
that subjective constraints on behaviour, the ‘disposition’ (Bourdieu 1984:167) of 
industry actors, is as important a factor as the ‘rules’ established to govern their 
behaviour.  This disposition is best explored through an examination of a second 
important constituent of Bourdieu’s field theory, that of habitus.  Overwhelmingly 
the dispositions that most define the logic of the field of military private security 
were created in state military service and it is to these formative processes that I 




Chapter 4 Being Military 
The British military private security industry was understood by my interviewees 
to be a specialist-field of private security activity, based in the United Kingdom, 
but with an international focus.  It was differentiated from domestic market 
security (manned guarding, door supervision and ‘celebrity’ body-guarding) less 
by the services it provided than by the former military nature of its participants, 
and the behaviours and practices they adopted in the conduct of their work.  This 
‘elite’ layer of the private security industry was presented as having developed 
from a kernel of specialist military expertise dominated by former members of the 
United Kingdom’s Special Forces community and the SAS Regiment in particular.  
As this field of military private security evolved, so opportunities increased for 
former soldiers with a broader range of military experience to gain employment 
in the field, with Iraq representing a ‘sea change’ that allowed the mass 
participation of soldiers from non-Special Forces backgrounds and, at times, had 
permitted involvement of participants with little or no military experience.  
However, this pluralisation was considered by many interviewees to have ‘diluted’ 
or compromised the nature of a field, which, at heart, was constituted to provide 
for the commodification and sale of specialist military expertise.  As such, the 
quality of being military could quickly be identified as central to the participants’ 
construction of field.  But what was it to be military, and why was this so significant 
to participation, access and conduct within the sector? 
No accurate statistics exist for the number of former British military service 
people moving into the type of UK centric, transnational military security activity 
identified as the ‘field’ in which my participants engaged.  White (2017:16) 
identified that only relatively few (2% of) public military veterans moved to 
‘protective services occupations’61 (including private security management) in the 
UK on completion of their service.  Overall service leavers transitioned into a wide 
variety of work across a number of industry sectors (White, 2017:17).  
Comparisons with data from the Transitions Mapping Review (Forces in Mind 
 
61 This includes, police, police community support officers, fire service, prison service and ‘associate 




Trust, 2013) and Defence Personnel Statistics (Rutherford, 2014)62 made clear 
that, if my focus group assessments were accurate, it was probable a significant 
proportion of participants in military private security did not enter the sector 
directly following the termination of their military service, but instead after a 
period of time in civilian employment and/or unemployment (see Chapter 5).  
This raised a number of questions: why did only some military people choose to 
work in private military security?  Why did they select this career when others did 
not?  Why did people with military experience choose to work in military private 
security even after periods of civilian employment; and why, if the sector 
employed actors whose most recent work experience had been civilian, did those 
working in the sector see the activity they conducted as distinct from the broader 
field of private security and possessing a more military character? 
The answers to these questions emerged most clearly in the importance that 
interviewees placed on the continuity between their military service and their 
private security work.  The strength of this continuity was striking.  Interviewees 
had been invited to take part in research that would examine their experiences of 
work in the private security industry.  In each case the initial interview began by 
me asking them to provide, in their own words, a narrative of their career in 
private security.  Even where interviewees had transitioned into private security 
following lengthy periods of civilian employment, all former regular service 63 
interviewees began their narrative with a history of their prior military career, 
describing this as a primary and foundational phase of their journey towards their 
employment in private security.  
In talking about their military service, the interviewees focussed on the 
acquisition of different types of skills, capacities and status similar in function to 
Bourdieu’s ‘field capital’.  They viewed the possession of these capacities as 
 
62 The Transitions Mapping review of 2013 (Forces in Mind Trust, 2013) provided evidence that 18,570 
service people left the armed forces in 2009/2010, and a roughly equivalent number in 2012  
(19,950). In 2009/2010 this would have resulted in 12,286 service people who had successfully 
completed military training leaving the military from across all services.  Defence outflow numbers 
have remained consistent with a shrinking regular force (Rutherford, 2014) and show no significant 
increase that could, by itself, account for private military sector participation. 
63 i.e. full-time rather than Territorial Army service. 
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instrumental to their transition to private military security.  Thus the ‘field’ of 
private military security was presented as a place where (predominantly) ex-
military people practiced security in a manner that was, in some way, defined by 
their experience of military service.  This was congruent with Bourdieu’s 
characterisation of a ‘field’ of professional practice as activity that cohered around 
a  ‘common sense’ logic, a way of doing and understanding things shared by field 
participants and created by an interplay of subjective and objective factors.  Thus 
private military security was a place in which the logic and practices of the military 
influenced, informed and defined the way in which commercial security was 
conducted. 
Despite this, the military person did not always ‘fit’ seamlessly into the field of 
commercial security provision.  Mike, who had no military experience, but had 
worked as a senior executive and accountant with a number of private military 
security companies, described his role to be ‘creating wealth’ by reconciling the 
‘commercial imperatives of business with the cultural imperatives of the military’.  
He noted a number of characteristics that ‘military people’ displayed when 
working in a commercial environment, they were:  
‘Very ignorant when it came to commercial checks and balances – but 
reasonably fast learners.  Some of them had a big issue with making a profit.  
They disapproved of it; they were uncomfortable making a profit.  They 
hadn’t made the mental step that this is a commercial organisation – it isn’t 
an arm of the government.  Others found it difficult to accept that budgets 
had placed constraints on them.  They wanted to provide the Rolls-Royce 
solution but their notion of making money in the process was pretty 
limited.’ (Mike) 
Coupled with this relative commercial naiveté Mike observed that former soldiers 
‘always show more deference to their history than to their current situation’; with 
relations of status within the private military security office often determined 
more by previous service history that contemporary commercial acumen. 
George, a former Police Officer also noted the importance of prior service history 
to the conduct of private security, in particular raising the manner in which highly 
gendered forms of behaviour, specific to the uniformed services, influenced 
operational decision making: 
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‘We’ve got an industry which is very significantly based on the experiences 
that people have brought in from the cultures in their previous military or 
police backgrounds.  One organisation I worked for there was a lot of 
conflict on the security access points because these guys are all ex-military 
and somebody touches the wrong button for them and, that’s it, they kick 
off.  That’s why a lot of them get binned because they can’t deal with it. […]  
One thing I have a little bit of a problem with is egos, the macho image.  It’s 
a man thing you know, egos come into play.  It goes back to these cultures 
that determine the private security industry.’ (George) 
Roger agreed that the transposition of military cultures into the commercial 
realm, created a tension between the commercial aims of private military security, 
and the cultural practices of the military; particularly those of elite military units.  
This had become a key concern for staff recruiting former service people.  He 
candidly observed:  
‘We do not want any of their culture, none of it, because we recognise that 
to be harmful.  The Parachute Regiment has a culture so does the Royal 
Marines.  Mixing then is not a good idea because they bring their rivalries 
with them; at least not without a good dose of common sense from 
elsewhere spread amongst them.’(Roger) 
One interviewee with experience predominantly in the management related 
aspects of private military security went further.  Noting the preponderance of 
former Special Forces operators in the sector he stated:  
‘Special Forces are “special needs” – a lot of fucking prima-donnas; 
generalisation, [but] a lot of them are a pain in the arse – difficult to manage 
because they are used to being fairly maverick and not working within 
confines.’ (Anon.) 
Interviewees described a field that existed in a state of tension, the preponderance 
of ex-military actors, and the seminality of their experience was juxtaposed with 
evidence that elements of military culture were difficult to reconcile with the 
practices of commerce and the demands of ‘civilianised’ forms of security 
provision.  Further, it was sector with which only some former service people 
would seek to engage.  Thus, to understand the logic of commercial military 
security practices I needed to first examine the subjective dispositions, or 
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‘habitus’ 64  created by military service that my interviewees described as 
propelling them into private security work.  Through this the ‘unity hidden under 
the diversity and multiplicity of the set of practices performed in fields governed 
by different logics’ (Bourdieu, 1984:95) could be explored and the manner in 
which military cultures influenced the conduct and evolution of private security 
understood. 
The Military Habitus 
Competence in Extremis: Physicality and Danger 
Interviewees described their military service as having generated capacities and 
behaviours that were relevant to their subsequent employment in private military 
security.  Primary among these was the experience of physical duress. Here 
interviewees focussed on periods of arduous physical exercise during military 
training where they had been expected to reach high standards of physical fitness 
and to endure a range of challenging physical conditions including sleep 
deprivation, exposure to extreme weather, forced marching and running with 
heavy loads (Hockey, 2002).  However, these expressions of physicality did not 
stand alone as a category of meaning, in all cases the experience of arduous 
physical training was coupled with the fulfilment of other military tasks and 
functions; as Nick a former infantryman and Special Forces soldier observed: 
‘It’s not just knowing the skills.  It’s knowing them when you are wet and 
tired and exhausted…when somebody else is trying to kill you…it’s got to 
be second nature, so you don’t think about it, that’s the difference.  You only 
get that by proper hard training.  It’s a thing I noticed about the police.  They 
have some great shooters and drivers, it’s all they do, they practice a lot, 
[but] they don’t have to do all the other stuff that we do. Technically they 
are very good; but they don’t do it when they have been awake for 3 days, 
 
64 Bourdieu used the concept of ‘habitus’ to describe the subjective element of relations between 
actors within a ‘field’.  In his work The Logic of Practice he described the subjective ‘dispositions’ 
(Bourdieu 1990:53) that determined how individuals saw the world, reacted to stimuli, conducted 
themselves, and decided their preferences.  This ‘internal structure’ had an ‘embodied’ nature that 





or when they have tabbed 65  20K, when they are on they’re on their 
chinstrap66 and can’t think.  That’s the difference – it’s a different mind-set, 
total commitment’ (Nick) 
Physicality was presented as something specific to the military experience but 
important only in as much as it underpinned the performance of other military 
functions.  Thus, this notion incorporated not just a developed level of bodily 
performance, but a mental resilience and acuity (Hockey, 2009) that allowed the 
enactment of critical skills and knowledge in circumstances of adversity.  
Together with physicality, exposure to danger featured prominently in almost all 
interviewees’ discussion of their military past 67  (Hale, 2008; Higate, 2003; 
Hockey, 2003; Woodward and Winter, 2007).   Many talked, at times movingly, of 
their personal experience of injury and of the inevitability of witnessing the death 
or injury of colleagues.  The violence associated with the military profession was 
presented as a phenomenon less to be controlled and overcome than to be 
accepted and accommodated.  Terry, a paratrooper with experience of combat 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan discussed his attitude towards being mortared: 
 ‘I just wasn’t too bothered about it and people were running and getting 
under the cover and I was just sitting on my bed watching DVD’s.  I 
thought to myself if it’s going to hit, it’s going to hit, doesn’t matter where 
you’re standing.’ (Terry) 
Expressions of mortality and danger were not limited to the sphere of conflict or 
the exclusive result of violence by an enemy.  The physical danger of military 
training and the potentially harmful results of military institutionalisation were 
expressed with a similar frequency.  Stuart, describing his experience of serving 
with an infantry battalion in Northern Ireland, presented suicide as a routine 
 
65 ‘Tabbed’ or ‘tabbing’ is derived from the abbreviation for ‘tactical advance to battle’; to ‘tab’ is to 
march at a fast pace towards contact with the enemy.  The expression denotes a fast paced march 
during which troops may alternate between a walking and running pace while carrying weapons and 
equipment. 
66 ‘Chinstrapped’ or ‘to be on your chinstrap’ is military slang for being exhausted.  It evoked the 
image of the marching soldier’s head being so bowed by fatigue that the chinstrap of their helmet will 
touch the floor. 
67 The interviewees Kevin (whose military experience was part-time rather than full time), Mike, 
William and Lawrence, (whose roles the private security industry were commercially rather than 
operationally oriented) did not discuss physical danger or mortality in relation to their military past. 
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hazard of military life: ‘Oh yeah there’s been a lot of it, I was in Omargh68 in ’91, 
two and a half years we was there and we had about 5 suicides’.  In addressing, 
seemingly without rancour, the violence of the military system to the individual, 
Stuart implicitly affirmed that he was able to endure circumstances where others 
had ‘cracked’ in the face of the subordination of the needs of the individual to those 
of the institution.  In this, Stuart presented military culture less as a form of 
‘victimhood’ (McGarry and Walklate, 2011) than possessed of an ‘otherness’ the 
essence of which was ‘superior in both dignity and power’ to the ‘profane’ 
concerns of civilian life (Durkheim 1965:2).  Thus a ‘tolerance’ (or even 
enjoyment) of exposure to mortal risk was a capacity important in the transition 
to private military security employment and access to the sector. 
Doing What Others Won’t: Radical Professionalism and Dirty Work 
While physically embodied capability was the dominant capacity inculcated by 
military service, this was, with equal frequency expressed as underpinning the 
concept of military ‘professionalism’.  ‘Professionalism’ incorporated meaning 
that extended beyond embodied physical competence and contained within it an 
ethical dimension.  Andrew, a former senior NCO with experience of special 
intelligence operations in Northern Ireland, Africa and the Balkans explained:   
‘When you are in the mob [army] you do what you have to do, it’s not really 
a matter of if it is right or wrong, you do it.  You just have to be professional; 
you have to do your job as well as you can.  That’s what counts.’ (Andrew).   
For Andrew ‘professionalism’ incorporated a form of moral boundarying, where 
excellence in the commission of the act of soldiering superseded consideration of 
moral responsibility.  These ‘higher order’ considerations, where they were 
discussed, were constituted as the preserve of ‘others’ (usually policy makers or 
senior officers).  This construction was akin to the ‘radical professionalism’ of 
Larson (1974); described by Nuciari (2003:70) as a type of ‘institutional 
professionalism that is orientated towards total organisation’ and ‘isolated by 
civilian society because of its high functional specificity and political neutrality’. 
 
68 A City in Northern Ireland with a permanent garrison of British Army. 
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This divergence between the values of military professionalism as conceived of by 
interviewees, and the social values of the parent society was reinforced by the 
recognition that military work, in some of its forms attracted moral opprobrium. 
This was most acute in relation to practices surrounding the use of violence and 
coercive force 69  particularly in the civil conflict in Northern Ireland where, 
Andrew observed:  
‘You just didn’t talk about what you did with people you didn’t know, or 
even sometimes with your family.  Nowadays it’s a bit different because, 
with Afghan70 and that, the army is a bit more popular, and what people see 
on videos and social media, they know a bit more.  Still it’s not quite polite 
conversation’ (Andrew).  
Nigel, a former infantryman, highlighted that the risk of moral opprobrium was 
not restricted to the practice of violence alone, but extended across a spectrum of 
military conduct:   
‘Some of the things we do in the military, even normal things, if you actually 
explain them to a civvie71 they’d look down on you.  I did an exercise in 
Belize and we had to do a CTR72, I’d just got into recce platoon73 and I was 
all piss and vinegar74, we spent 4 hours crawling up this storm drain to get 
to the target, and in Belize they have a lot of open sewers so it was full of 
shite and, we were heaving75 by the time we finished, but we got the recce76 
done.  So I get home and I’m telling some friends about, you know, look 
what a fucking professional I am, and this one girl just looks at me like I’m 
a pooch77 who’d just shat on her best Persian rug… I was young (laughs), 
its lucky it was her friend I was interested in.’ (Nigel) 
 
69 Penny Dick (2005) observes a similar dynamic when interviewing Police Officers about their use of 
coercive force.  Woodward and Jenkins (2011:261), in their analysis of situated accounts of British 
military personnel, highlight the sense incongruity expressed by one participant on viewing 
photographs of a colleague his wife warmly greeting a colleague at a reunion.  The interviewee 
obverses that this colleague had ‘IRA kills to his name’ and opines that this violent history would 
cause unease among those outside the military ‘family’. 
70 Bernard Boëne observes similar changes in public sentiment towards the military noting that ‘the 
respect that surrounds them [the military] contrasts sharply with the vocal disrespect of a quarter 
century ago’ (Boëne 1998:181) 
71 Civilian 
72 CTR, Close Target Reconnaissance, the covert observation at close range of a potential enemy 
location. 
73 The platoon in an infantry Battalion responsible for reconnaissance. 
74 Slang for ‘aggressive energy’ 
75 Slang for ‘very dirty’ 
76 Reconnaissance 
77 Slang for ‘dog’ 
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In Nigel’s narrative the ‘dirty work’ construction (Hughes, 1958; Ashforth and 
Kreiner, 1999) was in evidence.  Penny Dick (2005) described the way in which 
individuals engaged in ‘dirty work’ used ‘front’ and ‘back’ region narratives to 
manage the potential reaction of people unfamiliar with the nature of their work.   
It was evident that Nigel’s inexperience caused him to feel stigmatised when he 
incautiously expressed the ‘real’ nature of military work to an uninitiated 
audience.  Despite this, he did not present this story as warranting sympathy; 
using profanity, humour (and masculine hyper-sexuality) to ensure the listener 
understood that his military ‘spirit’ remained unbowed.  The acceptance by the 
military actor that the nature of their work meant that their personal character 
was the subject of pejorative moral judgment, served to reinforce that military 
service was carried out within its own discrete moral universe; a space in which 
constructions of professionalism and gender were mobilised to both condition 
and justify practice.  Thus, preparedness to carry out acts that others may consider 
unpleasant or undignified emerged as a relevant capacity when choosing to 
engage in private military security activity and in selection for employment in the 
sector. 
The Military as a Folk Economy 
As narratives of physicality and embodied knowledge underpinned notions of 
professionalism, narratives of mortality and physical danger underpinned the 
personal relationships experienced in military service.  Potential exposure to 
death and physical injury were presented as foundational to the close bonds of 
friendship commonly described by participants.  Terry, discussed his feelings 
when, as a result of injuries sustained in Helmand Province he was restricted to 
administrative duties in a headquarters location: 
 ‘I desperately wanted to get out with the blokes, seeing them come in and 
out and I thought to myself “this is it for me”.  I joined the Army, and joined 
the regiment I was in, to do what I love doing, and as mad as that sounds, 
[that is] being in a war environment.  A lot of people ask me why, and it’s 
not that I enjoy war; it’s just that…I think it’s all to do with brotherhood if 
you like; the men that you can trust and work with… loyal friends that 
have, [on] many occasions, put their life on the line to rescue not only 
myself, but other blokes and suffered the consequences.’  (Terry) 
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The strength of the emotional connection with military colleagues was expressed 
by a majority of participants.  However, while it was clear that enduring traditional 
friendships did emerge from military service, the relationship between service 
people was described as having a different quality: 
‘It’s not like you ‘liked’ [gestures with ‘air quotes’] everybody in the 
battalion.  Certainly not in my battalion, there were blokes who hated each 
other.  There was more than one night you’d come in and there’d been a 
fight in the mess or whatever.  But when you’re in the field you’d still share 
your rations or your water or your kit with them if needs be, your average 
civilian wouldn’t do that.  If they were in trouble down town you wouldn’t 
just walk past, its not really to do with whether you like them.’  (Nigel) 
Participants described relationships within the military that could coexist charged 
with antipathy and antagonism on one level, but suffused with obligation, respect 
and even affection on another.  Woodward and Jenkins observed this phenomenon 
when they described the ‘fictive kinship’ of their military interviewees 
(Woodward and Jenkins 2011:261), proposing an invented affiliation that created 
kinship bonds that replaced the cosanguineal and affinal relations of the 
traditional family.  John Hockey in his ethnography of British Army infantry 
soldiers (Hockey, 2003:19)78 adopted a different interpretation, proposing that 
constructions of military kinship can be seen to have a quality based on 
conditioned group solidarity, while Carol Cohn (1999) observed similar narratives 
of ‘bonding’ and intimacy as facet of the military in popular culture.   Under any 
interpretation, it is clear that military service was seen to create relationships that 
transcended in importance and gravity the relationships of civilian life. 
These close personal bonds were reinforced by a communal approach to property 
and material ownership that contrasted sharply with civilian practices.  Craig, a 
former member of UK Special Forces had studied marketing before joining the 
military, he observed:  
‘I knew about accountancy and profit and the likes of that before I joined, 
but obviously then when I joined the army, I just wasn’t interested in 
 
78 Hockey describes Non Commissioned Officers deriding a trainee soldier on exercise for his 
‘selfishness’ in not sharing his cigarette with other members of his training platoon 
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money anymore.   It wasn’t part of the game.’  (Craig).   
A number of participants identified that their transition into the military was 
caused in part by a general ambivalence towards materialistic culture.  Kate, a 
former officer with experience in a variety of military organisations, including 
Special Forces stated: 
‘What made the military attractive? What I didn’t want to do was ‘make a 
profit’ because money doesn’t really motivate me.  I have to have a bit of 
money but I didn’t want to do a profit and loss job, and that got picked up 
every single interview.  On most job interviews I got to the final stages and 
then it was identified.  I wasn’t really passionate enough about making 
money.  [I joined the army] so I could run around, I didn’t have to sit in an 
office.   I was very naive.’(Kate)  
Thus, the norms of financial and material transaction in military culture were 
described as fundamentally different from those prevailing in civilian society. 
While rank and unit organisation were described as providing a structural 
framework for day-to-day existence, military experience; a composite 
construction of exposure to danger, physical duress and professional competence 
provided the capital of many interactions.  One participant who had served in the 
Falklands conflict observed:  
‘It [experience] makes a difference, when I went to depot79people would 
always listen to you because of what you had done.  No matter what the 
rank, you had done it for real.  You never had any problem getting the cooks 
to do you an extra portion of ‘bubble’80 with your breakfast when they 
knew where you had been.  Little things, you got messed around less when 
you’d hand over a quarter81.  You get treated better as you go up the ranks; 
but certainly I found it made more of a difference when people knew you’d 
been down South82.’ (John) 
In material terms the structured bureaucratic communalism of the military, 
coupled with the informal economy of somatic experience meant that participants 
viewed military life as a ‘folk economy’ (or ‘economy of good faith’, Bourdieu, 
2000b), possessions often held in common for the good of the group and 
 
79 Training Depot, a facility where young soldiers or officers are trained. 
80 ‘Bubble’, bubble-and-squeak, a dish made from fried vegetable leftovers. 
81 ‘A quarter’ is the accommodation provided to military families by the Army. 
82 ‘Down South’ the Falklands conflict of 1982 in the South Atlantic. 
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transferred on the basis of need rather than individual ownership.  Indeed Hockey 
(2003:19) identified this communal attitude towards belongings as central to the 
construction of identity within the combat arms of the British military. 
When coupled with evidence of participants’ strong constructions of kinship, this 
material communalism took on a different significance.  Paul James, drawing upon 
the work of Bourdieu, described customary tribalism as, ‘The framing condition of 
a certain kind of community in which persons are bound beyond immediate family 
ties by the dominance of modalities of face-to face and object integration, 
including genealogical placement, embodied reciprocity and mythological 
enquiry’ (James, 2006).  The ‘fictive kinship’ observed by Woodward and Jenkins 
can be reinterpreted as analogous to the ‘practical kinship’ of tribal cultures 
observed by Bourdieu and Passeron (1977:37); the basis of which is in continually 
rehearsed customs of interpersonal solidarity rather than affection, consanguinity 
or marriage.  
Tribes: Cultures, not Culture 
Despite this, the perceived ‘otherness’ of military culture should not be mistaken 
for homogeneity.  A universally expressed sentiment was that the military was ‘not 
one culture’ but instead ‘a lot of tribes’ (Dan) each carrying out different roles and, 
often deliberately, adopting divergent norms and behaviours to differentiate 
themselves from other groups within the military83.  This plurality of cultures was 
considered to be both a peculiarity and strength of the British Army and extended 
to both the professional aspects of the serviceperson’s role and to their ‘off duty’ 
behaviour.  Ross, a former member of UK Special Forces described his experience 
of training soldiers from a variety of infantry units in the techniques of jungle 
warfare: 
‘Even in something as singular as the infantry I noticed there were big 
differences between units.  A classic example was the Jungle warfare 
instructor course.  There was a large proportion of Gurkhas 84 , a large 
 
83 The ‘tribal’ nature of the military organization in the British Army has been commented upon by a 
number of Scholars (von Zugbach 1988; Beevor 1990 and Burk, 2018) 
84 Soldiers of Nepalese ethnicity recruited into the British Army. 
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proportion of Paras85 a large proportion of Marines86 and then the other 
element was made up entirely of Guards87: Senior NCOs and officers.  The 
ability and the approach of the Guards to the Paras to the Marine… there 
were 3 different approaches.  I can simplify it; effectively the Guards even 
their senior NCOs did not know how to think for themselves, you know 
there was no kind of initiative.  The officer, we used to call him “Captain A-
frame88” because every time he built an A-frame it collapsed ‘cos he was so 
used to having everything done for him.  The Paras: What you tended to 
find was the officers were difficult to differentiate them from the guys.  
They were certainly far more undisciplined than most.  One night for 
example they broke into the bar and got drunk.  I remember when we got 
to a stream they were the first ones going over the waterfall backwards 
(laughs) but they were very professional in the field, no two ways about it.  
Whereas the Marines were, what we used to call, the “thinking man’s Para”; 
they had that same level of professionalism but probably were a little bit 
more thoughtful on how they applied it’ (Ross) 
Ross indicated the manner in which different units, all responsible for a similar 
conventional infantry role, displayed very different dispositions towards risk, 
discipline, authority, initiative, competence and transgression. 
The subculture of units in which interviewees had served was a key determinant 
of their disposition and motivation to engage in private security following their 
military service.  The overwhelming majority of my interviewees had served in 
‘teeth arm’ units (Macdonald 2004:124) where ‘hot’ (Soeters, Windslow and 
Weibull, 2003:247), or front-line, experience was an element of their role.  This 
aligned with Caforio’s proposal that combat oriented elements of the military 
displayed ‘institutional’ values while support functions, that were more technical 
and administrative in nature, displayed a more ‘occupational’ character.  He 
observed, ‘These two subsystems express different kinds of rationality and are not 
easily compatible.  They are in fact characterised by two different ethics, one 
diverging in respect to civilian society, the other converging’ (Caforio 1998b:63).  
Thus the foundation of military experience relevant to the transition to military 
 
85 Soldiers of the Parachute Regiment. 
86 Commandos of the Royal Marines, part of the United Kingdom Navy. 
87 Cavalry and Foot Guards regiments that form the Household Division.  These military units have the 
historical status of the Monarch’s household guards.  They possess an elite military status and are 
renowned for the elevated social standing of their Officers.   
88 An ‘A-frame’ is a structure constructed as part of a jungle shelter from which the soldier suspends 
their hammock and mosquito protection the construction of which is a core jungle survival skill. 
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private security was overwhelmingly aligned with the cultures of front-line, 
combat oriented sub-units the values of which tended towards divergence, rather 
than convergence with the values of civil society. 
Being Elite 
The divergence between military and civil values was most acute in the 
subcultures of elite military units, just as service in these units provided the most 
direct path, and richest foundation of personal capital for the transition into 
private military security.  While experience in conventional elite units, (such as 
airborne or commando) was significant, experience of service in ‘special’ 
designation units associated with unconventional warfare (i.e. Special Forces and 
special intelligence) had particular relevance due both to the nature of this type of 
service and the centrality of former Special Forces actors to the development of 
the private military security industry. 
The transition into Special Forces required the service person to undergo a very 
demanding process of physical and psychological testing (usually referred to as 
‘selection’).  All participants who had served with Special Forces units, and most 
who had been engaged in special intelligence, had chosen to make this transition 
voluntarily and expressed a number of motivations for so doing.  Some described 
undertaking selection as the natural consequence of their personal commitment 
to embodied military professionalism: 
‘It was really the running that did it for me.  I had joined the regimental 
cross-country team when I was a junior soldier.  I enjoyed the physical side 
of soldiering, so going for selection was natural.  I was already in a 
Commando unit, so selection was just the next step.’ (Victor) 
For others the decision was influenced by the increased accessibility of 
operational roles where their military skills could be validated against a real 
enemy: 
‘When you go through a lot of training and then find out that all you are 
expected to do is sit in a garrison in Germany its frustrating. So I suppose 
part of it was to get out where the action was, see things that you wouldn’t 
otherwise get to do, use your skills for real’ (Stuart) 
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However, the transition was also expressed as a reaction to the rigid and 
authoritarian structures of conventional, or ‘green army’ existence. 
‘It was the bullshit that made me do it.  I can remember some snotty little 
Rupert89 coming around the troop lines after we had been in the field for a 
week and giving out extra duties for dirty kit.  I thought fuck this; I’m not 
having this.  I think the [SAS] regiment is more democratic than other units.  
Everybody’s voice gets listened too, sometimes too much so.  But it suited 
me better.  I don’t regret it.’(Victor) 
The nature of Special Forces service was seen to have a different quality to that of 
soldiering in conventional army units.  Participants considered that Special Forces 
and special intelligence work involved greater autonomy in decision-making, but 
also a greater expectation of rationality and judgement: 
‘When you are in a regular unit, usually you have a specific task.  It’s passed 
down to you through the organisation.  It’s quite controlled.  You are 
working within a structure.  If something goes wrong there are other 
people to deal with it.  With SF90 you have to show more initiative more 
awareness.  Often you are very isolated; so if you make a bad decision it will 
have an effect on you and the people you are working with, whether that is 
other members of the team or locals that you are working with.  You have 
to be more strategic, more thoughtful.  That’s why SF soldiers tend to be a 
bit older.  You have to have that experience.’ (Jack) 
The nature of the Special Forces mission, oriented towards operations conducted 
within a battle-space controlled by the enemy, carried with it the expectation that 
members of these units would be exposed to an increased risk of capture. The 
strategic orientation of Special Forces action further required that soldiers were 
able to limit the amount of exploitable intelligence that an enemy organisation 
could extract from them in the event of their capture.  This training was called 
resistance to interrogation (R-to-I) and was identified as one of the defining 
elements that distinguished Special Forces and Special Intelligence ‘operators’ 
from conventional ‘green army’ soldiers. 
 
89 ‘Rupert’ is mildly pejorative slang for an officer. 
90 SF, Special Forces. 
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Kate, described Special Forces training, and ‘R-to-I’ in particular, as incorporating 
a qualitatively different level of physical and mental duress91 to that which she had 
experienced during her ‘green army’ career: 
‘Physically it was a shock, not just the marching, but being beaten as part of 
the training in ‘R-to-I’.  It doesn’t bother me physically – probably this is how 
people pass, its mind over matter.  It is your mind being able to control the 
pain of your body.  We did two lots of R-to-I.  The first one was the normal 
one and the second was specific to Ireland92.  On the first one they would line 
you up and you would go into the chamber to go forward for processing and 
we had guys refusing.  The four guys in front of me just put their hand up and 
said “I don’t want to do this”: and you’re like “you haven’t even got there yet”, 
and they were like “no I can’t do it”.  One was a Para one was a Marine and 
the other two were infantry types who are meant to be these warrey 93 
roughty-toughty, definitely stronger than me physically but their brains, 
their minds were not strong enough.  So I think that’s the difference because 
eventually the physical side of it all evens itself out.  When we are at peak 
fitness we are all about the same; but what takes you the next step is your 
brain, whether you can make your mind control pain.  I think that women 
are often good at it.  That’s not to say men aren’t, but just to say all the women 
sailed through the resistance to interrogation training.’ (Kate) 
Thus Special Forces training exposed soldiers to substantially greater levels of 
physical and psychological duress, including levels of direct physical violence that 
would not normally form a recognised part of conventional military training. This 
level of physical brutality (i.e. ‘beating’) was a sanctioned exception to normal 
training standards, and was justified through the need to create in the trainee 
Special Forces soldier an embodied identity of greater physical and mental resolve 
and dependability than that required of ‘conventional’ service personnel.  
The exceptional nature of the Special Forces role was described as extending 
beyond the physical and mental duress of training.  The danger of death or injury 
 
91 The physical duress of Special Forces selection was commonly referred to in terms of a 
‘transcending’ experience where the superiority of psychological resilience over basic physical 
conditioning was realized.  
92 During Kate’s service the Conduct After Capture Wing (CAC Wing) of the Joint Services Intelligence 
Organisation (JSIO) provided two forms of resistance to interrogation training.  The first dealt with 
capture in a conventional war scenario and involved techniques designed minimise the release of 
exploitable information throughout the period of captivity, and until release.  The second dealt with 
capture by terrorist groups in Northern Ireland where there was little expectation of eventual release. 
93 ‘Warrey’, lit. War-ry, liking or enthusiastic about war. 
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in Special Forces operations was presented as more acute than that of 
conventional military service: 
‘The Danger of operations in an SF environment is different to the danger 
of operations in a ‘green army’ environment.  Often, for us [Special Forces] 
it was quite dangerous because we were in a role where we were on our 
own in terrorist territory, in IRA land.  I operated on my own a lot of the 
time; so, yeah dangerous in terms of you are operating on your own against 
an enemy that is unseen.  If they are ‘gonna get you’ they are ‘gonna get 
you’.  You would have to either fight your way out of it or talk your way out 
of it (which was not ever going to work)… or get through it.’ (Kate) 
Former members of Special Forces described experiencing danger both more 
acutely and with greater frequency than during conventional military service.  As 
with other participants, this continued exposure to danger manifested itself in risk 
normalisation.  Thus, the Special Forces and special intelligence roles could be 
seen to epitomise the most extreme constructions of physicality, embodiment, 
danger and mortality described by soldiers more generally. 
Special Forces exhibited a similar plurality of culture to that of conventional 
military units although their ‘tribal’ exclusivity was, if anything, more intense. The 
reification of culture expressed by participants was evident at Squadron or 
detachment rather than Battalion level (as was common in conventional forces). 
Ross described the differences in attitudes toward violent behaviour off-duty 
between different squadrons in the 22nd SAS Regiment: 
‘[There were differences of culture] even within the Regiment.  I worked 
with G Squadron94 and B Squadron.  In G Squadron most of their officers 
tend to be drawn from the Guards, so anybody who is a Guards officer who 
passes selection goes into G squadron.  Even when you’d go out for a few 
drinks everyone was well behaved.  There were certain kinds of expected 
behaviours, and if you did misbehave you could probably expect to be 
RTUd95.   
I then went across to B Squadron.  I got into a bit of bother [in Cyprus]; to 
cut a long story short I found myself in the middle of bar-fight.  We sorted 
ourselves out and dusted ourselves off.  We headed back to the camp.  We 
 
94 A Squadron is a sub-unit of the SAS comprising approximately 65 soldiers. 
95 RTU’d is ‘returned to unit’, discharged from Special Forces and returned to service in the soldier’s 
parent conventional unit. 
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were about two miles from where we were based and we were relying on 
the RAF to give us a lift and there was an old guy, about 50 odd, who was a 
corporal who said “look fellas I’ll get the Land Rover” if you wait here for a 
bit.  I was sat there chatting to him and there was an RAF lad who was a 
parachute packer.  He was a big lad, he joined the RAF Rugby team to play 
the New Zealanders and he had drunk too much.  He started giving this 
poor old corporal a hard time.  Because I was the senior NCO there I thought 
I should be responsible so I said “come on son calm down a little bit he’s 
doing his best, he’s helping us out”; at which point he grabs hold of me, so I 
slammed him up against a wall and he turned around and fell down.   All I 
could see from the back of his head was a pool of blood and I thought, “I’ve 
killed him” (laughs).   
We called an ambulance and they took him away and I woke up the next 
morning with a bit of a hangover thinking  “I’ve just ruined my career- what 
have I done”; fully expecting to be RTU’d, because that’s what I would have 
expected with G Squadron.  I was trying to avoid my boss all day, and 
sooner or later I bumped into him.  He had a big grin on his face and I 
realised; there is something wrong here, this is not the behaviour that I am 
expecting.  And to cut a long story short, it turns out that half of B squadron 
had been in punch-ups that night because B squadron tended to be your 
ex-Paras they had a totally different culture.  It was very much more 
maverick, if somebody was going to mess about it was going to be B 
Squadron.  And so within the Regiment you had G Squadron who were very 
precise and you had B Squadron who were the other extreme.  But there is 
a good example of how even within the Regiment you had different cultures 
within the squadrons.’ (Ross). 
Kate, worked closely with a number of United Kingdom Special Forces units and 
perceived differences in unit culture through their attitudes towards their 
inclusion of women in operational roles:  
‘There were different cultures within Special Forces.  I have very fond 
memories of working with the SAS.  I have very few fond memories of being 
with the Detachment96.  At that time there were two to three different types 
of Special Forces, the Special Boat Service, Special Air Service and 14 Int97.  
Generally 14 Int was blokes that couldn’t get in the SAS; so they went that 
way as a second choice.  They really didn’t like women being in [the unit] 
because it sort of emasculated them in some respects, so they always had 
 
96 ‘The detachment’, or ‘The Det’ refers to 14 Intelligence Company, a Special Forces organisation 
specialising in covert surveillance activity.  In 2005 14 Intelligence Company became the Special 
Reconnaissance Regiment. 
97 ‘14 Int’ is 14 Intelligence Company (see above). 
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this chip on their shoulder.  Whereas for the women it didn’t matter 
because we could never get in the SAS anyway, so actually we never carried 
that chip on our shoulder.  We used to work very closely with the SAS and 
we always got on well with those boys because they never saw us as a 
threat, we were just an enhancement to their operation.  I could get them 
into places that they couldn’t get into themselves – or I could take them in 
and then, with me, we could get more information.  The Detachment blokes 
never saw it like that. They always saw it as us [women] pinching their 
work; more of a threat to them – not all of them but a proportion of them.  
Most of them were OK.  The thing was that [they thought] we weren’t 
physically strong enough.  I mean, I could shoot better than most of them.  
They knew that, and so constantly the thing was, “well you’re not strong 
enough.  If I got shot you couldn’t pick me up and carry me”; no you’re right 
I probably couldn’t but neither could he, or he and he.  Physicality is a big 
thing in Special Forces.’ 
This divergence of culture was evident in both the formal regimes of training and 
operations, and the conduct of personnel outside the workplace.  Kate’s gender 
brought into stark focus the difference between normative behaviour in 
conventional military units and that of Special Forces, where hostility towards 
women soldiers was markedly greater: 
‘They were ghastly; the chauvinism and misogyny, I have never seen 
anything like it.  You would not get that in the green army.  They were 
allowed to get away with it because of the unit that they were.  Some of the 
blokes behaved extraordinarily badly.  Within a military context [there was] 
a lack of discipline, lack of respect, lack of any sort of cordial behaviour 
towards myself and [female colleagues], which I found surprising given that 
we were a military unit run by military law; and if you had behaved like that 
in the green army you would have been courts marshalled potentially – some 
of the things that they did…’ (Kate) 
This transgressive culture extended beyond sexual harassment and, in some cases 
manifested as violent criminality that, nonetheless went unchecked because of the 
elite and secretive nature of the unit’s work.  Talking of a soldier in the Special 
Forces surveillance unit Kate described: 
‘He used to go home at weekends and beat his wife up.  He lived in [a garrison 
town], every leave period the RMPs98  would be called to the house.  He 
 
98 RMP, Royal Military Police. 
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would be put in jail for the night to cool off.  It was well documented in [the] 
Garrison that he was beating his wife.  He would come back to the unit and 
we would all say, “oh god he’s been beating her up again”.  She refused to 
press charges which is often the case; but the unit knew about it and frankly 
that’s ‘conduct unbecoming’, you cannot have that behaviour, that’s showing 
aggression that’s showing temper, it’s showing a lack of conduct that I would 
expect of a Special Forces soldier.  If they are behaving like that in their 
private life what are they going to do on the ground in their work?  And the 
hierarchy never disciplined that guy.  He was never brought to task about it 
because in [the garrison] it was like: “oh you know he’s in the special unit”. 
And when he came back over [to Ireland] the officers had no moral courage, 
they were scared of the soldiers and let them get away with stuff that I 
personally disagreed with. 
There was a difference between social life of SF and green army.  You 
definitely got more harassment, definitely.  I mean its weird now when I 
look back on it and I hear my civilian friends talking about harassment at 
work.  I can’t believe I even put up with it.  You’re harassed all the time, 
constantly.  Inappropriate sexual advances.  Not for me, not physical stuff.  
It was always inappropriate sexual comments.  But when you are in the 
military you know what it’s like, it’s banter.  I’ve been to an officer’s mess 
dinner night where there were only two women there.   When one guy it 
was like, “Oh come on Kate to you fancy going off outside in the car park?”  
It was like… no!  What are you talking about?  He was a major Special 
Forces.  [I asked him] “are you serious?”  [He replied] “Well I thought I’d 
ask.”  What? (exasperation).  The guy from that night went on to pin 
another girl up against the wall and put his hand up her skirt.  
Inappropriate behaviour.   
[Harassment and abuse] was normally around dinners and alcohol.  You 
know [a senior NCO] in my first job said, “we could have an affair, nobody 
would know about it. We could meet in a hotel and…”, what? 
(exasperation). And it was one of those [times when you think]; am I 
leading him on? Have I said something to lead him on?  I have had about 
four conversations with the bloke on a professional level and he had 
obviously given it some thought.  It was constant.  That’s not ‘cos I think I 
am attractive.  It’s just all women have suffered that.   
Looking back I hardly think about it [the harassment].  The only time I think 
about that is within the NI99 context.   Because there were a couple of very 
bad things happened and they were never disciplined.  Three blokes 
[allegedly conducted a serious sexual assault on a woman] and they were 
 
99 Northern Ireland 
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never disciplined for it; and it was all caught on camera and they destroyed 
the pictures.  That sort of behaviour in NI that’s why I find it very difficult to 
forgive that management team at that time.  (Kate) 
Thus, while the autonomy of Special Forces and special intelligence operations 
required greater maturity and rationality from practitioners, it is clear that the 
elite status and secrecy surrounding ‘non-green’ army service led, in some units, 
to a criminogenic environment where serious sexual violence and harassment was 
accepted and, possibly, encouraged as part of the culture.  These transgressive 
behaviours were considered less likely to have been sustainable in conventional 
units operating with more transparency, greater objective control and less 
impunity.  Kate linked this (at times violent) sexism with the elite status of the unit 
in which she served, and the relative professional frustration (or un-fulfilment) 
that some members of this ‘second tier’ organisation displayed; an emotion that 
was more acutely experienced in the highly competitive Special Forces 
environment. 
While Kate was my only woman interviewee, and caution must be exercised 
before assuming that her experience is widely replicated, her narrative accords 
with the, relatively few, studies of domestic abuse within the British Military 
(Grey, 2016; Godier and Fossey, 2018).  Williamson (2012) and Williamson and 
Price (2009) ‘did not find high levels of self-reported domestic violence and abuse’ 
in conventional military units (Williamson, 2012:1385). Williamson’s survey data 
indicated that domestic abuse, when reported, led to arrest in more that two-
thirds of cases (Williamson, 2012:1381).  This accords with Kate’s assertion that, 
in non-Special Forces units, domestic abuse and sexual violence would, usually, be 
met by a disciplinary response.  Grey’s (2016) study of British military family 
members who had experienced or perpetrated abuse, and support workers 
engaged with military families, provides a useful insight into the qualitative nature 
of abuse in the British military context.  She identifies that ‘militarised enactments 
of the public/private divide play a role in shaping experiences of domestic abuse’ 
(Grey, 2016:2).  In Kate’s narrative we can see how the exaggerated ‘privacy’ 
created by the secrecy that surrounded Special Forces facilitated the suppression 
of evidence of domestic abuse and sexual violence, subordinating the safety of 
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women soldiers and family members to the maintenance of the elite unit’s  
‘operational effectiveness’ (Grey, 2016:8). 
Gender and Exception 
The centrality of embodied knowledge and identity, and the language used by 
participants to describe their military past, brought into focus the gendered 
nature of military service.  While the military has long been recognised as an 
institution that was both ‘gendered’ and gender-defining (Cohn 1993; 2013; 
Mathers, 2013:126-128) the masculine culture of the military institution was 
rarely referred to by male participants to the study; this aspect of military life 
sufficiently assumed by both participants and the researcher as to need no explicit 
reinforcement in interview.  This lack of reflection on the gendered nature of 
military life accords with Seidler’s (1997:9) observation that traditional 
masculinities were characterised by the ‘suppression of the emotional life’ and, as 
such, were un-reflexive about their gender status100.  Unsurprisingly gender was 
an explicit and central theme in the account of the only female participant to the 
study.  
Kate was one of the few women in the British Army to have formally engaged in a 
combat role during this period.  Her experience of both service and transition (see 
Chapter 5) was similar to that of contemporary female service personnel who 
have, more recently integrated into combat units that retain a hegemonic 
masculine character (Connell 1987).  Kate’s description of winning acceptance 
from male colleagues and co-constituting a sense of ‘belonging’ to units with which 
she served is perhaps more positive than the experience of ‘equivalence’ observed 
by Brownstone (2014) in her study of female US Marines.  Despite this, Kate’s 
experience in Special Forces exemplifies the ‘boundary heightening’ and ‘role 
encapsulation’ theorised by Kanter as the manner in which ‘token’ representatives 
of gender minorities were forced to manage their status within hegemonic 
organisations (Kanter in Carreiras, 2006:36). Kate described the requirement to 
‘justify’ her adoption of an unconventional gender role (Amancio in Carreiras, 
 
100 This in itself demonstrates the gendered nature of military service (see Amancio in Carreiras 
2006:27).   
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2006:28) achieving assimilation into the unit only through demonstrable ‘over-
performance’ on core combat skills such as shooting, driving and physical fitness.  
In this, she differed from Brownstone’s marines who placed greater emphasis on 
equivalence being achieved only through the demonstration of competence in 
other ‘specialist’ areas to balance physical deficiency. 
Kate proposed that, under most circumstances, even in a Special Forces unit, 
differences in physicality were more contrived than real.  In this she demonstrated 
a point highlighted by Marcia Kovitz (2003) in her 1998 study of the Canadian 
military: 
‘an organisational structure and meaning system that together incorporate 
a number of mutually informing and binary oppositions such as war/peace, 
death/life, strong/weak, military/civilian, defenders/defended, 
friend/enemy and uniformity/diversity.  It is onto these sets of oppositions 
that gender is mapped: men/masculinity is associated with the former (i.e. 
war, strong, military, uniformity, defenders, friend etc.) and 
women/femininity with the latter (i.e. peace, weak, civilian, diversity, 
defended, enemy etc.), embodying in part, impediments to operational 
effectiveness.’ (Kovitz, 2003:6)  
Kovitz proposed that the rejection and problematisation of females in the military 
was related less to ‘what females are, than what they represent’  (Kovitz 2003:6).  
Kate’s narratives demonstrated that the female body was not ‘incompatible’ with 
the demanding environment of the Special Forces unit, but in some units, 
particularly where their own elite masculine status may be challenged, this 
compatibility may itself have provided the basis for rejection.  
It is significant that Kate described the greatest problems with the integration of 
women as existing in units that formed a ‘second string’ of Special Forces activity, 
where many of the unit members had opted for service in this unit because they 
had failed selection to ‘top tier’ Special Forces units like the SAS (Ford 1997:187 
and 190).  In these accounts we can see how Kovitz’s representations of masculine 
and feminine identity play out in practice.  Kate’s presence in the unit was resented 
to a greater degree where members felt more challenged by the construction of 
their work (surveillance) as compatible with feminine characteristics.  Individuals 
within this unit were rejecting of female operators irrespective of their ability to 
115 
 
bring capabilities to their undercover work that could not be achieved by male 
operators.  By linking masculine professional insecurity with this seemingly 
illogical approach to the benefit that gender diversity brought the unit, we can 
observe the centrality of masculinity to elite military identity.  The belligerence 
that Kate experienced being symptomatic of the ‘boundary heightening’ prevalent 
in organisations where the dominant masculine gender identity required constant 
reinforcement. 
This interpretation was significant.  Recent developments in the study of military 
masculinities emphasise that, as there are a plurality of unit cultures, so there is a 
plurality of types of masculinity experienced in the military (Higate, 2003:29) of 
which the masculinity of the ‘combat soldier’ sits at the ‘apex’ (Woodward and 
Winter, 2007:63).  Kate’s experience is testimony to the fact that even within this 
‘apex’ there were different forms of masculinity that gave rise to different 
performative expressions (Woodward and Winter, 2007:72-74), the masculinity 
of the SAS soldiers with whom Kate worked appeared less structurally 
transgressive than that which she experienced in the surveillance unit.  By linking 
this to the  ‘second tier status’ and professional un-fulfilment of some Special 
Forces surveillance operators, Kate demonstrated the inter-relation of sub-unit 
habitus, relative field capital and compensatory hyper-masculine excess.  Thus 
forms of transgression identified in critiques of private military security could be 
argued to form a structured element of state military service, particularly in elite 
combat units. 
Discussion: Military Culture as Capital 
Most participants expressed a direct continuity between military service and their 
work in private security.  At the heart of this connection were the competencies 
and behaviours created by military service, dispositions that came to form the 
‘habitus’ of the military person.  The logic of this exposition was that, in the 
creation of this habitus, the military person generated a form of embodied capital 
that facilitated the participants’ transition to, and movement within, the ‘field’ of 
private military security.  
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When discussing military service the central and coalescing theme was that of the 
creation of subjective modes of thought and behaviour that allowed the military 
person to be successful in the commission of violent conflict enacted to achieve 
specific aims determined by an external other.  This required the development of 
competence in a number of practices, from the manual pre-reflexive skills of 
handling weapons through to the physical and psychological conditioning 
necessary to overcome natural inhibitions (fear, discomfort, pain etc.).  These 
practices involved more than just physical fitness and a preparedness to work in 
dangerous circumstances; but, ostensibly, incorporated the seemingly divergent 
qualities of being able to be both rational and aggressive simultaneously in the 
face of opposing hostility (Hockey, 2003 and Holmgren, 2013).  The dispositions 
created by this conditioning aligned more closely to ‘warrior’ (rather than 
peacekeeper) modalities, and formed the foundation of the military habitus, a 
bedrock of behaviour that defined what it was to be military and that had to be 
mastered before other more sophisticated military skills and knowledge could be 
acquired. 
This foundational habitus created the expectation that the military person would 
be able to behave reliably and prevail in circumstances of violent confrontation.  
This expectation, more concrete when it had been tested in conflict, became a 
means by which value and status was ascribed within the military environment 
and formed the basis of many social transactions.  Indeed, the role of economic 
capital, so dominant in civilian fields suffered diminution within in the military 
context.  As such, it was the aggregate of embodied physical and neurological 
practices that prepared soldiers to be successful in conflict with an enemy, a type 
of ‘militarised somatic memory’ (Highgate, 2012e in McSorley, 2013:18) best 
conceived of as ‘fighting capital’, that served to place the soldier in the military 
field and facilitate their movement and possibilities within in that field.  The level 
of ‘fighting capital’ possessed by the soldier was determined by the formation of 
the habitus; a well-formed military habitus, with service in front-line or elite units 
and experience of operational soldiering, would confer greater status and capital. 
The participants’ emphasis on the physically embodying practices of military 
identity formation was indicative of the somatic nature of military knowledge 
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(Hockey, 1986; Morgan, 1994) and the ‘embodying institutionalization’ of military 
culture (Higate, 2005:305).   Contained within this construction was meaning that 
extended beyond simple physical/mental capability.  Military identity was 
intrinsic and pre-reflexive, informing every action and response when confronted 
with crisis.   When an incident occurred ‘the training just kicks in’ (Nigel) and 
technique was applied in the interests of power (in this case the state) without 
either need or recourse to cognition.  As such, the somatic conditioning of military 
practice served to reinforce the ‘morally boundaried’ nature of military culture.  
Out of necessity the military actor was trained to be able to take action before 
individual moral cognition could be exercised.  In combat units this was reflected 
in a culture of ‘radical professionalism’ that established the abrogation of 
individual moral agency, and subordination of this function to either higher 
authority or practical expedience.  This became a tenet of professional identity. 
The importance of embodiment in the creation of social habitus has been 
recognised by scholars (Wacquant, 1995, Cambell, 1996, Shilling, 1997), as has its 
importance in military training (Highgate, 2003, Hockey, 2002; 2009; Lande 
2007).  Lande, making the link between embodiment and the interaction of 
habitus and capital within the military ‘field’ observed that: ‘Changes in form to 
what phenomenologists call the ‘corporeal schema’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2002) entail 
the addition of new dispositions and kinetic and sensory powers that alter the very 
foundations of social interaction and conduct’.  Lande proposed that that: 
‘Embodiment is thus a crucial but missing theme from traditional sociological 
accounts of military life’ (Lande, 2007: 97).  Where embodiment has been explored 
it has been closely linked to gendered cultures and identity (Arkin and Dobrofski, 
1978).  Indeed Paul Higate has argued that embodied masculinity resides at the 
core of all military identities.  Under any analysis it is clear that the physically and 
ritualistically (Burk, 2004 and Winslow, 1999, Thornborrow and Brown’s 2009) 
reinforced, hyper-masculine, communitarian and professionally radical culture of 
the combat unit creates in the soldier a combative identity of considerable 
strength and durability. 
In a military sense the logic behind the creation of this highly durable identity was 
clear; to overcome the challenges of persuading (largely, though not exclusively,) 
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men, to engage in violent and dangerous activity which, left to their own devices 
they would be unwilling to carry out101, and to ensure their competence in the 
enactment of this activity when required.  This demonstrated the way in which the 
‘ritualisation of emotions’ in the military environment worked to alter and 
minimise the effect of ‘entropic’ natural emotions such as  ‘fear, timidity, 
anxiousness, disgust and boredom’ (Jelušić, 2005:238) on the ability of military 
units to maintain cohesion and effectiveness in war:  
‘The military while managing emotions, tries to redefine the situation of 
emotions, change the expressive gestures, impose regulative norms and, 
sometimes, create consistent action.  These attempts might be so powerful 
that the individual soldier reinterprets the emotion and no longer reflects 
on himself/herself or his or her subjective feelings, but, rather, reflects on 
collective and institutionalised emotions internalized through trained 
emotional work’ (Jelušić, 2005:239) 
In the creation of this ‘reliable identity’ military service fundamentally altered the 
emotional condition, providing incentives to emotional fulfilment through 
exposure to stimuli that the civilian would consider harmful or entropic (danger, 
physical adversity, conflict etc.).  As such, the identity of the military ‘warrior’ was, 
one in which danger and insecurity was actively sought so that could be challenged 
or dominated. 
Special Forces and the Capital of Exception 
The themes of physicality, embodied knowledge, mortality and danger were 
common between the former regular military participants in the study.  It was 
clear that these experiences created somatic capabilities and behavioural 
dispositions that determined their access to the field of private military security 
and the decisions they made as private sector actors (see Chapters 6-8). However, 
service in Special Forces was seen to have a distinct quality that distilled and 
intensified these categories of meaning and the masculinities that underpinned 
 
101 Marcia Kovitz (2003:5-6) highlighted the frailty of the normative assumption of the genetic 
masculine pre-disposition to enthusiasm or efficacy in the conduct of organised violence.  In On Killing 
David Grossman (1996) provided a remarkable insight into the difficulty that most military people 
experience with the conduct of violence.  Randall Collins, in his microsociology of Violence (Collins, 
2008) demonstrated that, even with considerable training and conditioning, most people remain 
profoundly uncomfortable with violence and (with the exception of a small minority of the 
population) generally inept in its commission. 
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them.  The habitus of the Special Forces soldier was a highly refined version of that 
of the conventional military actor.  Commensurately the perceived value of the 
Special Forces soldier’s ‘fighting capital’ was greater than that of their ‘green army’ 
peers102.  Yet, despite these similarities Special Forces service was seen to impart 
a meaning and experience that had a different character to that of conventional 
military service.  The levels of physicality required by Special Forces transcended 
the purely corporeal and were seen to become a function of mental toughness that 
was expressed in language verging on the spiritual.  But more than this, Special 
Forces service was seen to impart a quality of exceptional individual autonomy 
and innovation.  This both required and inculcated greater grounded strategic 
awareness in the Special Forces ‘operator’ than would be required of the 
conventional military soldier.  In turn, this demanded of the Special Forces actor a 
greater maturity and rationality than their ‘green army’ counterpart.  Despite this, 
it was clear that, in some cases, this latitude also created circumstances in which 
transgressive behaviour had been free to flourish. 
To understand the significance of this, we have to understand the nature of the 
Special Forces role and organisation.  ‘Special’ status in military terms denotes 
units whose mode of operations involves actions that fall beyond the scope of 
traditional conventional warfare.  Indeed the specific function of many Special 
Forces and specialist intelligence units is, specifically, the conduct of 
‘unconventional warfare’.  The denomination ‘special’ therefore expresses a 
‘hybrid’ status, one in which the service person is engaged in activity that is both 
‘hyper-military’ and ’beyond military’.  These types of military operation are 
characterised by the manner in which the traditional boundaries between the 
military, the constabulary, the state and the private, the legitimate and the 
criminal are broken down (Kaldor, 2003).  As such the social capital (i.e. the 
operators network of professional contacts) extends well beyond that which may 
be experienced in conventional military service.  Further, conduct of ‘special 
operations’ on behalf of the state implies the acquisition of skills and techniques 
that fall beyond the normal sphere of conventional military action.  These skills 
 




exist in the nexus between criminal activity and warfare.  As one former SAS 
participant observed: 
‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s Special Operations Executive, what is 
SOE if not a terrorist organisation?  I mean their brief from Churchill was 
to set Europe ablaze.  If that is not terrorism I don’t know what is.’ 
(Craig) 
The development of these unconventional military roles created a type of 
soldiering that required individual motivation and self-discipline rather than the 
more traditional collective discipline of the conventional military.  This was seen 
to have inculcated very different standards of objective control within these units.  
In Kate’s description of Special Forces surveillance, the unit culture differed 
radically that of the conventional military.  The unconventional nature of the 
covert surveillance role meant the unit adopted practices, such as non-standard 
dress (Parks, 2003) and an informality in relations between soldiers and officers, 
(including the implied acceptance of sexual relations between officers and soldiers 
serving within the same unit), that would have been considered unacceptable in 
the ‘green army’.  Some of these behaviours, such as the sexual harassment and 
sexual violence described by Kate, would have resulted in arrest and courts 
marshal in a conventional military unit.  Despite this, none of these incidents led 
to the unit, or individuals being the subject of censure, isolation or stigma.  The 
exceptional nature of the unit’s role and status sustained this transgression as an 
acceptable divergence from conventional military norms. 
This impunity was reproduced within the broader military field where members 
of special designation units held a formally recognised differentiated status, 
becoming, in the words of one participant ‘an army within an army’.  Special Forces 
training transcended the constraints of conventional military training; its 
circumstances both more testing and more hazardous (Chisholm, 2008).  The 
nomenclature of Special Forces roles and status had a different quality; the elite 
‘non-green’ soldier often referred to as an ‘operator’ rather than a ‘private’.  
Additional increments of pay103 served to distinguish between conventional army 
 
103 Special Forces pay and special duties pay are upgrades to the soldiers remuneration received when 
they have qualified as, and are serving with ‘non-green army’ military units. 
121 
 
rank structure and the exceptional status of the elite Special Forces or special 
intelligence operator.  Further, within the military imagination Special Forces 
were held to a different standard in relation to the force they exercised (Asher, 
2002; Nichol, 2017; Fence, 2020).  Additionally, special designation units received 
the best funding; the most up-to date equipment and access to secret intelligence 
that would often be withheld from conventional army units. 
Civilian and non-Special Forces interviewees perceived the Special Forces habitus 
to display qualities of both impunity and privilege.  Despite this, the elite ‘non-
green army’ soldier was neither isolated nor stigmatised.  Instead they were 
celebrated as the ultimate exemplars of military value (Chisholm, 2008).  In one 
participant’s words they were ‘military rock stars, they’re the people who 
everyone wants to be’ (Andrew).  As such, in keeping with their designation, 
‘special’ units displayed an independence from the norms and constraints of the 
traditional military institution while still remaining a part of that system.  In this 
respect the Special Forces or special intelligence ‘operator’ embodied the ‘ecstasy 
belonging’ that Agamben described as the ‘topological structure’ of the state of 
exception; the condition of at once ‘being-outside and yet belonging’ (Agamben, 
2005:35) that formed the ultimate expression of sovereignty. 
Thus ‘non-green army’ service implied a culture and disposition that extended 
beyond the radical professional, or ‘morally boundaried’, construction of the 
conventional military.  The exceptional actor accepted that theirs was a role that 
engaged in legitimised transgression both more routinely and of a nature 
qualitatively more extreme than that which would be acceptable in the 
conventional military.  Further, the ‘non-green’ identity incorporated an increased 
emphasis on the agency of the individual soldier to determine when the 
transgression of normative (i.e. conventional) military standards was warranted.  
This allowed Special Forces units and sub-units to rationalise their own divergent 
practice and conferred upon their soldiers the quality of the sovereign actor.  In so 
doing the Special Forces habitus created a form of military capital that 
transcended the ‘fighting capital’ of the foundational military habitus.  The Special 
Forces soldier was seen to possess symbolic capital associated not only with 
superior military somatic knowledge, but embodying state-like sovereign 
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exceptionalism, a quality which had its own value when transposed into the 
commercial sphere; the mobilisation of this capital becoming a central means 
through which the export military methods and techniques into (formerly) civilian 
fields could be legitimised (see Chapter 8). 
In this Chapter I began by proposing that only some military people chose to 
transition into military private security, but that military experience was seminal 
to this transition.  Overwhelmingly, the experience my interviewees considered 
relevant to their transition to military private security was linked to service in 
combat units.  These units were dominated by ‘warrior’ modalities that were 
divergent, rather than convergent with the values of civil society, but that, through 
the highly encompassing somatic conditioning and cultural reinforcement of 
military training, provided a form of guarantee that the soldier would act reliably 
in the interests of the collective under circumstances of existential threat; a 
‘fighting capital’ that could be commoditised in the commercial security field.  
However, in creating this capital the military altered the emotional condition of 
the soldier, creating a disposition in which exposure to adversity and danger 
became a source of emotional fulfilment, and which could be seen to incentivise 
the individual to seek circumstances of insecurity over which dominance could be 
imposed through violent action.  In this, the military habitus placed higher order 
moral considerations beyond the bounds of cognition and created practical ethics 
as a function of unit or sub-unit culture.  These cultures existed in tension with 
overall institutional (and societal) values.  The greater the elite status of the sub-
unit, the greater the permitted divergence from societal norms, with Special 
Forces representing an apex of radical professionalism, masculine individualism 
and state-like exceptionalism.  As we will see in the next chapter, it was the desire 
to re-capture, or maintain, these circumstances of service that most directly 




Chapter 5 Transitions 
Having examined the elements of their military past that my interviewees 
considered seminal to their transition into private military security, I now turn to 
the transitioning experience itself.  How and why did certain military people, and 
ex-military people choose to work in private military security and what was their 
experience of transition into the field?  
Military to Civilian Transition 
The concept of military to civilian transition (MCT), the process of moving from 
military to civilian employment, has emerged in the United States (Castro, Kintzle, 
& Hassan, 2014) and Israel (Vigoda, Baruch and Grimland, 2010) as a field of both 
practice and scholarship in recent years.  British military involvement in the Iraq 
and Afghan conflicts has meant that the transitioning experience has become a 
focus of political attention in the United Kingdom (Cooper et al., 2016).  The 
process of a serviceperson’s transition from regular (i.e. full-time) military service 
to non-military employment is referred to in the British Armed Forces as 
‘resettlement’.  This process has been defined by the Forces in Mind Trust, a 
leading charity supporting research in the military service sector, as  ‘a period of 
reintegration into civilian life from the military and encapsulates the process of 
change that a service person necessarily undertakes when her or his military 
career comes to an end’ (Forces in Mind Trust, 2013 in Cooper et al., 2016).  
Resettlement sought to provide the service-leaver with a period of briefing and 
training prior to discharge from the military, equip them with knowledge of the 
opportunities available in the civilian marketplace, and provide them with civilian 
qualifications that would assist in transition.  The details of this process were set 
out in the Tri-Service Resettlement and Employment Support Manual produced 
by the Ministry of Defence (MoD, 2015). 
In her 1994 study of the transition of 62 British armed forces personnel to civilian 
life Ruth Jolly (1996b) proposed that former service people were divided into two 
groups: those who re-constructed a new civilian self-identity independent of their 
military past, and succeed in transition; and those who, even after their transition 
to the civilian world, continued to see themselves as military.  Jolly asked the 
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question of why so many military people retained a sense-of-self that never 
transcended the construct formed during military service and, in Jolly’s words 
‘remained captured by their military past’ (Jolly 1996b cited in Higate, 2001:446).  
Jolly provided a useful template for understanding the phases of transition 
experienced by the service person: The first of these, ‘confrontation’, was the 
period in which the service leaver confronted the differences between the military 
and civilian realms and accepted (or otherwise) the requirement for change.  
‘Disengagement’ was the phase in which the former serviceperson began to 
examine their loyalty and affiliation to the military institution and question the 
decisions and priorities they cultivated while they were serving.  ‘Resocialisation’ 
was the process of acquiring a civilian ‘self’ that superseded their former military 
identity and ultimately concluded the process of acculturation to civilian life.  
Paul Higate, in his examination of the transition of former members of the armed 
forces to homelessness and rough-sleeping provided a counterpoint to Jolly’s 
interpretation.  He emphasised that the experience in service of military personnel 
varied significantly depending on their role; an RAF Clerk, for example, having a 
very different experience of service to that of a soldier in the Parachute Regiment 
(Higate, 2001:445; 2003).  While agreeing with Jolly that an analysis of the 
subjective experience of transition was essential, Higate considered Jolly’s 
position too reductive.  He proposed that a purely subjective approach failed to 
take into account the manner in which the ex-serviceperson was viewed by society 
and the affect this had on their opportunities for post military employment.  Based 
on then contemporary developments in social theory, Higate proposed that 
through the identification of the ‘universal features of military experience’ (Higate 
2001:444) the nature of the military civilian transition for a broad spectrum of 
former military actors could be better understood. 
In seeking the ‘universal features’ of military service Higate (2001) first examined 
the concept of military ‘institutionalization’.  While observing that the military 
functioned as a ‘total institution’ (Goffman 1961) he found that the concept of 
‘institutionalization’ was little more than shorthand for a perceived lack of 
adaptability by service personnel transitioning into civilian roles.  Highgate found 
that many service leavers, faced with challenges of transition, fell back on the 
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embodied skills of fieldcraft and survival that they had learned in the military.  
These skills were based less in the institutional modalities of military life than the 
embodied masculine identity that remained a continuous characteristic across all 
roles and services of the armed forces.  Higate considered that the deployment of 
these somatic capacities explained the high prevalence of transition between the 
military and ‘masculinised organisations’, such as the police, prison service and 
private security observed by Jolly (Jolly, 1996a:102), but could also account for 
the prevalence of former service people that least ‘institutional’ of social groups, 
the homeless street population.   
In an insightful (albeit limited, n14), qualitative study of British veterans Jens Zinn 
(2011) examined the manner in which former service people managed the risk 
and uncertainty of discharge from the military.  Zinn’s work focused on 
motivations for leaving the Armed Forces and highlighted tensions that lay at the 
heart of many service peoples’ decision to resign from service.  Zinn proposed that 
the ‘distance’ between the individual and the military in terms of both 
occupational and moral behaviors was key.  Under this approach it was possible 
for the service person to believe in military institutional values, but feel tension 
with an organisation that, in their perception, had failed to live up to these values, 
whether in terms of everyday occupational conduct, or in respect of its 
commitment to professed moral standards.  Zinn’s work supported the notion that 
a waning of ‘organizational commitment’ 104  was at the heart of transitioning 
decisions.  He observed that, in transitioning to civilian life, the ‘proximity or 
distance’ with, or from, military culture could be adopted as a paradigm through 
which the individual’s approach to military-civilian transition (and ultimately 
their success or failure in this endeavor) could be understood.  Implicit to Zinn’s 
analysis was the belief that those service people who, during their service, resisted 
or avoided complete immersion in institutional values tended to fair better in 
military civilian transition.  
More recent studies on career transitions in general can also assist in 
understanding military civilian transition.  In his work on civilians transitioning 
 
104  As defined by Meyer and Allen (1997) and developed by Vigoda-Gadot, Baruch and Grimland, 
(2010)  in their study of Israeli Defense Force personnel in transition. 
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into radically different careers Potter (2015) provided the concept of ‘transitional 
spaces’ and ‘self-actualisation’.  The former encapsulated the notion of the liminal 
space in which the individual in transition sat between two formed identities, that 
of the thing they were and that of what they wished to become.  It was in this space 
that identity could be re-moulded and the challenges of Jolly’s ‘confrontation’ 
addressed.  Potter’s concept of ‘self-actualisation’ is analogous to the charge of 
emotional energy used by Durkheim, Goffman and Collins to describe the 
powerfully experienced, non-material fulfilment that motivates social interaction 
at all levels (Collins, 2004:102-140).  Potter provides evidence of the extent to 
which radical career transitions were based on notions of self-actualisation; that 
in modern society we are defined by our work and that, for many people to change 
career is to change oneself.  Thus, transition often occurred in the context of an 
individual desire to realise personal potential and achieve a subjective sense of 
fulfilment.  The narratives of participants in my study reflected many of these 
themes and rationales. 
Participants described a number of different trajectories in their transition from 
military services to private security.  For some the transition was direct, with no 
interposing period of alternative civilian employment, a trajectory I term  
‘continuous transition’.  For others engagement in private military security came 
after periods work in entirely non-military industries (i.e. ‘discontinuous 
transition’).  Each of these trajectories encompassed differing motivations and 
reasons for transition; but also shared some underpinning rationales. 
Continuous Transition: Incidental Continuity  
Victor was in his 60s, a former senior NCO in the SAS.  He left the Army in the 1990s 
having completed 22 years of service.  He would have been eligible to continue his 
service in Special Forces but instead chose discharge from the military.  While not 
intending to move into private military security, Victor found himself transitioning 




 ‘I had a run in with the Colonel and instead of going from SQS 105  to 
Sergeant Major I was side-lined.  So I spent the last two years with the TA 
and my idea when I was coming up to leave the Army, in my last 18 
months or so, was that the last thing I would do would be go into the 
security industry.  I’d set my sights on a pre-release course in Health and 
Safety and I was absolutely determined to leave the Army and get some 
sort of job in Health and Safety.  Well, I was in that last three months, I’d 
already done my pre-release course when a chap rang me up and said 
“look I’ve got this short job, it’s only about 10 days probably, security role 
down in London, nice, easy, just security on a hotel, well not the hotel 
itself, the back part which is a private apartment block for the incredibly 
wealthy”.  I said OK.  I just did night shifts for 10 days and got a decent 
salary for it.  And then once that had finished within the space of about 2 
or 3 weeks the same chap rang me up and said, “look there’s another 
coming up but this one’s going to be 2 and a half to 3 months”.  So I went 
on that job, that was more close protection, working through the day 
escorting people from where we were, quite near Sunningdale Golf 
Course, into London, around London, very, very simple, low key, and the 
money was OK.  And then another job came up, and then after that 
another. And I suppose after 2 or 3 years, unintentionally I’d actually 
fallen into the trap of doing the one thing that I’d intended not to do.  I 
mean, to be honest, I think what I should have done, maybe after 2 or 3 
years, is said “right that is it! I’m going to get back on track with Health 
and Safety”.  But I didn’t because these roles kept coming up and some of 
them were really interesting.’ (Victor) 
Victor’s original intention was that, with the end of his career, he would make a 
clean break from the military and transition into a different sphere of civilian 
work.  In this he demonstrated his willingness to make a change to civilian 
employment (Jolly, 1996a:10).  The military had provided him with some time for 
re-training and preparation for his discharge.  However, as his discharge 
approached, opportunities arose in private security that made the effort and 
insecurity of the transition to truly civilian employment unnecessary.  This pattern 
was common among an older generation of senior NCOs from the Special Forces 
community.  The move to private security expressed in terms of continuity rather 
than transition as labour market access to the private military security ‘Circuit’ 
was facilitated by the social capital (Bourdieu, 1984;1986) of Special Forces 
service.  Many of the commercial tasks performed at this time were similar in 
 
105 Squadron Quartermaster Sergeant 
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nature to military tasks and involved working directly with former military peers.  
In the 1990s, prior to the establishment of the Private Security Industries Act 2001 
and the Montreux process, qualified former Special Forces soldiers were not 
required to re-train in order to work in the civilian environment.  As such, passage 
from the military to the private security field involved no meaningful transition 
through a liminal/transitional space (Potter, 2015) where values and dispositions 
were confronted (Jolly, 1996b:10). 
In expressing his reasons for leaving military service, we see in Victor’s narrative 
a recurring theme, that of disillusion with the organisational culture (Martin, 2002 
in Potter 2015:104) of the military and frustration that the forward momentum of 
his career (in this case the promotion to Sergeant Major) was thwarted by poor 
relations with an individual senior officer.  Thus Victor’s decision to leave the 
military was conditioned by a subjective association between success and 
continued progress through formal ranks of socio-economic status akin to 
Hirschman’s ‘ideology of exit’  (1970:112).  In this, Victor’s values were less closely 
oriented to ‘institutional’ modalities than to the more modern individual 
expectation that both life and career should have ‘forward trajectory’, a concept 
that is a relatively contemporary ‘western’ construction aligned closely to the to 
the idea that the function of work is to provide ‘self-actualising’ emotional 
fulfilment (Berger et al., 1977 in Potter, 2015:74). 
The theme of ‘self-actualisation’ was also evident in Victor’s reasons for continuing 
to carry out private security work.  While money was a factor in his decision to 
continue working in the sector, it was neither the single nor the driving impetus.  
Instead Victor’s decision was based on more experiential factors.  In his words the 
work he was conducting in private security was ‘really interesting’.  Thus, subject 
to a basic level of financial security, Victor’s decision to continue military style 
work in the private security sector was influenced by the desire to continue 
experiencing the sense of meaning and relevance associated with this type of 
work, albeit without the constraints of a military occupational culture with which 
he had become both frustrated and disillusioned. 
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Despite this, Victor expressed no resentment in respect of his military career; his 
service in the SAS included personal involvement in some of the most defining 
actions of that unit.  The tension that resulted in his decision to leave the Army 
was the same that propelled him into Special Forces in the first instance; that of 
distance between his own values of resourcefulness and individualism and the 
rigidity of the military institution.  In this, Victor displayed a consistent ‘distance’ 
from military culture that, despite the absence of any distinct period of transition, 
allowed him to adapt to the world of the commercial provision of military style 
services with relative ease.  However, this transition took place with little need or 
opportunity to engage in the self-reflective confrontation, disengagement and 
resocialisation described by Jolly.  Thus for Victor, transition to ‘the Circuit’ was to 
continue to be military by other means, without the impediment of rigid 
institutional constraints.  Victor left the private military security industry in the 
late 2000s and re-trained in Health and Safety.  His experience of commercial 
security providing him with what he latterly saw as an extended transition into 
genuinely civilian employment. 
Discontinuous Transition: Re-Engagement  
The theme of individual progress and emotional fulfilment was similar for Ian, a 
former senior NCO in the SAS Regiment.  Ian’s intention, like Victor’s, was to move 
into civilian work after leaving the military.  Initially Ian chose to take a security 
job in London to support himself while he undertook training in business 
administration.   He rejected drifting directly into the more militarised field of ‘the 
Circuit’ and sought to provide himself with the ‘transitional space’ necessary for 
resocialisation to civilian life.  Over time Ian became employed in managing a large 
portfolio of facilities and property management, a wholly civilian role.  However, 
feeling unchallenged by the work he was asked to conduct, and observing the 
opportunities that the 2003 Invasion of Iraq presented to an ex-Special Forces 
soldier with a knowledge of Arabic, he re-engaged with military style work in the 
private sector: 
‘I Left  [the Army] rather than extending my career.  I wanted to do an MBA 
(Masters of Business Administration).  The first job offer I had was to work 
for [a company in the extractive industry] as I spoke [two languages].  
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However after a lengthy interview process, and passing all of that, getting 
ready to go out to [a country in Africa], I was asked to do a security survey 
for [a major City of London financial institution]. Having done a survey, the 
business asked me to become their security manager and, eventually, Head 
of Security.  I was married at the time, so rather than go to [Africa] I 
accepted the job in UK.  I would be better paid and I would be in the City.  
So I moved from Hereford and into the City of London and worked there.  
It was quite a difficult transition to go from the military, where you talk in 
acronyms and a different type of ‘speak’, to a civilian environment.  I ended 
up doing a whole series of things that weren’t security, running facilities, 
running this big restaurant, business continuity - which for a financial 
institution is all IT based, a property portfolio worth 14 million.  But every 
two years I got ‘itchy feet’.  I was paid really well, but I decided to leave, 
sitting there with your life going by and your brain becoming stale, that for 
me wasn’t living.  There were people who I had promoted who were 
capable of doing my job.  So I asked to be made redundant.  I left and set up 
a company to track and recover stolen goods.  I set this up with a friend of 
mine, a head of Special Branch, using GPS technology to track goods in 
transit.  This didn’t work out.  I needed a change and I decided to use my 
Arabic, which I had learned in the Army.  I took a job with a [western] Oil 
company, liaising with the Iraqi Army.  I came back from Iraq and I worked 
for [a major news agency] in Pakistan and then worked in the Middle East 
doing security for NGOs and oil companies.  (Ian) 
Ian talked of completing his MBA as providing him with the ‘language’ to be able 
to communicate effectively in the civilian business world.  The experience of 
undertaking security in the City of London, and the exposure this provided to the 
environment of business, created for him a ‘transitional space’ to confront his 
military identity and resocialise to a civilian environment.  His ability to adapt to 
the environment of work in the city earned him promotion, involving a move away 
from security and into more mainstream business.  However, despite an 
ostensibly successful transition to the civilian workplace (where he received high 
pay and career progression) civilian work did not provide the emotional fulfilment 
of the military; despite his ability to adapt, Ian had not fully disengaged from his 
military past. 
This pattern of re-engagement was not uncommon among older servicemen.  
David describes how, following a successful career in the City of London he chose 
to re-enter the private military security field with the expansion of opportunities 
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in the maritime security sector: 
‘I’m a former Royal Marine from some time back.  I joined the Marines in 
1982, left in 1992.  Until 2010, I had a career in the City [doing] business 
development in various industries, ranging from production to 
investment banking.  So when this industry kicked off, the maritime 
industry, I had periodically got myself qualified, if you like, I got the basis, 
the entry level qualifications that at the time were required for this role. 
 So I’d got myself prepared for this industry, as I was at a point where I’d 
started to… I suppose for want of a better word, I had my male 
menopause.  There was lots of guys I’d served with who’d gone into land 
based work for companies like Aegis, Olive, Edinburgh Risk… that wasn’t 
really something I wanted to get into.  Although I have lots of contacts 
within that [field] and job opportunities were there, but it wasn’t 
something that I felt an urge to do.   
 As the Maritime industry started to gather and pick up pace, and 
companies were forming which seemed to have a reasonable pipeline of 
business, obviously you’re getting phone calls from your old network of 
colleagues, people you’ve served with, saying there’s opportunities.  I 
started to look into it a lot more seriously.  From my point of view, 
financially, it wasn’t so much a financial gain because the financial gains 
[in maritime security] had been quite good initially.  However being an 
older guy coming into it, I’d had a fairly good civilian career so I wasn’t 
financially motivated.  Mine was probably more from… I don’t know 
really, capturing a bit of the old youth and I suppose job satisfaction. It got 
to a point where I was getting a bit stale and bored in what I was doing.  
So that was one of the real motives for me.’  (David) 
For both Ian and David, the growth of the private military security field meant that 
they were able to use specific skills and capital provided to them by their military 
service.  For Ian, service in an elite military Special Forces organisation and 
knowledge of Arabic was central to his re-engagement with security related 
activity in the international sphere.  For David, service with an elite unit (in this 
case the Royal Marines) was also pivotal, as this implied both experience and 
capability in armed conflict (fighting capital) as well as the specialist knowledge 
of maritime practice.  These forms of capital were directly transferable to 
emerging sub-fields of commercial security.  In both cases the choice to transition 
was not motivated by financial gain.  Instead emotional fulfilment, or ‘self-
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actualisation’, was central to their decision to re-engage with military style work 
in the private sector. 
We can see in Ian and David’s path into military private security the broader 
trends in the industry described in Chapter 1.  Ian’s relatively high levels of capital 
associated with his Special Forces background provided him with immediate 
access to a market that was, at the time, still emerging from the informality of ‘the 
Circuit’.  David’s capital was less well developed and would probably not have 
provided him with access to the relatively closed labour market of the Circuit era.  
However, as the private security industry grew with the advent of the Global War 
on Terror, new opportunities for conventional military service people began to 
emerge.  In David’s case his service as a Marine gave him the physical capabilities, 
skills and knowledge (the somatic capital) directly relevant for the newly 
emerging maritime boom.  By this time growing systems of governance within the 
military private security field  (and in maritime security in particular) meant that 
on joining the maritime security industry David was required to undertake a 
‘transitional’ period, re-training and gaining qualifications as a pre-requisite for 
employment.  Despite the relatively short-lived maritime security ‘boom’ David 
was successful in his career transition.  His experience in the City stood him in 
good stead and as he was able to move from the position of a freelance security 
team leader into a role in corporate management.  From here he became engaged 
in commercial business development activity for a range of ground and maritime-
based security. 
Continuous Transition: Aspirant Continuity:  
For a younger generation of service person with conventional military experience 
the Global War on Terror and Invasion of Iraq in 2003 meant that, for the first 
time, the option of transferring directly from the military into private military 
security was a possibility.  Terry, a former soldier in the Parachute Regiment, 
transitioned into private security following a short military career that was 
characterised by significant engagement in high-intensity counter-insurgency and 
war-fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Terry’s transition from the military into 
private security was precipitated by the restriction of his ability to be actively 
engaged in front-line soldiering.  The cause of this restriction was injury; hearing 
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loss sustained as a result of his protracted exposure to gunfire and explosives 
during combat operations in Sangin.  Terry talked about managing the 
consequences of his disability, his decision to leave the military and his feelings on 
transitioning to employment in military private security in Iraq: 
 ‘I mean it was basically out of my hands.  I went to do a course, to become 
[an Army] physical training instructor… and back years ago, some of the 
PTI’s106 were deaf as doornails, so it was a safe haven if anything was to 
happen to you.  But on the course things changed, health and safety came 
in, and basically I was pulled off that course because of my hearing loss.  It 
would have been unsafe to perform the duty on roads in case I didn’t hear 
the traffic.  I decided then, I thought that’s that, and it really upset me a lot, 
I mean I thought my career’s ended.  I didn’t want to go down the only 
path I could of within the Battalion because I didn’t see myself as, no 
disrespect to them on that side, stores and HQ and stuff like that… but I 
didn’t join to… to be a storeman.  
 So I’d gone for different tests anyway and all the phonicals in my ear had 
been destroyed, so my hearing was worse when I came back and I got 
downgraded107.  I spoke to a Medical Officer, really nice fellow and he 
basically told me I could either stay in and [work as a storeman], or get 
out.  The consideration of re-cap-badging 108  wasn’t there, because he 
knew that that wouldn’t happen… and I chose to get medical discharged 
because I couldn’t go anywhere.  I got discharged out the Army.  I wasn’t 
too happy, but there was nothing I could do. 
 I was on leave from getting medical discharge, I’d spent six month off. 
They basically medical discharged me on the day, but it took six month to 
write the papers up, and I went and worked on a building site, which I 
didn’t mind, but it wasn’t what I wanted to do.  I was missing the ‘family’ I 
had.  I was missing going on operations.  I was hearing people in the 
Battalion; they were going here, there and everywhere.  I had to think of a 
way of getting that back and the only way I knew was to do a close 
protection course and go and do private security.  Because a lot of the 
people around the time I was getting out were all getting out to do the 
same thing… and it was my brothers, a lot of people that I knew and 
worked with within the military were now in the private sector.  So I went 
 
106 PTI – Physical Training Instructor.  
107 Downgraded, medically downgraded is to be diagnosed by a military doctor with a condition that 
affects a soldier’s ability to carry out their role. 
108 ‘Re cap-badge’ is to change regiments (literally to change the badge on one’s headdress) 
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and did a close protection course through the Army, they paid for it, and 
really enjoyed it, and that’s what I decided to do. 
 The owner of the course, he helped me out a lot.  He’s helped me out a lot 
ever since to be honest, every job I’ve got.  He said, what were my feelings 
about going to the Middle East?  And I said, that’s what I’m looking to do.  
He put a word in and then two weeks later I get an interview.  It was just 
before Christmas I had a week to deploy.  I spoke to my partner and, 
basically, in this industry for your first job you can’t really say no because, 
although it won’t give you a bad reputation, if you then decide to [apply 
for work] with the same company they never forget and they blacklist you.  
So I decided to deploy. 
 I was really happy actually.  I enjoyed it, I went out there, there was a few 
blokes from the same Battalion and from the same regiment, but different 
Battalions.  There was a bloke there from the Falklands; he was still going 
strong, I shared a room with him… a lot of stories, a really good bloke.  I 
still keep in contact with him now.  I think he’s still out there.  Yeah, I 
enjoyed it.  I did the training, really good training package, the vehicles, 
the kit that was on the vehicles was outstanding.  I didn’t really think it 
existed, but it did.  I got settled in quite quick.  My hearing didn’t come into 
play there, they didn’t really ask.  Before I got the job I had to give them 
my discharge papers and, because I spoke to them on the phone, they said 
“you sound like you can hear me”.  But it’s all about high tone hearing loss.  
I had to sign an agreement and my doctor had to class me as medically fit.  
That’s me saying if anything happens then it’s my own fault.’ 
In common with many other participants, Terry’s decision to leave the military 
was the result of a tension created by the waning ‘organizational commitment’ 
(Zinn, 2011) between him and the military institution.  This manifested as a form 
of ‘value strain’ (Zhang et al., 2011)109; Terry’s experience of the bureaucracy 
surrounding his injury creating disaffection as he tried to reconcile the demands 
of the institution with the elite sub-unit culture that anchored his sense-of-self.  
His career transition to private military security was defined by his desire not to 
accept or confront a change in his identity.  Terry was a paratrooper and a combat 
soldier.  This identity was sufficiently durably constructed to mean that neither 
 
109 Zhan et al. propose a theory of strain based Agnew’s general strain theory (Agnew, 1992) in which 





the prospect of a more sedentary role within his battalion, nor medical discharge 
from the military was sufficient to make him confront, or disengage from this 
sense-of-self.  Despite a limited transitioning period (the result of the bureaucracy 
of his discharge being completed) in which he experienced other civilian roles, he 
continued to seek the emotional fulfilment of service in active conflict 
environments.  As with other participants, for Terry the imperative of self-
actualisation transcended traditional ‘institutional’ loyalty.  He was not tied to the 
institution of the Army. Instead he remained wedded to a more discrete identity, 
that of the elite airborne combat soldier; with the constructions of danger, 
sacrifice, action, kinship, and masculinity that this implied; an 
initiatory/communal identity (Thomas and Rosenzveig, 1982) formed at unit level 
that, following his discharge, he sustained in the private military sector.  
By the time of Terry’s discharge in 2010 the Army was offering security-training 
courses (in this case close protection) as part of the standard resettlement 
package for service leavers.  The owner of the organisation conducting this 
training was key to Terry’s ability to gain employment following the completion 
of his close protection course.  This introduced him to a commercial field where 
the fighting capital created by his experience of combat operations had an 
exchange value.  Despite this, Terry recognised that the offer of employment 
followed his training was facilitated by a ‘gatekeeper’ (the owner of the training 
course).  This gatekeeper was a former member of Special Forces whose service 
background and entrepreneurial status provided forms of capital that Terry’s 
conventional military service did not (i.e. the social and symbolic capital necessary 
to develop and maintain networks of state, corporate and private clients).  Terry 
continued to work intermittently in the Middle East.  However, by 2015 
continuous close protection work had become difficult to obtain and he was 
reluctantly seeking permanent civilian employment in the UK. 
Continuous Transition: Entrepreneurialism 
The expansion of private military security provided the opportunity for Victor, 
Ian, David and Terry to engage as employees, or freelance consultants, in different 
parts of the private military security industry.  For others the specialist knowledge 
that they had acquired in service could be could be exploited more 
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entrepreneurially.  Stuart was a former infantry NCO who served with a UK Special 
Forces unit specialising in covert surveillance of suspected terrorists in Northern 
Ireland.  Towards the end of his contracted service (22 years) he and a colleague 
founded a company providing military style covert surveillance to corporate, state 
and private client’s in the United Kingdom and abroad: 
 ‘I think a lot depends on you yourself and your personality and your make 
up, when you come out of the military into civilian life.  We were serving 
in a covert operations unit before we came out of the military and that 
really gives you a sort of mind set to how you see the world.  It is a whole 
different world out there, the world we work in at the moment to the 
world that a lot of other people see.  They hear more and more about it 
these days, because the threat has changed, not from terrorists, there’s 
always terrorists out there, but it’s changed from the more mainland, 
Northern Ireland terrorists to do with the UK, and it’s now much more a 
Muslim and Islamic terrorist that the world is fighting.   
 So because of that, a lot more of the, shall we say, the dark side of the 
forces, the covert units, all the books that have come out, the films that 
they make nowadays, they’re starting to put a lot more of the tradecraft110 
in it.  So a lot more secrets are coming out.  I think peoples’ perceptions 
now have changed; the world is more aware, and has woken up to what is 
happening in “our world” as we call it.  They’re not completely aware of 
what is happening, but they have a lot more of an idea now than they used 
to 10 years ago and… I wouldn’t say the business is opening up, but the 
views of people are becoming wider.  A lot more secrets are coming out. 
There’s many others who have come out [of the military] and have started 
their own business, and that could have been builders, plumbers and 
decorators, or who have come out and gone into the security industry.  
Some are at one end of the scale, where they have a company who 
provides manned-guarding111, so you’re talking quite a turnover, lots of 
employees, that type of thing.  For us it was an idea that blossomed really.  
We thought about it while we were still serving.  Once we came out we 
thought, “Right we need to make a living, this is what I’m good at, this is 
what I’m going to do”.  That’s where [the business] was formed from.  
 At the same time, having worked in that world, coming out and doing it 
commercially, not sure where we were going to stand or how we were 
 
110 Tradecraft is a term used to refer to the techniques, skills and procedures of covert action, 
espionage and counter terrorism. 
111 The provision of security guards for facilities and premises 
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going to go about this, who our clients were going to be, how much work 
is actually there, it’s a very, I should say, it’s not very, but sufficiently more 
lucrative market than say your average builder, painter, decorator, bus 
driver, etcetera.  Business was a totally alien world and that was our 
biggest learning curve, not transferring the skills from military to civilian 
but learning about business.   You soon come up against book work, VAT, 
employee contracts and stuff like that.   It’s a whole new world out there 
of which I’m still not fully one hundred per cent to grips with it.  But if you 
can provide the core service then, you know, the rest of it is 
administration really.  So it’s that side of things, which we found difficult. 
It’s not as straightforward as it looks and even now we’re still learning 
things.    
So you’re combining really, with what you’ve done with your life so far 
and taken it into the civilian world and, having done that for the last 7 
years, having run our own company it’s got us a nice living.  There’s been 
times where we’ve had to tighten our belts a lot more and there’s times 
where the sun has shone a bit more brightly.  So, you know, it has its ups 
and downs.’ (Stuart) 
Stuart expressed his transition into the private security sector as having its roots 
in the increasing public knowledge of covert military techniques.  During his 
military service secrecy was a defining feature of his work (Urban 1992:35).  
However, the nature of the work he conducted became more widely known with 
an expansion of information available to the public about covert military activity 
from the 1990s onwards.  This trend had its roots in the proliferation of military 
memoirs in popular literature such as The Operators (Rennie, 1996), Fishers of Men 
(Lewis, 1999) and Immediate Action (McNabb, 1996) following the Good Friday 
agreement and the end of the conflict in Northern Ireland.  These memoirs 
confirmed the existence of 14 Intelligence Company and other specialist covert 
units and brought their activity to the consciousness of the general public for the 
first time.  Stuart believed that the proliferation of information in the public sphere 
about covert practices and techniques increased with the post 9-11 ‘Global War 
on Terror’ and the shift in emphasis in the United Kingdom from ‘domestic Irish’ 
to ‘international Islamic terrorism’.  He believed that the greater accuracy of 
information available to the public regarding specific covert military techniques 
had created new demand for these skills and services among corporations, ‘lower 
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tier’ state organisations (such as local authorities and welfare departments) and 
private individuals. 
The concept of Stuart’s private surveillance business was created while he and his 
business partner were still in the military.  The impetus for this was, in part, 
circumstances common to the longer-lived post-war generation of military service 
person - the necessity of finding gainful employment when the age of mandatory 
retirement from the Army was reached (Jelušić, 2003).  Changes to the scope and 
scale of the private security industry, coupled with the proliferation of knowledge 
about covert techniques, created the somatic knowledge of covert surveillance as 
a type of capital that could be exchanged in the newly emerging private security 
field.  Further, these changes legitimised the use of the exceptional practices of 
covert counter-terrorism by the commercial, private, and state entities that 
became Stuart’s clients (see Chapter 8). 
While Stuart underwent little by way of structured transition to the civilian 
workspace, he considered that his exposure to covert operations within the 
military eased his transition to the non-military world; the adoption of cover 
identities and cultivation of civilian dress and behaviour (Urban, 1992:35; Rennie, 
1996; Lewis, 1999) having given him an insight into civilian culture and practice.  
The exposure to civilian and law enforcement agencies required by his Special 
Forces role, and the acquisition of specialist skills with an application beyond the 
military environment, all assisted in his move from the state to the commercial 
sector. 
Stuart had successfully established himself in business within a few years of his 
discharge from the military.  He was not a ‘freelancer’ dependent on his affiliation 
with the large security companies for his next contract.  He was a partner in his 
own company, winning business and contracting other surveillance operators to 
work with him on the ‘jobs’ he identified and brokered.  Nonetheless, he expressed 
the relative uncertainty of work as subcontractor, particularly by contrast to the 
stable employment status of a serving member of the military.  In this respect his 
experience was similar to that of workers in an increasing number of trades and 
specialisms operating loose employment practices at the end of a contracting 
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chain (Thiel, 2012:12-15; Sennett 2008:34).  As a subcontractor Stuart was 
required to effectively estimate the cost of the work that he was to undertake and 
market his skills to a network of prospective clients.  
Stuart did not express an ‘anomic’ or ‘culture shocked’ transition between civilian 
and military employment (Higate, 2005:305) nor did he see his socialisation in the 
military as having significantly disadvantaged his transition to civilian life (Jolly, 
1996a; 1996b; Randall and Brown, 1994).  The experience of running a business 
meant that he had ‘confronted’ some areas of conflict between military life and 
that of work in the private sector; most significantly the relative lack of ontological 
security (Giddens, 1991) in business and the difficulty in understanding and 
adopting the practices of commerce.  In Stuart’s case this was balanced by the 
financial rewards of his entrepreneurial activity and the continued emotional 
fulfilment he derived from engagement in the ‘secret world’ of covert surveillance.  
In this, the continuity of identity between Stuart’s military past and his 
commercial present was clear.  Stuart was still something other than civilian; the 
practices of covert surveillance serving to underpin his identity as an elite actor 
engaged in specialist and ‘exceptional’ activity, whether this was conducted on 
behalf of the state or in the interests of commerce.   
Discontinuous Transition: Transmigration 
For much of the Cold War era the relationship between state service and 
employment in the private sector was both distinct and exclusive.  An end to state 
employment often implied a cessation of status and access that was concrete and 
immutable.  With the restructure (Rose and Miller, 2008), or withdrawal, (Harvey, 
2005) of the state as an element of neoliberal economic thinking, opportunities for 
a form of hybrid state/commercial status began to emerge.  The use of former 
government employees as commercial consultants began to increase.  Within the 
military the use of reservists (Edmunds et al., 2016) in operational roles and the 
retention of commercial consultants by state security and military organisations 
emerged as an acceptable form of hybrid state engagement.  Thus, by the 1990s, 
for certain types of former service person ‘transmigration’ (Lomsky-Feder et al., 




Kate’s transition experience provided an early example of this.  A former Army 
Officer, she spent the majority of her military career working with Special Forces 
as a surveillance operator.  Her departure from the military brought into stark 
focus the institutional tensions that female service people were exposed to at the 
time of her service.  As I have described, dissatisfaction with the rigidity of the 
military career structure (made more acute in Kate’s case by the restrictions 
placed on women soldiers and officers) was a common thread running through 
participants’ decision to leave the military.  However, Kate’s very considerable 
experience, and particular status as a female Special Forces operator, meant that 
soon after leaving the Army she began to undertake roles that involved state 
service and commercial business concurrently: 
‘For my final job in Special Forces they put me in as an assistant operations 
officer.  Then they said, “you have been in the Army for too long as a 
Captain, so you’ve got to get promoted to Major and if you don’t go to 
JDSC112 then that’s it really”.  I didn’t want to go to JDSC.  I had a real bee in 
my bonnet about staff work.  Sitting behind a desk.  It was a slight lack of 
confidence actually; I hadn’t worked in the green army for years.  SF is a 
particular ‘brand’ and I fitted well within the ‘brand’.  My last job [in the 
Army] was operational planning and I was really good at that, but it was 
training you to do a job that was sitting in an office, because effectively 
most people went on to do a staff job at the end of it.  I would have probably 
had to do a staff job for a couple of years.  I was really worried that I was 
never going to make the grade because a lot of friends of mine who had 
been in the green army, they knew stuff that I just didn’t know, because you 
never got exposed to it SF.  Now days SF fits within the green army much 
better, it’s all part of the bigger picture.  But when I was in, we ignored the 
rest of the green army.  I mean nobody spoke to the green army unless you 
had to.  We were this sort of elite ‘pillar’ that didn’t have any other 
knowledge.  So actually there was probably a bit of me that thought – god 
I’m going to struggle – I don’t know what the fuck they’re talking about.  
The decision to leave was made for me.  If I didn’t complete another 6 years 
I wouldn’t get my pension so I had to consider that.  Then there was a guy 
called Toby Rushford113 who is now General Rushford.  He came to see me 
and he sat in my office and I said “look what jobs are you going to give me 
if I stay in? I’m looking for 3 jobs”.  But the jobs they were offering me were 
jobs that I didn’t want to do.  One was sitting in the head office in main 
 
112 JDSC, Junior Division Staff College; the qualifying course for Captains wishing to become Majors. 
113 Not his real name. 
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building, one was going to Chicksands114  as head of their interrogation 
wing; I don’t like that sort of thing.  He said “Well Kate to be honest you’re 
probably going to go off and have a baby so it’s not really worth talking 
about it too seriously anyway”.  He then mentioned the jobs that we talked 
about and then said “Well we might put you into those, but to be honest we 
might send you back to the [conventional unit]” from whence  I had come.  
I said, “that’s not really an option, I want three jobs in SF”.  Then he 
reiterated, “Well you’ll probably have a baby” – and I said, “oh well I tell you 
what, don’t you worry about whether I will have a baby or not, why don’t 
you worry about my career”, and he sort of… (pause and shrug).  So at that 
point I thought, you know what, it’s time to go, leave on a high I always say; 
leave while you are smiling and have good memories.  So I left.  I’d done 10 
years of military experience and I left as a Captain.  He’s still a General in 
Special Forces.’ 
In Kate’s description of her military service we can see the ‘initiatory’ (Thomas 
and Rosenzveig, 1982) nature of her affiliation to the Special Forces sub-unit.  
Despite her clear professional overachievement (Kanter, 1993 in Carreiras, 
2006:36), her reluctance to fulfil the institutional requirements of an officer’s 
career was central to her decision to leave the Army.  In this case the inflexibility 
of the military institution was exacerbated by gender inequality.  Kate wanted 
work that incorporated the values of Special Forces (despite the ‘hyper-masculine’ 
subculture through which these values were given expression); the requirement 
of the military institution that she diversify her experience and carry out roles that 
were more administratively focussed was at the heart of her decision to leave. 
‘When I came out, I looked at the Officer’s Association.  I had chats with all 
sorts of people.  I did it properly.  I went across the board looked at all sorts 
of commercial jobs.  And I just can’t… it just doesn’t bother me about 
making money.  I just don’t care about a profit sheet.  And I quickly realised 
that unless you care about it it’s not fair.  You wouldn’t stay in the job very 
long if you don’t make any money.  I don’t want to run my life around a 
profit and loss account.  In the end I went to work for [a press agency] but 
I left after about 6 months.  I was a project manager on an IT software 
implementation team.  That was my first job.  I looked really good because 
all I had to do was do an agenda and make sure people did what they said 
they were going to do.  And they were like “ahh Kate this is amazing, how 
did you manage to do that, how did you get people to do that thing”.  And I 
was like, “are you serious?  You just do an action plan and hold people to 
 
114 Chicksands, The Defence Intelligence and Security Centre 
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account for it”.  Actually, I got the job through networking; somebody’s 
brother ran the team.  There must have been about 25 project managers.  
Nobody spoke to me for a bit and everybody was like, what does she know 
she’s ex-military.  Eventually they started speaking to you but it was quite 
painful to start with.  [Despite this] I still had this thing about going to work 
in a ‘proper job’ so I guess the whole of my life I have avoided going to work 
in a ‘proper job’ I got it into my head that I wanted to be normal and live a 
in a house like everybody else did’ (Kate).   
Kate tried actively to confront and disengage from her military past.  She strove to 
conform to what she saw as normal civilian roles and practice.  However, she 
realised that, while she no longer wanted the institutionalisation of a permanent 
role in state service, she was unfulfilled by work in the civilian field.  This 
conundrum was solved when two opportunities appeared simultaneously.  These 
allowed Kate to ‘dip in and out’ of the more emotionally fulfilling covert Special 
Forces activity that her departure from the military had interrupted. 
‘The [Government Agency] offered me a 6-month contract quite soon after 
I left; to carry on doing surveillance, carry on doing interesting stuff.  So I 
jumped at that and what I needed was a job that fitted in with it.  That’s 
how I ended up freelancing for a rather long time – because it all fitted in 
rather well.  [working for the state and working commercially] fitted my 
ideology of still trying to help out.  I have this huge sense of always wanting 
to help people.  And I went to NI originally because I said, “well, if I save 
one person by doing that job then it will all be worth it”.  And we saved 
probably a few more than that.  And I think, probably when I left, because I 
only did 10 years and I still had a bit more in me, sometimes I think: oh my 
goodness I should have stayed in.  It was the right decision to leave, but I 
still wanted to put something back.  [working for the state and working 
commercially] fulfilled lots of things; still giving back something to the 
government, because I think we all feel a huge sense of loyalty.    [Working 
for a government agency] wasn’t your traditional job.  It was still flying 
[around] doing cool stuff and we had lots of really cool jobs; which I 
thought made a difference.  Now I’m not sure they did.  I don’t know 
whether, looking back on it, they did or they didn’t, but I believed they did.  
So I just fell into it more than anything.  I don’t think it was a conscious 
decision. 
At the same time [a large media organisation] were just starting to take 
hostile environments training quite seriously so I went onto the team that 
had the contract for that.  Then I worked directly for [the media company] 
for quite a long time as a freelancer.  So I used to do half my year with [the 
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government agency] and half my year doing freelance stuff, mainly as a 
trainer; but also did quite a lot overseas, doing training overseas in hostile 
places.  We used to take the training to the locals.  Then the [media 
company] said will you come and work for us full-time.  So I was Head of 
their High Risk Security organisation.  Then I went to [a major commercial 
security consultancy] as a junior consultant and I worked for a very good 
guy who sort of mentored me as a crisis management consultant.  He had 
already done a Masters Degree in crisis management so he taught me 
everything I knew, or he knew.  After that I went back freelance again; so 
for about the last 10 years I have been back on the freelance circuit; set up 
my own company as well, so now run my own company.  
I missed the people that I worked with [in the military].  We were in a 
strong team… the banter, having said that some of it was sexual, it was good 
– and, you know, you weren’t allowed to banter outside; it was politically 
incorrect.  The [government agency] was slightly different because it was 
mostly military people in the unit I was working with.  But when I worked 
on civilian contracts… the [media organisation] was more politically 
correct than anything else.  So it was quite a culture shock.  You had to… I 
mean in never really used military language when I was in anyway, so I 
have never had a problem with speaking like a military person, but I found 
it quite difficult being… not politically correct, but being aware of 
sensitivities.  I mean what you might have seen as a throwaway line.  We 
all made mistakes at the start of the [media organisation] contract.  You 
know, you would make a throwaway line and you would get it in the 
feedback,  “That was a sexist/racist comment”, whatever, god.  So over time 
the banter had to change and you were very conscious of being more 
politically correct than you were in the military where there were no 
repercussions for that kind of thing.’ 
In transition Kate displayed some of the same dynamics of ‘unintended continuity’ 
expressed by other highly qualified ex-Special Forces soldiers. Despite her 
intention to engage in a ‘proper job’ (i.e. civilian work unconnected to the military) 
her high levels of military capital provided employment options that she was able 
to pursue with little conscious effort.  Notably, for Kate, these opportunities 
appeared concurrently in both the state and the commercial sphere.  As with other 
participants, her primary motivation was not financial. Instead it was a desire to 
be engaging in work that had social meaning, in her words, ‘giving something 
back’.  In this, Kate expressed both her experience of military service, and that of 
work in the private security sector, in terms of altruism.  The notion of service in 
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the military and private security as an act of ‘caring’ appeared gendered, with no 
male participant referring to their service in these terms.  This was coupled with 
a desire to replicate the self-actualising qualities of military work that 
characterised her early career in Special Forces; a trait she shared with other 
participants. 
For Kate the intensity and meaning of Special Forces work meant that, despite a 
real desire to transition to genuinely civilian employment, disengagement from 
her military identity could not be achieved quickly.  Despite this, she proved able 
to confront her military disposition and, over time, adapt to a civilian work 
environment.  The move into both government agency work and commercial high 
threat security management provided Kate both an antidote to the anomie of 
civilian work and a transitional space (Potter, 2015) where disengagement and 
resocialisation (Jolly, 1996b) could be worked on. 
Kate’s military experience meant that she possessed both a status (the symbolic 
capital of Special Forces service) and skills (the somatic capital of covert counter 
surveillance) that provided her opportunities in both the state and the commercial 
sectors.  This model of hybrid employment was relatively unusual at the time she 
left the military.  However, the incidence of highly qualified former state 
employees adopting hybrid private/state employment after leaving permanent 
government roles has increased in recent years.  As such, Kate’s experience can be 
seen to presage the hybridity of modern military ‘transmigrants’ (Lomsky-Feder 
et al., 2007) who, with the increasing use of reserve forces in overseas military 
operations may now move frequently between civilian employment and 
deployment to areas of active conflict.  These ‘travellers between civilian and 
military worlds’ (Lomsky-Feder et al., 2007:594 quoted in Edmunds et al., 2016) 
may increasingly mix military style commercial activity with intermediate periods 
of reserve military service or contract employment with government agencies.  
Discussion: Between Institutionalization and Banality - Perpetuating the 
Military Self in the Civilian Realm  
Ruth Jolly (1996b:61) observed that transition to the civilian world tended to be 
more adequately accomplished by those who were disillusioned with the military 
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(and thus had already begun to confront their military identity) than those who 
found themselves the subject of disappointment (i.e. career frustration or 
disciplinary discharge).  For my interviewees with a regular military background 
the decision to leave the military was most frequently the result of ‘strain’ (Agnew, 
1992) with the military institution.  This tension was, in all cases where it was 
present, a result of the individual’s frustration with the occupational culture of the 
military rather than with the institution’s moral values.  Unsurprisingly, and 
unlike the civilian participants of Potter’s (2015) study of career transition, 
service people who moved into private military security were unlikely to display 
repugnance at the moral conduct of their former profession per se.  
Disillusion, where it was expressed was more functional than ideological.  
Frustration with a military institution whose occupational culture was inflexible, 
that based reward and progression on class (Macdonald, 2004; Jolly 1996b:62-
64), gender and institutional needs, rather than merit; and whose practices were 
simply too rigid and hierarchical to accommodate the individual’s subjective need 
for a sense of progress, formed a common motivation for leaving the military.  This 
‘disappointment’ had both positive and negative qualities; the slight of historical 
injustice was still felt by some participants, but for many the breach between the 
individual and the institution represented an assertion of personal independence 
and worth.  As Foster (2003:224) observed, the act of joining a force represented 
the subjugation of the self to the group, so the actions of the disappointed leaver 
constituted a re-affirmation of autonomy over solidarity.  This was most 
noticeable where thwarted progress was associated with not only ‘formal’ 
progression in military rank, but also with a desire to continue conducting roles 
that provided an emotionally fulfilling experience.  In many cases frustration with 
restrictions implied by the military institution’s occupational culture was cast 
within the context of a divergence of values between the culture of the elite sub-
unit, and that of the broader military bureaucracy.  This manifested as a form of 
‘value strain’ (Zhang, 2011) as the military institution asserted the equivalency of 
its needs and values with those of the (elite) sub-unit.  This interpretation explains 
the ostensibly ‘institutional’ (Moskos, 1986) disposition of participants, who 
maintained close ‘proximity’ (Zinn, 2011) with the military values of the elite sub-
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unit, while contextualising how frustration with the institution was often key to 
their decision to leave the military.    
Financial factors were not usually a unique or defining factor in the decision to 
transition from the military to private security.  This accorded with descriptions 
of military life in which financial reward was often described as being 
unimportant (or at least less important than it was perceived by participants to be 
in the civilian world).  The group most likely to be motivated by financial reward 
were those who transitioned into ‘entrepreneurial’ activity.  However, even within 
this group economic motivators were neither dominant nor stood alone as a 
rationale for transition.  The chief factors determining a move into the private 
security sphere was the desire to replicate the experience of military operations.  
This was most commonly expressed as either an aspirant continuity; an attempt 
to prolong the military experience when, for other reasons it was no longer 
available; or an incidental continuity that was often the result of a lack of strategy 
rather than a deliberate choice to engage with the sector.  This latter type of 
transition was particularly pronounced among highly qualified former Special 
Forces senior NCOs, where the transition into private military security required 
little or no retraining and where the network access to the sector was already 
implied as part of the social and symbolic capital they had acquired in service. 
In almost all cases the move to private military security was motivated by a desire 
to continue, or recapture a meaningful and self-actualising emotional experience 
akin to military service.  In Terry’s case; seeking to replicate the defining 
experience of warfare and kinship he had encountered in the Parachute Regiment; 
in Kate’s example, a desire to ‘contribute’ or ‘give something back’ by continuing 
to be involved in the type of operational work that had characterised her career 
as a Special Forces operator.  Similarly for Victor, private military security work 
was ‘really interesting’ by comparison to civilian alternatives, and for Ian, a means 
of avoiding the boredom of civilian employment.  In all cases the move into private 
military security work was a means of assuaging the perceived banality of civilian 
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life115.  Where participants had moved into more profit oriented ‘entrepreneurial’ 
activity; the impetus for leaving the military remained balanced between strain 
with the institution (in Stuart’s case the enforced end of a career) and the 
opportunities presented by a life of commerce.  Even here, the decision to 
transition to private security was based more firmly around a continuity of 
experience than the prospect of economic enrichment.  Indeed the financial 
opportunities of the private sector were finely balanced against the ontological 
insecurity that characterised the commercial sphere. 
As masculinity underpinned the experience of military service, so it underpinned 
the anticipated emotional fulfilment of private military security work.  In general, 
the masculine nature of both the military and the private security sector was 
implicit; sufficiently understood between interviewees and researcher that it did 
not warrant specific reiteration (with the exception of Kate’s narrative).  However, 
the relative absence of overt masculinity in the civilian environment by contrast 
to the military and private military security, was identifiable in many narratives, 
male and female.  David’s reference to his decision to engage in maritime security 
as a ‘mid-life crisis’ is one such example.  
The transitioning experience served to highlight not just the gendered ‘regime’ 
(Carreiras, 2006:40-54) of the military institution, but also the notion that the 
military is a ‘gendering’ institution.  Kate had become socialised to routine sexist 
and racist language, and to an environment where sexually predatory behaviour 
was normalised.  She had accommodated these practices to the extent that, on 
leaving the military, she had to guard against her own behaviours.  Her adoption 
of a ‘masculine’ register resonates with Carreiras (2006) observation that ‘token’ 
(Kanter, 1993 in Carreiras, 2006:36) women would either accept isolation or try 
to become insiders defining themselves against their gendered category.  Thus 
Kate’s engagement in an area of military life perhaps more aggressively masculine 
than any other (Special Forces) displayed similar dynamics to those observed in 
Martin’s study of female Police Officers (1990; cited in Foster, 2003).  Here Martin 
 
115 In this respect the decision to engage in the sector was akin to the ‘postmodern’ motivations for 




proposed that women police officers either chose to adopt a position where they 
carry out more feminised roles, and become ‘policewomen’; or embraced the 
masculine institutional culture and become Policewomen.  Her experience of 
transition shows that Kate had adopted the latter path becoming a Special Forces 
woman.  The question remains whether it would have been possible for her to 
adopt any other identity and still succeed within the narrow masculine culture of 
Special Forces. 
A number of objective factors were also pertinent to the decision to transition 
from the military to the private security sector.  In some cases, the bureaucratic 
rigidity of the military system, exacerbated by the modern trend towards the 
reduction of standing armies, led to the individual either seeking employment on 
the private military security field, or drifting into this field as a result of its 
perceived similarity to the military.  This transition was often facilitated by a 
‘network’ of contacts, developed in service, who acted as ‘gatekeepers’ to different 
realms of militarised civilian employment.  This ‘social capital’ (Bourdieu, 1986) 
was sustained through the strong bonds of mutual dependence created in military 
service.  Thus, ‘push’ factors were mirrored by the ‘pull’ of the increasing viability 
of the commercial commoditisation of the skills and competencies acquired 
during service.  This expansion of opportunity was linked not only to the growth 
of the private military security field following the invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, but also a result of the proliferation of, once secret, military 
knowledge by former Special Forces soldiers.  While this can be interpreted as a 
function the perceived ‘peace dividend’ that accompanied the end of the Cold War 
and the conflict in Northern Ireland, it is also indicative of a realignment of the 
relationship between individuals and the state that accompanied neoliberal 
reform, the memory and experience of even the most secret forms of state service 
becoming a tradable commodity.  
Thus we build a picture of the former military private security actor as having a 
range of motivations for transition.  Among these the conventionally ascribed 
motivation of increased financial reward was not predominant.  Instead the 
satisfaction of personal experience that, in its more masculine expression could be 
interpreted as adventurism, and in its less gendered form, a desire to be involved 
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in socially meaningful activity was prevalent.  More than this, the transition to 
private security provided the former military actor with a sense of continued 
‘relevance’ when, through the severing of links to the institution or sub-unit that 
defined their identity, they were required to re-constitute their sense-of-self.  
Underpinning the act of transition was the very durable identity created in 
military service.  This identity was inherently traditionally masculine, 
incentivising a sense of fulfilment associated with action, danger and physicality.  
Thus, while the act of transitioning to private military security could be based on 
a desire to distance oneself from this hegemonic culture (as in Kate’s case) or to 
re-capture the un-complex fulfilment of youthful masculinity (as in David’s case), 
the emotional fulfilment sought by employment in the sector remained linked to 
the conditioned masculinity of the military.  Despite this, the experience of 
transition required an adjustment of the gendered-self, as greater exposure to the 
civilian world meant that overt expressions of hegemonic masculinity had to be 
restrained; the act of transition creating a ‘dictionary change’ (Chan, 1996 and 
2004:333) to the individual habitus, aligning them with the less overtly gendered 
register and practices of the commercial sphere. 
The experience of Jolly’s (1996b) phases of ‘confrontation’, ‘disassociation’ and 
‘resocialisation’ in my participants’ transition to military private security were not 
uniform.  In most cases transition was subject to either no resocialisation into the 
environment of commercial security, or an acculturation that emphasised 
continuity with, rather than divergence from the military.  Even where divergence 
was emphasised, the relative strength and durability of military identity ensured 
that civilian attempts at resocialisation were unlikely to significantly eclipse the 
conditioned and embodied dispositions of the military habitus.  In these 
circumstances success in the civilian sphere could still be achieved where the 
former service person was sufficiently reflexive and adaptable. Thus, while the 
emotional fulfilment of military style activity remained a key motivation for 
seeking private military security employment, it appeared somewhat simplistic to 
assert that successful transitions were those in which the formative military 
identity was subsumed by resocialisation into the civilian realm (Jolly, 1996b).  
Increasingly migration between civilian and military employment was a viable 
150 
 
option; and success in one field did not de-facto imply failure in another.  The 
successful private security practitioner was able to adjust to a liminal identity that 
sat neither wholly in the military nor the civilian realm.  The question remained 
how the military disposition manifested itself in commercial security and what 




Chapter 6 Experiences of Private Military Security 
The conditioned behaviours of the military had emerged as the thread of 
continuity between my former-military interviewees’ past and present work, and 
remained the foundation of their sense-of-self even after extensive periods of 
civilian employment.  As such, military norms and behaviours, often little changed 
by any intermediary transitional experience, had the potential to both influence 
and determine the way in which they viewed their role as private security actors.  
Moreover, these formative experiences could be seen to shape and define the 
choices and decisions they made when conducting this role.  Thus, the nature of 
the field could not be fully understood simply through the evolution of the 
industry’s relations with civil society or the development of regulation.  It was 
defined also by the actions and perceptions of security practitioners working on a 
multitude of contracts across the breadth of the field. 
I wanted to understand how these perceptions and practices coalesced to create 
‘motivational and cognitive structures that constitute the practical world as a 
world of goals already reached and objects provided with a permanent teleological 
character’ (Bourdieu, 1980:88 quoted in Belvedere 2013:1095).  As the private 
military security field developed so had the experience of actors in the industry.  
Exploring how participants had, across time, understood and contextualised the 
day-to-day business of providing security in the private sector was a necessary 
step in understanding the logic of the field.  My interviewees provided details of 
circumstances that both typified their experience of private military security at 
different times, and illustrated the boundaries and decisions that they considered 
defined their work.  By examining these circumstances it was possible to discern 
those facets of the private military security sector that were enduring, and those 
were more mutable or transitory.  Through this, further insight could be gained 
into the genesis and effect of the structural changes to the industry described in 
Chapter 3, and what these meant to the people working in the field of private 




As I describe in Chapter 3, the early ‘Circuit’ years of the modern private security 
field were dominated by a small group of ex-Special Forces veterans.  The limited 
size of this market, in terms of both participating security practitioners and their 
relatively discreet group of high-net-worth and corporate clients, meant that the 
majority of work carried out during this period was conducted by individuals as 
security consultants or in small teams (e.g. training teams or close protection 
details).  The British state was involved in this work on a number of levels; tacitly 
providing authorisation for work in overseas jurisdictions in which the 
government had interests, or actively working through private companies or 
individuals to support government aims overseas, such as the training of foreign 
Special Forces by private companies.  At times, particularly in the case of contracts 
undertaken for Middle Eastern royalty this had a ‘hybrid’ quality, with the 
delineation between state and private interests often quite opaque.  However, 
direct UK government contracting of military private security was rare, or at least 
carried out at very considerable arm’s length. 
Much of the consultancy and advisory activity conducted during this period was, 
in essence, military knowledge work.  Here the symbolic capital of elite military 
service, as well as the social capital of unconventional soldiering (contacts with 
police, intelligence services, government officials and non-state groups) were 
important in establishing credibility with potential clients, and forging links with 
other military and civil actors in the operational theatre.  Training contracts 
involved the deployment of both the symbolic and fighting capital of elite military 
service; the ability to establish credibility as a military operator and to actively 
demonstrate and transfer somatic military knowledge without, in most cases, 
engaging in combat.  Other tasks, such as close protection relied more directly on 
the potential enactment of somatic capability in the protection of a VIP client, 
although even here, the expectation of violent confrontation or use-of-force was 
less routine than became the case after the Iraq invasion of 2003. 
In this milieu the defining decisions of the private military security actor centred 
around the discourse and arbitration between security practitioners and foreign 
civil and military organisations in the operational environment.  Key to this were 
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decisions relating to the proposed use-of-force in pursuit of the private client’s 
aims; albeit a use-of-force that would relatively rarely be enacted directly by the 
security practitioner themselves.  Craig described just such an operational 
environment working for a corporate client in Kashmir in the early 1990s116.   
 ‘We were there from ninety-three to ninety five as quite a big team, eight 
or nine men, spread over four or five different sites.  And the main threat 
was a kidnap threat.  In fact the liaison through the [Pakistan] Special 
Branch said that the militants, they used to call them militants, had passed 
a message to me that they know about the Englishmen.  It was a French 
company we were working for, but they knew that the security team were 
English.  They said “we know about the Englishmen and as long as they just 
look after the equipment, which is what we understand they are told to do, 
they will be alright, but if they start interfering with us that will be another 
thing”.’  (Craig)  
Craig described how a group of militants had attacked one of the client’s 
outstations and stolen a radio rebroadcasting mast117.  The attack was assessed by 
Pakistani Police and local employees to be the culmination of the militants’ basic 
military training and, as such did not represent a direct increase in threat to the 
expatriate workforce.  Craig went on: 
 They gave us the option ‘carry’118 after that, 9mm pistols.  One guy wanted 
to [carry a pistol].  The more experienced guys, most of, us refused.  We just 
didn’t see the need.  You see, they [the militants] knew everything we did 
on site. If we were carrying, they would know and that would just escalate 
things, they would be more suspicious of us and next time, if there was a 
next time, they would come in harder.  They were not targeting [the French 
company or project team].  So most us, the more experienced guys refused.  
So, basically by [one person] being armed he put all of us in danger, and the 
client as well.  There was no need for it. 
Maybe I am saying it for tribal reasons, but when all the people on the 
Circuit were coming from two-two119, the sort of person who had got into 
two-two had been selected for two-two.  One of the procedures is assessing 
self-discipline.  They want you to be able to go away on your own and do 
the job without any structure.  So when they get put into positions on their 
 
116 See Thornbury (2011) for a comparison of this incident with the circumstances of Craig’s work in 
Algeria. 
117 A mast used to boost the range of a radio broadcast. 
118 Carry a weapon 
119 Two-two, the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment. 
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own with power and weapons, it doesn’t faze them and they have nothing 
in their heads in the first place. 
[The team member who wanted a weapon in Kashmir] had been in the 
Regiment, but he had only been a long weekend basically120.  He didn’t have 
a good track record.  He wouldn’t have survived.  Well, he went up to the 
six-year point.  He was a buffoon, but selection doesn’t filter everybody out 
who shouldn’t be there.  It takes a few years sometimes, but that guy, he 
was off the Circuit.  Not purely because of the weapons thing, but that went 
along with other things.  It was very, very controlled by your own… you had 
your own standards.  I suppose in the old days of the Circuit it was almost 
a family.  The guy in Kashmir who wanted weapons, that was the last job 
he ever did on the Circuit.’ (Craig) 
Craig emphasised the rationality and self-discipline of the Special Forces actor as 
central to an informally generated consensus on acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour.  Where a practitioner’s judgement was suspect, such as a desire to 
retain and use of firearms in an environment where this may have exacerbated the 
security threat, they were sanctioned by an unofficial, but effective ‘black-balling’ 
(Craig).  This self-policing function was perceived to reduce the opportunity for 
behavioural excesses and represented a form of self-regulation effective across 
the small number of firms active in the market at this time. 
During this period the major factors determining both suitability for employment, 
and the social boundaries of acceptable and transgressive conduct within the 
sector, were determined by standards derived directly from the participants’ 
military past.  The process of deploying onto a security task rarely involved any 
formal induction, training or preparation (Thornbury, 2011).  Thus, the Circuit 
operated largely without any discrete standards for the conduct of security in the 
civil sphere, with practitioners adapting military training and practices as they 
saw fit to address the clients’ needs.  This created a general lack of distinction 
between the military and civil fields that could lead to ambiguity in establishing 
the bounds of ethical behaviour.  Craig described a contract that he undertook 
conducting training for an anti-poaching unit in Africa: 
 ‘A classic case, two of us did a two-month training job in Botswana for an 
anti-poaching unit.  We would like to think we’re both fairly sane and good 
 
120 Slang for only having completed a short period of service. 
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operators.  We did an AMIC121 course basically.  We had three things to 
achieve, a change over from Siminovs to SLRs122 (so we had to teach them 
SLR one to eight123).  We missed out the bayonet fighting.  Then we had to 
train them to be instructors and then we had to run an NCOs cadre.  All 
this in two months.  Now, we got our heads together before we went away 
and sketched it all out.  Again, this was on a fag packet, there is nothing in 
writing from [the employing security company].’ (Craig) 
In his example Craig, spent a period of time living in the bush and working with 
the game wardens, who were all civilian civil service employees, and training them 
in tactics drawn directly from military manuals.  The one concession made to the 
civilian nature of the anti-poaching unit being that they were not instructed in the 
use of the bayonet.  Craig recalled that,  
‘At night we used to have them put a guard on, just to bugger them about 
and get them into the training, because they were civil servants but we 
wanted them to start thinking they were military.’  
Indeed, Craig considered this work have been identical to that which he would 
have carried out during his service in Special Forces, albeit with fewer staff:   
‘Two of us were doing what a nine man team would do in the Regiment. 
That’s the commercial world, two men doing nine men’s job.  Some people 
couldn’t adjust to it.  But, if you are good, it’s a good challenge and you can 
do it.’ (Craig) 
As the task developed it became clear to Craig and his colleague the danger posed 
to the game wardens by groups of Zimbabwean poachers.  These groups included 
former ZANU-PF 124  guerrillas who were armed with automatic weapons and 
rocket propelled grenades.  Craig suggested to the head of Botswana’s game 
wardens (a former French Foreign Legionnaire) that a more offensive strategy 
should be used to tackle the poaching problem.  This involved tracking the 
poachers following a kill, predicting the point at which they would cross the 
border back into Zimbabwe and then, using game wardens transported by 
 
121 AMIC, Army Methods of Instruction Course.  Training that prepared soldiers to teach military skills 
to other soldiers. 
122 Self Loading Rifles. 
123 Lessons one to eight in the British Army weapon-handling course. 
124 ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front.  A military group involved in the 
Rhodesian bush war of 1964 to 1979. 
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helicopter, mounting an ambush that would aim to kill the poachers as they left 
Botswana.  Craig confirmed that the anti-poaching unit had subsequently 
employed this concept and it had resulted in 4 poachers being shot dead.  He 
observed:  
 ‘Thinking about it in a philosophical moment; I wonder what the Guardian 
reader would think about that and the Greenpeace people.  I saved two 
rhino but I got four benighted poachers shot.  What do you want?  What is 
most important?’ (Craig) 
From Craig’s examples it was clear that Circuit era security work involved the 
enactment of skills and knowledge drawn directly from military practice; there 
existed no intermediary discipline that adjusted this learning to the civilian 
environment.  Thus the training and advice provided by Craig facilitated the 
adoption of practices that were much more offensive in nature than those 
previously practiced by the civilian client organisation.  Craig was conscious that 
his civilian status, and that of the wildlife protection team he was training, made 
the facilitation of offensive operations ethically questionable.  However, no 
governance structure or received practice existed at this time through which this 
dilemma could be reviewed.  Further, Craig constructed the ethical aspects of his 
decision making as existing outside the field of his direct responsibility. 
Despite this, while the act of training anti-poaching wardens required the use and 
display of somatic military knowledge, Craig and his colleague did not accompany 
the trainees on operations or engage in combat themselves.  Instead their input 
was limited to more traditional knowledge work (i.e. consultancy and instruction) 
rather than the personal enactment of somatically conditioned ‘fighting capital’.  
As such, the culture of practice within the field of private security at this time was 
one where the direct use of force by private military contractors was relatively 
limited and the use of firearms infrequent rather than routine.  Practitioners’ 
participation in the sector was contingent upon them demonstrating rationality in 
respect of the use-of-force that implied threats should be avoided before they 
were confronted.  Thus, while the general lack of distinction between military 
operations and civilian consultancy generated the potential for militarised 
behaviours to be propagated, the rational imperative of private actors avoiding 
157 
 
personal engagement in potentially escalatory forms of physical violence was an 
element of the ‘doxa’ of the field during this period. 
By the 1990s privatised military activity had come to the attention of civil society 
organisations.  This was in no small part the result of the increased use of private 
military security companies in supporting roles by transnational humanitarian 
organisations engaged in the newly created foreign policy endeavour of 
‘humanitarian intervention’.  The use of contracted military services by 
organisations like the United Nations created both the pressure and incentive for 
private security actors to engage in combat operations.  This gave rise to 
increasingly nuanced decisions about the operational demarcation between  
‘defensive’ security and support orientated tasks, and more ‘offensive’ roles.  
Roger gave the example in which his company provided commercially contracted 
staff to crew armoured vehicles in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia: 
‘In the Balkans the [peacekeeping] battalions that did not have armoured 
vehicles were supplied armoured vehicles by UNPROFOR 125 .  They 
provided Czech OT64 APCs126 .  Well, blow-me-down, the battalion that 
doesn’t have any vehicles can’t maintain them either – so they asked, “can 
you find some mechanics?”.  Yes we’ll find some Czech mechanics for you.  
“By the way, that battalion that can’t maintain them also can’t drive them 
without wrecking them; so will you provide drivers?”.  You are now taking 
part in peacekeeping patrols, at which point we ‘drew the line’. We will 
provide drivers, we will provide anything you want short of turret-crew, 
who must be blue bereted nationally enrolled peacekeepers; licenced to 
carry a weapon and to make decisions about its use.  We will do anything 
else but we draw the line. We will not make the decision to open fire, nor 
will we be able to open fire in any circumstance.’ (Roger) 
Thus, while issues relating to the appropriate exercise of force by commercial non-
state actors became more acute, the ‘circumspection’ of the early Circuit era 
towards the engagement of private actors in direct hostilities prevailed.  Despite 
this, the direct support of ‘humanitarian intervention’ operations acted as a 
gestation period in which the legitimate engagement of private companies in 
active elements of armed conflict became a possibility; a boundary shift that is 
 
125 UNPROFOR, the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia. 
126 APC, Armored Personnel Carrier 
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consistent with Kaldor’s (2012) observation of the weakening distinction between 
state and non-state actors in ‘New War’ conflicts.  However, the tenuous consensus 
of the Circuit, and indeed the nature of the field itself, was to change profoundly in 
the early years of the 21st Century. 
Iraq and the Global War on Terror 
 ‘The thing which made the most change was Iraq.  It was like floodgates 
were opened because there was a phenomenal amount of money poured 
into various companies operating in Iraq.  The reconstruction companies 
suddenly found themselves in a situation where they were operating in 
what was becoming an increasingly hostile environment.  They were very 
concerned about the safety of the workers and there was this scramble to 
get the best security operatives, the ex-Special Forces people, working on 
their jobs and there were so many positions required that companies just 
couldn’t find enough of those sorts of people.’ (Victor) 
While the Circuit era had seen a rough alignment between supply and demand for 
private military security services, Iraq caused a change both in terms of the 
volume and the nature of the expertise required.  The emergence of the insurgency 
in Iraq after the invasion gave rise to circumstances where, on a large scale, British 
military security contractors were routinely engaged the potential use-of-force 
while conducting commercial security work.  As such, the corporeal capacity for 
the private security actor to effectively respond to a security threat through the 
use of weapons (their fighting capital) became a key requirement for clients.  
Where in the Circuit somatic military knowledge had been only one element of the 
capital required by the security practitioner, in Iraq this became the dominant, and 
in some cases unique, requirement.  This was to change the nature of labour within 
the field as well as the constitution of the workforce.  With these changes the 
specialism, discretion and exclusivity of the Circuit, with its tight-knit bonds of 
informal control had ended.  However, the structures of a mature industry were 
yet to emerge.  Victor observed:  
 ‘Prior to Iraq people knew each other, you had people working in the 
London office of Control Risk, ArmourGroup, KMS and Saladin who knew 
people; as often as not they knew them because they worked with them 
at some stage in the Regiment 127 . Even if they didn’t know them 
 
127 ‘Regiment’, colloquial for SAS. 
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personally and they never worked with them, they knew them by 
reputation.  So there was this source of people who they could fairly safely 
pick from knowing that they were getting a certain standard.  They would 
know that that person had gone through a very rigorous selection process 
to get into the Regiment for a start, they would have known that that 
person would have done a quite long and extensive VIP protection 
training course so they would know all about the body drills, the foot 
drills, the car drills, the anti-ambush drills and all the rest of it.  
 Iraq was when things really started to change.  Initially it was mainly ex-
regiment people, but even by that stage we were seeing more ex-paras, 
ex-marines, ex-infantry, which I didn’t have a problem with because of the 
type of role we were asking them to do.  It wasn’t specifically close 
protection in an environment like Paris or London it was very much along 
military lines, military convoys, escorting from the border up to wherever 
they were doing the work and then setting out a perimeter security and 
then at the end of the day coming in, in a military convoy, an armed 
convoy, so there wasn’t a problem there.   
 But then as time went on and they were poached and filched by other 
companies we started to get people coming who might have been in the 
TA128 and then we were getting the odd person who knew someone who 
had been in the TA, and the standard really dropped.  There were people 
coming into Iraq being given a weapon and put on security that quite 
literally I wouldn’t allow to look after my flipping dog overnight, because 
some of them were just somebody who’d done a bit of bouncing on a door 
in some pub in Gateshead or wherever it was. And some of the smaller 
companies, the fly by night companies that were springing up all over the 
place were a lot less scrupulous about it, and there was some real dross 
coming into Iraq at that stage.’ (Victor) 
The increased demand for military security practitioners meant that security 
companies began to extend their recruitment, initially to groups of former service 
people from conventional units of the military, and to those whose experience was 
in reserve military units or other uniformed services.  Eventually even those with 
only commercial security experience, or with no military or security experience at 
all, were finding employment.  Victor linked declining standards to the financial 
incentives created by this increase in demand; but also to the type of adventurism 
that the culture of the Circuit era had acted to contain: 
 
128 Territorial Army. 
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 ‘Probably, what most people would do that sort of job for was the money; 
because at that time the salaries were relatively high.  They could 
probably work out there for three months and earn what they’d earn in a 
year in the UK.  I’d bump into someone while I was waiting at the border 
and they’d say “You want to see the last bunch they bloody sent out to us, 
minicab drivers, ex-bouncers and people with no military experience at 
all who really had no experience of handling weapons”.  To be honest a lot 
of it was appalling; but I think at that time the incentive was probably 
mainly money.  I think for a lot of these, the ex-bouncer, minicab driver 
type person it was also the, “I’m working out in Iraq, driving around, I’ve 
got this Land Cruiser and I got a pistol and AK”, so I think a lot of it was 
also the kudos of being able to go back to their mates in Scunthorpe or 
wherever they were from and saying I’m working for such and such out 
in the Middle East, AK weapons, ammunition all over the place and pistols 
and (exasperation)’ (Victor) 
Thus, with the growth and pluralisation of the market the constitution and 
disposition of actors in the field changed, and with it the relationships of capital.  
Initially economic capital was channelled into military style armed protective 
security.  In turn the exchange value of the capital of somatic military knowledge 
increased.  This raised the dominance of financial reward as a motivating factor 
for labour market entry; but also changed the experiential nature of private 
security work.  The field now provided increased opportunities for the enactment 
of somatic capital of violent force and this attracted individuals, military and 
otherwise, who sought this form of emotional reward.   This change caused a sense 
of rootlessness, among the older generation of actors involved in the Circuit era of 
security provision as the informal standards to which they had become 
accustomed were ‘diluted’.  This anomie was mirrored the general disorder 
created by the change of norms associated with the early years of post-9-11 
foreign policy.  In Tony Blair’s words at the initiation of the Global War on Terror 
‘The Kaleidoscope has been shaken.  The pieces are in flux.  Soon they will settle 
again.  Before they do, let us re-order this world around us’ (Guardian, 2001b). 
The dominant experience of private military security in Iraq at this early stage was 
that of work in an increasingly disordered and insecure social environment.  
During the Circuit era, the chief role for security contractors had been knowledge 
work, liaising with de-facto authorities managing or advising on security 
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measures; close protection work, where it had been conducted, had been 
specialised and discreet.  By contrast, in Iraq private security staff were now 
engaged in the direct provision of armed security in small teams operating in an 
increasingly hostile environment.  The routine application of (potentially lethal) 
levels of force by private contractors presented some practitioners with 
difficulties.  The legitimacy of this experiment in the privatised application of 
coercive force was ambiguous.  Arron, a former Special Forces NCO explained: 
 ‘When we went into Iraq I was with [a media organisation] so we were 
basically right up behind the FEBA129, right up behind the fighting.  As we 
pushed forward there was no kind of order, no government. The Iraqi 
government had collapsed.  So there was no real order and we had to 
make our own order, our own procedures.  First we looked at what the 
client needed to achieve, what they had to do to get their story.  I used the 
collective experience of my team.  The experience we had from working 
in hostile areas in the military.  The Rules of engagement, the ‘yellow 
card’ 130  type rules that we had used in the past.  But it was a moral 
[dilemma], because when you are working for a corporation you can’t 
quite take the moral high ground like you do in the military, where it’s all 
clear and what you doing is sanctioned by the government. There was no 
government, so we did what we needed to keep the client safe. 
 Over time it was obvious that the threat, the situation, was getting worse. 
I took [my journalist client] through some weapons training.  Nothing 
fancy, just loading, unloading, making-safe131.  Pistols and AKs, basic kit 
we were carrying.  Some of them weren’t happy, most of them were. But I 
said, “look, I need you to know this, not just for your safety, but for mine 
too. If it gets like that, fuck the rules, you need to do what you need to do 
to get out”. (Arron) 
Thus, where the environment demanded that extreme levels of force may be 
required to ensure the security and safety of private clients (and their 
accompanying security staff), and in the absence of any rules or norms to 
differentiate state military or constabulary activity from commercial security 
practice, practitioners fell back on their military experience.  However, in so doing 
were they were prone to breach traditional boundaries, in this example those 
 
129 Forward Edge of Battle Area, the ‘front-line’ of fighting. 
130 The rules of engagement for the British military in Northern Ireland, carried by every soldier and 
printed on a yellow card. 
131 Ensuring a weapon is unloaded and in a safe state. 
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between combatants and non-combatants, and promote the values of 
‘exceptionalism’ that characterised service in the military generally, and Special 
Forces in particular. 
A similar debate was played out, with greater or lesser degrees of reflective 
sophistication across thousands of contracts and hundreds of private security 
companies and client organisations.  At its heart was the difference between the 
practice of force by state militaries, where ‘offensive’ operations were legitimised 
through the link to sovereign power as an embodiment of national (or 
transnational) common good; and the use of force by commercial entities to 
protect their own assets, personnel and operations.  Victor explained how he 
viewed these differences in role:  
 ‘[In the war in Dhofar] We had 25 pounders132 literally laying down a 
barrage [of shells] in front of us and as that advanced we advanced behind 
it.  We had the jets coming in and mortars and, in an environment like that, 
you’re not defending or protecting a thing, because if you do that you’re 
going to lose the war or the battle, you go out and you dominate ground, 
you put out ambushes, you conduct searches to look for signs of where 
[the enemy] might have weapons or ammunition.  So you become very, 
very proactive and you go looking for the bad guys to engage them, to kill 
them or to deny them the freedom of movement around the place.  
Whereas in Iraq, you don’t do that, in a private company environment, for 
instance my role on that particular task for [a multinational oilfield 
services company] was ensuring security when people came from the 
border up to where they were working in the Rumaila oil fields. Protecting 
them when they were operating in the fields through the day, doing their 
maintenance repairs and then escorting them back.  You’re keeping them 
safe travelling from A to B, keeping that area safe with a safe perimeter 
while they’re on the ground and escorting them back.  At no point do you 
escort everybody back to the border and then go out at night looking for 
the bad guys and setting ambushes up.  So yeah it’s a very, very different 
thing.  The role itself is very different because all you’re involved in doing 
is protecting people, assets or installations’ (Victor in Thornbury, 2011) 
Commercial ‘security’ was seen to have a more defensive and protective character 
than military counter-insurgency.  Victor considered that the more ‘passive, 
reactive’ parts of the conventional military role were identical to those carried out 
 
132 A field artillery piece 
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by private security.  Thus, commercial security was conceived of as a more 
restricted version of conventional military operations; but nonetheless a position 
within a range of behaviours the ambit of which included more aggressive options.  
Colin a former infantry officer, worked on teams conducting close protection and 
convoy escort in Iraq, and then moved into a role coordinating operations for a 
number of teams.  He described how in 2005-2006 there had been an increase in 
the frequency and competence of insurgent attacks on civilian and military 
convoys.  He illustrated how the ‘offensive’ orientation of military training could 
manifest in private security convoy protection operations: 
‘In the first company I worked for they were basically using the military 
system, the card Alpha133.  We did a week of training in country.  At that 
time the drills were quite similar to the military.  That changed a bit over 
time, [for example] you were allowed to use warning shots as a deterrent, 
which you couldn’t do in the military, certainly not when I was in.  The 
weapons were different as well, M4, the SIG, AK47.  They took it at a bit of 
a slower pace in training than you would [in the military], because some 
people hadn’t handled weapons for a time.  And you do a range package 
with vehicles.  There were different drills as well.  You can’t be ‘all systems 
go’ because you have a principal 134 , but if you came under fire it was 
basically the same principles, fire, manoeuvre, hit a baseline, reconsider 
your options.  That was just back-to-basics’135. (Colin) 
One of the issues was that some teams would follow up very hard when 
they had a contact136.  You know, debus137, pairs fire-and-manoeuvre138.  
Take on the bad guys.  You would ask the team leader, why did you do that?  
Why did you not just drive through?  They would say “why not? We had the 
kit, we had the people, why not?” The problem is if you are going in very 
hard are you still acting in self-defence, or in defence of the principal?  If 
the bad guys are bugging-out139 is there still a threat?  Or are you really 
doing the job of the security forces140?  Some teams were definitely too 
aggressive.  When I was doing ops141 you had to keep a grip on that, that 
tendency.  The client is only paying for you to get the equipment or the 
 
133 The British Armed Forces rules of engagement governing the use of armed force (MoD, 2018:56). 
134 The principal is the person being protected by the security close protection detail 
135 A return to basic military principles. 
136 An ambush or an exchange of fire. 
137 Exit the vehicle. 
138 Move in pairs, with one person firing, or prepared to fire at the enemy while the other moved. 
139 Withdrawing. 
140 The Coalition and Iraqi military. 
141 Working in an operations role. 
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principle to the work-site, or wherever.  That’s all.  If you have gone in hard, 
what happens to the next team who go through that village?  It tended to 
be the very aggressive companies that got taken on a lot, some of the 
yanks142 were much more full-on, and got taken on more than we did.’ 
(Colin) 
A number of interviewees described how the increasingly effective insurgency 
against the Coalition presence in Iraq led to a debate across the professional field 
about the response to the growing number of attacks on convoys.  At an 
operational level this centred on the appropriateness of covering certain 
vulnerable areas on the company’s convoy routes with ‘pickets’ of armed men 
occupying static positions overlooking likely ambush points or pre-emptive 
patrols in areas where insurgents were thought to congregate prior to an attack.  
While the logic of this approach was clear from a military perspective it risked 
drawing private companies into activity that was no longer protective in nature.  
This tendency was tempered both by concerns that this type of ‘mission creep’ 
would involve private companies in activity that replicated the counterinsurgency 
of the military, and by the fact that any such more expansive role required funding 
that was not forthcoming from existing clients (Thornbury, 2011).  
Establishing the demarcation point between more defensively oriented 
commercial security activity and more ‘offensive’ modes of conduct was 
complicated by a second factor, the changing political and legal environment. This 
was reflected in pronouncements made by the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA).  The first of these was the extension of military immunity from prosecution 
for infractions of local law to civilians under the direction or command of the 
Coalition military powers or Provisional Authority (CPA, 2002).  The second was 
the alleged declaration by CPA Administrator, Ambassador Paul Bremer, that he 
wanted private security companies to become actively engaged in using force to 
stabilise the security situation in the country.  While the response to these policies 
by private military security companies was seen, at least in part, to be a function 
of nationality (with American companies prone to the adoption of a more 
aggressive stance and British companies more recalcitrant); this signalled a clear 
 
142 American companies. 
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political departure from the standards and norms of private force that had 
prevailed throughout the Circuit era. 
Despite professed misgivings by practitioners, the socially and politically 
disorganised environment in Iraq, coupled with the burgeoning insurgency, rapid 
expansion and change to the private security labour markets, and the 
normalisation of the direct use of armed force by contractors, together created 
conditions where opportunities for transgressive behaviour increased.  Key to this 
was that security contracts in Iraq saw former soldiers operating in small team 
structures with access to the means of coercive force (Rothe and Ross, 2010) 
carrying out tasks that were indistinguishable from those they had carried out in 
the military.  These security details operated with little expectation of external 
monitoring or investigation in the event of an incident143.  Within this structure 
ethical and moral decision-making was defined at team and contract level.  This 
allowed divergent cultures to develop and exceptional practices to flourish.  Gary, 
commenting on a former colleague, observed how this situation provided 
conditions for individuals to fulfil the unrealised potential of their former military 
service with disproportionate, but self-actualising violence. 
‘You remember Darren144 who worked on the security side for [a private 
security company] in Iraq.  He was in [another country] doing mine 
clearance work but had been made redundant.  After that he went to work 
as a shooter145 doing convoy work in Iraq, although he was also EOD146 
qualified.  [Name] was his project manager.  He used to tell me how 
fucked up he was.  I mean you could see it.  You’d see it when you ran into 
him.  He always had found it difficult in the commercial world.  With less 
hierarchies he was always trying to take over the operations that he was 
involved with.  That’s what got him dismissed from [two private security 
companies].  In Iraq, he really lost it.  He was brilliant, a really good bloke 
when he was in the mob147, his blokes would do anything for him.  He 
‘bled green’, you know, lived for the army, typical airborne warrior.  
 
143 While some contracts required the reporting of contacts with the hostile forces and the use of 
force by contractors, there is some evidence that, particularly in the early years of private security 
engagement in Iraq, these rules were loosely adhered to. 
144 Not his real name. 
145 A weapon carrying member of a security detail 
146 Explosive Ordinance Demolition 
147 The Army 
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Hated craphats 148.  He’d fight anyone and in that [military] environment 
you know, that is OK.  Well, it’s tolerated as long as you’re good at your 
job.  He was always frustrated that he had never passed selection [for UK 
Special Forces].  He was super fit and failing that course really rankled 
with him as there were guys less fit than him who had passed.  He also 
never did much operational work when he had been in the mob.  He just 
missed the Falklands.  I think that was a thing with him ‘cos he saw 
himself as a field soldier.  He really let go in Iraq.  He came back to UK 
openly telling stories of killing people [while working] on the convoys.  
That had made people concerned.  Other guys were saying that it was bit 
over the top.  You know, people were getting brassed149 when they didn’t 
need it.  He was an EOD operator, so he could be doing something else.  
But he moved from EOD work to the convoys because there was a better 
chance of seeing action.’ (Gary in Thornbury, 2011) 
This description demonstrates how the re-creation of military style sub-units to 
conduct the high-threat work of convoy protection created circumstances akin to 
the ‘hyper-invested’ (Wilson, 2010 and 2016 in Burk, 2018:14-16) ‘deviant 
cohesion’ (Venneson, 2015 in Burk 2018:13) observed by Burk in military units in 
Northern Ireland.  In Burk’s view the potential for disproportionate violence in 
military sub-units had a structural cause as, ‘instincts finely honed in training, can 
also lead to acts of deviancy if a unit’s desire to assert its absolute physical 
dominance over an area of operations and/or over rival groups of young men is 
not tempered by the wider institution’ (2018:15).  This tension between 
institutional aims and sub-unit cultures could create a ‘negative strategic 
consequence’ (2018:13) as the violence of the deviant sub-unit undermined the 
legitimacy of the wider counterinsurgency.  Darren was described as using the 
relative paucity of institutional control in the private security environment to 
enact a disposition towards emotionally fulfilling, but commercially and 
strategically counterproductive violence that, to a greater or lesser extent, had 
been constrained by the more institutional structures of military service. 
Kevin, was one of the few participants without a regular military background to 
have worked on ‘the Circuit’, and in armed protective security in the post 9/11 
environment.  He observed just such a dynamic: 
 




Kevin: ‘Towards the latter part of the Libya contract they began bringing in 
the ex-military guys who had been out in Iraq.  And they were having to tell 
them, you know we’re not out in Iraq now.  You can’t just walk around and 
shoot at people and such, you’ve got to change your attitude.  A lot of these 
guys had worked for [a major UK based security company] on the big 
contracts that [the company] had out there.  And they were all telling the 
stories of what they got up to.  And you just think; how did they get away 
with it for so long?’ 
Interviewer: “What sort of things?” 
Kevin: ‘You know, shooting at civilians.  When they first got out there if 
anyone got too close instead of following orders they’d just put a couple of 
rounds through the windscreen and not care less.  And whether it was 
bravado or not, I don’t know.  You just used to think how did you get away 
with it?  I suppose the first part of Iraq it was like Dodge city until they got 
a bit of order.  But, yeah, they all talked about it.  You had to say to them, 
“you’ve just got to tone it down a bit, you can’t go around doing the same 
things that you used to do in Iraq”.  They were all mates from the Iraq 
contract so that was how they got talking about it.  I heard what had been 
going on, sitting in the car and people would be saying, “oh you know so-
and-so, he was a right nutter.  He’d do whatever he wanted”; you hadn’t got 
anyone to answer to.  Whereas in Libya there were a lot of people to answer 
to.  You were working for the British Embassy and that was different to 
working on, say, the Matrix contract150.’ (Kevin) 
The expansion of the military private security market in Iraq meant that, for a 
period, this type of transgressive behaviour went unaddressed.  The rapid growth 
of the field meaning that pre-employment screening of practitioners was often lax 
and even contractors with a known track record of excessive behaviour, or drug 
and alcohol abuse could, with impunity, move between companies to avoid 
censure (Thornbury, 2011:26; Pelton, 2006:341).  Issues of sexual misconduct 
also began to emerge from the environment of Iraq and Afghan private security 
(Snell, 2011: Brooking and Schmeidl, 2008), providing further evidence of the link 
between transgression and hyper-masculine contract/team cultures151.  
As civil society and media attention focussed on evidence of misconduct and 
 
150 For a history of this contract see Hagedorn (2014:52 and 89) and White (2017).  
151 Allegations of sexual violence and exploitation pre date the Iraq war and have been levelled at US 
security contractors working in the Balkans (Guardian 2001a).  Snell (2011) draws a clear link between 
legal immunity for contractors from local law and instances of sexual violence. 
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transgression, so public concern over the new phenomenon of private security 
grew.  This had other repercussions, with the expansion of private security in Iraq 
serving to establish the role of the private security contractor as a separate 
category of actor in the conflict and post-conflict environment.  For the first time 
this meant that public organisations, including the military, came under pressure 
to define their position on, and relationship with the emerging industry152.  This 
provided a challenge to many who saw their involvement in private security as 
representing a continuation of their military identity.   
‘One of the things about Iraq is that it challenged the military a lot.  I was 
surprised, because we were all ex-forces and we didn’t really see ourselves 
as different.  We were all doing the same job.  But I remember incidents 
where contractors got injured and the military would not come in to 
evacuate.  There was an incident in Basra where an Australian guy got 
injured and the RAF wouldn’t come in to evacuate because he wasn’t a 
British national.  That made you realise that what you were doing was 
different.  The support you get in the military was not there.  It was a shock 
because more than once we had crashed-out153 to help military callsigns.154 
I came back to UK and I was looking to get qualified in emergency planning.  
You know, strengthen my CV.  I did a course at [a college].  There were some 
council people and an Army Sergeant on the course.  When I mentioned I 
was ex-forces we had a chat.  At that time there was a lot of casualties [in 
Iraq] and I mentioned I’d been out there with [a private security firm].  He 
just looked at me and said, “Well they asked for it, they took the money, 
that’s their choice”.  It was funny ‘cause it makes you realise that when you 
are out, you are out.  But also all those guys who we lost or got injured with 
[private security company], a few years before were blokes like him, good 
blokes from good regiments and he’s a soldier looking down on them.  I had 
to go and take a walk.’ (Nigel) 
Thus Iraq had the quality of a ‘grand experiment’ in hybrid public/private state 
building in an environment of active insurgency.  As the frailties of private security 
practice began to emerge, tension with both state and commercial clients 
 
152 Kelty and Bierman (2013) demonstrate similar ambivalence towards contractors among the US 
military personnel. 
153 Crashed-out, to deploy rapidly to a situation or incident. 
154 Callsign, a military unit, denoting their unique indicator on a radio network. 
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increased155.  This tension was reflected in the broader ‘field’ of commercial and 
government contracting with which military private security companies had 
become engaged.  New paradigms were developed by organisations relying on 
private security.  With this the logic of practice, and relations of capital within the 
field began to rationalise: 
‘To the clients it was obvious, you’ve got people with no background 
working for these companies, why would you pay for an expat to do convoy 
escort, or guard an installation when all you’re getting is some ex-bouncer? 
It really started with the Gurkhas.  You could get a Gurkha cheaper than a 
western expat and they were reliable.  So companies that could provide 
Gurkhas competitively; first it was British Army Gurkhas, then Indian Army 
or Nepal Army, then it was other Indian or Pakistani soldiers.  Then the US 
companies had their links with South America and you got the Colombians 
coming in and all sorts.  But for the clients it didn’t make difference by then.  
They just needed a guy with a gun on a convoy or on a site to get their 
insurance.  It didn’t make sense to be paying for [western] expats.  […] Then 
you got more of the Iraqis being employed and that was political ‘cause it 
was like the Iraqis policing themselves.  But for the [client] companies it 
was better because Iraqis shooting each other wasn’t news.’ (Nigel) 
With this rationalisation the opportunities for former British service people began 
to reduce.  The commercial impetus favoured companies who had the ability to 
recruit economically competitive ‘third country nationals’ (TCN) and manage 
them effectively (Spearin, 2007:551).  This placed those actors with existing 
experience working in a commercial environment with local (Iraqi) or other 
security staff of non-western origin at an advantage.  With this, work that involved 
western expatriates in the direct application of force began to reduce and, as 
employment opportunities declined, some selectivity returned to the labour 
market.  The possession of narrow conventional somatic ‘fighting capital’ was no 
longer sufficient to obtain security work in Iraq.  Broader expertise, including 
commercial security qualifications and the cultural acumen associated with 
training and instructing foreign military forces became pre-requisites for work in 
the region.  This reduced opportunities for newer entrants to the field with more 
limited military experience and privileged more highly qualified former military 
 
155 Kelty and Bierman, 2013 illustrated the ambivalence with which soldiers and government 
employees began to view security contractors. 
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personnel (i.e. Special Forces and those ‘green army’ soldiers who had significant 
experience training and operating with local Iraqi forces).  Nonetheless, Iraq had 
set a precedent for the large scale and direct exchange of military capital in the 
field of international commerce.  As opportunities in Iraq contracted others were 
opening up. 
Maritime Security 
While having its roots in the same basic economic and political dynamics as the 
ground based revolution in security practice seen in Iraq, the maritime security 
boom of 2008-2009 was to develop under very different circumstances.  While 
piracy had engendered a threat in some areas of transit for international shipping, 
the field of maritime commerce did not remotely resemble the unstructured and 
socially disorganised environment of the Iraq insurgency.  Indeed, maritime 
commerce was characterised by a surfeit of regulation, rather than its absence.  
Private military security was incorporated into an existing structure of risk 
management developed and codified by the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO)156.  By 2009, the framework of higher-level laws and regulations mentioned 
by David in Chapter 3 had developing into a series of ‘lower tier’ (but nonetheless 
more detailed) guidelines for shipping transiting ‘the High Risk Area’.  This 
became known as ‘Best Management Practice’ (IMO, 2009, 2010 and 2011) and by 
2010 the IMO had established the international legal basis to require action by 
national governments and transitional organisations to bring the security 
situation off the Somalia coast under control157.  This included a resolution in 2011 
that sought to ensure compliance with the Best Management Practice issued by 
 
156 The International Maritime Organisation had adopted resolutions to deal with piracy beginning in 
1983 with resolution A.545(13) on “Measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships”.  This was updated in 1991 with resolution A.683(17) on ‘Prevention and suppression of acts of 
piracy and armed robbery against ships’ and in 1993 with resolution A.738(18) on ‘Measures to 
prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships’.  
157 Resolution A.1002(25) on “Piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of 
Somalia” through which the Assembly of the IMO recommended that action be taken by 
Governments, the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, the Council, the Maritime Safety 
Committee and the Secretary-General of the United Nations act to address the security situation the 
High Risk Area 
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the IMO158 and resulted in the generation of specific guidance on the use of armed 
private security by shipmasters and owners (IMO, 2012).  All of these measures 
were driven by the increasing concerns of the shipping insurance industry who, 
unlike the firms underwriting ground based security in Iraq, had a clear idea from 
the outset of the liabilities involved in piracy at sea and the measures required 
were these liabilities to be underwritten. 
Rather than the ‘anomic’ experience of security contractors in Iraq (where no 
similar legal or regulatory structure was functioning), the experience of 
participants engaged in maritime security work was that of integration and 
conformity with an existing structure of objective control.  The most obvious 
manifestation of this was the training required before a security operator was 
eligible to work on board ship.  A new entrant needed to be in possession of a raft 
of qualifications beginning with a Standards of Training Certification and Watch 
Keeping for Seafarers (STCW) course.  This included a module on behaviour 
aboard ship that sensitised trainees to working in a multicultural maritime 
environment.  Additionally, applicants had to undergo specific training on first aid, 
fire fighting and sea survival and a separate Maritime Security Officer’s (MSO) 
training course.  All crew required an ENG1 seafarer’s medical examination and 
security officers had to produce documents from their general practitioner 
attesting to the condition of their mental health (particularly in relation to 
depression, acute and post-traumatic stress reactions) and vouching that they had 
no history of substance abuse. 
This existing structure of regulation had a significant effect on the experience of 
labour market entry.  Janet Chan (1996 and 2004:333), in her study of police 
culture, used Sackman’s four dimensions of cultural knowledge to examine the 
habitus of policing.  Chan, citing Bourdieu, described the ‘doxa’ of policing as 
incorporating forms of ‘axiomatic knowledge’.  This included: ‘dictionary 
knowledge’ providing ‘definitions and labels of persons, things and events 
encountered by police in the course of their work’;  ‘directory knowledge’ that 
 
158 Resolution Msc.324(89). 
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which ‘informs police officers about how operational work was routinely carried 
out’; and ‘recipe knowledge’ as ‘the normative dimension of cultural knowledge 
that suggests what should or should not be done in specific situations’.  The 
development of lower tier, operational guidance in maritime security created a 
change to the ‘dictionary knowledge’ of security at sea that had a direct effect on 
the ‘recipe’ knowledge’ of maritime security practitioners.  This structure of 
accountability was reflected in descriptions of the very controlled framework of 
response employed in the event of a security incident: 
‘So you’re on a vessel, all your guys are on watch, the Officer on the watch 
or the AB159 or you, yourself, spot something on the radar, or at sea - to 
start with a couple of miles away.  Then you confirm it on the radar, you 
have a look at it, you can’t PID160 it or see ladders or weapons to start with.  
However, you’ve looked at your position, and you’re not in fishing areas.  
So you’ve got three or four skiffs, you can see they’re not fishermen.  So you 
instantly in your own mind know that’s slightly out of the normal, slightly 
strange.  They could be just sat there together in the water, just bobbing 
around.  What are the tell-tale signs? If you then see another vessel, which 
could be ten or twenty miles away from these skiffs, which could be the 
mother vessel that they will launch from.  However, regardless of seeing 
the mother vessel or not, you’ve got three or four skiffs in the middle of the 
ocean, on their own, definitely not fishing even though you can’t see 
anything positively, it makes you think that’s not quite right.  
My initial reactions to that would be to instantly get everybody inside who 
was working on deck, lock the ship down, stand the rest of the security 
team to161, get them to the bridge, inform the Master.  With the Chief I 
would get confirmation that everybody is in the vessel.  I wouldn’t panic 
them all at this point, press the alarm and say get to the citadel.  I would 
just ensure everybody is inside the vessel and the vessel is locked down.  
Then, with the Master and the Chief and my team would just keep eyes on 
the vessels that are out there.  We’d probably split.  You have two on the 
port side, two on the starboard side.  As a Team Leader, you’d be in the 
middle, chatting to the Master, looking at the radar.  If they come a little bit 
closer, so this could be up to a mile and a half away now, you can try various 
things.  You can increase speed, slightly alter our course.  If they start to 
follow us and increase speed themselves then there’s a fair indication that 
actually they’re looking at us.  At that point, I would then say to the Chief 
 
159 Assistant Boatswain. 
160 PID, positively identify. 
161 Stand-to, to prepare for action. 
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“is everybody locked down?”.  He’s confirmed it.  At this point we’d just say 
everybody get to the muster point.  So if they’ve not gone to the citadel, 
they’d have gone maybe to the engine control room.  So he will just say “yes, 
we’ve got twenty-five people on board, there’s five of you on the bridge, 
twenty-one are with me down here, everybody’s ready to go”.  I’d say 
“fantastic, thank you.  Just stay as you are”.  
We’ve now altered course slightly, we’ve increased speed slightly and these 
skiffs are following us.  So at this point, it could be down to a mile. I’d be 
saying to the guys “get geared up”.  At this point we’d put on helmets, body 
armour, get our individual weapons, get our grab bag.  We’re not loaded at 
this point.  So basically we’re going through this traffic light system, the 
escalation.  So that, if you like, would be amber.  We’re getting ourselves 
prepared for [the use-of-force].  
Those skiffs, now a mile away and have split, two starboard – starboards 
on the right side – two port.  They get to four, five hundred metres.  We can 
now see weapons, we can now see ladders.  At that point, probably a 
thousand metres away, they’re still coming towards us, I’d give the order 
to load.  That means physically putting the magazine into the weapon, that’s 
not made-ready, (made-ready means that’s the weapon cocked).  So we’ve 
gone from what’s called a ‘weapons hold’ state to a weapons ‘semi-free’.  I 
haven’t given the order to fire just yet.  So we see weapons, we see ladders, 
we see four, five guys in each of them.  They’re still following us.  Bear in 
mind we’re in a bridge a hundred a fifty foot off the water, they’re down on 
the water.  Unless they physically show intent to endanger the vessel, 
endanger life, you can’t just start shooting because of the rules of use-of-
force.  However, if you’ve seen the equipment and it’s getting to four, five 
hundred metres away, you could do a show-of-force; show them the 
weapons.  If they’re testing to see if there is security on-board they now 
physically can see that you have armed security.  You’ve showed the 
weapons.  You could, if they’re still coming towards you at that point, fire 
flares.  That is what we used to do.  To be honest, once you’ve shown 
someone your weapon and they’re still coming the next thing they’re going 
to do is probably open fire.  But if they don’t and they’re still coming 
towards you, you fire warning shots to the front and the stern of that vessel.  
Again, all this is recorded.  The minute someone stands up in the skiff, 
points a weapon at the ship it’s recorded.  By this time I’ve given the 
command “weapons free” and the lads have made ready.  So if it’s 
something I can’t see (although I can still hear it), if team member A says 
“he’s got the weapon in his arm, he’s pointing at the vessel” then obviously 
he can take immediate action, which will be to use lethal force, but only to 
that individual with a weapon pointing at the ship.  Not, as you’ve probably 
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seen on YouTube, with the different American companies where they’ve 
just totally riddled up skiffs and killed everybody.  You could say they’re 
just pirates but it’s immaterial, you still have to go through the escalation 
of force, because the safety of lives at sea means you just can’t willy-nilly 
do what you want.  So ultimately someone’s aimed a weapon at the vessel, 
whether they’ve discharged their firearm or not, the minute it’s pointed 
then you can take immediate action.  And that’s the point where you would 
discharge your firearm.  All this process could all take a couple of hours.’  
(David) 
In this example accountability for use-of-force decisions was clearly articulated.  
The discharge of a firearm was an individual responsibility, but procedures 
permitted the Ship’s Master to request that force not be used except in 
circumstances where there was a direct threat to the life of security officers; thus 
establishing a form of ‘checks and balances’ over use-of-force decisions.  These 
standards were reflected in documentation that was jointly promulgated by 
commercial security sector industry organisations 162 , transnational maritime 
organisations, national ‘flag’ authorities, security companies and client maritime 
organisations. 
The Best Management Practice of the IMO formed the basis for a framework of 
escalation that precluded the type of ambiguity that could provide space for 
transgression.  However, the coherence of this system of control was in no small 
part a function of the physical environment of maritime operations.  Unlike ground 
based security a threat to the ship would usually be identified a number of 
kilometres distant.  Space and time was available to calibrate the threat and 
escalate the potential use-of-force.  The ship’s environment lent itself to the careful 
monitoring and logging of decisions; and the environment of surveillance (with 
CCTV throughout the bridge and covering other areas of the vessel, and 
dictaphones routinely used to record all communication during incidents) meant 
that there could be little expectation that mistakes or wrongdoing would go 
unaddressed.  Thus threats at sea involved less uncertainty and immediacy than 
land based threats and required less devolved discretion.  In turn, this created less 
space for the development of transgressive team cultures.  These factors, coupled 
 




with the physical constraint that security operations were restricted to the deck 
and bridge of the vessel they were protecting, limited potential for the ‘creep’ 
towards offensive security practices that participants experienced in Iraq. 
The relative transparency of the maritime environment meant that the 
rationalisation of the maritime security market happened even faster than that of 
its land-based equivalent.  Another participant, Kevin, described how on his first 
transit in 2008 he was earning UK£300 per day as a team member and, later, £325 
as a team leader.  However very quickly working conditions began to degrade.  
While initially teams would recover back to the UK between transits, it became 
commonplace for them to stay in a port of destination, sometimes for weeks to 
rendezvous with a second transit to a third location before returning to the UK.  
Simultaneously remuneration rates for armed transits began to drop as firms 
started to hire security officers, initially from other NATO nations, but soon after 
from a variety of other national militaries.  Thus the cycle of high initial 
opportunity and reward was tempered as uncertainty and risk reduced.  The 
relative relationship between economic capital (represented by the client 
organisations and insurers) and the military capital of western contractors 
changed.  The relative simplicity of the use-of-force decision, and the actuarial 
evidence that ships carrying any armed presence (regardless of background or 
experience) were unlikely to be boarded, meant that terms and conditions 
deteriorated and labour market opportunities for former British service 
personnel contracted. 
Discussion: The Rationalisation of Military Capital in Security Markets 
In the narratives emerging from Iraq in particular we see the instrumentalisation 
of the reliable (former) military body to engage in conflict in ways manifestly 
similar to those exercised by the military.  However, in transposing this action to 
the civilian field a contradiction became evident that sits at the centre of the 
private military security phenomenon; that the creation of individuals competent 
in violent action provided a subjective incentive for the enactment of this 
capability.  In Bourdieusian terms, the value of the actor within the field could not 
be ascribed without opportunities for them to enact the capital they proposed for 
exchange.  In the military the structural incentive towards the enactment of the 
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cultural capital of somatic military capacity (i.e. fighting capital) was that of 
increased status and credibility within an institution geared to the enactment of 
just such an aim (i.e. fighting).  However, when the same incentives were 
transposed into the private security environment, where the perceived legitimacy 
of the violent act was not underpinned by the state’s presumed monopoly over 
coercive force, the preparedness that military conditioning created to enact the 
embodied discipline of competence in violence, had more limited utility.  
Security was constructed by participants as a field of activity more restricted in 
scope than warfare.  Geographically this was certainly the case.  Action by security 
actors removed in space or time from the object of their protection quickly ceased 
to be defensive in nature.  Simultaneously, the creation of a secure environment 
was recognised in contemporary military doctrine as being a task of greater 
complexity and sophistication than conventional military operations; the 
condition of security being achieved by the potential, not the actual enactment of 
violent action (Dobbie, 1994).  Thus the military capital of somatic expertise, with 
its associated highly masculine orientation towards the capable enactment of 
violence, had the potential to both enhance and jeopardise the aim of achieving 
security. 
This was, in many respects unsurprising.  The aim of conventional military action 
was less to create security for the polity on whose behalf the military acted, than 
to create insecurity for the polity against whom they were set.  However, this gave 
rise to a paradox within military culture where competence in the creation of 
insecurity was seen to be foundational (rather than antithetical) to competence in 
the creation of security.  The emotional incentives created by the inculcation, 
through training, of competence in aggressive offensive action that created 
insecurity to the enemy ‘other’ manifested as displays hyper-invested violence 
that damaged the strategic aim of creating and sustaining secure environments.  
These displays of poorly aligned and non-adaptive behaviour (Garland, 2001) 
were most prevalent in circumstances where security contractors worked with 
relative autonomy, limited objective control and in small teams that re-created the 
conditions of the military sub-unit.  For some, these small private security sub-
units provided a vehicle for highly masculine action-oriented behaviours that 
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were enacted to compensate for unfulfilled personal potential or stymied self-
actualisation.  This hyper-invested deviance was sustainable in private security 
markets through the collective misrecognition (Bourdieu, 1977) of the utility of 
‘fighting capital’ to the creation of security. 
Brought together we can see how these dynamics played out when changes in 
geopolitics created new potential operating space for private military security 
companies in Iraq.  In the initial phase, characterised by considerable uncertainty 
and acute but un-calibrated consciousness of risk, client organisations (possessing 
economic capital) created over-demand for the somatic military capital of 
competence in the enactment of force (i.e. fighting capital).  This placed premium 
on the military capital available to all service people (conventional and Special 
Forces) to a greater or lesser extent, but with an emphasis on the highly 
masculinised military habitus of combat units.  The emotional and cognitive 
disposition of this habitus was seen to be a guarantee of ‘reliability’ under 
circumstances of physical threat, and became a capital that could be exchanged in 
the market.  This created employment opportunities that attracted former service 
people from conventional military units into an industry to which they had not 
previously had access.  The concentration of (largely) men with conventional 
military experience into teams where they were directly engaged in the 
application of violent force replicated the circumstances of the military sub-unit.  
This created a situation where (potentially idealised) combat unit cultures were 
reproduced in an environment where normative institutional military culture no 
longer provided an anchor against which divergent behaviours would strain.  This, 
coupled with low levels of supervision, a socially disorganised operating 
environment and changing cultural and political expectations as to role, increased 
the potential for transgressive behaviour.  
It was here that the divergence between the Iraq and maritime security experience 
became evident.  In Iraq the creation of military style security sub-units was 
coupled with the rapid and unregulated proliferation of new security companies 
and, for a time, the potential of ever increasing financial reward.  The result was 
itinerant behaviour that assisted wrongdoers in evading formal and informal 
social control.  The nature of the insurgency that followed the 2003 invasion 
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further exacerbated these problems.  Here the practices of ground based 
unconventional warfare and the geography of the operating environment led to 
teams making defining decisions about the use of force in isolated circumstances 
with little prospect of oversight or accountability.  By contrast the highly 
controlled maritime environment, replete with an existing structure of 
encompassing accountability and objective control, and restricted by the 
geography of a ship at sea, gave rise to far less potential for socially harmful 
behaviour. 
In both cases, as the initial phase of uncertainty matured into a framework of 
understanding, the market for private security rationalised.  The field relationship 
between the military capital of security actors and economic capital of clients 
changed.  In Iraq incidents like the Danny Fitzsimons killings (Daily Mail Foreign 
Service, 2009) and the shooting of unarmed civilians in Nisour Square by 
employees of the US firm Blackwater (Krahmann, 2017), highlighted the corporate 
reputational liability associated with the employment of western private security 
companies.  This dovetailed with societal disapproval of the new ‘mercenary’ 
phenomena.  More significantly, as the nature of the risks from the insurgency 
became clear the true exchange value of basic somatic military capability (fighting 
capital) was re-calibrated.  Poorly managed it could be a liability as well as a 
benefit and was therefore most useful when it was threatened but not employed.  
The acceptance of this stance led to the realisation by both clients and insures that 
most security tasks did not require the exclusive use of expensive western 
expatriates.  
Against this evidence the economic capital of client organisations re-asserted 
dominance in the field.  Third country national employment became economically 
(and politically) more desirable and, critically, was sanctioned by insurers.  
Western security contractors came under wage pressure and only specialists who 
could demonstrate aptitude for commercial security (i.e. who had a wider base of 
capital, either military or commercial) could maintain their field position.  Lesser 
skilled practitioners, those without a well formed commercial security habitus, or 
without other forms of specialist military expertise, began to find market access 
restricted and remuneration reduced.  Simultaneously, the reduction in the 
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premium placed on ‘fighting capital’ saw a change to the way security contractors 
were deployed.  Fewer western expats163  were employed working together in 
teams and those that remained in Iraq moved back to more traditional 
coordinating and consultancy roles.  In turn incidents of transgression by western 
contractors began to reduce.  
A similar dynamic was evident in the maritime market, although here greater 
transparency and accountability (and a direct link to more developed insurance 
practices) ensured that the transition to employment of ‘third country nationals’ 
happened with even greater speed than in Iraq.  Fundamentally, the cultural 
capital of competence in the direct application of force was found to have more 
limited utility across the longer term than perceptions in the initial phase of crisis 
had given rise to believe.  Thus, the relationship of the various forms of capital at 
work in the field rationalised.  Clients with economic capital quickly identified 
where a (purportedly) reliable capacity to apply force under complex and arduous 
circumstance was really required, assessed the extent to which this capacity was 
associated with specific experience (i.e. elite western military), and took a position 
on the extent to which access to this capital justified the economic premium.  
In turn there was some evidence that, in the middle-market of security in the 
Middle East, this created pressure for private military security firms to review 
their hiring practices and adopt a more nuanced position on utility of military 
experience.  Roger observed that his company now actively sought employees who 
demonstrated the ability to distance themselves from the culture of their former 
military service: 
‘We want an ’ordinary person’; the average program manager or customer 
relations manager might be a young Captain coming out of the forces; but 
the changes are they’ve had a university education before the forces.  They 
will be quite well educated and actually they are probably, generationally, 
coming with a more open mind.  They may have left the military because 
they may have thought that that was not the ‘way ahead’ for them.  In other 
words, already, mentally they are on a different track.  When you look at 
 
163 The number of non-US and Iraqi nationals engaged in private security contracting fell from a high 
of 14,477 in the third quarter of 2009 to 2,262 in the first quarter of 2014 (Peters, Schwartz and Kapp, 
2017:10-11) based on CENTCOM data. 
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the ‘steeped’ military person who has done 20 years, whether he is an 
officer or an other-rank, the jargon, the approach, the camaraderie, it is not 
consistent with our needs.  In terms of attitude, the longer they have spent 
in the military the less suited they are.  Increasingly our projects will be run 
by civilians.  They will have a deputy who has the pure security knowledge.’ 
(Roger) 
Thus some security organisations had begun to address the potential negative 
impact of un-reconstructed (and un-reconstructable) military identity.  These 
companies had come to the realisation that a more ‘Janowitzian’ alignment 
between the behaviour of the security actor and the values of the referent society 
was necessary for commercial reasons and, ultimately, to ensure the perpetuation 
of the sector as a viable field of activity.  However, this progress was not universal 
and there remained some areas of the field where this reformatory impetus was 





Chapter 7 International Fringe: Consultants and ‘Mercenaries’ 
Analysing the narratives of my participants it seemed clear that the 
commodification of military expertise had the potential to create circumstances of 
considerable ambiguity and risk, the prime source of which was the unfettered 
propensity for security practitioners to create insecurity rather than security 
through a predisposition towards aggressive, offensive modes of behaviour.  
There was also evidence that exposure to the logic of the market (i.e. the exchange 
of capital) and developing structures of governance had some effect in restricting 
this propensity.  However, the landscape of private military security was not 
uniform.  There were certain areas of the field which operated with limited 
transparency and in which ethical and legal ambiguity remained commonplace.  
Thus, the ethical landscape for field participants was not defined solely by the 
decisions made in an operational environment between ‘professional’ and 
‘unprofessional’ practices.  Practitioners also made choices about the type of 
private security actor they wished to become, and the type of contract or 
employment that they were prepared to undertake.  These choices defined their 
position in the field of private military security and the trajectory of their career.  
Kate described her experience of contact with these more ambiguous sub-fields, 
and the choices she made: 
‘There was a coup in Equatorial Guinea164.  People I knew were asked to 
take part in that and, you know, do bits and pieces.  In Papua New Guinea165 
a couple of technical people I know were asked to help on the Coup there 
with Tim Spicer166.  He subsequently went out there and got arrested so 
they were glad they didn’t do it.  I made the decision when I left [the Army] 
that I will only work this side of the law.  I won’t do illegal stuff, so anything 
that is vaguely illegal I won’t do.  I just turn it down [and say] “thanks for 
asking”.  In those couple of years after you leave people try and test the 
water to see if you will do it or not.  Everybody knows who is leaving and 
the people who do that type of work, they want to know who will do it and 
who won’t.  If you do one job, if you ever became known as doing that type 
of job, you would never be used by the good people.  I just made the 
decision that I was never going to do that and I never have.  There is an 
 
164 The ‘Wonga Coup’ of 2004 (Carmola, 2010:48). 
165 The planned involvement of Sandline International in Papua New Guinea in 1997 (Shearer, 
1998:36). 
166 See Spicer (2000). 
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informal divide between the companies that work ethically and those that 
don’t.  The coup end of the market is the mercenary end.  The other end is 
the illegal stuff around surveillance, around breaking into people’s houses 
around digital security, what’s legal and what isn’t, hacking and stuff.’ 
(Kate) 
Kate and other participants identified two ‘fringe’ areas of the military private 
security field.  It was in these areas that my interviewees considered the greatest 
potential for both wrongdoing and social harm to exist.  One of these sub-fields 
was well publicised and recognisable, the international fringe of ‘mercenary’ 
activity (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011; Musah and Fayemi, 2000; Steinhoff, 
2008; Baker, 2008; Percy, 2007).  The second fringe area was the less visible world 
of the (predominantly domestic) covert surveillance industry.  In this chapter I 
address the international fringe of private ‘mercenary’ activity and military 
training before turning in the next chapter to covert surveillance. 
Coups, Conflict and Consultancy 
The fringe area of international ‘mercenary’ activity is one of the more debated 
facets of the contemporary private security phenomenon.  The field is 
characterised by definitional disputes (both scholarly and practical) over the exact 
nature of ‘mercenary’ activity and the ethical/empirical basis for the application 
of the generally pejorative moniker (see the dispute between Brookes and Fainaru 
in Carmola, 2010:13).  Victor, a former Special Forces NCO, confirmed that a fringe 
area of activity was accessible to those with the necessary experience and contacts 
where more aggressive forms of military activity were practiced for profit.  He 
considered that a fairly clear ethical distinction existed between this and the 
routine activity of the Circuit and its early corporate successors for whom he had 
conducted the majority of his own work: 
‘If I was to go next door now and say to [my wife] right if you get some 
young lad who’s been in the Army for let’s say 5 years and, he was offered 
a job working as a security advisor or providing security somewhere, on 
some oil installation or something, I’m very confident that she would say 
yeah that’s OK.  Now, what if that young lad was given ammunition, an 
assault rifle, grenades and him and 50 or 60 other people supported by 
sniper rifles, 50 calibre machineguns, you know, personal anti-tank 
weapons and mortars and they were to go and  [conduct a coup] would you 
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think that’s acceptable? I’m sure she’d say no, that’s bloody mercenary, you 
know and they shouldn’t do that.’ (Victor in Thornbury 2011) 
 
Yet, in the explanation above Victor provided evidence of the complexity of the 
‘mercenary’ construction even among industry participants.  His own distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate work was a complex amalgam.  It contained 
elements of Carmola’s (2010) distinction between illegitimate ‘mercenary’ type 
activity and more legitimate security activity as a function of the ‘purpose’ of the 
activity conducted; whether the security action in question ‘aims to change the 
status quo or not’ (Carmola, 2010:19).  However, Victor’s interpretation also 
encompassed a distinction between ‘offensive and defensive’ actions (Percy 
2014), the nature of the client contracting the military activity (Kinsey, 2006), and 
the constitution of its organisation (ad-hoc or working within a recognised 
structure of power, Petersohn, 2014).  Thus, in a security field encompassing both 
‘business suited security consultants’ and ‘combat troops in army fatigues’ 167 
(Mandal 2002:94 in Carmola 2010:18-19) the ‘look and feel’ of a security 
organisation had an impact on the extent to which it was considered ‘legitimate’ 
or ‘illegitimate’ (Spearin 2007:545); the titles and nomenclature of the business 
world potentially serving to neutralize the societal disapproval associated with 
more ‘battlefield’ oriented functions (Percy, 2007b and 2016). 
On examination, the international ‘fringe’ of private military security was not a 
clearly defined space determined by definitive boundaries between normative 
and trangressive legal and ethical practices.  While the general construction of  
‘legitimate’ activity (such as training and consultancy) and ‘illegitimate’ activity 
(such as offensive operations, coups and revolutions) did exist the distinction 
between ethical and unethical activity was, in practice, difficult to discern. 
Ostensibly  ‘legitimate’ tasks, overtly sanctioned and supported by the UK 
government often blended into territory where private security firms were used 
as deniable instruments of national realpolitik in a manner that made the 
distinction between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ forms of work difficult to 
determine. 
 
167 See also Singer (2003 on MPRI for a good example of a company that simultaneously encompassed 
both of these functions and identities. 
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Kate, like Victor, proposed an emphatic commitment only to conduct ‘legal’ 
security work.  However, she also observed that even commercially procured 
offensive military activity could not in all cases be considered wholly unethical.  
She gave as an example Executive Outcome’s engagement in the conflict in Sierra 
Leone in the 1990s (Kinsey 2006:62).  While the use of South African mercenaries 
to conduct counterinsurgency operations fitted the ‘mercenary’ construction, the 
mission was sanctioned and supported by a number of western governments and 
afforded the legitimate government of Sierra Leone some success in confronting 
RUF 168  rebels.  Thus, while its aesthetic and organisation was ‘mercenary’ its 
outcome was considered legitimate by some practitioners. 
On reflection, Kate proposed that the distinction between legitimate training and 
consultancy work, and illegal mercenary activity had become more indistinct with 
the demise of firms like Executive Outcomes and Sandline 169  whose overt 
engagement in offensive military operations established a more visible dividing 
line (in public opinion at least) between ‘mercenary style’ private military 
companies and those oriented to defensive protective security.  Now a host of 
companies who ostensibly signed up to the values of Montreux and the ICoC, 
engaged in activity, often with state connivance, that skirted or crossed the line 
into offensive operations.  Through this more offensive, combat oriented activity 
was melded and conflated with the ostensibly more legitimate sphere of training 
support, a field more commonly associated with state sponsored security sector 
reform (Kinsey, 2005; 2006 and 2016; Avant and de Nevers, 2011) and 
constructed in much official discourse as a ‘non-combat’ function (Percy, 2007a; 
White, 2018). 
Military Operations in Africa 
One participant who had been engaged in contracted military work that was 
definitively offensive in nature and would fit the ‘mercenary’ stereotype was Pete.  
Pete’s British military service was in the RAF Regiment in the 1970s.  His first 
 
168 Revolutionary United Front 
169 Executive Outcomes ceased trading in 1997 following the company’s unsuccessful engagement in 
Papua New Guinea in 1996.  The company was contracted to Sandline International Ltd, who 
themselves ceased trading in 2004, following criticism by the UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee in relation to their involvement in Sierra Leone (Kinsey, 2006:70). 
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exposure to an operational military environment was in Doha protecting Salalah 
airfield during the secret conflict in Oman (Hughes, 2009).  Like many participants 
he enjoyed the no-nonsense pragmatism of operational service, but was frustrated 
by the institutionalised routine of service life on his return to the UK.  For Pete, the 
self-actualisation of soldiering in an operational conflict environment became a 
driving motivation.  He achieved this by volunteering for service in the then 
Rhodesian military, which, at that time, was engaged in active counter-insurgency 
against ZANU PF guerrillas. 
‘At the time, this would be ’76, ’77, there was a lot of civil unrest, civil war 
going on in Southern Africa and it was making the news and there was quite 
a lot of coverage on the TV of Rhodesia and problems in South Africa and 
Angola which caught my eye. By coincidence there were recruiting 
pamphlets that were floating around our unit, our squadron, to join the 
Rhodesian forces.  At the time that was illegal because Rhodesia had 
announced UDI in 1965, which was the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence against the Crown, so if you were a serving member of the 
British Forces it was deemed illegal to have any correspondence with the 
Iain Smith government in relation to serving them.  However, saying that, 
certain members of our unit did write off to see what the situation was and 
basically they were offered positions in their military if you could prove 
that you had previous service and you were medically fit.’ (Pete) 
Pete left the RAF Regiment and paid for passage to Rhodesia where he enlisted in 
a special operations unit.  A combat injury and the culmination of the bush war 
ended his service in Rhodesia, but Pete, like many others, enlisted in the South 
African Defence Force where he served in their Special Forces until the mid 1980s.  
Together with a number of former Rhodesian military colleagues he then 
transitioned from the military into the commercial security sector in South Africa 
where he conducted a number of roles involving close protection and static 
manned guarding.  In the early 1990s he returned to the United Kingdom and, 
through military contacts, found employment in ‘the Circuit’ protecting residential 
estates in the UK for high-net-worth Middle Eastern families.  Soon Pete was 
conducting regular close protection work in both the United Kingdom and abroad.  
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Pete was well placed to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the 
instigation of the Global War on Terror and the invasion of Iraq.  His ‘credible’170 
military background and commercial experience, as well as his network of 
contacts, ensured he was at the front end of private security engagement in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  In Afghanistan he coordinated security for major financial 
institutions engaged in the re-establishment of functioning banking and currency.  
Shortly thereafter he moved into employment in Iraq, conducting armed 
protective security for senior military commanders in the Coalition Provisional 
Authority’s Organisation for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
(ORHA).  In this role Pete was drawn into work in the ambiguous ground created 
by the Head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul Bremer, whose policy was 
that private security be engaged directly in the maintenance of law and order.  
Pete observed that during that period ‘basically we acted as a military police unit, 
which was a bit surreal’. 
Pete continued to work in Iraq for a number of years.  However, when 
remuneration and working conditions began to deteriorate he returned to 
England and worked on a series of security contracts for British ‘risk management’ 
companies in UK, Pakistan, Congo, Nigeria, Eastern Europe, Sierra Leone and 
Yemen.  It was during this period that he was offered the opportunity of work in 
Africa with a more directly military orientation. 
 ‘I took up another position in Nigeria through contacts I knew from my 
Africa days.  It was a training/operational job in the Nigerian military 
which was a three-month contract and the job was completed before the 
recent elections.  In fact it had to be completed before the elections took 
place.  It was meant to be kept quiet.  However, the Directors of that 
company decided to publish some articles on the web about what went 
on, which really upset the client and the Nigerian government.   
 I wouldn’t normally go and do this type of work okay.  However, saying 
that [the security company] did the job.  But it wasn’t run very well in the 
sense that… really I know it’s a sort of ‘private’ military type of work, but 
you’ve still got to run it like a [military] company.  The people who were 
running it were Special Forces type people that don’t know how to run an 
 
170 Pete was described in these terms by other participants.  In this context the ‘credible operator’ was 




infantry company, they haven’t got the experience of doing that. They’ve 
probably got the experience of working in small teams.  The job was 
actually forming up a unit, a strike-force, and going into operation with 
them against Boko Haram.  So the job was done but it wasn’t done very 
well.  We did lose some people and that should have been avoided. We 
shouldn’t have done what we did, so it was badly led in that sense.’ (Pete) 
The contract Pete became involved with was between a commercial mineral 
extraction company based in Nigeria and a security company led by former South 
African soldiers from the Apartheid era (Barlow, 2016 and Varin, 2018).  The 
terms of the contract required that the security company select and constitute a 
small military force of commercially hired former soldiers (predominantly) from 
South Africa, but also including a number of ex-British servicemen.  These soldiers 
were then to provide training to elements of the Nigerian military before 
accompanying them in a coordinated assault on Boko Haram insurgents.  This 
involved direct engagement in combat operations alongside Nigerian Army 
soldiers on completion of their training.  Pete described the process of recruitment 
for him and others involved in the operation: 
 ‘It wasn’t something I would normally do.  But I knew the client.  He told 
me that, “a couple of South African guys are here in London” [looking to 
recruit for the operation].  If I’d have known what was going to happen I 
wouldn't have gone, without a doubt I wouldn't have gone on it, but I did.  
And I'm glad I went in a way because I've seen how they performed.  
There's nothing wrong with the guys in the field, but the way the whole 
thing was organised and run was bad. 
 I know how the South Africans [were recruited] because they were all 
connected.  They’ve got their own ‘Circuit’.  I did know one, the guy that 
got killed171, he was on the ORHA172 job in Iraq.  He was one of the close 
protection guys.  Anyway, as for the British guys, some of them were 
contacted because they had worked in Sierra Leone.  I was in Sierra Leone 
so I was one of them, I stayed with an ex EO173 guy who’d lived in Sierra 
Leone for fifteen years.  He stayed on there after the [Executive Outcomes 
operation] and he got a normal… well he got a job on the port checking 
containers and things like that, it was an office job.  We used to go to 
 
171 See The Citizen (2015), ‘SA Military Contractor Killed in Nigeria’ 
172 OHRA, Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq 
173 EO, Executive Outcomes. 
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IMATT’s174 for functions, we used their gym, and we used to go on the 
range with them and shoot.  We were civilians but they’d invite us down 
there on the range, so they we kept in contact with them.  When they left 
the Army, which was just recently (I think they left the army within the 
last twelve months), the guy I stayed with brought them into [the 
operation].  The other [British] guys, I don’t know, because I didn’t know 
them personally.  However, one or two of them had worked in Sierra 
Leone after I’d left there.  I think another guy came in through some South 
African contact.  But some of them told me that they didn’t have SIA175 
licenses, they couldn’t get work on the circuit in the UK, which I couldn’t 
understand.  Even these WO2 176  instructors from Scottish regiments 
couldn’t get work.  They could only get the odd job with G4S177 for the 
Olympics or something like that.  Some had security licenses some didn’t.  
Some couldn’t have licenses because, I think they had some previous 
criminal convictions, which to me didn’t really make a lot of sense - 
because I think they were stuff that maybe happened in Germany, 
something that happened in their Army days.  You’ve served your time 
you know what’s that all about.’ (Pete) 
The recruitment of former soldiers for the contract was a networked exercise that 
crossed between two ‘fields’, the South African private military ‘Circuit’, involving 
actors formally connected to the private military firm Executive Outcomes (EO) 
and groups of former British military personnel who had established contact with 
the South African field often through service in British training and advisory teams 
in Sierra Leone.  For some of these men regulation of the UK security industry 
following the Private Security Industries Act of 2001, and the barring of 
individuals from employment in the sector if they had a record of even minor 
violent offenses (not unusual in military service), meant that they were unable to 
gain conventional employment when their service had ended.  The unregulated 
international field therefore became an attractive option when faced with 
increasingly restrictive employment practices at home. 
The initial phase of the contract involved a stringent physical selection that 
replicated Special Forces pre-mission preparation.  Here the group of potential 
 
174 IMATT, International Military Advisory and Training Team, the main British military presence in 
Sierra Leone following the British intervention in Operation Palliser in May 2000. 
175 SIA, UK Security Industries Authority. 
176 WO2, Warrant Officer Class Two, A senior NCO responsible for a company or squadron of soldiers. 
177 G4S, Group 4 Security, a multinational private security company. 
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participants in the operation was whittled down from approximately 75 to 25178.  
Pete completed this selection, but observed: 
 ‘What I'm saying is, yes it might suit some of the younger Paras179 that are 
eager, but if you’ve worked in the commercial field, private sector for 
years like I have you don’t want to be going and doing what I've just done 
really.   You don’t want to be shouted out and run around. I was at 
Maiduguri Airport seven years previously when it was open, it was an 
international airport now its closed down, and no way did I think we’d be 
doing PT on the bloody apron there.  Physically it didn’t bother me 
because I could do it.  I'm not as fit as a thirty year old, but whatever they 
threw up - I could do.  But what really got me is that the guys they put in 
command were guys that couldn’t do it.  They had bad knees and they 
were old boys, the old boars from ‘their’ days, twenty years, thirty years 
ago, and they ended up being team leaders.  They should have used these 
Brit guys really, the WO2s who had been in Sierra Leone training with the 
Sierra Leone Army.  I don’t want to mention names but they had 
experienced guys there.’ (Pete) 
Pete questioned the organisation of the operation by the South African senior 
management who, he considered, lacked both up to date combat experience and 
adequate knowledge of conventional military operations.  In his opinion the 
Directors of the South African company running the operation should have 
adopted positions managing commerce and logistics, and allowed operational 
command to be disseminated to younger British and South African staff with more 
recent experience of combat and training in Afghanistan and Sierra Leone.  He 
observed, ‘The guy who was company commander was seventy two years of age 
and basically he’s lost it, lost the way of doing it, so he should never have been in 
there or involved in that side’.  The older South African staff, senior within the 
contracting company, attempted to re-create the rules bound environment of the 
Apartheid era military (McAleese, 2011).  This approach sat uneasily with Pete, 
but also with the younger generation of ex-servicemen who were used to less 
 
178 Another interviewee stated that one ex-soldier recruited to the operation died as a result of 




hierarchical behaviour on operations: ‘These guys were 20 years ago and it doesn’t 
work like that anymore, it was on the bus of the bus180”. 
This lack of cultural adaptability felt jarring to Pete.  It was also reflected in 
relations with the Nigerian soldiers that the company had been contracted to 
train: 
 ‘It’s like going back into the military but it isn’t the military because you’re 
still being told you’re contractors.  But if you don’t meet the level you’re 
out of the whole thing.  I would never say I was fearful of anyone in there, 
but they sort of tried to run it a bit on fear.  They didn’t run it properly 
with their logistics and stuff, and some of the South Africans still thought 
they were back in South Africa in the old days of Apartheid.  So that 
[became difficult] when the Nigerians complained.  It wasn’t mutiny, but 
at one stage it wasn’t far off because they [The older white South African 
instructors] were being abusive towards them.  Most of these guys hadn’t 
worked in Nigeria before.  I’d worked in Nigeria, I know exactly how the 
Nigerians operate, they will never get equipment quickly, it doesn’t 
matter even if it’s the President asking, they’ll still hold the helicopters up 
in customs and this, that and the other.  So you’ve got to go with the flow 
and try and save time; but they were under a bit of a time pressure to get 
these operations done.’ (Pete)   
As the operation progressed frailties in the South African management’s 
understanding of large scale conventional military combat operations began to 
emerge: 
‘They were still doing 1960s tactics where they should have listened to the 
British guys, the Paras and guys that we had.  [The South African senior 
management] were under the impression that the Afghan thing was just 
protective security.  Some of these South Africans, I mean the old school, 
thought it was just running around in pickup trucks doing security.  They 
didn’t understand that [the British] guys were fixing bayonets and getting 
stuck-in.  That’s why, just the mentality I didn’t understand, I mean we all 
know Afghan was a war and there was restraints on the British Forces, but 
a lot of those guys got stuck-in and it was fighting hand-to-hand basically.  
So when you’ve got guys with that experience why don’t you take that on 
board? And at the end [the South African senior management] said sorry 
 




we should have listened to some of you guys.  It’s a bit too late after it’s all 
over.’ (Pete) 
Former members of South African Special Forces dominated the structure of the 
private military company Pete worked with and established themselves in key 
positions in the framework of operational command; while former British 
soldiers, despite their superior physical conditioning, recent combat experience in 
Afghanistan and Sierra Leone and greater knowledge of conventional military 
operations were subordinated to non-command roles.  Thus, within a commercial 
environment the symbolic capital of the South Africans’ Special Forces service and 
their later involvement with Executive Outcomes, enabled these actors to retain 
dominance over the conduct of an operation that may better have been run by 
members of the British contingent, with their superior ‘fighting capital’ and more 
contemporary experience of conventional war-fighting operations.  This hierarchy 
of military elitism led to a Bourdieusian ‘misrecognition’ of capital (Moore, 
2012:101) that, in Pete’s opinion, cost lives even though the operation achieved 
its aim: 
‘It did work in the end, it worked181.  They did what they did, they achieved 
what they should have done.  The Nigerian Army, its got no leadership and 
no logistics as such.  It’s got billions in money that has apparently been 
thrown at it, but where’s that gone?  I don’t know182.  Everything was done 
so quickly we didn’t have the right equipment.  We had some equipment 
but it came in very late so we were mucking around with weapons that 
were forty years old.  We didn’t have the vehicles and helicopters and all 
that [until very late].  But we came in and started a momentum for the 
Nigerians to do it.  And I think that's what [was needed]. It was really 
leading from the front to get them motivated to do it… I wouldn't say 
motivated but organised.’(Pete) 
In this account Pete gives weight to the claims of private military industry actors 
(Brooks, 2000b; Brooks and Wright 2007; Baker and Pattison, 2012) that, private 
companies can achieve, with greater efficiency and more limited expenditure, 
things that conventional military forces (with their extended procurement and 
planning cycles and extensive logistical requirements) would struggle to achieve.  
 
181 See Barlow, 2016 and Mkandla (2017) on the relative success of the operation. 
182 See also Varin, 2018:149 
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Pete’s account displayed something of the racialised construction of expertise 
observed by Chisholm (2014a), but this was balanced by the assertion that, 
operationally, cultural differences had to be accommodated rather than 
suppressed or challenged.  Beyond this, the characteristic racism of post-colonial 
era mercenary operations in Africa (Singer 2003:37) was evident in the behaviour 
of the South African contingent that Pete worked with.  Pete also cites poor 
leadership and disorganised logistics, although a lack of fighting spirit does not 
appear to have been evident (Carmola, 2010:12).  Indeed, if anything, this episode 
illustrates the tension that exists when an aging demographic of very ‘invested’ 
former elite soldiers engage in the type of activity that, with discretion, might have 
been more aptly accomplished by younger veterans with more contemporary 
operational experience and cultural orientation. 
Thinking about his decision to undertake the contract Pete reflected on the 
political aspects of the operation: 
‘If you think about why they brought in a [private] company, you come back 
to: why isn't the British government doing more in these sort of places, 
especially a former colony?  I don’t quite understand it.  I think the 
Americans would have [sorted it out].  But the Americans would require 
boots on the ground and to have a permanent base there to do that sort of 
thing, and the Nigerians won’t allow that183.  They don’t want that because 
once you get the Americans in its very hard to get them out.  However, the 
British do a lot of talking and indirectly… indirectly I would say that the 
Americans and British are maybe the cause of some of that issue that are 
going on [in Northern Nigeria].  For the Nigerian part, it was something that 
was probably stoked by some of the governors up there [in Northern 
Nigeria] and got out of control and then they [Boko Haram] got funding 
from elsewhere and the whole thing became quite a big threat.  But for five 
years they knew about these guys [Boko Haram] and they should have done 
something about it.  It’s politics again.’(Pete) 
In Pete’s view the genesis of the conflict in Northern Nigeria could be attributed to 
both local Nigerian politics and the influence of western powers in the region.  As 
such, the contract operation he worked on was conducted in the ambiguous 
middle ground between official public policy and less transparent national 
 




interest; the private military sector providing options for the enactment of policies 
that would be politically impossible to achieve if they were to be realised using 
state military forces.  Ultimately Pete’s decision to engage in commercially 
contracted combat operations was less about political than personal 
considerations: 
‘For me it served a purpose, it gave me three months good pay.  That type 
of work really… I shouldn’t have gotten involved in the operations side at 
my age.  Saying that, there were guys older than me.  But the whole idea of 
it… I think everyone’s got a conscience or you’ve got a moral [position]; but 
sometimes you do things on adrenaline and the whole heat of the moment, 
you do something, which is totally abnormal.  So I don’t know, it’s hard to 
say, it’s hard to actually define and say I wouldn't do this and I wouldn’t do 
that, because you just don’t know until it happens.  But I would personally 
not go back and do what I did there; and it’s not because I'm too old to do 
the sort of thing they wanted us to do.  There were a lot of people out there 
too old to do it, and we shouldn’t have been doing it; I shouldn’t have been 
doing it.  I've done most things and worked and had a lot of really well paid 
jobs, like the Yemen job, I worked six months a year and I earned a hundred 
thousand pound a year, so why did I go and do that?  Well there was a bit 
of an adrenaline buzz involved and I knew [the client].  Without that I 
wouldn't have gone and done it and would I do it again?  No not that same 
thing.’ (Pete) 
Thus Pete, a professional soldier and security practitioner, with experience of a 
number of conflicts, expressed ambivalence about working on offensive military 
operations conducted in the commercial sphere.  These misgivings stemmed from 
both the conduct of the operation and a general sense that this, more offensive 
type of activity, should really have been the preserve of state actors.  Despite this, 
the excitement and emotional fulfilment of combat operations, the practical 
necessity of employment and his affiliation with other participants involved in the 
operation was enough to persuade him to take part. 
Culture and Combat on the Fringe 
Pete’s description of the Nigerian operation has some shades of the ‘Wild 
Geese’184, and a direct link to the operations of Executive Outcomes in the 1990s.  
 
184 Fredrick Forsyth’s novel about mercenary operations in Africa in the 1970s made into a film 
released in 1978 starring Richard Burton (McLaglan, 1978). 
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But was the offensive operation in which Pete took part the ‘last hurrah’ of a cohort 
of old mercenaries, an embarrassing throwback to bad old days of the post 
Apartheid African mercenary boom? Pete’s ambivalence about the operation was, 
at least in part generational.  Older participants (Pete and Victor were in their mid 
60s at the time of interview) were far less likely to accept offensive military 
operations as a legitimate role for private companies.  While most considered the 
training of foreign militaries to be an acceptable commercial role, the strongly 
expressed view was that a ‘line was crossed’ if the trainer accompanied troops into 
operations, and a further line crossed if the private actor engaged in combat 
activity themself. 
Younger participants (those between 33 and 47 years old at the time of interview) 
took a different view.  They saw the use of force by private security actors as a 
‘normal’ activity for the industry.  Kate, considered that the type of operation in 
which Pete had been involved was now both acceptable and fairly routine, ‘Would 
you be armed and go in with them185?  Yes you would nowadays; that’s quite 
normal’ (Kate).  For her the demarcation between ethical and unethical, reputable 
and disreputable was different: 
‘Doing a training team job, although there are boots on the ground, that is 
not mercenary.  There are loads of contracts like that.  In my head that still 
sits within the legitimate side of the house.  As long as the deployment on 
the ground was to manage weakness in the Nigerian command structure, 
that still makes it legitimate.  It’s a bit like what the military do in Kurdistan, 
a lot of them were deploying on the ground or a BATT Team186.  In the olden 
days you didn’t deploy [on active operations] whereas now I think you do.   
Just to keep control and, yes, you probably are armed.  The difference in my 
head was the old companies, EOs and Sandlines they actually would get the 
contract to take-out the government.  Also they weren’t using locals.  So, for 
example, in Equatorial Guinea one side of the government paid for a team 
of mercenaries to get on a plane and fly 60 blokes to attack [a target].  They 
had a plan.  They put in the advanced recce (who were all arrested) and 
then the other plane got stopped in Zimbabwe.  They were all rehearsed all 
practiced back in South Africa and then they flew in to do the coup.  Now 
that in my head is wrong.  That is a mercenary job.  You know, that is regime 
 
185 In this context ‘go in with them’ referrers to engaging in combat with the unit the instructor has 
trained . 
186 A British Advisory and Training Team, a military mission to train foreign forces. 
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changing.  That’s not the same as putting training teams into countries 
where the [UK] government has sanctioned it.  In some of the countries 
where we have worked, where we have put training teams in [the security 
company] check with the FCO and we never go in anywhere if it’s not 
sanctioned.  We put training teams in, yeah, we put a lot into Africa but it is 
always sanctioned by our government.  We won’t do it unless it is 
sanctioned.  [The Nigerian operation] would have been sanctioned.’ (Kate) 
Attitudes towards the conduct of offensive operations were bifurcated.  An older 
generation of security actors believed that, while the training of foreign 
government forces was a legitimate role for the private sector, the armed 
accompaniment of those trainees into combat operations rendered the private 
security actor a combatant and crossed the boundary between ethical and 
unethical conduct.  For a younger generation of military private security 
practitioner the armed accompaniment of trainees into combat operations was 
seen as routine.  The demarcation point between these two interpretations had 
two aspects: the role the security actor played in the offensive operation and the 
ratio of foreign consultants to local actors.  With regard to the former, there was a 
distinction drawn between the oversight of local force command structures and 
the direct assumption of command by foreign security consultants.  In the latter, 
there was a general consensus across all parties that the provision of teams 
comprised predominantly of foreign actors to carry out offensive military tasks 
independently (at a tactical level) was still unacceptable. 
This division of opinion has its roots in the changing nature of state military 
engagement in training and advisory roles for local forces.  During the Cold War 
era superpower confrontation was conducted strictly by proxy.  Training and 
advisory missions would observe a strict divide between the training of local 
forces and engagement in the subsequent offensive operations that they 
conducted.  In the post-Cold War era this division has not been so strictly 
observed.  Kate mentioned British military support for the Kurds, but the same 
situation could be observed in Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan.  Indeed as the 
pieces of the ‘shaken kaleidoscope’ (Guardian, 2001b) of the Global War on Terror 
settled, forms of warfare that involved active cooperation in combat between local 
force actors and small groups of specialists from sponsoring western nations came 
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to be accepted in military doctrine (Boot, 2003:50).  As such, we can see that as 
the doctrinal changes in ‘stability support’ operations developed during the 
humanitarian interventions in the 1990s have transferred into private sector 
practice, so have the more ‘hands-on’ post Global War on Terror practices in 
relation to training, advising and supporting local force actors. 
This bifurcation was evident even in more mainstream area of the security field187 
and could not simply be attributed to the propensity of younger private security 
operators to greater laxity and more trangressive patterns of behaviour.  Indeed 
some non-military interviewees’ observations of the character of former Special 
Forces personnel entering the private security sphere from different generations 
of service gave a more nuanced picture: 
 ‘I do think that the modern Special Forces guy in contrast to guys that I 
used to work with in the eighties are different.  These guys in the eighties, 
they sailed close to the wind. I think that now the individual they’re 
looking for is a more thinking individual.  These guys in the past, some of 
them were thugs, characters, but they were a different type of individual 
to the ones now.  [The contemporary Special Forces soldiers] they’ve still 
got that adventurism, but it’s more controlled.’ (George) 
Thus, older operators were perceived to be more liminal in their behaviours, more 
violent and more ambivalent in their adherence to rules and norms; but had a 
stronger sense of the traditional distinction between the role of state and non-
state actors in the application of coercive force.  Those with more contemporary 
Special Forces experience were perceived to be more measured and rational in 
their conduct, but demonstrated less concern over the direct application of 
violence by private companies.  Thus, this fringe area of the private military 
security field had simultaneously become normatively more aggressive and 
(perhaps, as a result) culturally less transgressive. 
This dynamic was reflected in Kate’s experience of gender in this more ‘combat 
oriented’ area of the market.  Working with a younger generation of private 
 
187 Gary, who had worked in both security and de-mining stated that it had now become 
commonplace for weapons to be carried by staff supervising de-mining teams.  He noted that this 
type of practice had, until the advent of the War on Terror, been frowned upon as de-mining had 
been considered a humanitarian occupation. 
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security actor engaged in tasks routinely involving conflict, her experience did not 
bear the same hallmarks of extreme transgressive sexism as had her service as a 
Special Forces surveillance operator. 
‘Weirdly, the negative elements of military culture, in terms of being a 
woman were not carried over into private security.  I have never had any 
issues at all in the private security world.  Completely because there aren’t 
that many of us out there.  I’m not boasting, I have a reasonably good 
reputation and generally I am going in as a consultant.  I am going in to look 
at [security] and make recommendations.  If you look at my pedigree as a 
consultant, most people know what my background is before I get there.  
You know what it is like, they check you out.  So I’ve never had an issue.’ 
(Kate)  
Kate acknowledged that this was at least in part a function of the role that she now 
carried out.  Consultancy provided her with greater agency and more power to 
determine her relationship with other practitioners: 
‘It is to do with being a consultant.  I know it is different for females on a 
team.  I know women CP operators but not within the hostile environment 
where they are armed.  I don’t know any women that work out in Iraq for 
example.  There have been some, but I think they have suffered much more 
of what I saw in NI, the “whether you can shoot straight, whether you can 
carry…”.  I think you go back to that if you are at that low level; if you are 
on a team I think you would go immediately back to that world again.  But 
if you’re going in as a consultant or as an operations manager that goes 
away, because suddenly you are in charge and they can’t argue with you so 
much.’ (Kate) 
Where Kate was dealing with contractors engaged routinely in combat operations, 
and where her role retained both distance and authority, coupled with her relative 
novelty as a woman in the field, she did not pose the emasculating threat to these 
private military actors that she had to her Special Forces colleagues.  While this 
may be a function of the fact that access to circumstances where violence could be 
enacted was not competed for to the same extent in environments like Iraq as it 
had be in Northern Ireland, the more ‘loosely coupled’ and less tightly institutional 
nature of the private provision of armed force provided Kate with a space where 
she could exercise her expertise without her gender being the source of challenge 
or restriction.  While she remains a single example of this phenomenon, this 
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provides a useful reminder that the ‘masculinized and masculinizing’ (Eichler, 
2015) effect of private security culture intersects with role and status in ways 
which are not uniform, with less evidence of social reproduction of ‘hyper-
masculine’ cultures in the more autonomous parts of the industry (i.e. 
consultancy) and, more in the cultures of small operational teams. 
Discussion: Commercial as the ‘New’ Covert Activity 
While younger actors in the field appeared less prone to wilful transgression, they 
adopted a more aggressive normative position in relation to the direct application 
of violence by private actors.  This appeared to both stem from, and contribute to, 
the contemporary latitude afforded private companies to engage in the conduct of 
offensive military operations.  This latitude, while on one level empowering the 
private military security actor, was experienced by participants as creating 
profound ambiguities and complexities around the determination of acceptable 
and unacceptable propositions of employment.  Kate observed that caution had to 
be exercised by private security practitioners in determining work in which 
national governments were using private companies accountably, and where the 
commissioning of a private entity was designed to avoid accountability: 
‘[Government agencies] do that all the time; they use security companies 
when they don’t want their fingers burned.  And I know that because I was 
due to do a job in [an African nation undergoing a process of post-conflict 
political change].  It was just before [a significant constitutional process] 
was going to happen, about 3 months before.  [The contracting security 
company] called us in and said, “will you go and do a training task in [a rural 
location] up-country”.  I think we were going to put three people in, me and 
two others, training the [country’s] intelligence services.  I said, “well, wait 
a second is this sanctioned? Because if we get caught doing this training 
team we are going to wreck the peace process; wreck the [constitutional 
process] and the whole thing is going to go down the pan and war is going 
to break out again”.  And they wouldn’t give us an answer about whether it 
was sanctioned or not.  
The guy who was the project manager [for the security company] was an 
ex [UK government agency employee], so I knew damn well he had a line 
straight in, and I said to him: “right we’ll do the job but we want a written 
confirmation from the government that this is backed – we’re not doing it 
without that”.  [The contracting security company] were a bit, “oh it doesn’t 
matter stop fretting about it”.  And I said “Well you’re not the ones on the 
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ground who are going to get hung out to dry when [the government] turns 
around and say, ooh no that’s nothing to do with us” because they were 
using a security company; because  they wanted a cut-off.  So actually, they 
were tasking through this bloke [the project manager].  He’d left [a UK 
government agency], he’d been out a few years and they were tasking [the 
security company he worked for] because they know that they would do it.  
Most other companies wouldn’t have done it.  It was a cut-out; if it went 
pear-shaped [the security company] would take it on the chin and the 
government would just deny it to the hilt.  And that’s why they would never 
put anything on paper to say they were tasking us.  Anyway we turned it 
down.  
I know [the work was] sanctioned [by the UK government].  But unless they 
are prepared to stick their neck out and say it’s sanctioned I am not going 
out there. Because if we get caught, you know, high chance of getting 
caught, it isn’t worth it.  You know, I’m not getting paid enough to do this.  
So anyway we didn’t do it and another company went and did it.  
There have been another couple of examples where the British 
Government have tasked security companies to go and do their dirty work 
in countries where it’s ‘helpful’ to have people trained.  [It] Gives a 
capability without the media finding out, because they are always worried 
about that.  So there are companies that will do that.  All the companies that 
I have worked for will do it.  I mean, I have gone off and done training tasks 
with other governments, but it’s all sanctioned, we’ve got the letter saying 
we are being tasked by [the government].  So I would only do jobs that are 
sanctioned by our government because if you don’t do that, and you get 
caught, the British Government will probably wash their hands of you; and 
suddenly you are training a mercenary force working against your 
government and I won’t work against our government.  You’ve got to be 
quite careful of that.’ (Kate) 
In Kate’s narrative we can see how options for building military and security 
capacity through the use of private companies have become common practice for 
state organisations that, having lost capacity with the drawdown in standing 
military forces, are now accessing similar capacities through the private sector 
(Petersohn 2010; Taylor 2011).  This was not a change in capacity alone.  The 
hiring of private forces by state agencies has, throughout much of the post war 
period, been regarded politically as illegitimate under international law and 
engaged in by governments only under circumstances of great secrecy.  The use of 
mercenaries has been constructed in public consciousness as the ‘dirty wars’ of 
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the ‘secret state’; limited by both public disapproval and the absolute 
requirements of ‘deniability’ imposed by a backdrop of potential superpower 
conflict.  As such, throughout the era of the Cold War this type of military support 
would have been carried out sparingly and on a covert (or even clandestine) basis 
(DeVine and Peters 2018; Cormac, 2018). 
The emergence of new forms of commercially accessible military force that have 
developed since the end of the Cold War have provided states with opportunities 
to use military and security training of local actors as a key form of ‘hybrid’ 
warfare.  The expansion of the corporate security field, and its legitimisation 
through both government contracting and state participation in regulatory 
assemblages (i.e. the Montreux Convention and the ICoC) means that nation states 
are able to use private actors to achieve manifestly similar aims to the state 
dominated covert operations of the Cold War; the legitimation of ‘corporate’ style 
military training consultancy serving to ameliorate the public discomfort that 
accompanied Cold War era ‘mercenary’ activity.  This was represented by a 
generational shift in attitudes towards the engagement of commercial entities in 
conflict, with younger actors less likely than their seniors to disapprove of the 
commercial contracting of offensive military capability.  Indeed, among the 
younger cohort the distinction between ethical and unethical private military 
activity was seen to be less a function of the distinction between the private and 
state spheres, and more dependent on the identity and aesthetic of actors involved 
in the operation (i.e. the ratio of foreign to local actors, the extent to which 
recruitment was ‘informal’ or structured through a corporate entity).  Ultimately 
the legitimacy of the state outsourcing its traditional monopoly of force had 
become less and less contentious; a trend that had provided state actors the ability 
to use militarised solutions in a greater range of circumstances than was possible 
during the Cold War and pre-Global War on Terror eras (Kinsey 2006:51-57). 
In these narratives, Carmola’s contention that private security is now routinely 
being used to obviate ‘all but the most serpentine processes of oversight’ 
(Carmola, 2010:15 on Scahill, 2007) was clearly borne out, while simultaneously 
the use of the same private military services was becoming less contentious.  
Further, the contracting by national governments of private companies directly 
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coordinating and conducting offensive operations by foreign military and security 
organisations legitimised the practice of the commercial contracting of armed 
force by the private sector.  The vehicle used to deliver the offensive military 
operation conducted by Pete (i.e. the ‘client’ who hired and contracted the 
operation) was a private company not a state entity.  It appears likely that this 
private initiative had substantial covert state backing and was sanctioned by both 
the British and Nigerian governments.  However, the active engagement of 
government agencies in the conduct of offensive operations both for, and by, 
private companies cannot but influence the behaviour of private sector actors.  
Ultimately the covert commission of armed force by governments through private 
companies alters the possibilities open to the mercantile field and creates 
opportunities for the use of militarised forms of capital that would previously have 
fallen beyond the ‘doxa’ of the field of commerce, thus changing civilian practice 
to a more militarised norm.  Interestingly, this dynamic was most in evidence not 
in the hotly debated field of the international ‘mercenary’ activity, but instead in 
the commercial market for specialist counter-terrorist style surveillance in the 




Chapter 8 Domestic Fringe: Covert Surveillance 
While the social construction of the private military security field emphasised 
overseas work in high-risk areas as a core and defining concept, almost all 
participants had also conducted security work in the United Kingdom (see 
Appendix D).  The most common form of domestic employment was that of close 
protection work (i.e. body-guarding), but a significant proportion of participants 
had conducted covert surveillance activity in the UK.  While close protection has 
been a regulated activity since the establishment of the Private Security Industries 
Act in 2001 (UK Government, 2001), commercial covert surveillance had no such 
framework of governance.  Interviewees identified covert surveillance as a ‘fringe’ 
area of the private military security field in which there was little transparency, 
and where the greatest potential for ethical ambiguity and illegality arose.  It was 
in this sub-field of private security that some of the more far-reaching social 
implications of the proliferation of military capital were in evidence. 
The Covert Surveillance Sub-Field  
Covert surveillance is the deployment of a person, or group of people, to observe 
secretly another person, or group, to establish evidence of their conduct, lifestyle, 
associates or affiliations.  This evidence may be used in a number of ways and for 
a variety of purposes, including in support of criminal and civil litigation, in the 
conduct or resolution of employment or commercial disputes, or as an element of 
a security assessment or investigation.  Stuart described a ‘typical’ covert 
surveillance task: 
‘A lot of the jobs we get is a manager or an executive officer who was 
disgruntled with his company, he would go to a competitive company and 
say look I’ve got these secrets, I’ve got these clients or whatever, I want to 
come to you and work for you, I’ll bring these with me, which is against civil… 
well you’re not allowed to do it within their contract obviously.  And that’s 
generally when we get called in.  So when we find him meeting with 
competitors, we’ll record conversations at their restaurant table, café table, 
park bench, whatever. And then at the end of it, whether that be one weeks’ 
worth, two weeks’ worth, or with a particular individual three and a half 
months of evidence, we go “oh you met this person or you met that person”, 
it’s so conclusive that they haven’t got a leg to stand on, so it [the dispute] 
goes no further.’  (Stuart) 
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The exact size of the covert surveillance market in the United Kingdom is difficult 
to define; there remains no official record of the numbers and identities of actors 
involved in the sector.  Andrew estimated that there were 60-70 companies in 
London that provided ‘sophisticated surveillance’ as either a sole service or as part 
of a basket of security services that they offered.  These companies all 
subcontracted from the same ‘pool’ of 50-60 specialist commercial surveillance 
operators who worked exclusively in covert surveillance roles, or used the 
services of a few hundred other contractors who would conduct covert 
surveillance as part of a wider portfolio of security work.  He proposed that there 
were ‘probably a thousand’ companies that would provide ‘unsophisticated’ 
covert surveillance.  The majority of the latter he described as ‘small private 
detective agencies’ or ‘one-man bands’. 
Participants drew a divide between ‘unsophisticated’ surveillance, which they did 
not consider to be part of the private military security field and, higher status, 
‘sophisticated’ surveillance, which was.  ‘Unsophisticated’ surveillance involved a 
single, or pair of operators following a surveillance target188.  The act of following 
a person may have been conducted on foot or by vehicle and.  At this level, mobile 
telephones were often used to communicate between operators and cameras or 
mobile phones used to record evidence of the target’s activity.  By contrast 
‘sophisticated surveillance’ utilised techniques that better obscured the 
surveillance operators’ identities and employed more complex technical means to 
acquire and record evidence of the surveillance target’s activity.  In most cases this 
meant that a team of four or more surveillance operators was used, among whom 
the responsibility for actively watching the ‘target’ (called ‘having the eyeball’) 
rotated.  This practice aimed to minimise the chance that the ‘target’ would 
become aware of the surveillance through the persistent presence of a single 
follower.  This type of activity required training and practice and would take place 
both on foot and using vehicles. 
The complexity of ‘sophisticated surveillance’ meant that effective and 
unobtrusive coordination of this larger team required communication between 
 
188 The object of surveillance activity. 
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team members using specialist covert radio equipment.  ‘Sophisticated 
surveillance’ also involved the use of a wide variety of technological aids.  This 
included GPS tracking units that could be attached to vehicles, sensitive audio 
recording equipment to capture conversations at a distance and a variety of 
electronic eavesdropping devices (bugs).  A range of ‘aids to surveillance’ were 
also used that could include disguises, motorbikes, specially outfitted surveillance 
vans, and liveried vehicles including black taxis (Hickman, 2014). Further, 
‘sophisticated’ surveillance incorporated a number of sub-disciplines that could 
be provided to clients, either in the form of training, or direct service provision.  
These included counter-surveillance (the act of establishing if a third party was 
surveilling a client) and anti- surveillance (a series of actions carried out by a 
person under threat to identify and avoid surveillance).  These latter disciplines 
often crossed over with close protection and so many practitioners undertook 
both types of work 189 .  Stuart described the workings of a typical covert 
surveillance job for a corporate client: 
Commercial Covert Surveillance Case Study 
‘We had a good one recently, a guy was stealing top end clothing from the 
warehouse he worked at.  He was one of the managers.  The place he worked 
at didn’t have great security around it.  It was a new place they’d moved into 
which hadn’t been thought out, so the temptation to steal was a lot greater 
because the risks were lower.  [As he was doing this] we’ve covert filmed him 
over a number of nights, taking this stuff out, hiding it in his car, distributing 
it to his friends.  We had his lock up; well a lock-up? It was a house!  They 
called it a lock-up.  We had all the evidence against him.  On the actual night 
where we had police with us, we got him with the merchandise in the boot 
of his car from the factory.  In cooperation with the police we stopped him 
there and then brought in the police who arrested him and carried out 
everything else.  Now that spreads like wild fire through the rest of the 
factory, if you’re going to do something wrong you’re going to get picked up.  
But [the client] picked up on it a bit too late, he’d been doing this for 18 
months, got away with about a million and half pounds worth of clothing, 
Dolce and Gabbana and Prada and all that sort of stuff. 
We recorded the guy on 3 separate nights, putting the stuff into his car and 
distributing it.  So we had photographs, we had video, everything he was 
 
189 See also Sarah Ford’s (1997:263) memoir. 
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doing and where he was going.  We put all this into a file, along with our logs 
and reports, give that to the police and said, look this is what he’s done, this 
is where he’s been doing it, this is how he’s been doing it.  And the police took 
that off us and said “thank you very much”.  They arrested him and we said, 
“well you need to search his lock up and you need to search his house”.  This 
is then when you start treading into a minefield.  Police don’t have the same 
powers as us, we can do a lot more than they can do.  For them to carry out 
the operation that we did would take months and months of paperwork and 
red tape bureaucracy.  Whereas with us it takes a phone call, that’s it.    
So, yes the police have their hands tied to a certain degree.  If the guy has 
been stealing they’ve got to have the evidence that he’s been stealing; they’ll 
say, “how do you know he’s been stealing?”. Because we’ve caught him with 
it! I mean that’s why they [the client] brought us in.  Here’s the evidence he’s 
been stealing, this is what he’s been stealing, it’s all documented.  But again, 
the police were so… their powers were so limited, it became a bit of a farce 
and the company involved got very annoyed with the police, they couldn’t 
take it any further and it took a while to come to court.   I’ve just had a letter, 
about two weeks ago, the guy went to court eventually, pleaded guilty to 
stealing the stuff and was given a 15-month jail sentence, suspended for 24 
months and he had to do 200 hours of community service. (Stuart)   
This case study provides a good technical example of the type of work in which 
covert surveillance operators engage, and the ambiguous relationship they have 
with state law enforcement bodies.  However, Stuart and Andrew both 
emphasised that work from which criminal charges may result forms only a small 
part of activity in the covert surveillance sub-field.  The majority of the 
interviewees’ work was connected to civil disputes between corporate clients, in 
particular those relating to the prevention of the unauthorised transfer of 
sensitive commercial information to competitors by senior executives within the 
client’s own organisation. 
Stuart estimated that 80% of his work was is in the United Kingdom, and the vast 
majority of this was in London, particularly the City of London and affluent areas 
of the capital such as Mayfair and Kensington and Chelsea.  Indeed, the bias toward 
London was marked; he recalled only having done 4 ‘jobs’ in other areas of the 
United Kingdom since the firm was established 7 years ago.  The remaining 20% 
of Stuart’s work was conducted overseas.  These contracts were carried out in 
locations as diverse as China, the United States, Western and Eastern Europe as 
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well as in territories associated with luxury recreation or expatriate residence 
such as the Maldives.  Both Glen and Andrew described a similar distribution of 
work, with covert surveillance in the United Kingdom forming 80% of the work 
they conducted or commissioned.  This was predominantly London based, with a 
small amount of work in the Channel Islands.  The remaining 20% of Glen’s work 
was evenly mixed between conflict and post conflict environments such as: Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and regions of Africa, and less ‘hostile’ regions such as 
mainland Europe and China.  Of this second category a significant proportion was 
conducted in regions associated with the tax residence, or recreation, of economic 
and financial elites e.g. Monaco, the Maldives, Bermuda, the Caribbean and the 
British Virgin Islands.  The overseas work Andrew commissioned was 
predominantly in Western Europe and the United States. 
Of the 30 interviewees, 11 had been involved in covert surveillance in the United 
Kingdom during their careers (either conducting or commissioning).  Of these, 
three of the participants were, at the time of interview, involved in the provision 
of covert surveillance as their primary business activity.  Other interviewees had 
conducted commercial covert surveillance in the United Kingdom as part of a 
broad range of security activity that they undertook, much of which would 
ordinarily have involved employment overseas in ‘high threat’ environments.  In 
this Chapter I focus on participants for whom covert surveillance in the United 
Kingdom had formed the majority of their working portfolio.  
Stuart and Andrew had both served in the British Army, Stuart as a Special Forces 
surveillance operator with 14 Intelligence Company and Andrew as a covert 
human intelligence specialist with the Force Research Unit (FRU) 190  and its 
successor units.  Stuart’s work in the covert surveillance industry incorporated 
both entrepreneurial activity and operational service provision.  He was 
businessman, a security/surveillance operator and a trainer.  Andrew began his 
private security career working for a number of security contracting companies.  
More recently he had becoming the corporate Chief Security Officer for a London 
 
190 The Force Research Unit was a British Army organisation that engaged in the identification, 




based financial institution.  Stuart and Andrew’s military service had placed them 
both in the United Kingdom military’s ‘high policing’ structures (Brodeur, 1983; 
2005; 2010) during the Northern Irish ‘troubles’ of the 1980s and 1990s.  During 
this period covert elements of the British military, including 14 Intelligence 
Company and the FRU were alleged to have been involved in state sanctioned 
illegality in their fight against republican and loyalist paramilitary groups (Foot, 
1990; Holroyed and Burbridge 1989; Urban, 1992; Punch, 2012).  Thus, both 
Stuart and Andrew were representative of those elite military actors involved in 
the application of the British ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005) in Northern 
Ireland.  
Glenn was a former member of a United Kingdom intelligence and security agency 
and Adam had, originally, served in a Commonwealth military before taking up 
employment with one of that country’s intelligence and security agencies.  Both 
worked in commercial covert surveillance in London.  Glen’s background was an 
intelligence officer and agent handler; his particular expertise being in the conduct 
and avoidance of surveillance as part this role.  Adam’s work involved technical 
support of secret intelligence operations; particularly the use of technology to 
attack and compromise information held by individuals and organisations 
opposed to the interests of the state.  This involved the construction, installation 
and use of a wide range of technical ‘means’ including electronic eavesdropping 
devices (bugs), tracking devices, covert photography and video, as well as the 
compromise of IT and telecommunications systems.  Both Glen and Adam left 
government service during the early 2000s and then worked in private security.  
Glen owned his own security consultancy business.  Adam worked for a number 
of companies on a freelance basis.  Both were involved in the practical conduct of 
covert surveillance. 
Employee Constitution  
‘There is a lot of ex-police out there doing this and they’re generally, I 
would say, average to poor.  They have their way of working, which is a 
different way.  We’ve come up against some foreign teams before who have 
their way of working, which is not wrong, just different, but all of them are 
not as good as the British [army] system.  Now even though the police is a 
British system, they still have their own system and depending on what 
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unit they were from, the threat levels were different.  So if you’re talking 
about police units who are working against organised terrorists, as they do 
in Northern Ireland, then their threat level is different to say a police unit 
who are working against burglars, thieves, pickpockets, that type of thing.  
You get somewhere in the middle of the covert units, kind of like SOCA191 
who work against drugs and organised criminals, so again, they carry their 
own threats.  But depending on what unit they used to work for [standards 
vary], generally the ex-police surveillance operators that we see are at best 
what we would call average.’ (Stuart) 
Participants described a sector where employees with differing backgrounds and 
experience inhabited different spaces within the field of employment.  The 
‘unsophisticated’ end of the spectrum, referred to as ‘ill-conceived lower end, one 
man insurance investigation type surveillance’ and ‘little better than stalking’ 
(Glen) was the preserve of former police officers who comprised 70% of the 
operators working in this area of the market.  At the ‘sophisticated’ end of the 
market, former military and security/intelligence service employees were in the 
majority by a similar proportion.  
Thus, former state employees held different relative positions and status within 
the field; former military Special Forces, state security and intelligence service 
employees populating the industry space encompassing ‘higher status’ or more 
complex surveillance work; former military employees having limited mid-level 
crossover with ‘lower status’ former police operatives; while former employees of 
security and intelligence agencies maintained a more elite status that (largely) 
precluded them becoming involved in more pedestrian ‘private detective’ work 
that was the preserve of former police officers.  Industry identity was created 
through concepts of inter-professional competition and symbolic boundary 
construction (Abbott, 1988), with the operational and jurisdictional boundaries of 
state service replaced by the somatic and symbolic capital associated with the 
practitioner’s former role.  In this, the distinction between those engaged in elite 
‘high policing’, i.e. acting in direct defence of the state (and imputed with the 
exceptional status discussed in Chapters 1 and 4) and the lower status roles 
 
191 The Serious Organised Crime Agency of the British Police, now the National Crime Agency 
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associated with the protection of the public was clearly in evidence (Brodeur, 
2010:226). 
The Covert Habitus 
A central construction in the field of commercial covert surveillance was the 
concept of secrecy.  Covert surveillance was, by definition, an act carried out in 
secret and the world of ‘clandestine’ activity was presented as markedly different 
from the ‘reality’ of civilian life.  Stuart discussed the reaction of trainees on the 
covert surveillance courses that he ran when they first began to understand the 
ubiquitous nature of covert activity by state authorities, as well as criminal and 
commercial groups: 
‘You know there are a lot more people doing ‘dark arts’ out there than we 
could imagine.  We pretty much think we know most of it but I’m sure there 
is a lot more going on and people would be absolutely shocked.  But there’s 
more and more about it getting released.  I think there was a documentary 
about a month ago about a specialist police unit who were taking on the 
names of dead people to give them a cover192, which was quite shocking to 
some people.  A lot of people would take it with a pinch of salt, you know I’m 
not surprised, it’s just coming from whichever background you are from how 
surprised you are about that.  
When you show someone just coming into [the covert surveillance field] 
what is actually going on they are very wide eyed and almost in disbelief.  
When we train our guys here, day 1 we say “for the moment you see this 
much, by the end of the training we’re going to let you see this much”, and 
they do, they are very grateful for allowing [them] into that ‘web’ for a while.” 
You see from personal experience when it dawns on them what’s going on 
out there.  Some people are very overwhelmed, you know you get into the 
psychological side of it where the brain shuts down where [people think] I 
can’t believe it, this is not happening, stick my head in the sand.  It happens 
when we’re training our guys, they work with us and they’re like “my god I 
didn’t realise that happened”, [it’s like] landing on another planet.’ (Stuart) 
 
192 Stuart refers to reports of the use by the Metropolitan Police of the names of dead children when 
creating cover identities for undercover officers (Lewis and Evans 2013a, 2013b). 
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Stuart was proprietary over this covert ‘reality’, referring to it as ‘our world’.  This 
secret world was one in which morality was viewed differently 193 .  Facets of 
behaviour that would be considered surprising or even shocking to the uninitiated 
were routine to the covert operator.  Indeed the practices of the ‘covert world’ 
were described as being sufficiently removed from the experience of ordinary 
people to mean that that exposure for the first time caused emotional discomfort 
akin to cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957).  Thus, while the proliferation of 
knowledge about specialist military and counter terrorist operations described by 
Stuart in Chapter 5 had resulted in increased societal consciousness of covert 
activity, the reality of this phenomenon, its scale and prevalence in society, was 
profoundly shocking when first encountered by the uninitiated. 
Boundaries 
‘How far do we push?  We work to a code of ethics; no one has regulated the 
surveillance industry thus far.  In the military you work to a set of rules laid 
down by RIPA 2000194, and that’s it, that’s as far as we go.  In the civilian 
world, because as a private company we don’t have those limits, that’s not to 
say we would go and break the law, we wouldn’t, we would go so far and 
then we would say to the client, sorry we can’t do that’ (Stuart) 
When asked about actions that constitute transgression interviewees almost 
universally used the yardstick of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, or 
RIPA (UK Government 2000), that governs state surveillance activity.  Stuart 
provided examples of where security companies had been approached by clients 
to carry out acts that he considered improper or illegitimate:  ‘They’ll get asked to 
put cameras or bugs into places where they shouldn’t’.  He highlighted how, under 
RIPA, such actions would be considered ‘intrusive surveillance’ and would require 
specific authorisation by a senior officer before they could be carried out.  Stuart 
explained that, in his civilian capacity, this was a boundary he would not be 
prepared to cross: 
 
193 See Loftus et al. (2016) for a similar description of how ethical norms differ between police units 
involved in ‘overt’ uniformed policing and those involved in covert work. 
194 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK Government, 2000) was instituted to govern 
the actions of state law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies when conducting 
investigations into terrorism of serious criminality. 
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‘If you’re a civilian, you’re not beyond the law, just because you’re doing a 
completely different job to everybody else doesn’t mean that you’re beyond 
the law.  You might drive a bit faster sometimes, but then so does a sales rep 
who is late for a meeting.  You might go through the odd red light, but so does 
a mini-cab driver.  That’s about as far as you’re probably going to push it.  But 
we know people who have placed bugs in people’s houses when they 
shouldn’t have, which is against the law, against human rights as well, and is 
something that we’re not prepared to do.  So the odd misdemeanour, fine, 
but not any of the heavier stuff.’ (Stuart) 
Thus, boundaries of conduct within the sector were mutable.  Transgression was 
not interpreted simply in terms of legality or illegality but was instead most 
commonly expressed through the more value neutral language of 
‘professionalism’.  Andrew observed: 
‘Sometimes the business gets tarred with a bad brush.  A few people have 
been unprofessional, done something they shouldn’t, or pushed it a bit too 
far.  Usually you find there’s a good reason; but part of the skill is knowing 
when to push it and when not to.’ (Andrew) 
Practice within the sector involved a range of behaviours that fell within or beyond 
the bounds of contention.  For example: the recording of conversations in a public 
space (a café, restaurant or park) using listening devices (bugs) was generally 
considered acceptable; however the planting of these devices in a private home 
was questionable.  Breaking into a house to recover information was not 
acceptable, but the recovery and inspection of domestic or business waste left for 
collection was, even where this was on private property.  Gaining access to 
premises or to data through misrepresentation (sometimes known as ‘proxy 
approaches’) was also acceptable, albeit a practice more prevalent in the ‘business 
intelligence’ 195  field than that of covert surveillance.  The installation of GPS 
tracking devices on target vehicles was acceptable, but the legitimacy of installing 
voice recording listening devices in a target’s vehicle was a matter of debate, as 
was the installation of listening devices inside telephone housings fitted to the 
 
195 Business intelligence is field of commercial activity separate from, but connected to private 
security and covert surveillance.  This sphere of activity involves the employment of a range of 




exterior of a subject’s premises.  As such, the boundary between normative and 
transgressive behaviour across the field was situational and highly contingent. 
Stuart indicated that some firms and operators within the covert surveillance 
industry were prepared to carry out acts that he would consider unacceptable or 
potentially harmful.  Beyond this, he also recognised the potential for the 
intelligence that he provided clients to be used in a number of ways, some of which 
may engender harmful outcomes (i.e. to coerce or intimidate).  He observed that, 
at times, understanding who clients were and why they were commissioning 
covert surveillance was difficult.  This made assessing the ethics or legitimacy of a 
proposed piece of work problematic, ‘You get some tasks where you’re not sure 
which side you’re working for and sometimes it takes a couple days to see what 
this person’s lifestyle is like and you think, what’s actually going on here?’ (Stuart).  
Andrew described a task he conducted in the UK and abroad where he 
experienced similar ambiguity: 
‘Sometimes you can’t tell what the client is really trying to get [from the 
surveillance].  We did a job looking at an arms company in [a town in 
Eastern Europe] so the job was a bit in London, where they did business 
and a bit out in [an Eastern European Country].  The clients were Gulf 
Arabs, but it came to us through, I would say some ‘reputable contacts’196.  
We thought they must be looking at the factory because it was a security 
thing197.  That made sense, because of where we got the introduction from.  
As it went on we began to see that the people who had hired us were 
actually in the ownership of [the arms company], but very ‘under the radar’ 
if you like – so it seemed like they were checking to see how visible that 
was.  A kind of penetration test198.  And you begin to wonder what these 
guys are up to?  Obviously you can’t ask, you just give them the 
[surveillance] logs, video, reports etcetera, and they do with it what they 
like’ (Andrew) 
In practice the motives of the client contracting covert surveillance were not 
always transparent.  Both Stuart and Andrew recognised that their labour may 
have produced harmful effects but did not consider these consequences to fall 
 
196 In this case a well-established Business Intelligence consultancy; see O’Reilly (2010) for an analysis 
of this specialist field of private intelligence work. 
197  A concern about the illegal importation or sale of weapons in the Middle East or Gulf region. 
198 A practice where an organisation checks the integrity of their own security measures by simulating 
an attack or attempted compromise of their own premises or organisation. 
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within their moral jurisdiction.  Indeed the encompassing secrecy of the sector 
seemingly prevented security contractors from conducting any meaningful due 
diligence on the clients contracting their services.  Instead the interviewees’ 
construction of transgressive behaviour in the sector was limited to discussion of 
the ‘tactical’ opportunities open to the individual operator; the structural social 
harm that may result from the employment of their skills was considered to be a 
‘higher order’ concern that existed beyond the bounds of the practitioner’s moral 
or practical jurisdiction. 
Overall interviewees presented a picture of an industry that worked to widely 
varying standards.  Stuart described the uncertainty this engendered in operators 
who moved between companies that had very different interpretations of 
normative and trangressive conduct: 
‘Obviously, there are good people and there are bad people in the world.  
Some people will go further than others and we know some companies will 
step over that line and do what they can for the client, because what’s more 
important to them at the end of the day is the dollar or the pound, and 
they’ll do whatever they need to, to secure that pound. […]  We get sort of 
proof in the pudding, when our operators go off and work for someone else.  
There’s no difference in the job, they’re watching someone, where they go 
and who they meet.  But when they come back to us there’s a sigh of relief 
as if to say “oh I’m back on a proper job”, because the standards of another 
company are different to the standards of our company.  Where we set the 
level, say this is what you need to do, however, here’s the line in the sand, 
that’s as far as we go.  They go and work for another company, there are 
different boundaries.’ (Stuart)  
Despite this, involvement in unethical practice or illegality while employed by 
other companies did not prevent Stuart from re-employing these same operators.  
Nor did knowledge of this conduct prevent operators from continuing to work 
within the sector as a whole.  Instead the secrecy of the sector ensured that 
information about transgression did not generally proliferate, and where it did, 
was unlikely to provide grounds for exclusion or censure.  In this respect the 
domestic covert surveillance field appeared to lack even the informal controls of 
‘the Circuit’ or the international ‘fringe’.  Instead the sub-field’s professional 
culture was replete with ‘differential association’ (Sutherland, 1949:234); the 
214 
 
surveillance operator’s transgression supported by the predominance of 
definitions that accepted such behaviour as a ‘reluctant compromise’ an 
‘exceptional necessity’ or simply the reality of turning a profit.  
Military Capital 
Although the United Kingdom would generally be considered a ‘low threat’ 
security environment the military disposition, and its associated capitals 
remained key to participant narratives.  Stuart placed emphasis on the more 
dangerous elements of the surveillance operators role and highlighted the 
importance of the somatically conditioned driving skills he had acquired during 
his specialist military training (Ford, 1997:81): 
 ‘We’ve had a number of car chases on the motorway (laughs), or I should 
say ‘follows’, where some people will drive at extremely excessive speeds, 
which is detrimental to our health and safety but also against the law.  You 
could lose your licence; if you lose your licence, you’ve lost your livelihood.  
Therefore, at times we’ve gone to certain speeds, where we’ll say right, if he 
maintains this then we’ll leave him, we’re just going to drop him.  It’s not safe, 
it’s illegal and if he’s going to continue doing this then we’re not following 
him and we’ll go back to the client and say, “look just be aware that the 
person we’re following is driving a hundred mile an hour plus down 
motorways in bad conditions and is driving dangerously.   We are not 
prepared to follow them when they start doing that”, and a hundred times 
out of a hundred the clients have said “yeah, no problem, totally agree”.  
(Stuart)  
Stuart’s description of the risk associated with his work was primarily personal 
and instinctively physical.  The enthusiasm with which he described high speed 
driving and car ‘chases’ was unmistakable. However, he quickly ‘checked’ himself, 
reverting to the more dispassionate vocabulary of ‘the follow’, a professional term 
for trailing a suspect.  This change in register accorded with the construction of 
professionalism that presented decisions relating to risk as taken on the basis of 
dispassionate rationality (Higate, 2012a).  However, in this exchange the tension 
between the life-affirming ‘action’ inherent to military identity (Jelušić, 2005, 
Woodward and Jenkins, 2011) and the maintenance of a professional ‘front’ more 
compatible with societal expectations less tolerant of masculine self-actualisation 
was evident (McElhinny, 1994:164). 
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The ‘danger’ theme was less pronounced in the narratives of participants without 
a military background.  Here the emphasis was on avoiding ‘compromise’ (i.e. .the 
target becoming aware of the surveillance operation).  Adam observed that, ‘There 
are always ways to get around it [car chases], we can put trackers199 on them’.  He 
accepted that some of these solutions may result in a greater degree of intrusion 
into the target’s privacy, but considered this a justifiable compromise against the 
risk of physical injury presented by high-speed driving.  Thus, the acceptance of 
physical danger formed part of former military participants’ discourse in a way it 
did not for those without a military background.  In a similar vein, military 
interviewees referred to the physical and embodied nature of surveillance work 
to a greater extent.   Stuart described how he had provided training to people from 
a civilian background intending to work in covert surveillance.  He emphasised the 
military-style physical rigour (Higate, 2000) of the training that he provided and 
asserted that his trainees were ‘mentally and physically exhausted’ at its 
conclusion and had ‘blistered feet’.  Non-military participants, by contrast, placed 
greater emphasis on perceptiveness and the ability to adapt oneself to different 
environments than on the ability to overcome physical adversity.  
While interviewees recognised that the covert surveillance operator was rarely, if 
ever exposed to extreme physical threats or challenges in the UK environment, the 
exposition of military values and experience remained important in the marketing 
of covert surveillance services.  Andrew proposed that the professional skills of 
the covert surveillance operator were used by clients in circumstances of conflict 
where the client was trying to establish dominance in a dispute, and that the 
military or Special Forces ‘brand’ underwrote the performance of the operator in 
circumstances of opposition:   
‘The client’s got a problem and they need that sorted out.  They need people 
who they know will be able to do the job even if the subject sees them and 
turns nasty; guys who won’t stop if they see something they don’t like, or 
get squeamish.  That brand, if you like, the military brand is useful.  I’ve had 
executive clients who only wanted SAS even though [covert surveillance] 
isn’t what they do.  They want the brand, to know that the people they are 
hiring are committed.  That they can go the extra mile – do things that other 
 
199 Global Positioning System satellite tracking devices that can be affixed to a vehicle magnetically. 
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people can’t or won’t.  These [executives] are people who are used to 
winning, used to getting their way.’ (Andrew) 
Covert surveillance was often used by clients involved in a dispute to re-establish 
control where it was perceived to have been lost, i.e. where the working consensus 
of the antagonists’ social reality has been disrupted (Goffman, 1959:10).  Thus, 
while the risk of death or serious physical injury was not present, the risk of an 
incident was and, as Goffman observed, ‘when an incident occurs and spontaneous 
involvement is threatened, then reality is threatened’ (Goffman 1967:135).  
Goffman proposed that an ‘incident’ can been seen to jeopardise the careful 
construction of social consensus through the unrestrained expression of 
individuals’ needs.  Covert surveillance was predominantly used to establish 
dominance within an on-going conflict, rather than for the avoidance of conflict, 
and was therefore more offensive than defensive in nature.  In this context military 
‘somatic’ capital was deployed to reassure the client that, even under the most 
trying circumstances of resistance, threat or compromise, the military operator 
was able to suborn the needs of the self to those of the task.  In so doing they could 
be relied upon to support the maintenance of social order as the client perceived 
it; an undertaking to moral detachment in the face of competing claims to the 
antagonists respective ‘rights and opportunities’ (Goffman, 1961 in Rawls 
1987:6).  
Craft as a Refuge 
Moral detachment replicated the circumstances of military service, but did so in 
conditions where the underpinning justification for the ‘moral boundarying’ of 
state service (i.e. reliance upon the normative link between the properly 
constituted authority of the state and the maintenance of the ‘common good’) was 
no longer in evidence.  Indeed the commercial surveillance operator was not 
employed by the state and this was a challenge to both legitimacy and status.  
Stuart countered this anomic condition (Durkheim, 1960) by replicating the self-
worth afforded by institutional affiliation with the state with a construction of self-
worth more closely linked to the concept of personal expertise:  
‘[Being out of the military] has its ups-and-downs.   Generally, you still work 
to a certain standard.  Because I’m not in the military anymore it doesn’t 
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mean I lower my standards.  Me, I am still me, and I have a certain 
fundamental core that I will work to, and the results I get from it need to be 
at that standard.   Now, that could be whether I am just building a guitar for 
my daughter to take to school, you put the same amount of effort into that as 
you would carrying out a covert operation for a company.  
Obviously the security industry is massive, but at the same time it is a very 
small world.  It is a very specialised area and you can go into it [but] if you’re 
not good at it, you’ll get found out very quickly, so it’s a matter of how far 
you’re willing to take the skills.  There are people out there doing the same 
work as us but to a lesser level.  [It’s like] if you need your front room wall 
papered, you can get a quote, it’s not always the cheapest, but it’s going to be 
the best.   It’s the same with us, we’re not cheap to hire, but what you get out 
of it is a lot more of a polished product.  That comes down to the fact we’ve 
put a lot of personal investment [into it], and that’s what it takes to get to this 
level.’  (Stuart) 
Adam expressed similar sentiments in respect of the construction and placement 
of technical surveillance equipment observing that ‘whoever the client is, in your 
previous life200 or this one, if you do a good job, then the jobs done’.  Thus the 
morally neutral measure of excellence in the ‘techniques’ of security was elevated 
in practitioner narratives to ameliorate the crisis of legitimacy created by 
estrangement from the institutions of the state.  As I described in Chapter 4, the 
military conditioned the life and thoughts of the individual in a uniquely 
encompassing manner that constructed higher order considerations (legitimacy, 
ethics etc.) as the business of the institution and not the self.  Thus notions of 
‘craftsmanship’ were used to both replace and replicate the ‘radical 
professionalism’ (Larson, 1974) of the military.  In so doing this reconstituted a 
life ‘anchored to a tangible reality divorced from higher pursuits’ (Sennett, 
2008:20) and re-created familiar boundaries.  By deploying the concept of ‘craft’ 
the issue of legitimacy was occluded by a focus on practical competence.  
Yet, the ‘craft’ of surveillance differed from that of the civilian artisan.  The desire 
to excel was not tied to the craftsman’s struggle toward the realisation of an 
aesthetic concept.  Covert surveillance left no legacy beyond the successful 
subjugation of the target (knowingly or unknowingly) to the control of their 
 
200 Refers to military or state service pre-dating involvement in private security. 
218 
 
adversary (the client).  The act of surveillance generated no public record that 
could be admired, neither was it a performance that could be viewed and 
applauded.  Its success was measured only by the operator’s domination of the 
target, and the opportunities for control that provided.  While the language of craft 
was a comfortable refuge it remained a technique of neutralization (Matza and 
Sykes, 1957).  Ultimately the conduct of covert surveillance was an exercise in 
power and not the aesthetic. 
Technique and Legitimacy 
‘Some people who probably have been on the wrong end of surveillance, say 
it was wrong, because we’re…stepping in on their lives, and say things we 
shouldn’t be saying201 and reporting facts that we shouldn’t be reporting.  
But you know we’ve never had an innocent party.  If you’ve got nothing to 
hide, then you’ve got nothing to worry about. 
To me it makes no difference, whether a corporation is doing it or the 
military.  It comes back to the saying of there’s no smoke without fire.  A 
corporation is not asking you to do something or look at one of their CEOs 
for no reason, and I can unequivocally say that we’ve never had an innocent 
party who we’ve looked at.  It’s what we do for a living and it’s no different 
to say a IBM programmer who has access to loads of different key codes […] 
sometimes the privileged information that we have on people is, without 
being ignorant, it’s just another job. Someone’s husband who’s doing what 
they shouldn’t be doing isn’t of any concern to us.  It’s another job, it’s an 
operation.  You do that job and report back to the client. 
If they think that something wrong is going on a lot of corporations 
nowadays have it written into their contracts, whichever way they word it, 
it basically says “we’re allowed to look at you without you knowing”.  Now, 
whether that be to check their computers, scan their emails, check their 
clocking in times, clocking out times or whatever, it’s written in the contract 
somewhere, which is how they get around it a lot of times these days.  But 
you know it’s really… to say it’s of no consequence to us would be wrong… 
but if corporations are asking us to do something, it makes no more 
difference to us as to when we were being asked in the military to do 
something.  Sometimes when we were in life-threatening situations and they 
 
201 Here Stuart refers to the disclosure to the client of details about the surveillance target that are 




asked you to do something, you might question yourself, if you have the 
ability to do that, but you wouldn’t really question the order.’ (Stuart) 
Former military interviewees placed little importance on whether the suspected 
transgression they were hired to identify was constituted by the state or a 
commercial client.  For Stuart the legitimacy of his work was determined by the 
professional expertise with which he carried out the surveillance task.  The 
adoption of technique as culture allowed for the construction of a normative 
morality based on the evidence of practice; if the surveillance was effective and 
professionally conducted, Stuart’s work was legitimated.  In this interpretation the 
ultimate ethical justification for covert surveillance was provided by its efficacy in 
uncovering ‘wrongdoing’.  Stewart’s assumption of the ‘guilt’ of his targets served 
to neutralize any moral responsibility he may have felt for the compromise of 
privacy in which he was engaged.  The ethical implications of his work were 
further distanced through the lack of meaning he attributed to the things he 
observed.  The person being watched was depersonalised through the detached 
bureaucratic rationality of the observer (Bauman, 1991), the target ‘othered’ 
(Loftus, 2009) to avoid moral ambiguity. 
Moral ambiguity was not restricted to decisions made by operators alone.  Stuart 
observed that many corporations and private offices202 ‘get around’ the legal and 
ethical problems associated with the practice of covert surveillance against their 
own staff by making acquiescence to such intrusion a contractual condition of 
employment.  By requiring the pre-emptive surrender of privacy beyond the 
workplace, employers sought to constrain the employee’s freedom of association 
where this was seen to conflict with the company’s interest in the maintenance of 
commercial confidentiality.  The ability to ‘police’ (Reiner, 1997) the employee’s 
beyond the workplace fundamentally changed the nature of the relationship 
between employer and employee, the reliability of the latter’s conduct now 
conditioned through the threat of detection and censure as opposed to the 
cultivation of loyalty. 
 




Military participants’ acceptance of the extension of the power of an employer into 
the private sphere was, perhaps, unsurprising.  The intrusion of the state, into the 
private realm of the individual during military service was complete (Scott and 
Morgan 1993:16).  As such, military identity provided an interpretive framework 
that isolated ethical concerns and remained focused on a successful conclusion of 
the surveillance act through the ‘unreflective accommodation’ created by 
embodied practical consciousness (Higate, 2005).  The dominance of this 
interpretive framework was cemented by the perceived superiority of practice 
associated with the defining experience of military service.  Thus, for Stuart 
embodied practice, proven in the face of lethal opposition in Northern Ireland had 
a legitimacy of its own.   
Developing Business 
So what of the consumers of covert surveillance? The field incorporated a wide 
variety of client organisations and actors who used covert surveillance services: 
‘The client could be any one of the 50 blue chip companies that work in the 
City203.  We have worked for foreign royal families, we’ve worked for the 
British Royal family, we’ve also worked for private clients, who are going 
through a messy divorce, that’s both on the husbands’ and the wives’ side’ 
(Stuart)  
‘We do work for mainly for high-net-worths and large corporates, but we do 
work for Her Majesty’s Government, we’ve assisted in training for the 
agencies, in fact we have training contracts with the agencies.  We work on 
the training, rather than on the operational side with them.  Likewise with 
MOD204, although MOD have come to us for operational advice as well in 
specific areas on the technical [surveillance] side.  And foreign governments 
or agencies as well, for example we’ve just finished some work for an anti-
corruption agency in Africa where they’re looking towards the ‘kite’ mark of 
UK PLC.   [This] sells well overseas in terms of the belief that the best training 
you can get is from the British.’ (Glen) 
Adam’s client base was similar to that of Stuart and Glen; he described the 
institutions and individuals he worked for as ‘The British establishment’.  The 
 
203 The City of London 
204 Ministry of Defence, see Ares&Athena (2017:17) for further details of this type of contracting. 
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majority of the people and organisations hiring his services held an ‘elite’ status, 
be that of traditional ‘power elites’ (Mills, 1956) or the ‘fusion’ of business owners, 
‘high level managers’ and ‘top level professionals’ identified by Atkinson, Roberts 
and Savage (2012:2).  The clients described by my interviewees conformed to a 
great many of the trends identified in the contemporary literature of elites and 
incorporated two main groups: those who had generated self-made access to 
economic capital (Bernstein & Swan, 2008) and those who were ‘waged’ and using 
capital that belonged to a parent organisation (Piketty & Saez, 2003).  Among the 
latter group the companies involved in the commissioning of covert surveillance 
showed an orientation towards the financial services sector (Khan, 2012:363).  
Traditional dynastic elites were represented, but in lesser numbers than other 
groups, indicative of their continued presence, but relative decline in relation to 
other types of elite actor (Edlund & Kopczuk, 2009).  What all these elite clients 
had in common was access to the economic and social capital to take advantage of 
the opportunities presented by the commodification of technique previously held 
as the preserve of the state.  At the ‘top end’ of the market covert surveillance 
knowledge was being marketed directly to foreign governments and sold back 
into state organisations that had divested themselves of these specialist skills 
(Krahmann, 2010a).  These state clients were represented by a more traditional 
‘power elite’ (Mills, 1956) and it was through this we can see that the techniques 
available to elite private clients are of the same nature and quality as those 
employed by state organisations. 
The maintenance of this elite clientele was a function of the fact that access to the 
practitioners of ‘sophisticated surveillance’ was, to some extent, restricted.  While 
some of the larger security companies advertised openly, public facing 
promotional material would rarely provide details of their covert capabilities 
(beyond a limited reference to ‘investigations’).  Neither Stuart, Glen nor Adam’s 
companies had any internet presence and had never engaged in advertising of any 
sort. Participants described sourcing commercial opportunities predominantly 
through a closed network of security industry contacts or former clients:  
‘I think the whole point is you don’t advertise what we do.  We get contracts 
by recommendation.  People we have worked for, and we trust refer us on to 
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other people.  Usually it’s the security people, but sometimes the clients 
themselves.  We’ve done a good job for them and they will pass on details 
when someone else has need of our services.  After a point you don’t find 
yourself short of work.  Sometimes we have to turn down jobs.  But I would 
I ever do a job for a ‘walk in’205 off the street? Not a chance. (Adam) 
Interviewees emphasised the importance of the ‘gatekeeper’ function carried out 
by the security consultants and managers directly employed by the client (people 
like Andrew).  It was the security consultant/manager, with their shared access to 
closed networks of former police, military, security and intelligence services 
personnel, and a familiarity with their operating techniques, who provided the 
client with a solution that alone the client would be unable to identify and access.  
The security consultant was seen to provide a link between two ‘fields’: that of the 
client’s normal commercial activity and that of specialist security activity.  
Nonetheless, Stuart articulated the relative unfamiliarity of many clients with the 
techniques of covert surveillance: 
‘In the civilian side, you’ve got to educate your clients in certain aspects [of 
surveillance work].  Whereas in the military it’s a lot easier, the word would 
come down to say you’re going to be going out and doing this, there’s nothing 
you need to feedback apart from the intelligence that you’re gaining.  
Whereas with civilian clients, you’ve got to do a lot of educating, and as long 
as they know what is at stake, they’re willing to take the risks.  We can probe 
so far into a person’s life, gather intelligence on what is happening, who 
they’re meeting etcetera.  But they’ve got to be aware that if we push too far 
you’re looking at a potential compromise.  If that happens then that is going 
to make the subject you’re looking at very aware of what is going on around 
them.  Sometimes you’re put straight onto a subject who is already 
‘surveillance aware’ and straightaway that changes the parameters of what 
you’re doing.   
In the military, every subject is treated as [surveillance] aware and therefore, 
it’s not a problem, resources are thrown at it, we’re talking 16-man teams 
with an 8-man team back-up.  Civilian life, you don’t have the affordability to 
do that type of thing, so you need to do it as best you can with the resources 
that you’re given.  Depending on what they can afford, will depend on how 
far we can push.  If they say, “I can’t afford 8 men or 6 men”, then we say, “we 
 
205 By this Adam means a client to whom he has not had an introduction. The phrase is also used for a 
hitherto unknown source who volunteers information to an intelligence agency. 
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can do it with 4 men, however, this is all [the intelligence] you’ll get out of it”.  
If they’re happy to accept, that’s fine, we can go for it.’  (Stuart) 
Where differences existed between civilian and military surveillance it was in the 
threat posed by the surveillance target becoming aware of the surveillance 
operation.  The relative threat of ‘compromise’ affected the level of resource 
(operators and vehicles) required to observe the target effectively.  However, 
where in a military context decisions relating to the commitment of resource 
would be addressed through an assessment of risk alone, in the field of 
commercial security questions of economic efficiency, and implicitly price 
competitiveness were also relevant.  Thus operational decisions were made in an 
environment that was more complex than that that of military service, but where 
a balance was mediated between the professional capital of the surveillance 
provider and the economic capital of the client. 
So how did the exchange of these forms of capital function in practice?  Stuart, 
spoke at length about this.  He described his clients as unknowing and 
inexperienced in the ‘reality’ of the covert techniques he employed.  In his 
construction, the surveillance operator adopted the role of a teacher, creating an 
understanding of the breadth and scope of possible solutions to the client’s 
problem.  The operator’s expertise was dominant in this aspect of the dialogue, 
their command of the privileged knowledge of the covert world unchallenged.  
Stuart’s described how his ‘doxa’, his ‘feel for the game’ and command of the 
techniques of state counter-terrorist operations, emboldened the client and 
served to legitimise their decision to use covert surveillance.  However, this 
legitimation was achieved without ever specifically addressing the issue of 
legitimacy (Bourdieu, 1977:168).  The client’s contribution to the discourse was 
presented by Stuart as limited; restricted often to a discussion of the accessibility 
of financial capital to support the project.  Andrew proposed that the client’s 
agency was often reduced by the exigency of their circumstances, ‘By the time its 
got to security sometimes they’ve tried most other things; they don’t know what 
else they can do – security gives them those options’.  This reinforced the often-
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asymmetric relationship between the covert surveillance specialist and the 
client206.  
Through the description of the discourse between the security practitioner and 
the client the importance of the surveillance operator’s own ‘elite’ identity came 
into focus.  They possessed not only specialist somatic knowledge (i.e. how to 
conduct covert surveillance), but also the symbolic capital associated with the 
conditions of  ‘the state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005) in which these skills were 
developed and practiced.  While the surveillance operator’s ‘epistemic power’ 
(Leander, 2005) made them central to a field now shared by both elite civilian 
clients and former state actors, reflexively the client’s habitus was changed to 
incorporate the practices of state-like exceptionalism promoted by the covert 
operator.  The ‘doxic’ narrative of this specialist field (the ‘common sense’ logic of 
the conduct and use of counterterrorist techniques) served to legitimise and 
normalise the adoption of practice that may otherwise have engendered 
discomfort or ‘hysteresis’ (Hardy, 2008:131). Through this the elite client’s 
disposition was altered, no longer constrained by the unexceptional solutions to 
conflict that previously bounded the field of their activity.    
The client was not presented as an entirely passive actor.  In the words of Loader, 
the act of the purchasing security was, ‘redolent with social meaning’; the 
consumer acquiring both a tangible service (people ‘doing something on their 
behalf) and engaging in a symbolic act that ‘says something’ about them and their 
relationship to others (Loader, 1999:380).  In each case the satisfaction obtained 
by the client from the potential resolution of a dispute was only a part of the 
rationale for the purchase of the services of covert surveillance.  Stuart observed 
how surveillance was used by high-net-worth clients in achieving dominance in 
personal confrontations with business or social rivals:  
 
206 Leander described the ‘epistemic power’ wielded by private security practitioners (Leander, 
2005:805 and also Berndtsson, 2012). This power was derived from the consultant’s ability to ‘shape 
understandings’ of security, often employing ‘securitizing’ (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, 1998) 




‘For a lot of the private clients it’s about competition and ego.  They have 
‘feuds’ and we are part of that […] they like the idea of having that ability, 
the ability to get one over on the opposition’ (Stuart).   
Glen, went further; describing how the symbolism of state exceptionalism was 
attractive to private and corporate clients, ‘A lot of them like having us around, 
we’re like their little secret service’.  This attraction was most acute among the 
elite civilian clients rather than security industry ‘gatekeepers’207.   
‘The civvies can be worse than the military or police.  An ex-military 
security guy knows the score.  They need us for a job to do a certain thing.  
There’s less showboating’ (Stuart).   
Other participants supported the view that security services were often 
commissioned less for the functional value of the service provided than to 
demonstrate the social status of the consumer208, a dynamic that aligned with the 
observations of a number of scholars who see commodities as an expression of 
social differentiation and relative position (Bourdieu, 1984; Loader 1999, 
Longhurst and Savage, 1996; and Neocleous, 2007).  Thus, while Loader (1999) 
proposes in his analysis of security consumer culture that, through a sense of a 
fictive victory over a constructed criminal other,  ‘the consumption of policing and 
security may have as much to do with pleasure as with anxiety’, this analysis can 
be taken one stage further.  Together the positional value of the security 
commodity, and the symbolic expression of ‘sovereign’ agency that this 
represented, often underpinned the purchase of this form of security. 
Discussion: Creating the Elite Civil-Military Field 
Through discussion of the manner in which business was negotiated between 
clients and covert surveillance companies, it was clear that the background and 
identity of the commercial surveillance operator had a significant effect on the 
development of civilian security practice.  The skills of former state operatives 
 
207 Heads of Security and Chief Security Officers working on the client’s staff. 
208 This dynamic is particularly notable is the commissioning of close protection officers (bodyguards) 
by high net worth and corporate actors.  ‘You get it when you do CP as well, when they just hire you 
to look good or important, like competing with each other’ (Nigel).  Here the visible nature of security 
signified the ‘value’ of the protected individual and their ability to command physical force. 
226 
 
were accessed by elite actors, both corporate and individual, through consultants 
and security managers acting as ‘gatekeepers’ between the fields of commerce and 
areas of specialist security.  Each of these ‘clusters’ of decision-making could be 
conceived of as a node (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Shearing and Wood, 2003; 
Wood and Shearing, 2007) or an assemblage (Abrahamson and Williams, 2011), a 
collection of actors who together interacted to create a social space.  Secrecy 
ensured that external influence was limited, and the paucity of oversight and 
regulation meant that these ‘nodes’ were, at best, only loosely ‘anchored’ (Loader, 
1997a, 1997b, 1997c; Loader and Walker 2007) to the state in any formal sense 
(e.g. the tenets of law were recognised as a boundary but only ‘more or less’ 
adhered to).  The interaction between parties within and across these nodes 
formed its own sub-field in which the actors expended their relative capital (for 
the client; economic, for the surveillance operator; somatic and symbolic) and co-
constituted a ‘logic of practice’ that normalised the application of the counter-
terrorism technique of the ‘exceptional state’ to the resolution of the private 
client’s problem.  
The direct marketing of specialist covert military techniques to civilian clients can 
be seen to have created new ‘fields’ of activity that are neither wholly civilian nor 
wholly military in nature.  The ‘doxic’, common sense, logic of the of the 
surveillance operator’s solution to the client’s security problem served to 
neutralize the anxiety (or hysteresis) that might otherwise have resulted from the 
proposed use of these highly invasive military techniques in the commercial arena.  
The power of the security practitioner’s narrative was underpinned by the 
assumption of somatic reliability and dominance in the face of existential 
opposition common to all forms of military capital, but was given further weight 
by the symbolic capital of service in Special Forces.  This capital, associated as it 
was with sovereign ability to act beyond the constraints of legal and societal 
norms without censure or stigmatisation, served to legitimise the decision to use 
covert surveillance where otherwise its use may have been considered 
disproportionate.  The dialectic between the client and the surveillance 
practitioner engendered changes in the disposition of the client who, accepting the 
new possibilities presented by the use of techniques of counter-terrorism, altered 
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the field of commerce or private business in which they participated to a new 
normative state and, by so doing created a new, more hybrid field of practice 
(Bourdieu 1977: 72).  
Through the process described above we can see the creation of a hybrid field of 
elite corporate practice in which the use of state-like capacities to monitor and 
control is accepted.  While the nature of these practices is sufficiently at odds with 
the broader societal expectations of privacy and personal liberty as to cause even 
trainee surveillance operators discomfort, the social impact created by this change 
is simultaneously occluded by secrecy and normalised through its growing 
ubiquity.  In this, the techniques of the ‘state of exception’ have become a means 
through which elite individuals and organisations resolve their problems and 
extend their influence.   The commercial surveillance operator, interposed into the 
security dialectic as an agent of the market not the state, provides ‘implied’ 
legitimacy to the adoption of highly invasive practices in commercial and personal 
disputes.  However, the ‘public good’, represented through the democratic 
legitimacy afforded to state organisations, and created in part by the wide ranging 
controls over state intrusion, was no longer a constituent factor in the discussion 
that surrounded the commissioning of the security act.  This was replaced instead 
by an assumption of the implicit legitimacy of the elite client’s interests based on 
their control of economic capital.  Through recourse to the practices of the 
‘exceptional’ state, the private client adopted the duality of the ‘sovereign’ 
standing at once both outside the norm while simultaneously remaining 
‘embraced’ by the system. Thus, the paradigm for legitimation of exceptional 
forms of security practice was changed in fundamental ways, and with it the 
nature of sovereignty (Agamben, 2005:35).  
The risks associated with the transgressions of individual surveillance operators, 
while concerning, were secondary to the potential risk associated with the change 
in the nature of security and governance presented by the creation of an elite civil-
military field.  These changes altered the range of possibilities between actors in 
the civil space; the relationship between the employee and employer was recast 
and the behaviour of elite individuals and institutions shifted to a more aggressive 
normative state (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, 1998).  Beyond this, the increasing 
228 
 
capacity of elites to use military style solutions to resolve civil disputes, raised 
questions as to the continued efficacy of legitimate state interventions and, more 
broadly, the ability of the state to govern (Garland, 1996; 2001:110).  There was 
some evidence of such tension in the investigation into phone hacking in the 
United Kingdom where covert surveillance firms were accused of acting to identify 
and disrupt police investigations (CPS, 2013).  Thus, as Abrahamsen and Williams 
(2011:23-24) argue, the risks associated with changing security norms are not 
limited to precarious overseas environments.  The changing habitus of security is 
being created through practice on the streets and in the boardrooms of major 
western cities, albeit invisible to the gaze of those uninitiated into the covert 





Chapter 9 Findings and Conclusion 
Academic work addressing the rise of private security has focused on two 
overarching endeavours.  The first is the attempt to define the complex and plural 
nature of an emergent industry.  The second, an exploration of the implications 
and consequences of the privatization of military and security functions, formerly 
held to be the preserve of the state.  In this thesis I have explored how a group of 
people involved in one aspect of UK private security, the sale of military expertise 
in the commercial marketplace, experienced their work and shaped the 
development of the industry.  I have analysed the practical and ethical boundaries 
established by these practitioners, and how these boundaries were derived and 
constituted (Frost, 2008).  Inevitably this has led me to explore a set of separate 
but connected identities, those of the military person acting as a direct agent of 
the state; as well as the former military actor in the private realm.  As such, this 
study contributes to the relatively sparse sociological literature that explores and 
describes the private security sector through the experiences of its practitioners 
(Brodeur, 2010:259).  It also has relevance to the growing literature of civil 
military transition, and the more established literature on military identity and 
culture.  Beyond this, I have sought to explore the implications of my interviewees’ 
experience.  On the basis of a single limited study, my proposals in this respect 
must be considered tentative, an invitation to further research and exploration.  
However, these findings serve to highlight the opportunity presented to the 
researcher by the study of security in its commoditised forms.  Specifically, that 
private security can act as a prism through which our, often state-centric, 
understanding of conflict and security can be re-appraised.  Inevitably this 
analysis also gives rise to conceptual propositions of the manner in which the 
growth of private security is altering the relationships of power in our society.   
Overview of Findings 
My findings cover three distinct, but interrelated themes: 
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Theme 1 – The Exchange of Military Capital 
In this thesis I have proposed that the UK private military security sector forms a 
coherent ‘field’ of endeavour based on the commodification of military forms of 
capital and facilitating circumstances where the emotional reward of military style 
work can be re-experienced in civilian life.  I discuss how this process encourages 
the replication of military culture and behavior in the commercial security sector.  
This supports and creates a liminal identity, where the private security actor seeks 
the occupational freedom of civil society while striving for the ‘meaningfulness’ of 
military work.  The emotional incentives created by military service often exist in 
tension with the commercial imperatives of private security.  Without effective 
processes of resocialisation to civilian norms, the aggressive practices of (often 
elite) military sub-units are reproduced in private security, perpetuating and 
promoting ‘state-like’ practices in the civil sphere.  This creates a structural 
tension that can result in instances of violent transgression.  In functioning 
security markets this tension has created an impetus for industry reform.  
However, it is also the manifestation of a fundamental paradox in state military 
culture that becomes highly visible when enacted in the private realm: 
Theme 2 - Re-defining ‘Security’ 
This theme examines the tensions between state military identity and culture, and 
private security practice.  I propose that analysis of the direct transference of 
military forms of capital into private security improves our understanding of the 
nature of security and conflict in both its private and state manifestations.  
Drawing on the literature of conflict studies, I illustrate how the transgressive 
potential created by the enactment of military capital in the private military 
security field is replicated in state military and security activity, particularly in 
complex counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations.  I argue that this 
tension derives from a more fundamental paradox than that of the comparative 
legitimacy of force when enacted by private actors rather than state employees.  
Instead highly gendered ‘offensive’ forms of military behavior, designed to enforce 
‘dominance’ and create insecurity for the enemy, sit in tension with the more 
restrained and instrumental conduct necessary for the creation of sustainable 
security.  I describe how these findings reflect emerging tensions associated with 
a state-centric societal construction of ‘security’.  In identifying the link between 
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the ‘exceptionalism’ of sovereign power and the legitimate capacity to dominate 
others, we can see how functions that create insecurity are incorporated into our 
social construction of both ‘governance’ and ‘security’. 
Theme 3 - Commodifying Exceptionalism and Selling Sovereignty 
This theme addresses the implications of the proliferation of military capital in the 
context of power.  I argue that within the private military security market the 
symbolic power of state exceptionalism has become a capital in its own right.  I 
analyse how the symbolic capital of elite military service, particularly that 
connected with ‘exceptional’ state activity, is instrumentalised in private security 
markets, both domestic and international.  Veterans of special designation units, 
endowed with the ability to challenge and transgress conventional boundaries, 
have been central to the development of the UK private military security field.  
These actors have commoditised the symbolic capital of ‘high policing’ Special 
Forces to both create and enhance the potential for private clients to purchase and 
wield state-like capacities, and for state elites to ‘privatise’ their more politically 
contentious activities.  This has involved the active engagement of private military 
security practitioners in the creation of new forms of hybrid sovereignty that have 
the potential to change the nature and distribution of power in society. 
These themes run through the findings presented in this final chapter. 
Private Military Security Capital and its Implications 
The Military Private Security Continuum 
A central finding of this study was the marked continuity of aspiration, culture and 
purpose between military service and private security employment that 
characterised my interviews with former regular, full-time military service-
people209.  In these interviews the difference between military and non-military 
participants came into stark focus, and was exemplified when Mike, an accountant 
with no military background, observed that military people had very different 
motivations and priorities to civilians.  He highlighted the tendency among former 
military employees to remain highly invested in their history and status in service, 
 
209 A similar continuity of values and motivation between military and private security contractors has 
been observed among US private security practitioners (Franke and Boemcken, 2011). 
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by comparison to competencies more closely aligned to commercial success in 
private security.  The strength of this continued association with military culture 
and values was problematised by civilian co-workers like Mike, as well as by 
private security actors with a background in alternative state service (e.g. police 
or intelligence/security service).  Indeed, an inability to move beyond their 
military past was identified as a negative trait by former military actors whose re-
acculturation to commercial norms and practices was more advanced.  Despite 
this, all my participants suggested that military service provided capabilities and 
experience that were foundational to the conduct of more militarised forms of 
commercial security, and were central to the constitution of the ‘field’ of private 
military security in which they worked. 
Private Military Security as a ‘Field’ 
For my former military interviewees, their description of private military security 
work rested on their possession of forms of embodied and symbolic capacity, 
created in military service, but proffered in exchange for contracted work and 
payment in the commercial security sector.  This Bourdieusian ‘capital’ 
determined their entry and participation in the field of private military security, 
which could itself be conceived as a sub-field of the broader private security 
industry.  This field involved participants who either possessed military capital, or 
other forms of capital necessary to support the exchange of military capital.  This 
defined both the topology and extent of the field.  The coherence of the field was 
most challenged when, in Iraq, an increased demand for security services created 
circumstances where, for the first time, actors with little or no military service 
were able to gain employment and work alongside military veterans.   
Interviewees described how this created a sense of anomie among former military 
practitioners with long standing experience in the sector (see Chapter 6).  Here 
the military essence of the field’s logic and practice was challenged and its 
boundaries disrupted.  Paradoxically, the reduction in demand for the direct 
provision of military style services by ‘western’ actors in Iraq reduced the over-
demand that had led to civilian participation in this field.  This, together with the 
emergence of new sub-fields, such as maritime security, in which military 
expertise could dominate, meant that the sector emerged from the Iraq experience 
changed, but with its ‘military character’ still intact. 
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The military private security field did not dissipate as work in Iraq reduced.  
Instead sub-fields of private military security emerged as the sector explored new 
opportunities to derive benefit and fulfilment from the exchange of military 
capital, and in so doing perpetuate the field’s continued constitution.  This process 
was influenced by the quest for areas of commercial activity where the 
commodification of forms of behaviour central to the military habitus could be 
achieved.  For many of those involved, this was done less with the primary aim of 
deriving substantial economic reward, than to create sustainable circumstances 
in which the emotional meaning and fulfilment of military style work could be re-
experienced.  As such, a sense of Bourdieusian ‘doxa’ ran strongly through many 
of the narratives presented in this thesis.  The ‘business’ of private military 
security involved more than simple negotiation of commercial terms surrounding 
‘settled’ services, the scope and effect of which were familiar to both client and 
provider.  Instead it involved innovative new ways that military expertise could 
be applied to civil realm and, by necessity, the willful creation of a self-
perpetuating logic justifying the propagation of military style approaches to 
security.  Stuart’s description of winning business in the covert surveillance sub-
field is a good example (Chapter 8).  He described a transparently a mimetic 
process by which he sought to perpetuate and extend a field in which the 
techniques of counter-terrorism could be commoditised and enacted, insulated 
from wider ethical considerations by constructions of ‘craft’ and professionalism.   
These, and other examples, illustrate the unifying logic and practice of a field in 
which participants identified and innovated opportunities for military forms of 
capital to be enacted, and something akin to the military habitus (re)experienced.  
These actors established inter-field relations in which military capital could, at 
least at the outset, dominate.  They overcame the ‘hysteresis’ (Bourdieu, 1977) 
that potentially accompanied the adoption of military style practices by civilian 
organisations using their symbolic capital, narratives of exigency and rhetorical 
techniques of moral boundarying.  These actions perpetuated and extended the 
field.  Thus, the field of military private security was less a structure than a process 
in which learned behaviours of physical dominance and control were 
commoditised to protect, or extend, economic capital.  This, in turn, allowed 
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practitioners to (re)experience the emotional reward associated with these 
practices. 
This unifying logic notwithstanding, the field of private military security existed 
in a condition of both tension and fluidity.  Tension was clearly evident between 
the culture and practice of the various sub-fields that made up the field, e.g. 
between the neoclassical ‘middle market’ and the fringe fields of international 
military operations, and domestic covert surveillance; but was also evident within 
the sub-fields themselves.  An example of this is the extent to which the values of 
corporate management within the ‘middle market’, with its rights based 
orientation and commercial focus, may have diverged from the sub-unit culture of 
the small operational teams that they employed.  Practitioners tended to work in 
a number of sub-fields across time, with participants from different backgrounds 
exhibiting different ‘trajectories’ as they moved through the field; those actors 
with the greatest diversity of military capital (generally former Special Forces and 
special intelligence operators), showing the greatest mobility and practice across 
the greatest variety of sub-fields.  This fluidity meant that sub-fields and their 
associated habitus were in a state of constant interaction, such that the values of 
the neo-classical middle market of security would continue to be influenced by the 
more reactionary militaristic culture of the ‘fringe’ as participants moved between 
different areas of practice. 
Liminality – The Military-Civilian Hybrid 
The importance of continuity between state military services and private military 
security, and the centrality of experiential reward (emotional fulfilment) meant 
that the identity of the private military security actor had an anthropologically 
liminal quality.  Sitting neither quite in the military or the civilian realm this 
identity embraced the occupational freedom of civilian employment while 
constantly straining to replicate the ‘meaningfulness’ of state military service.  
This sense of liminality was much in evidence in my interviewees’ descriptions of 
their ‘transition’ into military private security (Chapter 5).  For example, for Victor 
the sector provided a form of semi-civilian work through which he was able to 
resocialise (Jolly, 1996) to truly civilian norms over time; for Kate, Ian and David 
it was a place where the emotional tariff of resocialisation (the banality of civilian 
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employment) could be, at least in part, defrayed or avoided.  Within the field of 
private military security, the potential for resocialisation to a more ‘civilian’ value 
orientation was uneven.  The most vocal advocates of structured resocialisation, 
be it through governance, training or recruitment practices, were senior corporate 
managers with responsibility for commercial operations or governance (for 
example, Roger’s contributions in Chapters 3 and 6).   
Without a resocialisation process between military and civilian practice, the 
potential existed for private security actors to engage in forms of behaviour that 
were antithetical to the creation and maintenance of security, and to the 
commercial interests of their employing company and clients.  The first of these 
was explicitly articulated by interviewees; the propensity for the security 
contractor to use the relative autonomy of private security, and ready access to 
the means of coercive force (Rothe and Ross, 2010) to enact highly aggressive, 
‘offensive’ behaviour in their work by using force more expansively than was 
required.  A second form of conduct was described, but not problematised by 
interviewees, in which the security actor would function as a de-facto state agent 
within their organisation, even where this was not in the interests of their 
employing company and clients.  For example Nigel’s description of assisting UK 
military units in Iraq when they were threatened or under attack (Chapter 6) was 
clearly ‘unofficial’ behavior that could have resulted in casualties, potentially 
drawn the private security contractors into a more ‘offensive’ forms of activity, 
and situated the company in problematic political and ideological terrain.  Thus, 
the embodied capacity to enact force inculcated by state military service had a 
paradoxical quality; it was both foundational and potentially highly 
counterproductive. 
In many cases a move to private military security work represented an attempt to 
perpetuate, or recreate the conditions of state service in the private sphere. Here 
the distinction between the public and the private was often opaque, particularly 
when private security work was conducted on behalf of state clients.  This created 
circumstances of subjective and objective ambiguity; where did the public end and 
the private begin? This made analysis of security through its relative legitimacy 
when enacted in the public and private realms problematic. Often this type of 
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analysis pre-supposed of the moral virtue of the state210, and assumed that the 
worlds of ‘the state’ and ‘the private’ were sufficiently distinct and self-evident 
that practitioners could, or should, be able to identify and adjust to these 
distinctions independently.  Instead, my interviewees described a field grounded 
in the continuity of state-identity in a way that belied the proposed ‘un-shackling’ 
of private security from its state antecedents (see Crawford, 2014 on Zedner, 
2006).  
Recent private security scholarship has begun to address the complex territory of 
disengagement and interdependence between private and public actors that the 
commodification of state security practices has created211.  O’Reilly (2015) has 
written about the ‘liquidity’ that now exists between state and private ‘high 
policing’ practices in the corporate intelligence sphere, and the incentives that this 
hybridization creates for government officials contracting out security functions.  
This thesis builds on that literature by demonstrating the extent to which the 
simple desire of former state actors to continue experiencing the fulfilment 
associated with state-like work drives the internal logic of the ‘supply side’ of 
security commodification.  This adds an additional paradigm to existing political 
instrumentalist theory and illustrates the sector’s innate propensity to militarise 
(Leibknecht, 1907) those civilian fields with which it comes into contact. 
Culture, Strain and Transgression 
The fact that my interviewees saw themselves as engaged in a ‘field’ that 
incorporated certain rules and logic, did not mean that their opinions and beliefs 
were homogenous.  In the development of her theory of ‘New Wars’, Kaldor 
highlights the distinction between ‘communities of practice’ and security cultures 
(Kaldor, 2018:21).  While the private military security ‘field’ was identified by my 
interviewees as a common area of endeavour (i.e. a community of practice), 
individual participants expressed different ‘ideas and practices’ that reflected 
different security cultures.  Pete’s reticence about his involvement in the action 
against Boko Haram, and the strict lines drawn by Victor between legitimate 
 
210 See also Shearing 2009 on the problematic nature of state-centric analysis. 
211 See Cusumano and Kinsey 2015, 2016:207, and Cusumano 2016 for emergent ‘organisational’ 
theories that see security outsourcing decisions as the result of changes in the relationship between 
different branches of government and civil society. 
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‘security’ activity and ‘mercenary’ work (see Chapter 7), were both reflective of a 
view of security culture aligned to a Cold War ‘geo-political’ (Kaldor, 2018:27) 
understanding of the proper role of the private practitioner of force.  By contrast, 
Kate was much more tolerant of the direct use of force by private actors, providing 
this force was sanctioned by the state; a view more closely aligned to the 
contemporary security culture that Kaldor associates with the ‘War on Terror’ 
(Kaldor 2018:31).  Roger’s views represented what could perhaps be described as 
the corporate ‘center ground’ of private security culture; that of an ostensibly 
‘liberal peace’ (Kaldor, 2018:29) cultural orientation, with the legitimacy of 
private security determined by its alignment with the rights based values of global 
civil society (Chapter 6).   
Age appeared to be a significant factor in determining security culture.  Older 
participants, those whose military service had begun in the 1970s, were less likely 
to see offensive military operations as the appropriate business of private 
companies, but were more prone to accept that these boundaries could be 
transgressed should the need arise, or the right inducement (financial or 
emotional) offered.  Younger interviewees, who had joined the military in the 
1980s and 1990s, expressed a more conformist view that was intolerant of the 
type of transgressive adventurism that would compromise the ostensible ethics of 
the right’s based corporate ‘center ground’.  However, among these interviewees 
there was greater acceptance of a more aggressive normative interpretation of the 
legitimate role of the private actor in the provision of force.  This superimposed a 
‘liberal peace’ logic at corporate level over conduct that, particularly in fringe 
areas of the field, had a more ‘War on Terror’ character.  Offensive action, up to 
and including direct involvement in combat operations, was considered a 
legitimate role for the private actor, provided that this had been in some way 
‘sanctioned’ by a national government.  Notably, at an operational level, the 
legitimacy conferred by ‘rights based’ corporate narratives was seen to be less 
important than authorisation by a sovereign power.  This state-centric 
interpretation of legitimacy sustained even where government sanction was both 
covert and deniable.   
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Private military security occupational culture was also linked to the same military-
private security continuum as capital.  This was most evident in discussions about 
the boundary between normative and transgressive practices in the field.  My 
interviewees attributed the potential for private security actors to engage in 
violent transgressive practices to two factors; the first was the formative exposure 
to highly aggressive, often elite, unit and sub-unit cultures in the military that were 
‘brought forward’ into the private security realm.  This was often coupled with the 
implication that professional deficiencies, or personal frustrations, manifest 
during military service underpinned this deviancy.  Disproportionately, my 
interviewees (and participants in the field in general) were drawn from combat 
oriented sub-units.  As such, through the lens of traditional military sociology, field 
participants would be expected to display a more institutional, and less 
occupational orientation to their military work (Moskos, 1986).  Despite this, the 
impetus for transition from the military to civilian and/or private military 
employment often rested in ‘value strain’ (Agnew, 1992 and Zhang et al., 2011), or 
tension, between the individual and the military establishment.   
The causes of the value strain that ‘pushed’ service people towards a decision to 
leave the military were varied, and were in some cases complemented by ‘pull 
factors in the civilian realm such as Stuart’s identification of the opportunity to 
profit from his training in covert surveillance (see Chapter 8).  Most frequently the 
impetus for leaving the services was the strain between the institutional demands 
of the military establishment and the interviewee’s desires to continue 
experiencing the initiatory, ‘warrior culture’ of the (predominantly) elite sub-unit.  
As such, the transition into private security was, for many, the result of the 
aspiration to work in circumstances that replicated the occupational flexibility of 
civilian employment, but also allowed them to engage in highly militarised forms 
of activity that perpetuated, or re-created, the emotional fulfilment they 
associated with the habitus of the combat oriented sub-unit.  This strain was 
particularly evident where, as in Victor, Terry and Kate’s accounts (Chapter 4), 
continued membership of the broader military institution may have constrained 
or prevented service or progression within the (elite) sub-unit. 
239 
 
In this context the creation of deviant, small-unit cultures in private security might 
be viewed as having a structural cause beyond that of  ‘ready access to the means 
of coercive force’ (Rothe and Ross, 2010).  Instead transgression resulted from the 
intersection of a number of factors.  This included stymied personal or 
professional progression in military service, an end to the military career that 
resulted from ‘value strain’ with the military institution, a continued personal 
investment in aggressively masculine combat-unit sub-culture, and the relative 
autonomy afforded by some forms of private military security.  My participants 
considered that these factors contributed to the creation of circumstances where 
the type of violent transgression described by Gary and Kevin (Chapter 6) was able 
to flourish.  These findings suggest the need for further research into the military 
units and sub-units where these foundational cultures are generated (e.g. 
Thornborrow and Brown’s 2009 study of Parachute Regiment culture) and 
studies that examine the differences in practices and performance between 
private security companies and groups conducting different types of security 
activity (Fitzsimmons, 2013).  Through this our understanding of the intersection 
between state-cultures and private security practice can be further developed.   
Private Military ‘Security’ and Conflict 
Culture and Conflict -The Offensive ‘Security’ Paradox  
The proliferation of military practices in the private security sphere, and the 
replication of military culture this created, had an impact that extended beyond 
the internal culture of the private military security firms themselves.  In Iraq the 
industry was intrinsically involved in a project of stabilisation (some might say 
pacification) of a nation emerging from war.  In this ‘neoclassical market’ 
(Petersohn, 2015), and against the background of a worsening insurgency, the 
aggressive conduct of some western security companies resulted in crisis of 
confidence among client organisations, both public and private.  Under pressure 
from civil society groups and public opinion, these clients had begun to regard the 
provision of military style security by visible westerners as a liability.  
Governments and corporations sought to mitigate this liability through the 
development of regulatory governance and changes to their procurement 
decisions.  This tension was often perceived to result from differing societal 
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expectations as to the legitimacy of coercive force when employed by commercial, 
as opposed to state actors.  But the public/private divide that dominated much of 
the literature (Berndtsson and Stern, 2016) was not the whole picture.  A familiar 
tension was evident in the scholarship of civil military relations where the conduct 
of counter-insurgency and peacekeeping by state forces was the object of focus.  
Thus, the tension that existed in the commercial security sector between the 
enactment of the more ‘offensive’ forms of embodied military capital, and the 
creation of stable secure environments where commerce, and society, could 
flourish was replicated in military thinking212.   
The key to this fundamental tension was most evident in my interviewees’ 
descriptions of the forms of capital created by military service and proposed for 
exchange in the commercial field.  These forms of capital were based on a premise 
central to the provision of security in all its ‘manned’, rather than technological, 
manifestations.  This was the implicit ‘promise’ of behavioural reliability in the 
face of physical danger or violent confrontation.  Through this capacity, threats to 
a client, be that a sovereign state or a commercial entity, could be met and 
overcome, and the dominance of the patron’s reality maintained in the face of 
challenge or contestation.  This ‘promise’ of embodied reliability was the core 
essence of the capital proposed for exchange by labour in the private military 
security sector, and existed in a particularly robust form in the somatic ‘fighting 
capital’ I discuss in Chapter 4.  This capital, formed around the behavioural 
reliability of the soldier, created through the development of the resilient military 
habitus, and designed to overcome the entropic emotions of fear and fatigue, 
demonstrated that the essential nature of physical security was as much about 
emotional control of self as physical control of others (Higate, 2017). 
It was evident that military emotional conditioning created a paradox; the 
inculcation of competence in conflict created the propensity to engage in 
conflict 213 .  This is to say that, overcoming the entropic emotions created by 
 
212 Compare for example Avant, on the ‘ integration of force with the referent social values 
surrounding violence’ (2005:43) in private security and Catignani (2012) on the harmful resilience of 
aggressive operational level cultures in modern British Army counterinsurgency. 
213 See Jelušić 2005 on the sociology of emotions in the military. 
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circumstances of physical threat required that the soldier’s emotional response to 
danger differ from that of the non-soldier.  This change was enacted in military 
training through a process of intense reinforcement on multiple levels (physically, 
emotionally, socially and institutionally) and underpinned by an aggressive 
hegemonic masculinity that acted as a ‘default’ identity in the event that military 
training failed to provide an adequate cognitive template for individual conduct.  
Thus, military service created a disposition where engagement in the successful 
enactment of violence became associated with positive rather than negative 
emotions, and increased the propensity that opportunities to engage in conflict 
would be sought and not shirked.  Indeed, this disposition was the emotional and 
physical topology of the ‘offensive spirit’ of the military combat unit. 
Gender and Liminal Military Identities 
The issue of masculinity warrants discrete analysis.  As I have described in my 
methodology, gender theory was not at the outset the central epistemology of this 
thesis.  Despite this, gendered identify forms part of the fabric of military life and 
is interwoven into my analysis where its relevance emerged in my participants’ 
narratives.  My subject group included a single woman and, as such, my findings 
in this area should be considered preliminary rather than substantive.  However, 
Kate’s almost unique position is worthy of comment not least because qualitative 
evidence of women’s experience in Special Forces, and private military security is 
rare.  
The disproportionately defensive response to Kate’s participation in Special 
Forces surveillance operations (Chapter 4) demonstrated the extent to which this 
threatened the masculine construction of Special Forces activity, even where the 
act of covert surveillance benefited from gender diversity.  However, this also 
revealed that, despite the centrality of masculinity to military identity, forms of 
masculinity were not uniform, and that some roles were seen to be more or less 
masculine in character even within Special Forces 214 . Indeed, the further an 
activity was removed from the essence of ‘warrior’ conduct (the physical 
engagement and destruction of the enemy) the greater the potential that it would 
 
214 See Higate 2003 on this phenomenon in a military context. 
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be perceived to be relatively emasculate.  Thus, the more limited remit of 
commercial security could be interpreted as displaying an inadequately masculine 
habitus by comparison to the combat units from which its members were 
recruited. 
In some settings practitioners could be seen to have responded to this sense of 
compromised masculinity with compensatory hyper-masculine excess (See Gary 
and Kevin in Chapter 6).  However, Kate’s success in the private military security 
field, and the relative paucity of harassment and discrimination she experienced 
in her role, indicates that the gendered capital of competence in the use of coercive 
force may have a higher value when enacted beyond the military institution.  As 
such, the logic of commercial security provision, and the more liminal identities 
that this creates, may have the capacity to subvert rather than reinforce the 
traditional gender hierarchies associated with state-centric practices of the 
military and private security (Stachowitsch, 2015).  There are comparisons that 
can be drawn here with recent scholarship on military peacekeeping in which 
different stability support functions are argued to create different forms of 
‘masculinity’ which themselves contain more ‘feminine traits’ (Duncanson, 2009; 
2013; 2015).  Thus, while there appeared to be a strong association between 
masculine gendered identity and competence in the more ‘offensive’ military 
capacities that (sometime violently) resisted any form of ‘regendering’ 
(Duncanson and Woodward, 2016).  Alongside this was evidence that these forms 
of masculinity were increasingly recognized to be incompatible with commercial 
imperatives of private security provision.  This meant that meant that the ‘middle 
market’ of private military security could be considered a potential locus for the 
type of ‘regendering’ reform that may benefit security cultures more broadly (see 
Stiehm in Duncanson and Woodward, 2016:5).  More work in this respect is clearly 
warranted. 
The ‘Security’ Paradox 
Its gendered character notwithstanding, interpreting competence in the use of 
coercive force as a form of capital meant that I was able to identify a fundamental 
tension in the performance of what we call ‘security’.  Victor’s (Chapter 6) 
description of the difference between offensive operations in war, and security 
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operations in a conflict environment, illustrated the distinctions between those 
activities designed to create security around a person or facility, and those 
designed to create insecurity for a group identified as enemies or antagonists.  For 
Victor war was about ‘proactively’ hunting the enemy, seeking conflict in order to 
dominate, even where this placed service personnel (and others) at risk.  The 
examples of transgression, or ethical ambiguity experienced by my interviewees, 
such as Craig’s philosophical ruminations over his anti-poaching ambush (Chapter 
6), and Pete’s ambivalence over his work in Nigeria (Chapter 7), were based on 
similar distinctions.  Where the aim of security was to dominate by bringing 
insecurity to ‘the other’, rather than security to the principal group, it ceased to be 
security.   
This paradox was reflected in the increasingly contested nature of the term 
security.  Luckham and Kirk (2012) have proposed that ‘security’ contained two 
‘Janus faced’ concepts.  The first involved a ‘process of political and social ordering’ 
(Luckham and Kirk, 2013:5) which included, but was not restricted to the use of 
coercive force, and which established a form of order determined by those in 
power.  However, the authors also characterised security as an ‘entitlement of 
citizens and more widely human beings to protection from violence and other 
existential risks’ (ibid).  Luckham and Kirk note that in seeking the establishment 
of political and social ordering, the actions of ‘global security actors’ often ran 
directly counter to the assumed entitlement of human beings to protection.  This 
reflected the reality that in creating, or re-creating, any specific form of socio-
political order, states and security actors may proactively target, and bring 
insecurity to groups who sought to assert their own, competing forms of order.  By 
contrast ‘protection’ required no proactive ‘offensive’ initiative, or contest to 
establish a strategic ‘dominance’, but used only such force as was necessary to 
achieve tactical parity to safeguard the object of protection.  Through this it is 
possible to see how narratives of ‘offensive’ security, oriented to the 
destabilisation of the ‘other’, contrasted with more restricted ‘defensive’ 
interpretations, and how this aligned with developing theoretical distinctions.  In 
this context the ‘offensive action’ of the private military security practitioner 
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represented an ‘exceptional’ (i.e. state-like) claim to the legitimate use of force to 
secure the primacy of a certain type of socio-political order. 
Sovereign and Sustainable Security 
The tension created by these ‘Janus faced’ constructions of ‘security’ was highly 
visible when enacted by private security actors, in part because of the lower levels 
of cultural affection and legitimacy afforded to private security by comparison to 
their state counterparts (Loader 2007).  However, as the literature of military 
sociology demonstrates, this tension was experienced by both private sector and 
state military/security organisations.  To recognise this shared dilemma is to 
recognise that the state does not govern society only through the creation of 
security, but also through the creation of insecurity; the act of governance being 
the establishment of dominance through the judicious use of stabilising and de-
stabilising applications of force.  The social construction of states as providing (or 
even maintain a monopoly over) security was, therefore, a ‘circumlocution’ 
(Klockars, 1988), the state maintained its dominance through both the provision 
of security to favored groups and the application of insecurity un-favored ones.  
Thus the tensions ostensibly created by the expansion of private security were not 
only about gaps in perceived legitimacy between the public and the private – but 
were more intrinsically tied to the paradoxical social construction of ‘security’ 
being applied by both state and private actors.  Here, as I describe below, the 
literatures of conflict studies and those of private policing elide. 
Crawford’s (2017) observation of the different nature of security when exercised 
by state and private policing practitioners draws similar distinctions between 
security that seeks to stabilise and protect, and that which aims to impose the 
dominance of a certain kind of order 215 .  He observed the persistence of a, 
‘normative logic’, ‘symbolic sovereignty’ and ‘punishment oriented tendency’ in 
public policing which, in many respects mirrored the dominating tendency of the 
traditional military ‘warrior culture’ (Huntingdon, 1957).  This tendency sat 
increasingly at odds with what Crawford has earlier described as ‘sustainable 
security’ (Crawford, 2014) and was recognised by participants in the domestic 
 
215 Crawford writes about the ‘Double Edged Quality of Security’ (2014:7) 
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private security sector, and their clients, as potentially detrimental to the creation 
of conditions of security for businesses and communities216.  Crawford contrasted 
this situation with domestic private security practices that were increasingly 
instrumental in nature, oriented to risk reduction and prevention, rather than 
confrontation and punishment (Crawford, 2017).  Crawford’s arguments reflect 
narratives within this thesis that emphasise restraint and proportionality as a key 
element of private security professionalism, such as Craig’s reluctance to carry 
weapons in Pakistan217 (Chapter 6) as well as distinctions made between the more 
‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ security acts that formed the boundaries of 
‘professional’ and ‘unprofessional’ conduct in the sector.    
In discussing how boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable conduct in 
private military security were constituted, the concept of ‘professionalism’ was a 
pervasive incantation; indeed, even violent transgressive behaviour was more 
likely to be described as ‘unprofessional’ than criminal.  With the exception of 
maritime security, where almost panoptical control of the conduct of security 
actors was possible, notions of ‘professionalism’ formed both the ‘recipe 
knowledge’ (Chan, 1996) of the security encounter, and the single subjective 
cognitive scaffold upon which the aspirations of ‘governance’ (such as the rights 
based principles of the Montreux Declaration) could be translated into action. 
However, ‘professionalism’ more than any other concept was seen to derive from 
the actors’ military past and, as such, remained stubbornly morally boundaried.  
This meant that when transferred into the private sector, ethical lacunae were 
papered over by constructions of craft and artistry (see Stuart in Chapter 8) and 
‘higher order’ moral and ethical considerations replaced by the narrow 
prioritisation of ‘client needs’ (see Arron’s description of his work in Iraq - Chapter 
6).  Thus, dominant constructions of security ‘professionalism’, tied as they were 
to state-like practices, failed to fully constrain the ‘Janus faced’ potential of 
security to create and perpetuate insecurity. 
 
216 In this Crawford’s position has evolved. His (2014:4) work identifies private security as potentially 
threatening the status of security as a ‘collective good’. 




Market Responses to the Security Paradox 
There was some evidence that within the more transparent neoclassical market of 
security provision in Iraq, that both state and commercial clients identified the 
potentially ‘Janus faced’ nature of the military style security provision with which 
they had initially engaged.  This changed the relation of capital within the field.  
The prevalent interpretation of my interviewees was that value of basic embodied 
military capital diminished rapidly in functioning markets.  In particular, the 
employment of more economically efficient ‘third’ or ‘host’ country nationals’ was 
generally considered to have been the result of a risk-averse response to the 
potential that hyper-invested violence by western contractors had to create 
newsworthy incidents (a concern considerably exacerbated by the Nisour Square 
massacre of 2007) 218 .  This was coupled with the recognition that, as the 
uncertainty of the operating environment reduced, the retention of security 
contractors possessing highly developed ‘fighting capital’ was unnecessary219. 
Private security companies responded to this change in sentiment by accelerated 
engagement with civil society, and the creation of governance initiatives such as 
the Montreux Declaration (see Chapter 3).  In the more mature and progressive 
parts of the market, this had created changes to practice that sought to ameliorate 
the most egregious potential for hyper-invested transgression by constraining the 
‘offensive potential’ of private security conduct220.  While scholars had differing 
perspectives of the extent to which developments of voluntary governance and 
self-regulation had substantively remediated the harmful potential of the sector 
 
218 This interpretation was underpinned by the racialised assumption of white, western military 
superiority (Chisholm 2014a; 2014b; 2016; McLellan, 2007), but is supported to some extent by 
Petersohn’s (2012) evidence that locally recruited security staff were more aggressive in their 
response to security incidents than western contractors. 
219This aligns with Petersohn’s (2012) observation that a deficit of committed aggression by private 
military contractors was not a central concern in Iraq.  Surveys conducted by the RAND corporation 
concur that they ‘identified no reliable accounts of armed contractors showing a reluctance to enter 
insecure areas or to do their jobs when under threat’ (Cotton et al., 2010)  
220 These progressive indicators are reflected by surveys of US contractors (Petersohn, 2012), where 
the performance of western PMCs compared favourably to the conduct of local PMC’s, local state 
forces and the US military.  However, Fitzsimmons (2013:707) highlights the importance of ‘culture’ in 
the performance of US private military companies with companies demonstrating a highly ‘military’ 
orientation representing a greater risk than those with a less ‘bellicose’ culture. 
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(Leander, 2012, 2016a, 2016b). In this thesis I provide evidence that in 
functioning and semi-functioning markets, private security companies have had 
to alter their behavior to more defensive and less aggressive norms in order to 
maintain their commercial viability.  While the long-term potential of this 
reformatory impetus remains to be seen, it could be argued that these nascent 
changes to conduct compare relatively favorably when set against the record of 
state military 221  and law enforcement institutions, both of which exhibit a 
potential resistance to cultural reform (Barton, 2003) that would appear difficult 
to sustain in a functioning commercial market.  However, more comparative work 
in this respect is clearly needed to explore the veracity of this interpretation. 
Security Acts and Security Constructions 
Above all the study of private security provides us with the opportunity to 
examine security in its private, state and increasingly hybrid forms.  The evidence 
of this thesis is that different  ‘security acts’ have different qualities that engender 
different emotional responses in those carrying them out, and by extension, in 
those who become the objects of these acts.  These qualities are certainly highly 
situational (Collins, 2008) but also have a strong subjective element; Craig 
rejected the idea of teaching game wardens bayonet fighting irrespective of 
situational factors; subjectively bayonet fighting was too aggressive to be 
compatible with civilian ‘security’ training.  The preemptive patrolling of convoy 
routes in Iraq and the use of long-range crew served weapons in the Balkans 
caused practitioners similar misgivings (see Chapter 6).  Conduct which involved 
aggression, pre-emption, was expansive or extra-geographical in nature, or that 
was conducted predominantly to meet the practitioners’ own emotional needs, 
was more likely to be interpreted as ‘entropic’, i.e. contributing to the creation of 
disorder rather than coherence or stability.  The more restrained and reciprocal 
the use-of-force employed by practitioners, and the greater proximity this had to 
the object of protection, the more likely the act of force was be interpreted as 
 
221 Farrell and Gordon (2009) demonstrate that, despite the reforms of the 1990s, the UK military’s 
progress in counterinsurgency operations has been inconsistent.  Dixon (2009) and Catignani, (2012) 
questioning the fundamental coherence of contemporary British counter Insurgency strategy, as does 
Ledwidge (2017) in Losing Small Wars. 
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creating security, and to maintain its value as a capital of exchange in the 
commercial field.  
Irrespective of their true utility, offensive practices remained foundational to the 
conduct of the state organisations from which practitioners were drawn and 
formed a seemingly legitimate part of state security practice.  Malešević (2017) 
notes that organised violence, while enacted at an interpersonal, level, is always 
the subject of ‘organisational mediation’ (Malešević, 2017:16), a strategic or 
political meta-narrative that provides a logic to the conflict in which the 
belligerents are engaged.  That actions which were subjectively experienced as 
‘offensive’ in nature were incorporated into our political and cultural construction 
of ‘security’ belied that fact that, subjectively they were experienced, by both 
object and subject as creating insecurity.   Notwithstanding the ‘organisational 
mediation’ that sovereign exceptionalism represented, effective security ‘capital’ 
was created by the preparedness to sustain risk, or even loss, to support or assert 
a client’s reality (or rights) without escalating to destabilising forms of offensive 
action.  Thus preparedness to sustain the risk of injury or death was semiotically 
associated with security creation, but actual belligerence or confrontation with 
the creation of insecurity.  Thus while expansive, proactive and aggressive uses-
of-force may have a place in the war-fighting environment, we should not mistake 
them for contributing to ‘security’. 
Tentatively, the evidence of this thesis can be seen to provide an additional 
dimension to existing critical security theory that sees the contemporary social 
construction of ‘security’ as a co-production of security and insecurity (Bigo, 2001; 
2014 and 2016).  Indeed, this approach goes some way to expose our 
understanding of state-centric forms of ‘security’ as an example of Bourdieusian 
‘collective misrecognition’ (Bourdieu, 1977:171) our cultural tolerance of the 
state’s ‘exceptionalism’ allowing it to administer security and insecurity 
selectively.  These distinctions may have utility across a range of disciplines 
engaging with security and policing policy where contemporary discourses 
surrounding ‘security’ appear to sustain and perpetuate conflict.  These include 
such areas as conflict and development studies, where an era of interventionist 
foreign policy is seen to have created alternate forms of hegemony and insecurity 
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(Duffield, 2001); policing policy, where drug-market interventions may have 
exacerbated associated violence and social harm (Werb et al., 2011), as well as 
scholarship that is beginning to theorize how non-state and hybrid forms of 
security differ from their state-centric predecessors (Wilson and Bakker, 2016).   
Private Military Security and Power  
Challenging Boundaries and Selling Sovereignty 
While the subjective needs of practitioners could be seen to drive the ‘supply’ side 
of market logic and field practice, the narratives of my interviewees provided 
some insight into demand side dynamics.  The ‘implicit promise’ of reliability 
under duress implied by basic somatic ‘fighting capital’ did not fully explain the 
activity of former Special Forces operatives conducting covert surveillance in the, 
relatively benign, environment of central London.  It became evident that service 
in Special Forces was itself an important currency.  In Glen’s words clients enjoyed 
having private recourse to their own ‘secret service’, a sovereign capacity usually 
reserved for states (Chapter 9).  Here, clients were using the purchased command 
of the symbolic capital of the ‘non-green army’, those units empowered to act 
beyond the ‘normal’ codes of military and legal conduct, to provide them a means 
through which they could extend their capacity to control and dominate.  The use 
of high-status former Special Forces operators served to annul the jarring 
incongruity caused by the use of highly invasive surveillance in (often relatively 
minor) civil disputes, and assuaged the sense of seedy prurience that might 
otherwise have been associated with the ‘dirty work’ of low-status private 
detectives. 
In identifying the importance of the symbolic capital of elite military service, and 
the foundation of this capital in forms of state exceptionalism, its commercial and 
social significance came into focus.  As post-Fordism and neoliberalism has 
changed the economic status quo, those best placed to create and seize the 
opportunities that the commodification of forms of military capital presented, 
were military actors whose ‘unconventional’ status allowed them to breach the 
existing social settlement, but remain ‘beloved of the system’ (Agambem, 2005).  
As Durkheim identified, transgression has always been a functional element of 
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societal change (Ben-Yehuda, 1985:7).  This co-constitutive principle was given 
weight by evidence of the autonomy and license that these ‘innovative’ Special 
Forces units commanded, and the potential for transgression that this generated 
(Nichol, 2017; The Intercept, 2017; McKensie and Masters, 2018; Fence, 2020).  
The preeminent symbolism of Special Forces, in both the marketing of security 
services, and the repertoire of operational practices employed by the sector also 
brought into stark relief the tendency for this type of innovation to strain always 
towards the acceptance of more ‘offensive’ and dominating societal norms 222 .  
Thus, in the development of private military security we can see how those whose 
military status afforded them the ability to legitimately challenge and transgress 
boundaries, became central to innovation in both the state and private realm.  
Special Forces acted as ‘super-incubators’ of boundary challenge (Liera 2016:38); 
constructed militarily as innovative unconventional thinkers and encompassing 
sovereign-like impunity in the popular imagination.  The centrality of actors from 
Special Forces units to the development of the sector can therefore be seen as a 
function, not just of their military competence and expertise, but also of their 
ability to challenge boundaries and create new norms, both within and without 
the military.   
The importance of symbolic capital was most evident in the ‘fringes’ of the private 
military security field (see Chapters 7 and 8).  These areas were characterised by 
their encompassing secrecy and were dominated by practitioners with a Special 
Forces, or special intelligence background.  In these areas activity that would, 
during the Cold War era, have been stigmatized as ‘mercenary’ was now being 
routinely conducted by corporately branded private security companies.  These 
firms used the social and symbolic capital of their Special Forces affiliation to 
promote and legitimise their activity.  In these fringe fields there was no evidence 
that developing regulatory standards or reputational concerns among client 
organisations worked to temper the harmful potential of this market.  Instead it 
was clear that in these areas very offensive forms of state-like dominance were 
practiced commercially with little governance or constraint.  In the international 
sphere this took the form of a complex territory of ‘sanctioned transgression’, 
 
222 See Cowan (2014: 5) on the ‘trajectory of struggle’ in global logistics. 
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where the deniable activities of the state (i.e. activity of such questionable political 
or ethical character that its conduct had to be kept from the public) was 
increasingly being outsourced to private entities223.  
The engagement of private contractors in military training overseas had a history 
that extended back to the era of ‘the Circuit’.  However, by 2015 the employment 
of former Special Forces operators to conduct military training that blurred the 
line between supporting and offensive military functions was becoming an 
established aspect of corporate private military security provision.  Here the 
opaque nature of state ‘authorisation’, and obfuscated contracting arrangements, 
meant that commercial confidentiality supplanted traditional ‘national security 
safeguards’ (Kruck, 2014) and obviated mechanisms of oversight.  These contracts 
were facilitated through the close personal relationships between middle and 
senior level managers in state intelligence, security and defence organisations, 
and practitioners of private security (i.e. their shared social capital).  This was 
further reinforced by the transmigratory status of (former) members of Special 
Forces and special intelligence units, who may simultaneously have engaged in 
work in both commercial and state sectors.  Thus, rather than affording 
governments less policy flexibility through the erosion of state capacities (de 
Nevers, 2016:171-172) the evidence of this study is that private military security 
provided governments with opportunities to act deniably in the foreign policy 
arena.  Most significantly this highlighted that the involvement of private military 
security practitioners in training associated with Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
provided a rich milieu for deniable state foreign policy intervention, a practice that 
may extend some way beyond that recognized in existing literature224.  In this 
context, it was perhaps unsurprising that where states had become involved in the 
regulation of private military security, this was seen to have served more to 
legitimise than control the activity of the sector (Leander, 2012).   
 
223 See Chaffin (2004); Rothe (2006) and Mestrovic & Lorenzo (2008) on contract interrogators, Zabci 
(2007) and Spearin, (2007) on the involvement of private contractors in un-attributable military 
activity, Michalowski and Kramer (1990) and Jamieson and McEvoy, (2005) on ‘state crimes by proxy’, 
and Stanger (2009) on general foreign policy implications. 
224 Contrast Kruck’s view that ‘activities outsourced by the British MoD focus on non-armed logistical 
support’ (Kruck 2014:127) with Kate’s narrative in Chapter 7. 
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Taken together the activity evident in ‘fringe’ areas of the UK private military 
security field was indicative that the ‘self-privatisation’ of the state described by 
Brodeur (2010) was well underway in the foreign policy sphere.  The exceptional 
(and now transnational) practices of state ‘high policing’ (and their military ‘non-
green army’ facsimile) evolving into a hybrid state/private form increasingly 
insulated from democratic control.  The indicative evidence of this thesis is that, 
over time, we could anticipate these practices becoming normalised, particularly 
as UK national defence policy now envisages increased levels of transmigration 
between the state and private military/security sectors225.  Ultimately, this has the 
potential to lead to a more ‘no holds barred’ (Kruck, 2014) approach to 
international relations.  As such, state behavior in relation to private security, 
while not strictly criminal could certainly be considered socially and politically 
harmful.  Indeed, the curation of a deniable special operations forces, both within 
and without the state, could be seen to involve the propagation forms of 
institutionalized deviance (Punch, 2012).  Recognition that a small, but significant 
element of private military security work involves supporting the capacity of 
foreign paramilitary and security organisations to carry out offensive operations 
is significant.  The ‘Janus faced’ nature of ‘security’ demonstrates that this type of 
action is often profoundly counterproductive and may create, or perpetuate 
instability and conflict (see Kate’s misgivings about the work she was offered in a 
country undergoing a significant ‘constitutional process’ – Chapter 7).  Here the 
state’s capacity to use private actors to create both security and insecurity; the 
consequences of which can be cohering or entropic; beneficial or harmful is 
evident.   
By identifying the impact of state-like practices through their interpretation as 
capital we can better understand the social consequence of this conduct unfiltered 
by the often-distorting lens of politics or jurisprudence.  This less normative 
approach is best illustrated by Craig’s statement in Chapter 4, where he candidly 
highlights the intrinsic character of practices carried out by Special Forces 
operators on behalf of the exceptional state, ‘what is SOE if not a terrorist 
 
225 See sections 1.15, 4.52-4.53 and 4.56 of the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence 
Review 2015 (HM Government, 2015) and Ares&Athena, (2017). 
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organisation?’.  This approach contributes to literature that is beginning to look at 
war and conflict through the prism of deviance (Walklate and McGary, 2015: Lea 
2015) by demonstrating that that acts undertaken in the name of sovereign 
exceptionalism (and exempt from the label of criminality), may be as socially 
harmful, and objectively deviant when enacted by the state as by private actors.  
Thus, the increasingly ambiguous position of the state, both in the conduct of its 
officials and the direction of neoliberal political culture and strategy, requires us 
to question its centrality to private security sector governance (Shearing and 
Stenning, 2016:146) and reinforces the need to rethink security practices in a 
manner that does not privilege state-like approaches. 
Changing the Nature of Sovereignty 
It is perhaps unsurprising that, as the traditional monopoly of state power has 
been eroded (Harvey, 2005) or restructured (Rose and Miller, 2008) by 
neoliberalism, the symbolic capital of state-like exceptionalism, should be 
identified as having a value to emergent private and corporate elites.  In this 
manner we can conceive of military private security as commodifying not only the 
state’s capacities, but also its symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1991).  Increasingly 
those with access to economic capital can buy the trappings of sovereignty and 
extend their ability to dominate into spheres where previously only the state was 
able to act and then only under conditions of great exigency.  In this, military style 
private security can be seen to drive the move towards greater corporate and in 
some cases individual sovereignty.  The elite groups, newly empowered by 
commercial access to the practices and techniques of the exceptional state, acquire 
the ability to challenge and re-cast social norms through the illocutionary force 
(Bourdieu 1991: 74-75) this purchased symbolic capital confers.  In the 
international sphere, in weak states, this allows private companies to challenge 
the state’s monopoly on physical force by appropriating military or policing 
functions, up to and including ‘war fighting’ (as illustrated by Pete’s involvement 
in anti Boko Haram operations in Nigeria – Chapter 7).  In developed political 
economies, areas of practice where the existing social settlement was un-codified 
have become the focus.  In the case of UK covert surveillance, where transparency 
was limited and regulatory control deficient, practices have developed that 
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provide elite clients the opportunity to adopt the ‘offensive’ capacity to create 
insecurity for their commercial or personal adversaries.  This is done using 
techniques drawn from the state’s fight against terrorism.  In this they adopt a 
state-like capacity to dominate those who fall within their orbit. 
Through this type of analysis, we can conceive of private security studies as a ‘petri 
dish’ in which we may examine the nature of the security act in circumstances at 
least partially removed from the assumed legitimacy of the state.  This allows the 
researcher a limited ‘liberation from the theoretical privilege of sovereignty’ 
(Foucault in Agamben, 1998:5).  Conversely, by examining the intrinsic nature of 
security, as employed by both state and private actors, we can reinterpret the 
nature of sovereign power free of its own assumptions.  The ‘ecstasy belonging’ 
described by Agamben as the ‘topology of the ‘state of exception” (2005: 35), that 
is the ability to break the rules but remain beloved of the system, can in fact be 
seen to underpin ‘elitism’ in all its forms.  The elite military actor is permitted to 
depart from institutional and legal conventions in much the same way as the drug 
taking of rock stars is treated with indulgence, and the wealthy permitted to 
procure ‘sweetheart deals’ on their taxes.  Exception, per se. is not the unique 
preserve of the sovereign state but instead that of elites in all their forms.  The 
maintenance of ‘elite’ status has always involved the purchase and employment of 
‘defensive’ security to protect property, autonomy and privilege.  The sovereign 
actor by contrast employs offensive modes of control to enforce a change of social 
reality more expansively.  Thus sovereignty is not simply the ability to breach the 
social settlement without rejection, but to challenge and achieve dominance over 
competing norms (by force if necessary) while still maintaining one’s place in the 
social community.  The ‘high policing’ private security actor is one means through 
which the symbolic power of the sovereign is transferred and manifest in new 
hybrid structures of power, and the distinction between the ‘elite’ and the 
‘sovereign’ conflated and transformed. 
When taken together, the importance of elite exceptionalism in all its forms 
provides us with perhaps the clearest indication of the ‘regressive’ capacity of 
private military security.  As neoliberalism has created new actors in the ‘field of 
power’, the private security industry is increasingly selling the trappings of state 
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to the new nobility.  Through this, corporate chiefs and high net worth actors are 
able to accumulate symbolic power, or the ‘power to secure the recognition of 
power’ (Bourdieu, 1990: p131) and, in so doing adopt an increasingly sovereign 
status within the system of globalized corporate capitalism.  In this the 
commodification of state security can be seen to give rise to highly iniquitous 
forms of private government and authority, (Bayley and Shearing’s, 1996; Hall and 
Bierstecker 2002).  That the ‘high policing’ practices of the exceptional state now 
have the ability to manifest in the private as well as the public sphere (O’ Reilly 
and Ellison, 2006; O’Reilly, 2015:26) provides evidence of the creation of 
reactionary, hybrid, forms of sovereignty where access to economic capital is 
replacing state centric concepts of ‘common good’ (Brodeur, 2010:289) as the 
legitimate foundation of sovereign capacity.   
Conclusion 
This thesis has provided an analysis of the experience of a group of people engaged 
in what they perceived to be a community of work.  This community was formed 
around a network of relationships created and maintained through the collective 
solidarity generated by military service.  The community had a history, boundaries 
to membership and an internal logic that was, more or less shared.  Through an 
examination of the way that this community was understood by its members, I 
have described a field of private military security; a complex social-space that 
formed the nexus of a range of often competing factors.  Many of these factors are 
reflected in the literatures of private security.  However, to date, the complexity 
and evolving nature of the sector means that it has proved stubbornly resistant to 
classification.  This work provides evidence that, underlying this complexity there 
are unifying characteristics that give logic to parts of the sector.  Private military 
security is the area within a broader security market in which individuals 
possessing military capital seek to exchange these tradable capacities for other 
forms of capital.  For participants, the field is not defined by distinctions between 
different forms of service provision (Hakala, 2010; Bearpark and Schultz 
2007:241) or types of clients (Kinsey, 2006) so much as it coheres around the joint 
endeavour of perpetuating and commodifying military forms of behaviour.  This 
is done not simply for financial gain, but for the opportunity to continue 
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experiencing the emotional fulfilment associated with the enactment of that 
capital. 
The examination of private military security as a field in which these unique forms 
of capital are exchanged, progresses our ability to understand how and why 
markets for private military services emerge, and how they respond to the logic of 
the civilian fields with which they integrate.  In the semi-functioning security 
market in Iraq, over time, client organisations (state and private) oriented their 
purchasing away from the commission of companies engaged in the more 
dominant and geographically unbridled forms of security provision.  This was the 
result of a number of factors that included risk-aversion and reputational 
consciousness, as well as practical evidence of the efficacy of offensive military 
capital in the creation of environments where commerce could flourish.  However, 
this evolution only occurred where transgression was visible and clients suffered 
the direct consequences of the conduct of their security providers.  In this respect 
the evidence of this thesis is mixed; functionalist theories that the privatisation of 
state security can provide greater flexibility and adaptability while also 
maintaining the rights based standards of civil society (Brooks, 2000), can be 
sustained, but only in a limited sense.  In those fringes of the field where 
transparency was most lacking there was little evidence that existing 
international regulation did any more than legitimise highly contentious practices.  
Thus, conduct in the field was tempered more by the interests of economic capital 
than by regulation, but only where transparency influenced the behaviour of 
clients.  Nonetheless, even these ‘middle market’ sectors could be argued to ‘settle’ 
at a more militarised norm as military style practices were incorporated into the 
logic of formerly civilian fields. 
The centrality of forms of military capital, based on conditioned emotional 
reliability, to participation in the private military security field allows us to 
develop our thinking beyond traditional areas of discourse.  There is surprising 
evidence contained in this study that financial reward is frequently a secondary 
motivation for engagement in the sector.  Indeed the desire to derive emotional 
fulfilment from the recreation of the military habitus predominates.  This aligns 
with other studies of US contractors (Franke, Von Boemcken, 2011) and takes us 
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beyond existing concerns over the juxtaposition of force and private profit.  By 
establishing the link between the resilience of the military habitus with its 
underpinning masculinity and emphasis on dominating offensive action, the 
‘strain’ associated with civil-military transition caused often by the tension 
between the ‘warrior culture’ of the military sub-unit and the containing logic of 
the broader military institution, and the structural propensity this creates for the 
proliferation of highly aggressive state-like cultures in the civil realm, we can 
move away from more binary public/private analytical paradigms.  In turn, this 
provides a basis for further study of the liminalities created by the proliferation of 
these state-like practices, and the forms of ‘hybrid sovereignty’, with a locus across 
traditional public and private realms, to which they give rise.  Beyond this, the 
study promotes an understanding of security that differentiates the state-like 
functions of ‘dominance’ from those more restrained, defensive actions that create 
the stability and safety necessary for commerce, and society, to function.  In so 
doing, we are better able to understand the contradictions inherent in our 
contemporary construction of ‘security’ both in terms of its practical effect and its 
semiotic potential. 
While there was some evidence that, in the more transparent ‘middle market’ of 
military private security, a transition away from state-like thinking was underway, 
this impetus was only superficially superimposed over a core professional identity 
that remained symbiotically linked to the symbolic authority of the nation state.  
It was this culture of security that dominated the more regressive ‘fringe’ areas of 
the field, with the active connivance of both state and private patrons, who sought 
to benefit from the autonomy and symbolic power this afforded them.  Through 
this, state foreign policy and intelligence elites could be seen to ‘privatise’ their 
sphere of practice, impeding oversight and adopting more autonomous, and more 
aggressive capabilities.  Simultaneously the commodification of the capacities of 
the ‘exceptional state’ provided non-state elites with the symbolic power of the 
sovereign actor; the ability to challenge boundaries and change the social 
settlement while still remaining ‘beloved’ by the system.  This could be seen to 
change the basis of the legitimate exercise of sovereignty from that of the 
representative embodiment of  ‘common good’ to the simple possession of 
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economic capital; a direction of travel that certainly highlights the regressive 
potential of the sector. 
The evidence of this thesis is less that we are returning to an era of structured 
company sovereigns (Philips, 2016) than advancing towards an society of fluid 
competing elites; private corporations and individuals, but also self-privatised 
elements of the state, who can purchase the symbolic trappings and substantive 
capacities of the sovereign actor.  The most pessimistic prognosis is that, in 
international territory, this will see a continued dilution of the link between the 
legitimate use of violent force and forms of democratic control and representation.  
This has the capacity see both public and private bodies adopt, and normalise, 
more ‘offensive’ modes of conduct, albeit conduct that is limited to the type of low-
intensity conflict sustainable by private companies, consultants and proxy forces.  
In developed economies corporate elites and wealthy individuals will seek to 
extend their control into areas that fall between or beyond the mechanisms of 
formal state supervision or civil society scrutiny.  Here, those with access to 
economic capital can use the symbolic power of purchased sovereignty to 
legitimate the use of techniques developed by the executors of the state’s 
exceptional prerogatives.  By so doing they extend their capacity to exercise 
control over society.  In parallel the self-privatised elites of the state bureaucracy 
can take full advantage of the capacity for surveillance and control that 
hybridization with the private sector can provide.  Thus, security privatisation 
creates a convergence between the offensive norms of state security and the 
normative practices of the civil sphere.  In this, the private security actor is a 
willing participant, assuaging the anomie of their separation from the state, and 
papering over the ethical contradictions of their work using constructions of 
‘professionalism’, craft and artistry to maintain the morally boundaried condition 
of state service.  A foreseeable outcome is that the condition of ‘civil society’ 
inexorably moves towards a more unstable, intrusive and authoritarian norm. 
Accepting the premise with which I began, that private security is ‘here to stay’, 
this thesis has implications for how we control and govern these new and hybrid 
fields of security.  The security ‘act’ is frequently performed in environments of 
conflict or under conditions of secrecy.  In these circumstances objective forms of 
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control are difficult to implement and monitor.  The key to achieving successful 
governance of security may therefore lie in conditioning the subjective 
dispositions of the security practitioner’s habitus.  The tension inherent between 
the emotional incentives created by the inculcation of competence in physical 
violence, and the expectation that this competence will only be exercised in 
extremis and not used offensively, sits at the heart of both security identity and 
practice.  It is no accident that, in the more progressive areas of the private military 
security field, operational experience in the more nuanced and constrained 
discipline of ‘stability support’ is now required.  Nonetheless the challenge of 
creating private security cultures that eclipse the embodied offensive instinct of 
military service remains significant.  This interpretation favours private military 
security being used for tasks involving less discretion and with firmer controls 
placed over geographical exploitation.  However, it is difficult to conceive that the 
private provision of force is, in the future, to be limited to this less autonomous 
norm.  Given this, a reinterpretation of the professional identity of the private 
security contractor is key.  The creation of a body of practice, differentiated from 
the normative logic of the state, that re-invents the identity of the private security 
actor as distinct from its state antecedent, and that embodies a new and different 





Interviewee Sample, Background and Employment Profile.  
 
226 Not real names. 
Participant Name226 Former Experience Private Security Experience Interviews 
1 
 
Allan Non Commissioned Officer in a Commando 
Engineer Regiment.   





Dan Senior Non Commissioned Officer in the 22nd 
SAS Regiment  
Security operations, consultancy and training in UK, Africa 




Craig Senior Non Commissioned Officer in the 22nd  
SAS Regiment 
Security operations, consultancy and training in Oman,  
Libya, the Middle East, Pakistan, Kashmir, Kenya and  




Jack Senior Non Commissioned Officer in the 22nd  
SAS Regiment 
Security operations, consultancy and training in the UK, 




Arron Senior Non Commissioned Officer in the 22nd  
SAS Regiment  
Security operations and consultancy in Iraq and  
Afghanistan  
1 
6 Ian Senior Non Commissioned Officer in the 22nd  
SAS Regiment 
Security management and consultancy in the UK, the  




Victor Senior Non Commissioned Officer in the 22nd  
SAS Regiment  
Security operations, consultancy and training in UK,  





Andrew Senior Non Commissioned Officer in the  
Intelligence Corps. Special Intelligence  
Operator in Northern Ireland 
Security operations, consultancy and training in UK, Iraq, 





Stuart Senior Non Commissioned Officer in Infantry  Security consultancy, training and surveillance in the UK 





227  The Armoured Corps employs tanks and other armoured vehicles to carry out its role. 
228 Airborne forces are soldiers who undertake training in military parachuting. This comprises the Parachute Regiment and associated supporting units. (i.e. airborne 
engineers, artillery etc.) 




George Police Officer in a UK Police paramilitary  
counter-terrorism unit  
Security training and consultancy in the UK 1 
11 
 
Terry Parachute Regiment soldier with experience in  
Iraq and Afghanistan 
Close protection in the UK and Iraq. 1 
12 
 
David Royal Marine Non Commissioned Officer with 
experience in Northern Ireland 
Maritime Security and commercial business development 1 
13 
 
James Police counter-terrorism officer in a United 
Kingdom dependent territory 
Security operations and Kidnap Ransom and Extortion 




Roger Commissioned Officer British Army Armoured 
Corps227  
Contract military work in the Middle East, Military and 
security consultancy for transnational organisations,  
security consultancy and management in Africa, senior 





Ethan Infantry soldier in the South African Defence 
Force and Royal Marine Non Commissioned 
Officer with experience in specialist intelligence  
Security operations, Kidnap Ransom and Extortion 




Mike Chartered accountant and corporate executive 
in the international oil and gas industry 
Senior executive and non-executive posts in a number of 
multinational security and risk management companies 
1 
17 Lawrence Commissioned Officer in UK Airborne Forces228 
 





Ross Non Commissioned Officer in UK Special Forces  
Service with the United Kingdom police. 





Pete Service the UK, Rhodesian and South African 
military including in Special Forces units 
 
Security and military training, consultancy, management  





Nick Non Commissioned Officer in the 22nd SAS 
Regiment  
Security management and consultancy in the UK, Middle  
East and Africa 
1 
21 Nigel Non Commissioned Officer in the United  
Kingdom Infantry 








Non Commissioned Officer in UK Airborne  
Forces with experience in the Falklands and 
Northern Ireland 
Security provision and EOD in the Middle East   
 
2 
23 Ryan Non Commissioned Officer in the 22nd SAS 
Regiment  
Close protection and security consultancy and training in  




William British Army senior Commissioned Officer in UK 
Armoured Corps 
Chief executive of a recruitment firm placing former  





Glen UK security/intelligence organisation  
 
Security consultancy, surveillance and investigations in  
the UK and abroad 
1 
26 Kate Commissioned Officer British Army, service in  
UK Special Forces and UK 
security/intelligenceorganisation 
Security consultancy in UK, Middle East, Africa, Asia, Latin 
America, Eastern Europe 
1 
27 Adam Non Commissioned Officer Commonwealth 
military. Service in Commonwealth 
security/intelligence organisation 
Surveillance and investigations in UK and overseas 1 
28 Gary Non Commissioned Officer in UK Special Forces 
(reserve), regular Airborne unit. 
De-Mining/EOD, security management and operations in 
Iraq, Eastern Europe, Balkans, Asia and UK  
1 
29 Kevin Non Commissioned Officer in TA Parachute 
Regiment 
Security management, operations, close protection and 




30 Colin Commissioned officer in British Army Infantry. 
Service in Northern Ireland, Balkans and Iraq 
Security management, consultancy and close protection 





Interview Schedule and Questions.  
The Chart below details the schedule of interview’s I conducted for this thesis 
and the topics that were discussed.  The second part of this appendix contains 
examples of the outline of questions I used at different stages in the study. 
 
229 Not interviewees real names 







Private security sector construction/constitution 
Experiences of work in the private security sector 
Close protection, security management, consultancy,  
covert surveillance, explosive ordinance demolitions 
operations 
Boundaries and Control 







History of UK private military sector 
Private security sector construction/constitution 
Special Forces role in sector construction 
Transitioning experiences 
Experiences of private security during circuit era and  
post War on Terror 
Training, close protection, security consultancy,  
Protective security operations 







Construction of the private security sector 
Armed protective security in Iraq 
Military culture and identity in private security 
Special Forces experience and culture 
Boundaries, control and decision making 








Construction of UK private security sector 
Experiences of the private security sector 
Security consultancy work 







Experiences of private security 
Covert surveillance operations 
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Military experience and culture 
Special Forces culture and identity 
Boundaries and decisions in professional conduct 
Construction of normative and transgressive field practice 
Security clients and purchasing 




Protective security, security management, consultancy  
and training operations (domestic and international 
environments) 
Boundaries and decision making 






Experiences of private security during circuit era and post  
War on Terror 
Protective security, security consultancy, training, covert 
surveillance operations 
Transitioning experiences 
Special Forces culture and identity 
Boundaries and decision making 








Covert surveillance, protective security and consultancy  
operations 
Special intelligence culture and experience 
Boundaries, controls and decision making 
Normative and transgressive practices 







Security training and consultancy operations 
Sector construction 
Police experience and culture 
Military/state cultures in private security 







Military culture and identity 
Police experience and culture 
Special Forces culture and identity 
Military culture in private security 




Private security experience 
Close protection, security consultancy, Kidnap and  





Boundaries and decision making 






Construction and history of UK private military security 
field 
Commercial practices and sector evolution 
Normative and transgressive sector practices 
Control governance and evolution of private security field 
Working with military people 
Military culture in private security 






Private security experiences 
Security consultancy work 
Boundaries and control 
Regulation, governance and ethics 







Experiences of private security in the circuit era 
Special Forces culture and identity 
State and commercial hybridity in private security 
Boundaries and control 







History and constitution of UK private military security  
field 
Sector clients 
Ethics and Governance of private security  
Boundaries and decision making 
Sector recruitment 
Normative and transgressive sector practice 
Military identity in private security 







Security training, consultancy, kidnap Ransom and  
Extortion consultancy operations 
Military identity and culture 






Construction/constitution of private military security field 
Military culture and identity in private security 
Covert surveillance operations 
Sector clients and purchasing decisions 
18.  Terry Career history 
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  Transitioning experiences 
Experiences of private security UK and overseas 
Close protection and armed protective security 
Boundaries and decision making 
Elite military identity and military culture in private  
security 




History of maritime security sector 
Business practices in maritime security 
Maritime security operations 
Elite military identity in private security 
Sector commercial conduct 
Normative and transgressive practices 






Entry to private security sector 
Private military security field construction 
Kidnap Ransom and Extortion, consultancy, training and 
Maritime security operations 
Working with military people 
Police experience and culture 
State and military identity and culture in private security 
Normative and transgressive sector practices 
Control and governance 
21.  Ryan 
 
UK private military security field construction/constitution 
Close protection, training and security consultancy  
sub-fields 
UK regulation and governance 
Military and Special Forces culture/identity 
Control and governance 






Private security experiences 
Private military security field construction 
Boundaries and decision making 





Private security experiences 
Private military security field construction 
Boundaries and control 
Military experiences 
Transgressive and normative sector practices 




Field constitution/construction and defining dynamics 
Motivations for participation and transition 
Military cultures in private security 
Transgressive/normative practices,   
Offensive and protective security practices 
25.  William Career history 
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  Transitioning experiences 
Security sector recruitment 
Security sector clients and purchasing decisions 
Military culture in civilian/commercial employment 







Maritime security sub-field 
Governance and control 
Boundaries and decision making in maritime security 
Control and governance in maritime security operations 








Private security experiences 
Protective security, security management, close  
protection, consultancy, private military operations 
Boundaries and decision making 
Fringe sub-field, private military training/operations 
Sub-field recruitment practices 





Normative and transgressive sector practice 
Security consultancy and training operations 
Fringe sub-field, private military training/operations 








Private military security field and constitution/ 
construction 
Security consultancy, protective security, training  
operations 
Military culture and identity in private security 
Security recruitment practices 
Governance and control 
Special Forces culture and identity 
Sector clients and purchasing decisions 




Military experience and culture 
Close protection, protective security and maritime  
security operations  









Explosive ordinance demolitions, protective security, close 
protection operations 
Private military security field construction 
Military culture in private security 
Elite military culture and identity 
Boundaries and decision making 







Construction of covert surveillance sub-field 
Military identity and culture 
State identities in private security 
Boundaries and decision making 
Normative and transgressive conduct 





Private military security field constitution/construction 
Fringe sub-fields 
34.  Kate Career history 
Transitioning experiences/transmigration 
Private military security field construction 
Fringe sub-fields, private military training/operations and 
covert surveillance 
Special Forces identity and culture 
Gender in military service and private security 
Boundaries, transgression and military culture 




Covert surveillance sub-field 
Working with military people 
Military culture in private security 
Boundaries and decision making 
State identities in private security 
Governance and control 
Normative and transgressive sector practices 
Sector clients and purchasing decisions 




Explosive ordinance disposal, protective security, close 
protection, covert surveillance, private military operations 
Fringe sub-fields 
Elite military culture and identity 
Transgressive/normative sector practices 
Sector clients and purchasing decisions 




Field constitution/construction and defining dynamics 
Motivations for participation and transition/ 
transmigration 








Transgressive and normative sector practices 
Constructions of offensive and protective security 
Fringe sub-fields 
Sector clients and purchasing decisions 




Private security experiences 
Protective security, close protection, maritime security 
operations 
Private military security construction and history 
Normative and transgressive practices in the sector 
Working with military people 
Elite military culture in private security 
Fringe sub-fields 




Private military security field constitution/construction 
Security consultancy protective security and close  
protection operations  
Sector clients 





Field constitution/construction and defining dynamics 
Motivations for participation and transition/ 
transmigration 
Military cultures in private security 
Transgressive/normative practices 
Constructions of offensive and protective security 
Fringe sub-fields 
Sector clients and purchasing decisions 
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Development of Interview Questions at Different Stages in the Study 
As the study developed the outline of questions that I used for interviews changed.  
Below is a sample of my outline of interview questions at different stages of the 
study. The format below was not rigid; my questions were altered for different 
participants with whom I wished to focus on specific topics. Additionally, within 
the context of the interview wide discretion was provided for interviewees to 
discuss subject matter that they felt was significant.  
Example of questions used during the early period of the study 
Below are the groups of questions drawn from my research notes that I used to 
structure my initial interviews from approximately first quarter 2013 to early 
2014. These questions were based on my initial research aims: 
Q1. Describe in own words your career in private security. 
Q2. Describe the work you conduct in the private security field 
 How big is the sector? 
 Where is work conducted? 
 How many actors? 
What is their background? 
What is the nature of the work conducted in the sector? 
Who are the sector’s clients? 
Q3. How do you see your role in private security? 
 What is your experience of work in the private security sector? 
 What does an average day of work for you entail for you? 
What factors influence or control your conduct and decisions, and across 
the sector more broadly?  
  Contracts 
  Supervision 
  Procedures 
  Professional standards 
  Social expectations 
  Regulation 
 How do you perceive the role of your work in society? 
 How do you think society perceives your work/role? 
 What do you think about that? 
Q4. Boundaries normative and deviant/transgressive practice 
Is there a good/bad side to the sector?  
Are there things that you would not be prepared to do? 
Are these boundaries absolute or have they changed/developed over 
time? 
How do you decide what you are prepared to do and what you won’t do? 
Might others be prepared to do things that you would not?  





Example of questions used during the middle period of the Study 
Below are examples drawn from my research notes of groups of questions I used 
to structure my interviews as I developed the themes and categories that emerged 
from my selective/axial coding. These questions were developed and used from 
approximately early 2014 until early 2016: 
Q1. Constructing the field of private security 
Can you describe the field of security in which you work? 
How big is the field? 
Has the field changed over time? If so, how? 
What activity does the field encompass? 
Who participates in the field?  Why do they participate and what do they 
do? 
What determines entry to, and participation in, the field/sub/field? 
How do different groups in society interact with the private security field 
(or specific sub-fields)? 
Q2. Military culture, identity and capital – nature and significance 
What was your experience of military service? 
Is military culture unified/homogenous or are there different cultures in 
the military? If there are, what are these different cultures?  Can you give 
examples? 
Was your military service relevant to your move to private security? If so, 
how and why was military service relevant to private security? 
Does military service differ from civilian work/life? If so, how? 
Does military service differ from private security work?  If so, how? 
What negative or positive effects does military service have on the 
conduct and practice of private security practitioners? 
Q3. Transitioning experiences – how and why do some service people transition 
to private security? 
Why did you leave the military? 
What was your experience of leaving the military and moving to civilian 
employment? 
What was your experience of civilian employment? Did it differ from life 
in the military?  If so, how? 
How and why did you become involved with private security? 
Why did you choose to become involved in [the type of security work you 
conduct]? 
Q4. Boundaries, normative and transgressive Practice 
How do you make decisions about what practices, behaviours and 
conduct are acceptable in private security and which are not?  Can you 
give examples? 
What factors influence or give structure to your decisions about what is 
acceptable and unacceptable practice? 
To what extent is regulation significant in the decisions you make in 
private security work? 
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What are the most significant factors, structures or experience that you 
use to make decisions in private security? 
If differences in practice exist in different parts of the field, or between 
different field participants, what are these? 
Are there types of work, or areas of the field that you would not work in, if 
so why? 
Q5. State identity and private security practice 
How do you think your experience of the military differs from that in 
private security?  
Does the [private security] job feel different from working in the military? 
If so, how and why does it differ?  Can you give examples? 
Are there similarities between private security work and service in the 
military? If so, what are these similarities? Can you give examples? 
Are there things that you would have done in the military that you will 
not/cannot do in the private sector?  If so, why? 
Have you been offered work that you understood to be illegal or 
unethical; did you refuse this work or agree to it?  What influenced this 
decision? 
Does military culture manifest itself in private security, if so, how and 
why?  
Example of questions used during the latter period of the study 
Below are examples of questions drawn from my research notes that I began to 
develop and used in late 2015 and early 2016. During this latter stage of the study 
existing data was being triangulated and emergent theories tested. These 
questions were used in both latter stage interviews and for the second and third 
focus group conducted in the second and fourth quarter of 2016: 
Q1. Field structure and dynamics 
What is the scope and extent of the field in which you work?  
If this field changed or developed over time, how has it changed and when 
did these changes take place? 
What are the significant events or dynamics that have influenced this? 
How many people have participated in the field during these different 
periods 
What areas of activity/practice do practitioners in the field conduct? 
Is domestic covert surveillance part of the private military security field? 
If not, does if form part of a different field of security practice? 
Are business intelligence and investigations services part of the private 
military security field?   If they are, where do they fit within the structure 
of the field?  Who participates in this activity and how do they enter this 
field? 
Are offensive military operations involving combat part of the private 
military security field?  Who participates in this activity and how do they 
enter this field? 
Q2. Capital and field participation 




Is military service a significant factor in field participation?  If so, why? 
How and why are non-military people involved in the field?  
How important is financial reward as a motivating factor for participation 
in private military security work?  
Why do only some ex-military people choose work in military private 
security?  
What are the differences between those who choose to work in private 
military security and those who do not make that choice? 
Q3. Military culture, identity and field capital 
Is military culture and experience a significant factor in the type of private 
security work you conduct? 
If so, which military cultures, experience or practice have most influence 
on conduct and practice in private military security? 
Do non-military cultures and experience determine conduct and practice 
within the field in which you work?  If so what are these cultures and 
experience and how significant are they? 
Is service in Special Forces or elite military units a significant factor in 
field participation?  If so, why? 
Q4. Field conduct and practice 
Does the profit motive create moral and ethical hazards in the sector?  If 
so, what are these hazards? Can you give examples? 
What role does international regulation, or codes of conduct, play in your 
operational decision-making? 
Does service in Special Forces or other elite military units influence 
conduct or practice in private security?  If it does, how does it influence 
conduct/practice? Can you give examples? 
Do you think that the private security sector has areas where conduct is 
less ethical, more legally ambiguous or less socially acceptable? If so what 
are these areas? 
Would you make a distinction between defensive operations from 
offensive operations? How would you differentiate these functions? Can 
you provide examples?  
Have attitudes towards the conduct of combat activity by private 
companies changed/developed over time, societally and within the field? 
If so, can you describe this change and give examples? What factors have 
influenced this change? 
Q5. Security purchasing and implications 
Who buys private military security services?  Has this changed or 
developed over time?  If so, can you describe this change and give 
examples? 
Why do client organisations and individuals hire private military security 







The purpose of this study is to capture the experiences of people active in the 
private security industry.  It will aim to provide a sociological perspective of the 
actors involved in this industry that will inform academic understanding of this 
phenomenon and provide a basis for analysis conducted in a PhD thesis.  This 
research will address: 
1. The career history of the participants involvement with the private 
security industry 
2. The participant’s perception of the nature of the private security work 
including the structure, governance and control of the sector and the type 
of activity conducted within it 
3. Factors that the participant considered informed or controlled their 
decision making when in private security employment 
In order to elicit your views I would like to conduct an in-depth interview with you 
into your experiences of the private security industry.  If you agree, this interview 
will be audio recorded.  This audio recording will be used to produce a transcript 
of the interview.  In this transcript your name, and the names of other individuals 
will be anonymised where appropriate, and as you request.  The names of 
companies and legal entities will be anonymised where reasonably possible and 
in all cases where you request they are so.  This transcript will be used as a 
material source for the final PhD thesis and elements reproduced in the thesis. 
This study does not require, and does not seek, to elicit details of times, dates 
organisations and personalities to achieve its research aims, although you are free 
to provide these should you so wish. 
The PhD thesis will be a publicly available document and will be lodged in the LSE 
library.  You will be given the opportunity to view and authorise the inclusion of 
any material that you have provided that could be considered sensitive or 
prejudicial in the final PhD thesis.  If you are unhappy with the inclusion of this 
material you can, without prejudice, request that it be withdrawn from the 
published document. 
The audio record and transcript of this interview will not be made publicly 
available. These documents will be held securely and will not be transferred to 
persons beyond those directly involved in the production and supervision of this 
thesis.  Your identity as a research participant will be maintained in the strictest 
confidence.  I will not, unless legitimately compelled so to do by a properly 
constituted investigation, pass on to any legal authority details of your identity or 
anything incriminating that you might tell me in the course of this research. 
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Informed Consent Form 
I, The undersigned, have read and understood the study sheet provided. 
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study. 
I understand that taking part in the study will include being interviewed and audio 
recorded. 
I have been given adequate time to consider my decision to take part in the study. 
I understand that my personal details, such as name and employer address will 
not be revealed to people outside the study. 
I understand that my words may be quoted in a PhD thesis document to be made 
publicly available via the London School of Economics and Political Science. I 
understand that my name will not be included in this document unless I request 
that it be so. 
I understand that all reasonable efforts will be made to anonymise names, places, 
companies, agencies and other entities identified in this study and that these will 
be anonymised in all cases that I request they are so. 
I understand that all preparatory materials related to this study will be stored 
securely. 
I understand that in the event that part of this interview is reproduced for the 
purposes of publication I will be contacted to provide my authorisation for the 
publication of any sensitive or prejudicial information discussed during this 
interview. 
I understand that I will be provided with a transcript of this interview should I 
request one. 
I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time and I will not be asked 
questions about why I no longer wish to take part. 
 
Signature    _________________________ 
Name (please print) _________________________ 










Subfield Constitution Chart 
The matrix above shows the experience of participants to the study, their 
experience prior to entering the private security field and the sub-field of activity 
that the author has been able to identify them as involved with during their private 
security careers.  These subfields are divided between ‘international’ fields, where 
the activity is conducted beyond the borders of the United Kingdom and ‘domestic’ 
fields within the United Kingdom.  Some subfields, such as ‘mine action and 
explosive Ordinance Demolition’ (MA)230 and ‘maritime protective security’ (PM) 
have been excluded from the domestic section, as no substantive industry of this 
type exists within the United Kingdom. 
Former Experience Key 
 
Code Description 
Military The participant has served in the military  
NCO The participant held a non-commissioned rank in the 
military  
Officer The participant held a commissioned rank in the 
military 
SF The participant was the member of a special forces unit 
in the military 
SI The participant was the member of a special 
intelligence in the military 
SU The participant was the member of a Police special unit 
that dealt with terrorism or serious organized crime 
Int/Sec The participant was the member of s state security or 
intelligence agency 
Police The participant served in a civil Police force or service 
Commercial The participant has experience in the conduct of 
commercial business in another industry 
 
 
The former experience key (above) details the experience of the interviewee prior 
to their entry into the private security field.  The Codes SF, SI, SU and Int/Sec are 
indications that the participant has served in an organisation connected with ‘high 
policing’ or specialist ‘non-green army’ functions. 
 
The sub-fields key (below) provides a key to the sub-fields of security in which 
interviewees had been active.  
  
 
230 There is a small area of domestic activity in relation to unexploded ordinance within the UK 
construction industry. Some construction projects require the employment of a ‘banksman’ 
responsible for monitoring a construction site that may be contaminated with unexploded ordinance, 
usually from the Second World War. There was no indication from this study that any significant 





Code Sub-field Description 
CP Close protection  
 
The specialist protection of individuals to whom a security threat 
may exist; classic ‘body guarding’ 
PS Protective security  
 
The security of all manner of facilities and assets; from private 
dwellings to oilrigs. This includes a wide range of activity including 
the management of guard-forces, operational management of 
physical and technical protection measures (walls, fences, lighting, 
CCTV, perimeter protection systems etc.), the escorting of goods and 
personnel in transit (i.e. convoy escorts, cash in transit etc.). This 
can include all elements of the security management process 
including intelligence management and threat/risk assessment etc. 
PM Protective security 
maritime 
 
The practice of providing security to vessels at sea. This includes the 
physical provision of security staff to vessels, and well as ancillary 
services such as maritime risk/threat assessment and intelligence.  
SC Security consultancy  
 
The practice of conducting security surveys and assessments, 
auditing security operations, advising on the design of physical and 
technical protection systems, the conduct of security investigations, 
intelligence reports, incident reviews, threat and risk assessments, 
the design of security policies and procedures, and a host of other 
tasks requiring specialist security advice. Consultancy can extend to 
the provision of advice on military as well as security matters. 
CS Covert surveillance  
 
The practice of physically following and monitoring the activity of a 
target person or group without then being aware that they are being 
watched.  
KR Kidnap Ransom and 
Extortion 
 
The provision of specialist consultancy to families and organisations 
that have experienced the kidnap, abduction or detention of a 
member with the aim of securing a ransom or extorting other types 
of undertaking or concession. 
TR Training 
 
The provision of training and instruction in a range of security and 
military disciplines on a commercial basis. This can extend from the 
provision of training in basic individual security skills to members 
of guard force, to the establishment of training regimes for foreign 
counterterrorism units, paramilitary organizations, security an 
intelligence services and regular military forces. 
MA Mine action Explosive 
Ordinance Demolition 
(EOD) 
The management and practice of locating and destroying or 
disarming bombs, mines and other explosive devices. 
CB Commercial, Small 
Business 
The practice of the marketing and selling of private security 
services, including ‘business development’ and client relations, 
within a ‘small business’ level, i.e. as a sole trader of freelance or 
consultancy services or within a security company that has low to 
medium levels of revenue and no developed corporate structure. 
CC Commercial, 
Corporate 
The practice of the marketing and selling of private security 
services, including ‘business development’ and client relations, 
within an established company with high levels of revenue and a 
developed corporate structure 
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Appendix E - Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations 
 
‘22, Two-two,  22nd SAS Regiment, The Regular Army Regiment of 
the Special Air Service 
‘9 millie’ or ‘9 mil’ A 9mm caliber automatic pistol 
14 Intelligence Company 
or ‘14 Int’ 
A UK Special Forces unit which conduct specialist 
surveillance operations 
AB Assistant Boatswain 
AK47 An assault rife designed in the Soviet Union  
AKE A UK Private Military Security Company 
AMIC Army Methods of Instruction Course 
APC Armoured Personnel Carrier 
ArmorGroup A Private Military Security Company 
headquartered in the US and UK and registered in 
a number of countries 
BAPSC British Association of Private Security Companies 
BATT British Advisory and Training Team, a military 
mission to train foreign forces 
Blackwater A US Private Military Security Company 
Blue Hackle A Private Military Security Company founded in 
the UK  
Brassed Killed 
CAC Conduct After Capture, training to prepare s 
service person for the eventuality of capture. 
Callsign A military unit, denoting their unique indicator on 
a radio network. 
CENTCOM Central Command, one of the 11 unified combat 
commands of the US Department of Defense 
Civvie, Civvies Civilian, civilians 
Control Risks A Private Military Security Company founded in 
the UK 
CP Close Protection, body guarding 
CPA The Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq 
Craphat A soldier who is not Airborne qualified and does 
not wear the distinct maroon beret of airborne 
forces. 
Crash-out To deploy rapidly to a situation or incident. 
CRB The UK Criminal Records Bureau, now the 
Disclosures and Baring Service 
CRG See Control Risks Group 
CTR Close Target Reconnaissance 
DSL Defense Systems Limited a UK Private Military 
security Company, later became ArmorGroup and 
then part of G4S 
ENG1 Form attesting to a seafarer’s medical examination 
EO See Executive Outcomes 
EOD Explosive Ordinance Demolition 
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Erinys A Private Military Security Company Registered in 
the British Virgin Island’s, UK and South Africa 
Executive Outcomes A South African Private Military Company 
FCO The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
FEBA Forward Edge of Battle Area, the ‘front-line’ 
Fieldcraft The techniques and practices of  conducting 
combat operations and living in the field 
FRU Force Research Unit 
G4S Group 4 Security, a multinational private security 
company 
GPS Global Positioning System 
Green army British Army Colloquial for conventional military 
units not associated with the Special Forces or 
Special Intelligence communities   
Groupe Islamique Armé Algerian Insurgent group 
Guards Cavalry and Foot Guards of the Household 
Division. Military regiments which traditionally 
guard the Sovereign 
Gurkha Soldiers of Nepali origin  
HM Government, HMG Her Majesty’s Government, the British 
Government 
ICoC, ICoCA International Code of Conduct, International Code 
of Conduct Authority 
IMATT International Military Advisory and Training Team  
IMO International Maritime Organisation 
JDSC Junior Division Staff College; the qualifying course 
for Captains wishing to become Majors. 
JSIO The Joint Service Intelligence Organisation, a 
British Army Intelligence Corps unit providing 
training to military personnel in a number of 
intelligence related functions. 
KMS Keenie Meenie Services, a UK based private 
military security company 
LQRA Lloyds Quality Registration Assurance, an auditing 
company 
M4 An US designed assault rifle 
MACP Military Assistance to the Civil Powers 
Made-ready, to make-
ready 
To prepare a weapon for firing by putting a round 
in the firing chamber; also known as ‘cocking’ a 
weapon 
Manned guarding The provision of security guards for facilities and 
premises 
MCT Military to Civilian Transition 
Mob, ‘The Mob’ The Army 
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War 
MPRI Military Professional Resources Incorporated, an 
American Private Military Security Company 
MSO Maritime Security Officer 
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NCO Non Commissioned Officer 
NCO Non Commissioned Officer 
NGO Non Governmental Organisation 
NI Northern Ireland 
OC Officer Commanding, usually a Major or equivalent 
OOTW Operations Other Than War 
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries 
 
ORHA Organization for Reconstruction and 
Humanitarian Assistance  
Para, Paras Members of the UK Parachute Regiment. 
Sometimes also used to refer to other units 
attached to airborne forces 
PID Positively Identify 
PMSC Private Military Security Company, a private 
company engaged in the commercial provision of 
military and security services 
Principal The person being protected by a close protection 
detail 
PSO Peace Support Operations, peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement 
PTI Physical Training Instructor 
PTSD Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
R-to-I Resistance to Interrogation 
RAF Royal Air Force 
RAF Regiment The Royal Air Force Regiment, a unit of the RAF 
tasked with the protection of airfields and trained 
in air defense and infantry tactics 
RIPA Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
RMA The Revolution in Military Affairs 
RMP Royal Military Police 
RTU Returned to Unit 
Rupert, Ruperts A British Army colloquial term for Officers 
Saladin A UK Private Military Security Company 
Saladin A private military security company 
SAMI The Security Association for the Maritime Industry 
Sandline A UK Private Military Security Company 
SAS Special Air Service Regiment, a Special Forces 
Regiment of the British Army 
SBS Special Boat Service, a Special Forces Unit of the 
Royal Marines 
SCEG The Security in Complex Environments Group a 
special interest group of the UK Aerospace 
Defence Security and Space Group 
SF Special Forces 
SIA The UK Security Industries Authority 
SIG A Swiss designed automatic pistol 
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Siminov A Soviet Self Loading Rifle 
SIS The UK Secret Intelligence Service, MI6 
SLR Self-Loading Rifle, a Battle Rifle 
SOCA The Serious Organised Crime Agency of the British 
Police, now the National Crime Agency (NCA) 
SOE The Special Operations Executive, a clandestine 
organization founded by Winston Churchill to 
conduct unconventional warfare against the 
Germans during the Second World War, a 
forerunner of the SAS 
Special Branch A UK Police grouping dealing with national 
security and intelligence 
SQS Squadron Quartermaster Sergeant – a senior NCO 
responsible for the stores and logistics of a 
Squadron 
SQS Squadron Quartermaster Sergeant 
Squaddie A colloquial term for British soldiers 
SSR Security Sector Reform 
Stand-to To prepare for attack or action 
STCW Standards of Training Certification and Watch 
keeping for seafarers’ 
TA Territorial Army – the United Kingdom’s reserve 
forces 
Tab, to tab To march, abbreviation of ‘tactical advance to 
battle’ 
TCN Third Country Nationals 
The Detachment, the ‘Det’ 14 Intelligence Company 
Tradecraft A collective term used to refer to the techniques of 
covert action.  This may refer to skills or 
procedures used to conduct espionage or counter 
terrorism. 
UDI The Unilateral Declaration of Independence, a 
political declaration made by the Rhodesian 
Government in 1965 
UNPROFOR The United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia 
Warrant Officer A senior NCO rank incorporating two ‘classes’, 
Warrant Officer Class 2 (WO2) is usually a 
Company or Squadron Sergeant Major, Warrant 
Officer Class 1 (WO1) is the Regimental Sergeant 
Major of a Battalion or Regiment. 
Watchgard A UK Private Military Security Company 
WO, WO2 See Warrant Officer 
WO2 Warrant Officer Second Class, a senior NCO 
responsible for a company or squadron of soldiers 
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